Peters v. Feyen et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 25-cv-00425-STV
TINA M. PETERS,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN FEYEN; and
PHILIP J. WEISER,
Respondents.
ORDER DISMISSING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to the Order of Reference [#64],
entered on August 20, 2025, and the parties’ unanimous consent to disposition of this
action by a United States Magistrate Judge [#63]. Petitioner Tina Peters is in the custody
of the Colorado Department of Corrections at the La Vista Correctional Facility in Pueblo,
Colorado. [#87 at ¶ 2] On February 7, 2025, Ms. Peters commenced this action through
counsel by filing an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
22541. [#1] The Court has carefully reviewed the filings to date, oral argument (held on
1 It is unclear whether the instant action is properly brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as a
challenge to the validity of Ms. Peters’ conviction and sentence or pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 as an attack on the execution of her sentence. 	See McIntosh v. United States
Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1997); Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164,
166 (10th Cir. 1996). 	Indeed, another judge on this Court analyzed a claim challenging
bail pursuant to Section 2241. See Hoover v. Golder, No. 05-cv-00419-MSK-PAC, 2006
WL 1083601, at *2-3 (D. Colo. April 24, 2006) (analyzing a habeas corpus case alleging
excessive bail in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under Section 2241
and not under Section 2254). 	Ultimately, the Court need not resolve that issue to
adjudicate the instant action.
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April 22, July 22, and October 16), and the applicable case law. For the following reasons,
the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ms. Peters’ Application and this action.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A Colorado jury found Ms. Peters, the former Clerk and Recorder of Mesa County,
Colorado, guilty of attempting to influence a public servant, criminal impersonation, first-
degree official misconduct, violation of duty, and failure to comply with requirements of
the Colorado Secretary of State in Mesa County District Court case number 2022CR371.
[#2 at 113-142] 	On October 3, 2024, the trial court sentenced Ms. Peters to a lengthy
prison sentence.3
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court discussed the reasons for sentencing Ms.
Peters to a prison term. [Id. at 102-05] The trial court stated that while Ms. Peters’ age
2 For consistency and clarity, the Court refers to the actual page number of the .pdf
document uploaded to the Electronic Court Filing system, rather than to the numbering
printed on each page.
3 The exact length of the sentence is unclear to the Court. At sentencing, the trial court
initially stated that it sentenced Ms. Peters to “eight and a half years total plus the six
months for a total of nine years incarceration.” [Id. at 108] By that point in the sentencing,
however, the trial court had sentenced Ms. Peters to three and a half years imprisonment
on counts 1 and 4 (concurrent to each other), three and a half years imprisonment on
count 2 (consecutive to the sentence on counts 1 and 4) six months on counts 9 and 10
(apparently concurrent with each other but consecutive to the sentences on counts 1, 2,
and 4), and 120 days on count 9 (concurrent to the counts on 9 and 10). [Id. at 107] That
sentence thus totaled seven years plus six months on the misdemeanors for a total of
seven and a half years. 	It was then brought to the trial court’s attention that it had not
sentenced Ms. Peters on count six and the trial court then sentenced Ms. Peters to fifteen
months on count six, consecutive to the other counts. 	[Id. at 108] After correcting the
sentence on count 6, the trial court again reiterated that it had sentenced Ms. Peters to
“eight and a half years total plus the six months for a total of nine years of incarceration.”
