Kalantari et al v. Chenega Global Protection, LLC

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN
KEYA KALANTARI and
ETHAN LAGE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CHENEGA GLOBAL PROTECTION, LLC, an Alaska corporation,
Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ fully briefed Motion for Hybrid Conditional Class and
Collective Action Certification. ECF No. 30. It is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART. In ruling on Plaintiffs’ certification motion, the Court presumes familiarity with the
parties’ 	certification 	briefing 	and 	attendant 	evidentiary 	submissions, 	and 	the 	legal
standards governing the Court’s certification analysis. See, e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; 29
U.S.C. § 216(b).
I. 	ANALYSIS
The Court has carefully reviewed the parties’ certification briefs. At bottom, the
parties’ dispute whether Plaintiffs have met their class and collective certification burdens.
Compare generally ECF No. 30, with ECF No. 35. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs they
have met their class and collective certification burdens, addressing their requests for
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 1 of 22

2
class certification and FLSA collective certification in turn below. However, the Court
declines at this time to approve Plaintiffs’ proposed class action notice and opt-out forms,
and collective action notice and consent forms. Explained further below, the parties are
ordered to confer regarding such forms.
A. Class Action Certification
Plaintiffs seek certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class premised on Defendant’s
alleged wage violations.1 See, e.g., ECF No. 30 at 5. The parties acknowledge and
identify the Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) burdens that Plaintiffs must satisfy. See, e.g. id.;
ECF 	No. 	35 	at 	3. 	Considering 	them 	in 	turn, 	Plaintiffs 	have 	met 	these 	burdens,
demonstrating Rule 23 class certification is proper.
i. 	Rule 23(a)
Numerosity. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they have met their numerosity
burden. See ECF No. 30 at 6. Analyzing Plaintiffs’ proposed Chenega class, which
Plaintiffs define as “non-exempt hourly employees who were employed by Chenega as
officers, lieutenants, captains and/or sergeants performing guard duties at the Centers
for Disease Control campus,” id. at 5, Plaintiffs have put forth evidence showing that
joinder of such employees would be impracticable, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).2 See also
1 Plaintiffs acknowledge that their “Overtime Class is a sub-class of the Chenega Class.” See ECF No. 30
at 6 n.1. The Court’s Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) analyses cover both the subclass and class. See id. As
the Court’s analyses makes clear, Plaintiffs have put forth evidence, and identified ample questions,
regarding Defendant’s common wage policies, as well as their common meal and rest break policies,
illustrating that both certification of the class and subclass is proper.
2 In their Reply, Plaintiffs “agree” to revise their proposed class definition to exclude “lieutenants” and
“captains.” See ECF No. 42 at 7. The Court accepts this revision and discusses it later, after analyzing Rule
23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 2 of 22

3
ECF No. 30-2 at 4; ECF No. 30-2 at 2. Notably, Defendant does not seriously challenge
Plaintiffs’ numerosity evidence, see generally ECF No. 35, but regardless the Court’s
independent analysis of Plaintiffs’ evidentiary submissions confirm that Plaintiffs have met
their Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity burden. See, e.g. Colorado Cross Disability Coal. v.
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 765 F.3d 1205, 1215 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Plaintiffs must offer
some evidence of established, ascertainable numbers constituting the class.” (citation
modified) (emphasis added)); D.B.U. v. Trump, 349 F.R.D. 228, 236 (D. Colo. 2025)
(determining 	numerosity 	conclusion 	was 	bolstered 	by 	respondents’ 	“failure 	to
meaningfully brief this issue, essentially conceding it” (citation modified)).3
Commonality. 	The 	Court 	agrees 	with 	Plaintiffs 	that 	they 	have 	met 	their
commonality burden. See, e.g., ECF No. 30 at 7. They have identified several common
questions of law and fact in their certification motion, including whether Defendant had a
“a policy or practice of failing to properly compensate hourly employees for work they
performed during their meal breaks”; whether Defendant required putative class members
to perform work during meal breaks; whether Defendant adequately permitted putative
class members to take rest breaks; and whether Defendant split work weeks to avoid
paying overtime, and relatedly whether Defendant properly compensated putative class
and sub-class members with their overtime. See ECF No. 30 at 8. Setting aside that
3 For substantially the same reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ proposed class is ascertainable.
See, e.g., In re HomeAdvisor, Inc. Litig., 345 F.R.D. 208, 220 (D. Colo. 2024) (“Although not specifically
mentioned in the rule, an essential prerequisite to an action under Rule 23 is that there must be a class.”
(citation modified)). Plaintiffs and potential class members may be identified using objective criteria,
including Defendant’s own employment records. Therefore, the class is ascertainable. See, e.g., id. at 220–
21 (““An identifiable class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria. If the
class members are identifiable using a defendant’s records, then the class is ascertainable.” (citation
modified)); ECF No. 30 at 2.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 3 of 22

