Reynolds v. Spargur et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 24-cv-03605-PAB-NRN
CHRISTOPHER LEE REYNOLDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRADLEY SPARGUR, Colorado state patrol trooper, and
ROBERT HOWELL, Colorado state patrol trooper,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [Docket No. 33]. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The facts are essentially undisputed. The legal issue is whether plaintiff’s claims are
barred by the statute of limitations.
I. UNDISPUTED FACTS1
On April 29, 2022, Mr. Reynolds was riding a motorcycle on Highway 491 in
Dolores County. Docket No. 33 at 2, ¶ 1. Sergeant Spargur and Trooper Howell
stopped Mr. Reynolds at approximately 11:00 p.m. on Highway 48. Id., ¶¶ 2, 4.
Sergeant Spargur and Trooper Howell impounded the motorcycle following the stop.
Id., ¶ 5. Sergeant Spargur sought and obtained a search warrant for the motorcycle.
Id. at 3, ¶¶ 7, 8. The search revealed a clear plastic bag containing 52 grams of
1 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
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methamphetamine, another clear plastic bag containing 93 grams of methamphetamine,
and a Smith & Wesson Bodyguard .380 pistol with an extended magazine and nine
rounds of ammunition. Id., ¶ 9. Mr. Reynolds was arrested pursuant to a warrant on or
about May 5, 2022. Id., ¶¶ 10-11.
A state court determined that the stop of the motorcycle violated the Fourth
Amendment and suppressed all the evidence obtained from the search. Id. at 4, ¶ 12.
The prosecution then dismissed its case against Mr. Reynolds. Id., ¶ 13. Mr. Reynolds
retained attorney Michael J. Fairhurst of Kilmer Lane LLP to represent him in asserting
civil claims against Sergeant Spargur and Trooper Howell. Id., ¶ 14. On April 24, 2024,
plaintiff, the Colorado State Patrol, Sergeant Spargur, and Trooper Howell, through
counsel, entered into a tolling agreement (the “Tolling Agreement”). Id., ¶ 15. The
Tolling Agreement was drafted by counsel for plaintiff. Id. at 5, ¶ 20. The Tolling
Agreement states: “This equitable tolling agreement is to run for the period between the
date of this letter up to and including 30 days after any party gives written notice that the
agreement is terminated.” Id. at 4, ¶ 16; see also Docket No. 33-2 at 1. 2 Pursuant to
the Tolling Agreement, Sergeant Spargur and Trooper Howell agreed to “voluntarily
waive the defense of timeliness or statute of limitations if litigation is filed after April 26,
2024, but within the time period of tolling as described in this agreement.” Docket No.
33 at 4, ¶ 17 (emphasis omitted).
2 While the parties do not quote every part of the Tolling Agreement in their
undisputed facts, they do reference the Tolling Agreement and do not dispute its
authenticity. Thus, the Court treats the content of the Tolling Agreement as undisputed.
Docket No. 33 at 4, ¶¶ 15-17; Docket No. 39 at 2, ¶¶ 15-17.
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On October 31, 2024, Mr. Fairhurst informed Mr. Reynolds that his firm “decided
to terminate our representation of you.” Docket No. 33 at 5, ¶ 21. 3 Mr. Fairhurst told
Mr. Reynolds that his firm was “no longer [Plaintiff’s] counsel” and that his firm “will not
be taking further action on your behalf.” Docket No. 39 at 3, ¶ 2. Mr. Fairhurst further
informed Mr. Reynolds that, once the Tolling Agreement was terminated, he would “only
have 30 days to file suit before the statute of limitations passes.” Docket No. 33 at 5,
¶ 22. On November 1, 2024, Mr. Fairhurst informed counsel for Sergeant Spargur and
Trooper Howell that Mr. Reynolds terminated the Tolling Agreement. Id., ¶ 23. On
November 6, 2024, Mr. Reynolds informed counsel for Sergeant Spargur and Trooper
Howell that he was no longer represented by Mr. Fairhurst’s firm and would be
proceeding pro se. Id., ¶ 24. On November 26, 2024, Mr. Reynolds sent an e-mail to
counsel for Sergeant Spargur and Trooper Howell, indicating his intent to terminate the
Tolling Agreement. Id., ¶ 25. On December 30, 2024, Mr. Reynolds filed a complaint in
this action. Id., ¶ 26. In the operative complaint, Mr. Reynolds asserts claims against
Sergeant Spargur and Trooper Howell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the
Fourth Amendment due to unlawful seizure and unconstitutional search and under Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 13-21-131 for violation of Colo. Const. Art. II, Section 7 for unlawful seizure
and unconstitutional search. 4 Docket No. 19 at 12-19, ¶¶ 50-109.