[Id.] But when the 15 months is added to the seven years, that only results in eight years
and three months incarceration, plus six months on the misdemeanors. And is not clear
to the Court from the judgment that the sentence imposed was eight and one half years
on the felonies plus six months on the misdemeanors, as opposed to eight years and
three months incarceration on the felonies plus six months on the misdemeanors. [Id. at
113-14]
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and limited criminal history were mitigating factors, it rejected her assertions of honesty
and pointed to her “lies,” defiance, abuse of her position, and her belief that she was
“above the law” as a basis for the imposition of the prison sentence. [Id.] The trial court
also 	weighed 	these 	considerations 	against 	Ms. 	Peters’ 	“corrupt 	conduct” 	and
“undermining of our democratic processes” that resulted in personal gain and attention,
concluding that she “betrayed [her] oath for no one other than [her]. 	And this is what
makes Ms. Peters such a danger to our community.” [Id. at 103-04] The trial court then
orally denied a stay of execution of the sentence as “wholly unwarranted” for these same
reasons and stated that although “[a]ll cases have a possibility of reversal on appeal[,]”
the rulings were made “after much consideration, [and] incredible amounts of internal
debate.” 	[Id. at 105] 	Ms. Peters’ counsel then orally moved for bond pending appeal,
which the trial court denied on the record. [Id. at 109]
Following the sentencing hearing, Ms. Peters filed a written Motion for Bond
Pending Appeal in the trial court. 	[Id. at 118-122] 	In support of her Motion, Ms. Peters
argued that: (1) her appeal has merit due to numerous errors committed by the trial court;
(2) she is unlikely to flee and does not pose a danger to the community; and (3) the factors
set forth in Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-4-202 weigh in favor of her release on bond. 	[Id.] The
trial court issued a written order denying Ms. Peters’ Motion for Bond Pending Appeal
“[f]or the reasons stated during [the sentencing hearing], and for the additional reasons
stated in the [prosecution’s] response” which addressed the factors set forth in the appeal
bond statute, Colo. Rev. Stat § 16-4-202. [Id. at 117; see also id. at 124-28] In particular,
the prosecution’s response to Ms. Peters’ Motion for Bond asserted that: (1) Ms. Peters
is a flight risk based on her “prior travel history, often with the assistance of others along
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with her disregard for court orders”; (2) Ms. Peters has a poor likelihood of success on
appeal “as any error is likely to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”; and (3) because
Ms. Peters “has not denied committing any of the acts, and has simply sought to justify
her actions based upon defenses not recognized by Colorado.” [Id. at 127-28]
After the trial court’s ruling, Ms. Peters filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion for
Bond Pending Appeal in the Colorado Court of Appeals (“CCA”). [Id. at 170-83, 185-221]
In the Motion for Bond Pending Appeal, Ms. Peters argued that the trial court erred in
finding Ms. Peters’ “statements made her a danger to the community.” 	[Id. at 200] 	Ms.
Peters further contended that the trial court “abused its discretion” when it determined
that Ms. Peters “lied about the risk of computer manipulation in elections conducted by
Mesa County, that this lie was somehow dangerous, and that [Ms. Peters] posed a danger
to the community because she was likely to continue expressing that view.” 	[Id. at 202
(internal quotations omitted)] Finally, Ms. Peters argued she was not a flight risk and that
her appeal was not frivolous. [Id. at 208-18] On December 6, 2024, the CCA denied the
Motion for Bond Pending Appeal. [Id. at 184] Ms. Peters’ direct appeal of her judgment
of convictions is currently pending in the CCA. 	[#66 at 4 n.1] 	Indeed, according to
Respondents, Ms. Peters’ direct appeal has been fully briefed and is awaiting oral
argument. [Id.]
In the pending 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Application, Ms. Peters does not challenge the
judgment of convictions. [#1] Rather, she “challenges the refusal of the Colorado Court
of Appeals and the District Court of Mesa County to grant her bail pending appellate
review of [her convictions].” [#1 at 2] The Application initially asserted the following three
claims for relief:
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(1) 	a First Amendment violation [id. at 11-17];
(2) 	a due process violation based on the trial court’s: (a) failure to “consider the
federal election-records preservation statutes;” (b) allow the introduction of
evidence of a “security breach;” and (c) failure to conduct a hearing into
whether a juror was biased against Ms. Peters [id. at 17-21]; and
(3) 	the denial of Ms. Peters’ right to “immunity from state prosecution” under
the Supremacy Clause and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment [id. at 21-26].