4
plaintiffs need only identify one question of law or fact, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), in
order to meet their class commonality burden, see, e.g., Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 882
F.3d 905, 914 (10th Cir. 2018), Plaintiffs’ briefing here demonstrates that they have
identified several that enable them to meet this burden. Indeed, resolution of any issue
that Plaintiffs identify “will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the
claims in one stroke,” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011), and
certainly show that proceeding on a class basis has the capacity to “generate common
answers” as to questions attendant to each claim “apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation,” id. (citation modified). See also Suaverdez v. Circle K Stores, Inc., No. 20 –cv–
01035 –RM–NYW, 2021 WL 4947238, at *4 (D. Colo. June 28, 2021), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:20 –cv–01035–RMR–NYW, 2021 WL 5513740 (D. Colo.
Oct. 19, 2021) (concluding commonality burden met where common question of fact
existed as to whether “class members were allegedly denied meal and unpaid rest
breaks” and common question of law existed as to “whether this alleged denial violated
Colorado wage-and-hour laws”).
Defendant devotes much of its commonality arguments to whether Plaintiffs have
met their related, but still distinct, Rule 23(b)(3) predominance burdens. See ECF No. 35
at 6. The Court discusses Rule 23(b)(3)’s distinct predominance requirement in greater
detail below. In any event, construing Defendant’s arguments as attendant to Plaintiffs’
Rule 23(a)(2) commonality burdens, they fail to persuade. The gravamen of Defendant’s
arguments actually go to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, rather than whether the common
questions they identify are sufficient for commonality purposes. See, e.g., ECF No. 35 at
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 4 of 22

5
6 (“Contrary to Plaintiffs’ self-serving testimony, CGP did and still does have a policy that
complies with Colorado Wage and Hour Laws.” (emphasis added)); id. at 7 (“[T]here can
be no question that Chenega, by its clear policies, permitted security guards to take 10-
minute rest breaks.” (original emphasis)). But questions regarding the lawfulness of
Defendant’s conduct, which is to say questions regarding the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims,
do not bear in the Court’s commonality analysis. See, e.g., McCormick, 2025 WL
2958834, at *3 (explaining that whether plaintiffs “will ultimately prevail on the merits” of
their claims “does not bear, at the certification stage, on the Court’s commonality analysis”
and collecting cases).
To the extent that Defendant argues individualized issues predominate, thus
defeating commonality, the Court is unpersuaded. That, for example, some putative class
members may have received a differing number of rest breaks relative to others is
insufficient to show Plaintiffs have not identified or put forward a question of law or fact
that is common to the class and its claims. Compare ECF No. 35 at 8; 11, with Milonas v.
Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 938 (10th Cir. 1982) (“[E]very member of the class need not be
in a situation identical to that of the named plaintiff.” (citation modified)); and DG ex rel.
Stricklin v. Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 2010) (observing that courts “do
not require” named plaintiffs to “prove either every class member had actually been
subjected to the controverted practices or every class member had actually suffered
constitutionally-cognizable harm as a result of the practices”). Especially where, as a
general matter, the Court must scrutinize the parties’ briefing for common contentions,
rather than for noncommon ones, see Sherman v. Trinity Teen Sols., Inc., 84 F.4th 1182,
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 5 of 22