3 The parties dispute whether this communication had the legal effect of
terminating Mr. Fairhurst’s representation of Mr. Reynolds. Docket No. 39 at 3, ¶ 1;
Docket No. 41 at 3, ¶ 1.
4 The operative complaint is the second amended complaint, filed on February
28, 2025. Docket No. 19.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when
the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). “A defendant may use a motion for
summary judgment to test an affirmative defense which entitles that party to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 564 (10th Cir. 1997). “[W]here a
defending party pleads a statute of limitation and moves for summary judgment, and it
appears that the action is barred by the appropriate statute of limitations and there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact in connection with such statute, . . . then the
motion for summary judgment should be granted.” Borum v. Coffeyville State Bank, 6
F. App’x 709, 711 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (citation omitted). When reviewing a
motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
III. ANALYSIS
Sergeant Spargur and Trooper Howell argue that Mr. Reynolds’s claims are
barred by the statute of limitations. Docket No. 33 at 6. Conversely, Mr. Reynolds
argues that he timely filed his complaint within the statute of limitations. Docket No. 39
at 1-2.
A. Statute of Limitations
The Court will first determine the applicable statute of limitations for Mr.
Reynolds’s claims. Mr. Reynolds’s claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-131. Docket No. 19 at 12-19 , ¶¶ 50-109. Section 1983 does
not have a statute of limitations. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To determine the
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statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, courts reference analogous state statutes. See
Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989) (“Limitations periods in § 1983 suits are to
be determined by reference to the appropriate state statute of limitations.”) (citations
and quotations omitted); see also Graham v. Taylor, 640 F. App’x 766, 768 (10th Cir.
2016) (unpublished) (“The statute of limitations for § 1983 actions is borrowed from
state statute.”) (citing Mondragón v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 2008)).
Here, the appropriate state statute of limitations is determined by reference to § 13-21-
131, which provides the closest state law parallel to the § 1983 claims. See Shash v
City of Pueblo, 770 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1307 (D. Colo. 2025) (noting that § 13-21-131 is
similar to § 1983). A civil action filed pursuant to § 13-21-131 “must be commenced
within two years after the cause of action accrues.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-131(5).
Section 1983 claims accrue when “facts that would support a cause of action are or
should be apparent.” Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673,675 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation
omitted). Here, Sergeant Spargur and Trooper Howell’s allegedly unconstitutional
search and seizure of Mr. Reynolds’s motorcycle occurred on April 29, 2022. Docket
No. 33 at 6. Sergeant Spargur and Trooper Howell allegedly performed a second
unconstitutional search on April 30, 2022. Id. Thus, Mr. Reynolds’s claims accrued on
April 29 and 30, 2022. 	Accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations for Mr.
Reynolds’s claims would be two years, and would have expired on April 29 and 30,
2024. 5 The parties entered the Tolling Agreement on April 24, 2024, id. at 4, ¶ 15, five
days before the statute of limitations would have expired on the claims which accrued
5 The parties do not dispute that the statute of limitations for Mr. Reynolds’s
claims would have expired on these dates absent the Tolling Agreement. Docket No.
33 at 6-7; Docket No. 39 at 4.