As relief, Ms. Peters requests immediate release from custody on bond. [Id. at 26]
On February 11, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to file a pre-answer
response addressing the potential applicability of the affirmative defenses of timeliness
and exhaustion of state court remedies. [#5] Respondents filed a pre-answer response,
contending that Ms. Peters’ claims were improperly exhausted in state court. [#25] Ms.
Peters filed a reply, arguing for the rejection of the exhaustion defense and seeking to
have Respondents answer the merits of her petition. [#34]
On May 5, 2025, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause as to why the
Application should not be dismissed as a mixed petition. 	[#47] 	On June 4, 2025, Ms.
Peters filed her response to the Order to Show Cause. [#50] After reviewing the pertinent
filings, on July 22, 2025, the Court held a hearing on the issues of exhaustion of state
remedies and Younger abstention. 	[## 58, 60] At that hearing, counsel for Ms. Peters
indicated her intention to only proceed with Claim 1, the First Amendment claim, and to
dismiss the remaining claims. 	[#60 at 9-12, 34, 38] And on July 25, 2025, Ms. Peters,
through her counsel, filed a Notice of Partial Dismissal of Claims, which dismissed Claims
2 and 3 in her Section 2254 Application and affirmed that “the sole remaining claim made
in Ms. Peters’ Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is Claim 1 . . . seeking her release
on bond pending her appeal due to the violation of her First Amendment rights.” [#59]
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Subsequently, in response to Court orders, the parties submitted supplemental
briefing on Younger abstention [## 62, 65, 66] and the merits of Ms. Peters’ sole remaining
claim [## 72, 82]. An amicus brief has also been filed and accepted by this Court. [#68-
1]
II. 	ANALYSIS
Ms. Peters’ claim, as set forth in the Section 2254 Application, asserts that the
denial of her Motion for Bond Pending Appeal violated her First Amendment right to free
speech. 	[#1 at 11-17] 	Respondents contend that the doctrine of Younger abstention
precludes this Court’s review of Ms. Peters’ sole remaining claim. 	[#62 at 3-6] 	Ms.
Peters disagrees, arguing that Respondents “waived any claim to Younger abstention”
[#65 at 17-18] and that Younger is inapplicable to this case [id. at 18-20]. The Court—
bound to follow Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent—agrees with Respondents
that it must abstain from hearing Ms. Peters’ claim.
Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts are prohibited from
interfering with ongoing state criminal proceedings absent extraordinary or special
circumstances. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971); Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d
885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997). 	Abstention is appropriate under Younger if three conditions
exist: “(1) an ongoing state judicial . . . 	proceeding, (2) the presence of an important
state interest, and (3) an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state
proceeding.” Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am. v. A-Quality Auto Sales, Inc., 98 F.4th 1307,
1317 (10th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted). “Younger abstention is jurisdictional” and thus
must be addressed “at the outset.” 	D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223,
1228-29 (10th Cir. 2004). 	Indeed, because Younger is jurisdictional, the Tenth Circuit
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has made clear that “Younger abstention is non-discretionary; it must be invoked once
the three conditions are met, absent extraordinary circumstances.” Amanatullah v. Colo.
Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999).
Because Younger is jurisdictional and non-discretionary, the Court rejects Ms.
Peters’ 	argument 	that 	Respondents 	waived 	their 	opportunity 	to 	raise 	Younger
abstention. 	A Court “may raise the issue of abstention sua sponte.” 	D.A. Osguthorpe
Family Partnership v. ASC Utah, Inc., 705 F.3d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 2013). 	Indeed,
because Younger is jurisdictional, “[w]hen all of the elements mandating abstention
clearly exist in the record, courts may, and should, address application of the Younger
abstention doctrine sua sponte.” 	Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. C.R. Gurule, Inc., 148 F.