6
1193 (10th Cir. 2023), and notably Defendant represents that “all proposed class
members share similar duties and are subject to the same policies,” ECF No. 35 at 9–10
(emphasis added).4 See also Stricklin, 594 F.3d at 1197; Owino, 60 F.4th at 444; Pruess
v. Presbyterian Health Plan, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1236 (D.N.M. 2024). Indicated
above, whether Defendant violated such policies is an entirely different matter that lacks
force in the Court’s commonality analysis. See, e.g., McCormick, 2025 WL 2958834, at
*3.5
4 This underscores that Plaintiffs’ have met their commonality burden as to all of their claims, particularly
where Defendant reiterates that it has a “standard operating procedure” that ensures “full compliance with
Colorado’s rest break requirements.” ECF No. 35 at 10. Again: the issue of Defendant’s compliance—which
concerns the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims—does not bear on whether Plaintiffs have met their commonality
burden. And in any event, this argument proves the point, essentially conceding that Plaintiffs were subject
to the same overtime policies and rest break policies. See, e.g., id. at 9–11; id. at 16 (arguing that Plaintiffs
fail to argue “as to how the payroll practice violates applicable state and federal overtime” law (emphasis
added)); Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., 60 F.4th 437, 444 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Commonality is necessarily
established where there is a class-wide policy to which all class members are subjected.” (citation modified);
Suaverdez, 2021 WL 4947238, at *4.
5 In this way, Defendant’s apparent efforts to generate factual distinctions between class members—for
instance, that they were “under the supervision of different supervisors” or that supervisors had the ability
to schedule meal and rest breaks—are unavailing, in light of the common policies to which all class
members were subjected, the common questions that Plaintiffs have identified, and the fundamental nature
of the Court’s commonality inquiry. See Golden v. Quality Life Servs., LLC, Civ. No. 22–579 GJF/GBW,
2023 WL 8112714, at *5 (D.N.M. Nov. 22, 2023) (“Thus, a successful plaintiff must identify some unifying
thread among the members’ claims that warrants class treatment—not issues identical as to each member.”
(citation modified)). See also ECF No. 42 at 2, 5; ECF No. 42-1 at 2. Particularly where such evidence
indicates that Defendant had a policy explicitly stating employees “will be provided meal and rest periods
as required by law,” ECF No. 35-1 at 2, and common questions that Plaintiffs have identified regarding the
meal and rest breaks are whether Defendant “required [class members] to perform work during” meal
breaks and whether Defendant “affirmatively permitted . . . [class members] to take a ten-minute rest break,”
ECF No. 30 at 8. And where Defendant offers evidence of current employees who, for example, have “never
been prevented from or felt unable to take a rest break,” ECF No. 35-3 at 4, the Court takes note of such
evidence, but agrees with Plaintiffs that such evidence does not defeat commonality, see ECF No. 42 at 3.
See also Avendano v. Averus, Inc., No. 14–cv–01614–CMA–MJW, 2015 WL 1529354, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar.
31, 2015) (“[S]uch declarations do not definitively prove that Defendants did not have a policy in place, only
that a policy might not have been uniformly enforced . . . Additionally, Plaintiff is correct that, at this stage
in this proceeding, courts generally afford little importance to the so-called ‘happy camper’ affidavits of co-
workers offered by defendants at this stage of litigation.” (citation modified)).
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 6 of 22

7
Typicality. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that they have met their typicality
burden. See, e.g., ECF No. 30 at 9. Defendant appears to argue Plaintiffs have not done
so by incorporating their commonality and predominance arguments. See, e.g., ECF No.
35 at 8, 12, 14. At bottom, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs “do not meet the . . . typicality
[requirement] because their experiences do not reflect those of the proposed class.” Id.
at 4. Of course, commonality and typicality arguments tend to merge, see Wal-Mart, 564
U.S. at 350 n.5, and even considering all of Defendant’s commonality arguments as
attendant to whether Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3),
they fail to persuade that Plaintiffs have not met their typicality burden. See, e.g.,
Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 676 (10th Cir. 1988) (“[D]iffering fact situations of class
members do not defeat typicality under Rule 23(a)(3) so long as the claims of the class
representative and class members are based on the same legal or remedial theory.”
(citation modified)); Milonas, 691 F.2d at 938 (concluding commonality and typicality
requirements were met where “all the [class members] were in danger of being subjected
to the [challenged] practices”); McCormick, 2025 WL 2958834, at *4 (collecting cases).
At bottom, Plaintiffs and putative class members were subject to the same policies,
see, e.g., ECF No. 30 at 9–10, from which their claims arise. Thus, they have met their
typicality burden. See, e.g., McCormick, 2025 WL 2958834, at *4 (“If a plaintiff’s claim
arises from the same event, practice or course of conduct that gives rises to the claims
of the class members, factual differences will not render that claim atypical if it is based
on the same legal theory as the claims of the class.” (citation modified)); White v. Gen.
Motors LLC, No. 1:21–cv–00410 –CNS –MEH, 2023 WL 3278460, at *11 (D. Colo. May 5,
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 7 of 22

8
2023). Indeed, courts have concluded in class actions involving meal and rest break
violations that any factual differences in class members’ experience do not defeat
typicality, as plaintiffs’ claims proceed on the same theory as other class members. See,
e.g., Sobolewski v. Boselli & Sons, LLC, No. 16–cv–01573–RM–STV, 2017 WL 6945045,
at *4 (D. Colo. Nov. 15, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16–cv–01573–
RM–STV, 2018 WL 3838140 (D. Colo. June 13, 2018).
Adequacy. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs they have met their adequacy burden.
See ECF No. 30 at 10; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Central to Defendant’s disagreement is
that Plaintiffs seek to represent a class that would include “supervisors and non-
supervisors [as well as] union and nonunion members.” ECF No. 35 at 13. To the extent
this argument is premised on any factual distinctions between class members, the Court
has rejected this argument as to Plaintiff’s other Rule 23 burdens and does so again here.
See, e.g., D.B.U. at 349 F.R.D. at 239. The Court’s adequacy inquiry looks to whether
“the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other class
members” and whether “the named plaintiffs and their counsel [will] prosecute the action
vigorously on behalf of the class.” White, 2023 WL 3278460, at *12 (citation modified).
Consideration of these issues confirms that Plaintiffs have met their adequacy burden.
First—despite Defendant’s effort to generate factual differences—neither Plaintiffs
nor their counsel have any conflicts of interest with potential class members. See, e.g., 1
Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions § 3:58 (6th ed.) (“[N]ot every potential
distinction between the proposed representative and other class members will render the
representative inadequate.” (citation modified)). Plaintiffs assert the same theories of
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 8 of 22