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on April 29, 2022 and six days before the statute of limitations would have expired on
the claims which accrued on April 30, 2022.
Mr. Reynolds and defendants interpret the Tolling Agreement differently.
Defendants argue that the Tolling Agreement required Mr. Reynolds to file any claims
within 30 days of any party terminating the agreement. Docket No. 33 at 8. Defendants
claim that Mr. Fairhurst terminated the Tolling Agreement on behalf of Mr. Reynolds
through his November 1, 2024 email. Id. According to defendants, Mr. Reynolds filed
his complaint on December 30, 2024, more than 30 days after Mr. Reynolds terminated
the Tolling Agreement, and his claims are thus barred. Id. at 8-9. Alternatively,
defendants argue that, even if Mr. Fairhurst’s email did not terminate the Tolling
Agreement, Mr. Reynolds terminated the agreement through his November 26, 2024
email. Id. at 9. Thus, because this email was sent more than 30 days before the
complaint was filed, defendants maintain that Mr. Reynolds’s claims are barred. Id.
Mr. Reynolds has a different interpretation of the Tolling Agreement. He
contends that the Tolling Agreement suspended the statute of limitations until 30 days
after the agreement’s termination. Docket No. 39 at 5. Because there were five days
remaining on the statute of limitations period at the time the parties entered into the
Tolling Agreement, Mr. Reynolds claims that he had 35 days to file his complaint after
he terminated the agreement. Id.
B. Mr. Fairhurst’s Authority to Terminate the Tolling Agreement
Mr. Fairhurst purported to terminate the Tolling Agreement on November 1,
2024, the day after he told Mr. Reynolds that he had terminated his representation of
Mr. Reynolds. Docket No. 33 at 5, ¶¶ 21, 23. Defendants claim that Mr. Fairhurst’s
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termination of the Tolling Agreement was effective, despite Mr. Fairhurst’s purported
termination of the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 8. An attorney’s authority to act on
behalf of a client, however, ends when the attorney-client relationship is terminated.
See Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 281 (2012) (“Having severed the principal-agent
relationship, an attorney no longer acts . . . as the client’s representative.”). Courts
have held that an attorney-client relationship is terminated when an attorney clearly
communicates the termination to his client. See People v. Heaphy, 470 P.3d 728, 734,
738 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2015) (finding that an attorney terminated representation of his
client when he sent an email explaining that he could longer assist his client and that he
was terminating representation); Brautigam v. Damon, 697 F. App’x 844, 847 (6th Cir.
2017) (unpublished) (“The attorney-client relationship is terminated when there is an
affirmative act by either party signaling the end of the relationship.”); Hartleib v. Weiser
L. Firm, P.C., 2019 WL 3943064, at *7 (D. Kan. Aug. 21, 2019) (“best practices
generally recommend the clear and unambiguous communication of termination of the
attorney-client relationship.”); Quinones v. Miller, 2003 WL 21276429, at *29 n.49
(S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2003) (“the [attorney-client] relationship can be terminated by the
express statement of . . . the attorney.”) (citing SWS Fin. Fund A v. Salomon Bros. Inc.,
790 F. Supp. 1292, 1398-99 (N.D. Ill. 1992)). The Court similarly finds that, here, Mr.
Fairhurst terminated the attorney-client relationship by informing Mr. Reynolds that his
firm “decided to terminate our representation of you.” Docket No. 33 at 5, ¶ 21. Having
terminated his representation of Mr. Reynolds on October 31, 2024, Mr. Fairhurst did
not have the authority to bind Mr. Reynolds through his purported termination of the
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Tolling Agreement on November 1, 2024. Accordingly, the Tolling Agreement was not
terminated by Mr. Fairhurst. 6
C. Interpretation of the Tolling Agreement
Because Mr. Fairhurst could not terminate the Tolling Agreement, the parties
agree that Mr. Reynolds terminated the Tolling Agreement on November 26, 2024. Id.
at 9; Docket No. 39 at 5. Thus, the question is how the Tolling Agreement should be
interpreted. Under Mr. Reynolds’s interpretation, the Tolling Agreement suspended the
statute of limitations, thereby preserving the five days left in the two-year period,
meaning that Mr. Reynolds had 35 days after November 26, 2024, i.e., until December
31, 2024, to file a complaint. Docket No. 39 at 5. Under defendants’ interpretation, the
statutory period continued to run during the tolling period, giving Mr. Reynolds only 30
days to file a complaint after the November 26, 2024 termination, i.e., until December
26, 2024. Docket No. 33 at 8.