Supp. 3d 1206, 1216 (D.N.M. 2015) (emphasis added). 	Here, consistent with these
principles, the Court noted potential jurisdictional defects and ordered the parties to
address jurisdictional issues, including the Younger abstention doctrine. [#60 at 33-35]
And consistent with that Order, Ms. Peters filed a response that addressed Younger and
she has thus had an opportunity to be heard on the issue. [#65 at 17-20]
The Court thus turns to the question of whether Younger applies. 	As to the first
Younger condition, the Court finds that there are ongoing state criminal proceedings
against Ms. Peters. Indeed, It is undisputed that her direct appeal is pending before the
CCA. [#66 at 4 n.1] And courts have held that ongoing criminal appeals invoke the first
Younger condition. 	Cross v. Quick, No. CIV-25-569-D, 2025 WL 1762983, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. May 20, 2025) (holding that the first Younger requirement was satisfied when a
direct appeal was pending); Mounkes v. Conklin, 922 F. Supp. 1501, 1511 (D. Kan. 1996)
(“For purposes of the first [Younger] requirement, a state prosecution is considered to be
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pending if as of the filing of the federal complaint not all state appellate remedies have
been exhausted.”).
In response, Ms. Peters argues that “the habeas relief sought by Mrs. Peters will
not interfere with any ongoing state prosecution.” 	[#65 at 19] 	In support, Ms. Peters
cites to footnote 9 of the Supreme Court’s decision in Gerstein v. Pugh. [#65 at 19 (citing
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975)] But there, the Supreme Court held that
Younger did not apply because the issue raised “could not be raised in defense of the
criminal prosecution” and any resultant order from the federal civil case “could not
prejudice the conduct of the [criminal] trial on the merits.” 420 U.S. at 108 n.9. Here, by
contrast, Ms. Peters could, and did, raise the issue of her bond pending appeal and
whether the denial of such bond violated her First Amendment rights. 	Moreover, that
issue is intricately intertwined with her current appeal that argues that the district court
improperly increased her sentence based upon the same statements the trial court relied
upon to deny Ms. Peters bond. [#66-1 at 30-31 (arguing that “the trial court incarcerated
Peters for speech that produced no threat of violence or lawless action, in violation of
her rights under the First . . . Amendment[].”)] Thus, any ruling by this Court on that issue
will necessarily impact the ongoing criminal proceedings.
As to the second Younger condition, the Court concludes that there exists the
presence of an important state interest. 	The Supreme Court “has recognized that the
States’ 	interest 	in 	administering 	their 	criminal 	justice 	systems 	free 	from 	federal
interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court
considering equitable types of relief.” 	Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (citing
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Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45). And Ms. Peters has not argued that this second requirement
has not been satisfied.4 [#65 at 21-22]
Under the third Younger condition, Ms. Peters had the opportunity to raise her
claim during the state criminal proceedings. Indeed, the record reflects that she did move
both the trial court and the CCA for bond pending appeal. [#102 at 118-22; 185-221] And
courts have held that such an opportunity satisfies the third Younger requirement. Spade
v. Sharp, No. 1:24-cv-0866-TMC, 2024 WL 1672304, at *2 (D.S.C. April 18, 2024) (finding
that the fact that petitioner “can pursue—and has pursued—his request for bond in state
court” afforded an adequate opportunity to present a federal constitutional challenge,
satisfying the third Younger condition); see also Brown v. Leeke, 460 F. Supp. 947, 948
(D.S.C. 1978) (finding Younger applies and that the federal court “will not interfere with
the state court’s determination of the amount of bail required to ensure the defendant’s
presence while his appeal is pending”), dismissed, 601 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1979). Indeed,
Ms. Peters has not cited a single case where Younger was raised with respect to an
appeal bond in an ongoing criminal proceeding and the federal court found Younger
inapplicable.