9
liability arising from Defendant’s conduct as all other class members. This demonstrates
that no conflicts exist such that Plaintiffs’ representation would be inadequate under Rule
23(a)(4). See, e.g, White, 2023 WL 3278460, at *12; D.B.U., 349 F.R.D. at 239
(concluding petitioners met adequacy burden where “they d[id] not seek any unique relief
contrary to the relief they [sought] on behalf of the class”). Therefore, it is unpersuasive
for adequacy purposes that, according to Defendant, Plaintiffs were sergeants, see ECF
No. 35 at 12–13, who seek to represent other types of employees (e.g., guards), when
the theory of relief that Plaintiffs seek is the same, and certainly not contrary, to other
class members. See, e.g., ECF No. 42 at 6; D.B.U., 349 F.R.D. at 239.6
Second, it’s clear that Plaintiffs and their counsel will vigorously prosecute this
action on behalf of the class. See White, 2023 WL 3278460, at *12. Counsel for Plaintiffs
and the class have litigated numerous class actions, see ECF No. 30 at 11, and are
“amply qualified to serve as class counsel in this case,” D.B.U., 349 F.R.D. at 239–40.
See also McCormick, 2025 WL 2958834, at *5 (“Here, counsel collectively have adequate
class experience.”). Further, counsel have litigated this case for over one year, up to and
including now, the certification stage, underscoring their commitment to this case’s
prosecution. See, e.g., id. at 240; White, 2023 WL 3278460, at *12.
6 To the extent that Defendant argues some class members may be subject to a union agreement that
contains an arbitration and grievance provision, whether any individual class member’s dispute or potential
claim is subject to arbitration based on their union membership is not an issue before the Court at this
time—and certainly does not bear on any Rule 23 factor, including whether Plaintiffs are or will be adequate
class representatives. Cf. ECF No. 35 at 13. In sum, the question of whether a claim is arbitrable is not the
same as whether Plaintiffs have shown that litigating their claims on a class basis is appropriate. Cf.
Langere v. Verizon Wireless Servs., LLC, 983 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Class certification and
compelling arbitration are not the same.”).
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 9 of 22

10
Fundamentally, there is no indication that counsel “have conflicts of interest with
any class members or that counsel will not vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of
the class.” McCormick, 2025 WL 2958834, at *5 (citation modified). Accordingly, Plaintiffs
have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that they and class counsel will
“adequately protect the class’s interests” and prosecute this action. White, 2023 WL
3278460, at *12 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)).
* * *
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs have, by a preponderance of the
evidence, satisfied Rule 23(a)’s threshold certification requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a). The Court now proceeds in its analysis of Plaintiffs’ certification motion under Rule
23(b)(3).
ii. 	Rule 23(b)(3)
Plaintiffs 	contend 	that 	they 	have 	satisfied 	Rule 	23(b)(3)’s 	superiority 	and
predominance requirements. See, e.g., ECF No. 30 at 11. The Court considers Rule
23(b)(3)’s requirements in turn, ultimately concluding that Plaintiffs have shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that these requirements have been met. See, e.g., White,
2023 WL 3278460, at *13 (explaining Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement);
McCormick, 	2025 	WL 	2958834, 	at 	*12 	(explaining 	Rule 	23(b)(3)’s 	superiority
requirement).
Superiority. To satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement, Plaintiffs must
show that “a class action is ‘superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.’” White, 2023 WL 3278460, at *16 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 10 of 22

11
23(b)(3)); see also id. (explaining “pertinent factors” in superiority analyses). Although the
parties do not meaningfully discuss Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement, the Court, in
conducting its own rigorous analysis of Rule 23’s requirements, see, e.g., Wal-Mart
Stores, 564 U.S. at 351, concludes that permitting litigation of Plaintiffs’ claims on a class
basis is superior to litigating them on an individual basis. See also Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class action
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive
for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” (citation modified)).
Given the nature of Plaintiffs’ wage and hour claims, and that the class is comprised solely
of individuals residing in this judicial district, “concentrating the litigation is desirable,”
White, 2023 WL 3278460, at *16, and the Court discerns few difficulties in managing a
class action, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See also McCormick, 2025 WL 2958834, at
*12. This is not, for instance, a case where Plaintiffs seek certification of “what are
essentially personal injury cases, where class members may have individualized interests
in prosecuting their own, separate actions.” White, 2023 WL 3278460, at *16 (citing In re
Pac. Fertility Ctr. Litig., No. 18–cv–01586–JSC, 2020 WL 3432689, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June
23, 2020)). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have satisfied their Rule 23(b)(3) superiority burden.
See also McCormick, 2025 WL 2958834, at *12; Menocal, 882 F.3d at 915.
Predominance. The parties devote their Rule 23(b)(3) briefing to whether the
“questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Compare ECF No. 30 at 11–
14, with ECF No. 35 at 8. As noted above, the parties’ predominance arguments largely
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 11 of 22