The Tolling Agreement is a contract and must be interpreted according to the
principles of contract law. Notably, “state law governs contract interpretation.” Rifle
Onion Co., LLC v. Hellman, No. 20-cv-03514-DDD-KAS, 2025 WL 446135, at *4 (D.
Colo. Feb. 10, 2025) (citing Flood v. ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 1110, 1117
(10th Cir 2010)). “Because the parties’ arguments assume that Colorado law applies,
[the Court] will proceed under the same assumption.” Grynberg v. Total S.A., 538 F.3d
1336, 1346 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court will apply Colorado’s
6 Defendants argue that Mr. Reynolds might have solicited Mr. Fairhurst to send
the November 1, 2024 email purporting to terminate the Tolling Agreement. Docket No.
41 at 3. This is mere speculation, which cannot create a genuine issue of material fact.
See Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988).
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contract-interpretation principles. “Under Colorado law, ‘a contract must be construed
to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties as determined primarily from the
language of the contract.’” Gol TV, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 692 F.3d 1052,
1055 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting East Ride of Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer & Weld
Irrigation Co., 109 P.3d 969, 974 (Colo. 2005)). “‘To determine the intent of the parties,
the court should give effect to the plain and generally accepted meaning of the
contractual language.” Id. (quoting Copper Mountain, Inc. v. Indus. Sys., Inc., 208 P.3d
692, 697 (Colo. 2009)). “When determining the plain and ordinary meaning of words,
[courts] may consider definitions in a recognized dictionary.” Owners Ins. Co. v. Dakota
Station II Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 443 P.3d 47, 51 (Colo. 2019) (quoting Renfandt v. N.Y.
Life Ins. Co., 419 P.3d 576, 580 (Colo. 2018)). Extrinsic evidence regarding a contract’s
meaning is not considered unless the terms are ambiguous. Ad Two, Inc. v. City and
Cnty. Of Denver ex rel. Manager of Aviation, 9 P.3d 373, 376-77 (Colo. 2000) (“Absent
such ambiguity, we will not look beyond the four corners of the agreement to determine
the meaning intended by the parties.”).
The Tolling Agreement states that it is “an agreement . . . to toll all applicable
statutes of limitations related to any claims Mr. Reynolds may file in federal or state
court against . . . Bradley Spargur and/or Robert Howell.” Docket No. 33-2 at 1. “The
tolling of a statute of limitations will . . . suspend the running of the limitations period.”
Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050, 1053 (Colo. 2004) (citations omitted). Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “toll” as “([o]f a time period, esp. a statutory one) to stop the running
of.” TOLL, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Thus, as a general matter, the
purpose of the Tolling Agreement would seem to be the suspension of the running of
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the statute of limitations. Some language in the Tolling Agreement is consistent with
this purpose, other language is not.
The Tolling Agreement states that: “This equitable tolling agreement is to run for
the period between the date of this letter [April 24, 2024] up to and including 30 days
after any party gives written notice that the agreement is terminated.” Docket No. 33-2
at 1. The term “to run for” is best understood in context as meaning “to continue in
force, operation, or production.” See Merriam Webster Online, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/runs (last visited Dec 31, 2025). Thus, this sentence indicates
that the Tolling Agreement continues in operation between April 24, 2024 and up to and
including 30 days after any party gives written notice that the agreement is terminated;
here, December 26, 2024. The language suggests that, because the statute of
limitations was suspended five days before its date of expiration, Mr. Reynolds had up
to and including December 31, 2024 to file a complaint regarding the April 29, 2022
search claims and up to and including January 1, 2025 to file a complaint for the claims
regarding the April 30, 2022 search.