Thus, all three requirements for Younger are met. 	“When Younger’s three
requirements are met, abstention is mandatory unless one of three exceptions applies:
the prosecution was (1) commenced in bad faith or to harass, (b) based on a flagrantly
and patently unconstitutional statute, or (3) related to any other such extraordinary
4 Ms. Peters’ brief focuses upon slightly different Younger criteria than those used by the
Tenth Circuit. 	[#65 at 18-20] This Court, sitting as it is in the Tenth Circuit, is bound by
Tenth Circuit jurisprudence. 	United States v. Young, 729 F. Supp. 3d 1198, 1200 n.1
(D.N.M. 2024) (noting that courts in the Tenth Circuit are “bound by precedent from the
Tenth Circuit”).
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circumstances creating a threat of irreparable injury both great and immediate.” Winn v.
Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). Ms. Peters does not
argue that one of these three exceptions applies, let alone establish grounds for such
rarely invoked exceptions. 	[#65 at 17-22] 	She spends one paragraph arguing that she
will suffer irreparable injury if relief is not granted, but she does so in the context of
analyzing the third Younger factor. [#65 at 20] And in doing so, she argues that the “loss
of 	First Amendment 	freedoms, 	for 	even 	minimal 	periods 	of 	time, 	unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury.” 	[Id. (quoting Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v.
Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14, 19 (2020)] 	But Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn dealt with
injunctive relief from a COVID-era restriction impacting the right to worship, not an
analysis of Younger or its extraordinary circumstances exception. 	592 U.S. at 15-16.
And, in any event, at no point does Ms. Peters argue that this Court should find an
exception to Younger, as opposed to arguing that the three Younger requirements were
not satisfied.
Moreover, 	to 	the 	extent 	Ms. 	Peters’ 	brief 	could 	be 	seen 	as 	arguing 	the
extraordinary circumstances exception to Younger, she has failed to satisfy her burden
of establishing such an exception. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 350 (1975) (“Unless
we are to trivialize the principles of Younger v. Harris, the federal complaint should have
been 	dismissed 	on 	the 	appellants’ 	motion 	absent 	satisfactory 	proof 	of 	those
extraordinary circumstances calling into play one of the limited exceptions to the rule of
Younger v. Harris and related cases.”). Under Younger, irreparable injury must be “both
great and immediate,” and exists only when the threat to federally protected rights
“cannot be eliminated by . . . . defense against a single prosecution.” Phelps, 122 F.3d
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at 889 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 46). Courts have “consistently refused to find an
exception to Younger when the injury could ultimately be corrected through the pending
state proceeding or on appeal.” 	Winn, 945 F.3d at 1259. 	And because Ms. Peters’
appeal remains pending in state court, where she argues that the trial court violated her
First Amendment rights by punishing her based upon her speech, any First Amendment
error can be corrected through the state appeal.
Without question, Ms. Peters raises important constitutional questions concerning
whether the trial court improperly punished her more severely because of her protected
First Amendment speech. But because this question remains pending before Colorado
courts, this Court must abstain from answering that question until after the Colorado
courts have decided the issue. 	Accordingly, based upon the Younger abstention
doctrine, her Application must be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Goings v.
Sumner Cty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 571 F. App’x 634, 639 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Under our
precedent, 	Younger-abstention 	dismissals 	have 	been 	treated 	as 	roughly 	akin 	to
jurisdictional dismissals and, accordingly, have been considered to be without prejudice.”
(emphasis omitted)).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED:
(1) that the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
[#1] 	is 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE 	for 	lack 	of 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction pursuant to the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971);
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(2) that Petitioner’s Emergency Motion for Court to Issue Expidited (sic) Opinion
And Order on Petitioner’s Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 [#89] and Amended Emergency Motion for Court to Issue
Expedited Opinion on Petitioner’s Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [#91] are DENIED AS MOOT; and
(3) that Plaintiff’s Motion to File Exhibit Under Seal [#90] is GRANTED for good
cause shown and that the Clerk of Court is instructed to maintain Document
90-1 at a restricted level 1.
DATED: December 8, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
s/Scott T. Varholak
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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