12
overlap with their commonality and typicality arguments. See id. (“Plaintiffs’ claim fails to
meet the commonality, typicality, and predominance requirements and instead invites a
case-by-case analysis that defeats class treatment.”). Explained further below, the Court
agrees with Plaintiffs that they have met their predominance burden.
First, the Court must “characterize the issues in the case as common or not.”
White, 2023 WL 3278460, at *13 (D. Colo. May 5, 2023) (citation modified). See also id.
(explaining this is first in the “two-step approach” to “predominance inquiries”). This
inquiry “begins with the elements of the underlying cause[s] of action.” Black v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 69 F.4th 1161, 1175 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). Explained
below, elements of all of Plaintiffs’ claims are “susceptible to generalized proof” and
certainly predominate “over [any] that are not.” CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Broad & Cassel,
773 F.3d 1076, 1087 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation modified); see also Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016).
Take Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to pay overtime premiums under Colorado law
(and even the FLSA—but which the Court discusses in its collective action analysis). See
ECF No. 7 at 11, 13. These claims, whose elements fundamentally concern whether
Defendant paid Plaintiffs and class members any wages and overtime that were due, see,
e.g., Rayfield v. Sandbox Logistics, LLC, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1299, 1300 (D. Colo. 2016),
are susceptible to generalized proof and present a common issue for predominance
purposes. These claims are attendant to and arise from Defendant’s wage policies and
practices—Defendant acknowledges as much. See ECF No. 36 at 16 (arguing “Plaintiffs
fail to allege how the payroll practice is unlawful and the practice itself is facially unlawful”
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 12 of 22

13
(emphasis added)). And while Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims lack merit, see id.,
this argument proceeds from the premise that Plaintiffs and class members were subject
to the same wage policies. See also White, 2023 WL 3278460, at *3 (“[T]he question is
not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the
merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.” (citing Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974)). This acknowledgment, which enjoys additional
support in the record, see, e,g., ECF No. 30-1 at 3, dooms Defendant’s predominance
challenge to Plaintiffs’ claims. See, e.g., Felps v. Mewbourne Oil Co., Inc., 336 F.R.D.
664, 676–77 (D.N.M. 2020) (collecting cases in support of the proposition that where
plaintiffs and putative class members are subject to a “corporate policy” they have met
predominance 	burden, 	despite 	any 	individualized 	questions 	as 	to 	individual 	class
members’ damages). At bottom, because Plaintiffs’ claims arise from Defendant’s wage
policies, there are “common, aggregation-enabling, issues” attendant to these claims, and
explained further below, these common issues are certainly “more prevalent or important
than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual issues.” Tyson Foods, 577 U.S.
at 453 (citation modified)).
Turn now to the rest and meal break claims. As with Plaintiffs’ overtime claim,
these claims are susceptible to generalized proof and likewise present common issues
for predominance purposes. See, e.g., Pilmenstein v. Devereux Cleo Wallace, 492 P.3d
1059, 1069 (Colo. App. 2021) (“And because the rest break provision implements a
provision of the Wage Claim Act, an employee alleging a violation of the rest break
provision can bring a private damages claim under section 8-4-110(2).”) (Pawar, J.,
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 13 of 22

14
concurring); By the Rockies, LLC v. Perez, 575 P.3d 445, 447 (Colo. 2025). As for the
rest break claims, Defendant again acknowledges it had a policy governing these breaks.
See ECF No. 35 at 7 (“Thus, there can be no question that Chenega, by its clear policies,
permitted security guards to take 10-minute rest breaks.” (first emphasis added)); ECF
No. 35-3 at 8. So too with the meal break claims. See, e.g., ECF No. 35-3 at 4; id. at 18;
ECF No. 30-4 at 2; ECF No. 35 at 16 (observing that “CGP [had a] policy and practice
concerning meal breaks”). These record-supported acknowledgments, as with Plaintiffs’
overtime claims, are sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ claims present common
issues—and, 	explained 	further 	below, 	demonstrate 	that 	Plaintiffs 	have 	met 	their
predominance burden for their rest and meal break claims. See, e.g., ECF No. 7 at 12;
Vasquez v. Leprino Foods Co., No. 1:17–cv–00796–AWI–BAM, 2020 WL 1527922, at
*17 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2020) (concluding plaintiffs met predominance burden on meal
and rest break claim because “a central common question for [their] meal and rest break
claim is whether [the defendant’s] class-wide policies and practices effectively resulted in
employees being placed on call during breaks” and “answering this common question
d[id] not require a great deal of individualized proof” (citation modified)); Espinosa v.
Genesis Healthcare, Inc., No. CV 20–688–DMG (JCx), 2021 WL 2497938, at *15 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 31, 2021) (concluding meal and rest break subclasses satisfied predominance
requirement where “common issues predominate[d] over individual issues,” including
whether the defendants’ “meal and rest break policies fail to provide meal and rest break
premiums” and whether the defendants “violated their duty to provide employees the
opportunity to take uninterrupted meal breaks and short rest breaks”). Particularly where
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 14 of 22