However, another sentence in the Agreement suggests that the parties did not
contemplate tolling beginning on April 24, 2024. Although the Tolling Agreement is
dated and signed on April 24, 2024, it states that defendants “agreed to voluntarily
waive the defense of timeliness or statute of limitations if litigation is filed after April 26,
2024, but within the time period of tolling as described in this agreement.” 7 Docket No.
7 It is likely that the parties meant to write April 29, 2024, which is the date the
statute of limitations would have expired absent a tolling agreement, rather than April
26, 2024, which is a date that has no apparent significance. This explanation is
consistent with Mr. Fairhurst’s warning to Mr. Reynolds that 30 days was left after
termination. However, whether the statute of limitations was suspended April 26, 2024
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33 at 4, ¶ 17 (internal quotations and emphasis omitted). This sentence indicates that
defendants waive the statute of limitations defense only if litigation is filed after April 26,
2024, but within the time period of tolling described in the agreement. The “time period
of tolling as described in this agreement” is best understood as 30 days after the
agreement is terminated since time left in the statutory period is not “described” in the
agreement. Thus, this language suggests that, because Mr. Reynolds filed his
complaint on December 30, 2024, which is more than 30 days after terminating the
Tolling Agreement on November 26, 2024, his complaint was untimely.
The Court finds that the sentences the Court just analyzed are inconsistent with
each other and create an ambiguity. The first sentence says that the Agreement “is to
run for the period between the date of this letter up to and including 30 days after any
party” terminates it, whereas the second sentence conditions the defendants’ waiver of
the statute of limitations defense on litigation being filed “after April 26, 2024, but within
the time period of tolling as described in this agreement.” Docket No. 33-2 at 1. Thus,
one sentence suggests the tolling of five days remaining in the limitations period and
the other contemplates, at best, the tolling of three days remaining or, at worst, no
tolling of the remaining three days, but only having 30 days after one party terminates
the Tolling Agreement to file suit.
or April 29, 2024 is irrelevant. If the statutory period was tolled beginning on April 26,
2024, three days would be left. Mr. Reynolds’ December 30, 2024 complaint—filed four
days after the 30-day post-termination period expired—would be untimely. If the
statutory period was tolled beginning on April 29, 2024, the statute of limitations would
have expired, giving Mr. Reynolds exactly thirty days to file the complaint after the
Tolling Agreement was terminated.
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Because the Tolling Agreement is ambiguous, the Court can look to extrinsic
evidence to help determine the Tolling Agreement’s meaning. Ad Two, 9 P.3d at 376-
77. It is undisputed that Mr. Fairhurst informed Mr. Reynolds on October 31, 2024 that,
once a party terminated the Tolling Agreement, “you will only have 30 days to file suit
before the statute of limitations passes.” Docket No. 33 at 5, ¶ 22. Mr. Fairhurst drafted
the Tolling Agreement, and he is in the best position to know what it means. Although
Mr. Fairhurst’s warning to Mr. Reynolds about having only 30 days after termination to
file suit does not explain the discrepancy between one sentence referring to April 24
and the other referring to April 26, it does clarify that “the time period of tolling described
in this agreement” is 30 days after termination, rather than thirty days plus whatever
time remained in the two-year limitations period. Thus, the Court finds that Mr.
Fairhurst’s understanding of the Tolling Agreement that the statute of limitations expires
30 days after a party terminates the Tolling Agreement is the proper interpretation.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Mr. Reynolds’s claims are barred by the statute of
limitations and that defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Moreover, because
plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations, the Court will dismiss his claims
with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 33] is
GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that each of plaintiff’s claims is DISMISSED with prejudice. It is
further
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ORDERED that this case is closed.
DATED January 5, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge
___________________________
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