15
the 	theory 	of 	Plaintiffs’ 	case 	concerns 	the “same 	alleged 	course 	of 	conduct” 	by
Defendant—violating class-wide rest and meal break policies—which is “at the heart of
all putative class members’ claims,” thus “predominating over any potential individual
differences.” O’Dowd v. Anthem, Inc., No. 14–cv–02787–KLM–NYW, 2019 WL 4279123,
at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 9, 2019).7
Accordingly, because all of Plaintiffs’ claims “turn on evidence that is susceptible
to generalized, class-wide proof,’” White, 2023 WL 3278460, at *14, the Court concludes
that the “issues [their] claims and this class action present are common,” id., and proceeds
to the second step of its predominance inquiry.
Second, comparing the “issues in this case that are subject to common proof
against the issues subject solely to individualized proof,” id. at *15, the Court agrees with
Plaintiffs that common issues predominate. See, e.g., ECF No. 30 at 12. As discussed
above, Defendant acknowledges Plaintiffs and class members were subject to class-wide
7 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ meal break claim is “now moot” because Defendant “satisfied this claim”
before Plaintiffs sought class certification, and therefore certification on this claim is improper. ECF No. 35
at 15. The Court disagrees. To the extent any evidence in the record demonstrates that Plaintiffs received
compensation for meal breaks, such evidence amounts to a letter from Defendant to Plaintiff Lage and
represents that this relief was provided in February 2025. See ECF No. 30-3 at 1. Defendant provides no
evidence for the Court to determine whether such relief was actually provided, and whether it was provided
to both named Plaintiffs or any class members. Cf. ECF No. 35 at 15. Plaintiff Kalantari declares that even
after an investigation into Defendant’s meal break policies resulted in payment of due wages “from
November 1, 2021 until October 1, 2022,” ECF No. 30-1 at 3, for the following two years “Chenega failed
to correct its meal break policy,” id. at 4, resulting in Defendant submitting to her a “a check for meal breaks”
but without “includ[ing] a breakdown of the hours and/or meal breaks it intended to compensate [her] for,”
id. In sum: There is insufficient evidence for the Court to conclude that Plaintiffs’ claims are moot. See, e.g.,
Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1269 (N.D. Okla.), aff’d on other grounds Bishop v.
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014) (“The defendant bears the burden of proving mootness . . . [and] this
burden is a heavy one.” (citation modified)). See also ECF No. 42 at 8. And to the extent that Plaintiffs have
received such payments, such payments speak more toward the individualized nature of any damages to
which Plaintiffs or class members may be entitled based on Defendant’s meal break violations—which is
insufficient to defeat predominance. See, e.g., Felps, 336 F.R.D. 664, 676–77; White, 2023 WL 3278460,
at *16.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 15 of 22

16
policies, thus giving rise to questions common to the class. Thus, given the nature of
Plaintiffs’ claims and the class-wide policies attendant to them, this is not a case “where
as a practical matter the resolution of these common questions breaks down into an
unmanageable variety of individual legal and factual issues.” White, 2023 WL 3278460,
at *15. Indeed, courts routinely conclude wage claims, such as Plaintiffs’ claims here,
survive predominance scrutiny. See, e.g., Felps, 336 F.R.D. at 675–76 (collecting cases);
Florece v. Jose Pepper's Restaurants, LLC, No. 20–2339–ADM, 2021 WL 5038773, at
*5 (D. Kan. Oct. 29, 2021) (same). And to the extent that class members’ damages would
need to be determined on an individual basis, this does not defeat predominance. See,
e.g., Felps, 336 F.R.D. at 676 (observing that “damages determinations are individual in
nearly all wage-and-hour class actions” and that “courts routinely have held that damages
calculations alone cannot defeat certification” (citation modified)). Especially where, as
Plaintiffs observe, they have met their Rule 23(b)(3) burdens, it is more efficient to
proceed on a class basis, and if necessary, the Court can later address any individualized
issues with class members’ damages. See ECF No. 30 at 14.
Accordingly, after engaging in its two-step predominance analysis, see, e.g.,
White, 2023 WL 3278460, at *13, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have met their
predominance burden by a preponderance of the evidence.
* * *
For the reasons set forth above, certification of Plaintiffs’ proposed class is
appropriate. They have satisfied Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirements by a
preponderance of the evidence. The Court is mindful, of course, that certifying the
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 16 of 22

17
proposed class under Rule 23 is not dispositive of their or any class members’ claims. “In
determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or
plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the
requirements of Rule 23 are met.” Eisen, 417 U.S. at 178. After conducting its “rigorous
analysis” 	of 	the 	class 	certification 	requirements, 	the 	Court 	answers 	this 	question
affirmatively. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 351. The Court discusses Plaintiffs’ request
regarding notice and opt-out forms, see ECF No. 30 at 15, in its discussion of their request
for collective action notice and opt-in consent forms below.
B. Conditional Collective Action Certification
Plaintiffs seek conditional collective action certification. See ECF No. 30 at 15–16.
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that collective certification is proper. See id.
Conditional 	Certification. 	The FLSA permits 	“conditional [collective action]
certification” of employees who are “similarly situated.” See, e.g., Bingham v. doTERRA
Int’l, LLC, No. 2:23–cv–00707–DBB–DBP, 2024 WL 1973342, at *2 (D. Utah May 3,
2024). In determining whether conditional certification is proper, the Court looks to
whether plaintiffs have put forth “substantial allegations that the putative class members
were together the victims of a single decision, policy or plan.” Robertson v. REP
Processing, LLC, No. 19–cv–02910–PAB–NYW, 2021 WL 4255027, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept.
16, 2021) (citing Thiessen v. GE Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001)).
This is a “lenient standard,” id. (citation modified), that imposes a “low burden” on
plaintiffs, Bingham, 2024 WL 1973342, at *2.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 17 of 22

18
Plaintiffs have cleared their low burden, id., of showing that conditional collective
certification is proper. As cited and discussed above, Plaintiffs—and Defendant—have
submitted evidence showing that they and potential collective members were subject to
the same wage policies from which their federal wage claims arise. See also ECF No. 42
at 10; ECF No. 35 at 6. These are more than substantial allegations showing they “were
the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.” Robertson, 2021 WL 4255027, at *1
(citation modified); ECF No. 42 at 10. At bottom, Plaintiffs’ allegations and evidence are
sufficient to establish that there may be other “similarly-situated putative collective action
plaintiffs,” Beall v. SST Energy Corp., No. 15–cv–01741–MSK–NYW, 2016 WL 286295,
at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2016), which are “enough to authorize notice to the putative . . .
members” of Plaintiffs’ collective action, Robertson, 2021 WL 4255027, at *2 (D. Colo.
Sept. 16, 2021) (citation modified). Defendant’s contrary arguments—that Plaintiffs are
inadequate collective representatives, and that they cannot prevail on the merits of their
FLSA claims—fail to persuade, as the Court’s inquiry at this preliminary stage concerns
only whether Plaintiffs have shown they and putative collective members were subject to
the same policies. Compare Robertson, 2021 WL 4255027, at *1, with ECF No. 35 at 18.
Notice. Because conditional certification is proper, the Court turns now to Plaintiffs’
proposed collective action notice. See ECF No. 30 at 2, 17; Robertson, 2021 WL
4255027, at *4 (“Once the Court concludes that conditional certification of an FLSA
collective action is appropriate, the Court may authorize plaintiff to disseminate a proper
notice and opt-in consent form to putative class members.” (citation modified)). Defendant
proposes modifications to Plaintiffs’ notice, and “requests that the parties confer regarding
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 18 of 22

19
Plaintiffs’ proposed notices and methods of distribution.” ECF No. 35 at 20. The Court
agrees with Defendant that the proper course is to order conferral among the parties as
to Plaintiffs’ proposed notice and consent form. See, e.g., Roberts v. Sidwell Air Freight
Inc., No. C21-5912 BHS, 2022 WL 16949565, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 2022) (“The
parties] should have an opportunity to meet and confer . . . regarding notice. Such a
meeting benefits both the parties and the Court.” (citation modified)). The parties shall
submit a joint status report containing a stipulated notice and consent form within 14 days
of this Order. See, e.g., Johnson v. Acad. Mortg. Corp., No. 2:12–cv–276 TS, 2012 WL
5416200, at *2 (D. Utah Nov. 2, 2012). To the extent the parties cannot agree, they shall
submit a joint status report by the same deadline, explaining the bases of their
disagreement and each party’s suggestion for resolution. See Roberts, 2022 WL
16949565, at *9; Madsen v. Sidwell Air Freight, No. 1:23–cv–0008–JNP, 2024 WL
1160204, at *16 (D. Utah Mar. 18, 2024); Abrams v. City of Albuquerque, No. 10–0872
MV/RHS, 2013 WL 11336856, at *8 (D.N.M. Sept. 24, 2013).
The Court notes that Plaintiff likewise requests the Court’s approval of its class
action notice and opt-out forms. See ECF No. 30 at 15. At this time, the Court declines to
approve such forms. Plaintiffs shall confer with Defendant regarding such forms—
including conferral regarding potential class members to whom such forms may be sent,
as discussed below—and in their joint status report Plaintiffs shall submit final proposed
class notice and opt-out forms for the Court’s review and approval. Conferral is
particularly appropriate here, where in their reply brief Plaintiffs “agree” to remove the jobs
of “lieutenants and captains” from their originally proposed class definition and have not
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 19 of 22

20
submitted notice and opt-out forms that reflect this revision, if the parties believe that such
a revision to Plaintiffs’ proposed forms is appropriate. ECF No. 42 at 7.
Production of Potential Members. Plaintiffs also seek an order “directing
[Defendant] to provide the names and contact information for all potential class members
within 14 days of any order approving this motion.” ECF No. 30 at 17. Such a request is
proper, particularly where Defendant has provided “no specific reason why it should not
be required to provide” such a list. Gomez v. Epic Landscape Prods., L.C., No. 2:22–CV–
02198–JAR–ADM, 2023 WL 3159604, at *5 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 2023). Accordingly,
Defendant shall provide Plaintiff with a such a list, containing the names and contact
information for all potential class and collective members, within 14 days of this order.
The parties shall indicate the status of such production in a separate section of their joint
status report.
Equitable Tolling. Finally, Plaintiffs seek equitable tolling of the FLSA statute of
limitations. See ECF No. 30 at 18. Defendant does not challenge Plaintiffs’ request. Cf.
ECF No. 35. Regardless, equitable tolling in FLSA collective actions is permissible, and
has frequently been ordered by courts. See, e.g., Kenney v. Helix TCS, Inc., No. 17–cv–
01755–CMA–KMT, 2018 WL 722458, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 2018); Bracamontes v.
Bimbo Bakeries U.S.A. Inc., No. 15–cv–02324–RBJ, 2017 WL 4621276, at *2 (D. Colo.
Aug. 3, 2017); Stransky v. HealthONE of Denver, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181–82
(D. Colo. 2012). The Court finds the reasoning of these cases persuasive, and that in the
interest of justice, the applicable statute of limitations is proper. See, e.g., Kenney, 2018
WL 722458, at *3. Accordingly, after considering the unique nature of FLSA collective
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 20 of 22

21
actions and the relevant tolling factors, see, e.g., Stransky, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1181, the
Court tolls the applicable statute of limitations. Although Plaintiffs appear to seek tolling
from January 28, 2025, which is the date this lawsuit was filed, see ECF No. 30 at 19, the
Court declines to adopt Plaintiffs’ request to toll the statute of limitations from that time,
see Stransky, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. Plaintiffs sought certification and tolling on August
1, 2025, and the Court determines that this is the proper date from which to toll the
applicable statute of limitations. See id. Accordingly, statute of limitations for opt-in
members of the overtime sub-class is equitably tolled from August 1, 2025, until 90 days
after such opt-in plaintiffs receive notice of this lawsuit. See id.; see also Bracamontes,
2017 WL 4621276, at *1 (“The court will equitably toll the statute of limitations and allow
for notice to apply to claims dating back to the date plaintiffs moved for conditional
certification.” (citation modified)).
II. 	CONCLUSION
Consistent with the above analysis, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Hybrid Conditional Class
and Collective Action Certification, ECF No. 30, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
The motion is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiffs seek certification of their Rule
23 class and conditional certification of their collective action. Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b), Plaintiffs’ class and subclass as proposed in the certification
motion, see, e.g., ECF No. 30 at 6, with the modification set forth in Plaintiffs’ Reply, see
ECF No. 42 at 7, are certified under Rule 23(b)(3). Pursuant to § 216(b), the Court further
certifies Plaintiffs’ proposed collective. See, e.g., ECF No. 7 at 10. Plaintiffs Keya
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 21 of 22

22
Kalantari and Ethan Lage are named as class representatives. Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(g), the Wilhite & Miller Law Firm is appointed as class counsel.
The motion is DENIED to the extent that Plaintiffs seek immediate approval and
issuance of their proposed notice and consent forms, as well as immediate issuance of
their class notice and opt-out forms. As discussed above, the parties are ORDERED to
confer regarding Plaintiffs’ proposed forms and file a joint status report as to stipulated
notice and consent forms—or, if they cannot reach such stipulation, explanations for their
respective positions—within 14 days of this Order. Defendant is ORDERED to produce a
list containing names and contact information of class and possible collective members
within 14 days of this Order. The parties SHALL indicate the status of such production in
a separate section of their joint status report.
DATED this 30th day of March 2026.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
Case No. 1:25-cv-00961-CNS-NRN Document 43 filed 03/30/26 USDC Colorado
pg 22 of 22