Reed v. Sandoval et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 24-cv-03564-PAB-CYC
MATTHEW BLAKE REED,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEPHANIE SANDOVAL,
JOSEPH REGALADO1, and
CARLY REY-HAYES,
Defendants.
______________________________________________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
______________________________________________________________________________
Cyrus Y. Chung, United States Magistrate Judge.
Defendants Stephanie Sandoval, Joseph Regalado, and Carly Rey-Hayes move to dismiss
plaintiff Matthew Blake Reed’s Eighth Amendment claims against them pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting, among other things, untimeliness. ECF No. 26.
Because the statute of limitations bars plaintiff’s claims here, the Court recommends that the
motion be granted.
BACKGROUND
According to the second amended complaint, whose factual allegations the Court accepts
as true for this motion, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), on November 25, 2022,
while incarcerated at the Colorado State Penitentiary (“CSP”), the plaintiff was involved in an
1 The second amended complaint identifies this defendant as Joseph Regaldo, ECF No. 9 at 1–3,
but this defendant clarifies in the motion to dismiss that his name is Joseph Regalado. ECF No.
26 at 1 n.1. The Court uses the correct spelling throughout this Recommendation.
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incident with another inmate in which correctional officers intervened. ECF No. 9 at 4–7; ECF
No. 9-1 at 19–20; Boldridge v. City of Atchison, No. 24-3190, 2025 WL 2793678, at *3 (10th
Cir. Oct. 1, 2025) (unpublished) (relying on both the complaint and attached documents to
determine relevant dates); Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001) (teaching
that “in deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court may look both to the
complaint itself and to any documents attached as exhibits to the complaint”). On that date,
Sandoval, CSP’s warden, authorized correctional officers to use excessive force against the
plaintiff, despite the incident being “a simple fistfight [sic] with another inmate.” ECF No. 9 at 4.
During the incident, Regalado shot the plaintiff multiple times with less-lethal munition,
including in the head, while the plaintiff was trying to comply with orders to get on the ground.
Id. at 5; ECF No. 9-1 at 20. Another correctional officer also tased the plaintiff while he was
attempting to comply with those orders. ECF No. 9 at 5. Following the incident, Rey-Hayes, a
CSP nurse, failed to provide proper medical care for the plaintiff’s injuries and failed to
document the severity of the plaintiff’s head wound. Id. at 6. Instead, the plaintiff was placed in
an unclean observation cell for eleven hours and then placed in segregation without receiving
medical care. Id. Sandoval failed to supervise this insufficient medical care. Id. at 5. He was
taken to a local hospital the next day. Id. at 6.
The plaintiff alleges that he suffers a variety of ongoing effects, including “neurological,
neuropsychological, and mental health problems.” Id. at 9. As a result, the plaintiff brings Eighth
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Amendment2 claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against each of the defendants in their
individual capacities3 and seeks money damages as well as various forms of injunctive relief. Id.
This motion followed.
There is a preliminary matter to address before turning to the legal analysis. The plaintiff
states that he was denied an extension of his deadline to file a response to the defendants’ motion
to dismiss. ECF No. 39 at 1–2. That is incorrect. Although the Court denied the plaintiff’s
request for an indefinite extension of the deadline, ECF No. 30, the Court sua sponte extended
the deadline to allow the plaintiff additional time to prepare his response. ECF No. 32 at 1–2.
And after the plaintiff filed two responses to the motion, ECF Nos. 36 and 39, the Court
discussed the two filings with the plaintiff at the July 17, 2025 Scheduling Conference and
accepted a response filed more than a week after the extended deadline. ECF No. 42. As a result,
the plaintiff had over fifty days to prepare his response, more than twice the time allowed under
this District’s Local Rules. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d).
ANALYSIS
The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The standard for evaluating those
arguments is oft-repeated and well-known. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
2 In his response, the plaintiff maintains that his claims are brought under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 39 at 3. He later states that his claims against defendant
Sandoval are brought under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 5.
Regardless of which amendments undergird his claims, they are all brought under section 1983
and are governed by the two-year statute of limitations discussed infra.
3 The second amended complaint makes clear that Sandoval and Rey-Hayes are sued in their
individual capacities, but is silent regarding in what capacity Regalado is sued. ECF No. 9 at 2–
3. The plaintiff’s response to the motion clarifies that he sues Regalado only in his individual
capacity. ECF No. 39 at 2.
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face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A district court’s duty is to “determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts
supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory
proposed.” Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).
The defendants argue that the statute of limitations bars the plaintiff’s claims. ECF No.
26 at 3–5. Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the issue may be resolved
on a motion to dismiss where its application is apparent on the face of the complaint. See
Dummar v. Lummis, 543 F.3d 614, 619 (10th Cir. 2008). A court will grant such a motion when
the undisputed relevant dates make a challenged claim untimely. Gardner v. Schumacher, No.
23-2150, 2024 WL 5199962, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 23, 2024)
Actions like this one brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the general
personal injury limitation period of the state in which the action arose. Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d
1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 1994). In Colorado, that limitation period is two years, Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-80-102(g), though federal law determines when a section 1983 cause of action accrues.
Herrera v. City of Espanola, 32 F.4th 980, 990 (10th Cir. 2022). Determining an accrual date
must “begin[ ] with identifying ‘the specific constitutional right’ alleged to have been infringed.”
Id. at 990 n.5 (quoting McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 115 (2019)). Accrual occurs “when
the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id. at
990; see Smith v. City of Enid by & Through Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir.
1998) (section 1983 “claims accrue when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her
constitutional rights have been violated” (quotation marks omitted)).
The plaintiff’s claims against all three defendants relate to their actions on November 25,
2022, when Sandoval authorized excessive force and failed to supervise the plaintiff’s medical
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care, when Regalado shot the plaintiff, and when Rey-Heyes provided inadequate medical care.
ECF No. 9 at 4–5. Therefore, “the plaintiff kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to know of the injury which is
the basis of his action” on that date, meaning that his “[s]ection 1983 claims accrue[d], for the
purpose of the statute of limitations” on that same date. Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266
(10th Cir. 1994); see Adams v. Taylor, No. 20-cv-02380-LTB-GPG, 2021 WL 11674438, at *2
(D. Colo. Aug. 2, 2021) (concluding that the pro se prisoner plaintiff “knew or had reason to
know of his injuries caused by the alleged Eighth Amendment violations at the time he allegedly
was denied mental health and medical treatment and subjected to excessive force”),
recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 11674436, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 2021). The two-year
limitations period therefore ran on November 25, 2024. This case was filed almost a month later,
ECF No. 1, barring the plaintiff’s claims.
The plaintiff protests. He complains that his lack of procedural knowledge and of legal
assistance prevented him from submitting his complaint earlier. ECF No. 39 at 3. Literally
construed, this is a non-starter. After all, “it is well established that ignorance of the law, even for
an incarcerated pro se plaintiff, generally does not excuse prompt filing.” Caballero v.
Wyandotte Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 789 F. App’x 684, 687 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks
omitted).
Of course, a district court must construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint “liberally” and
hold him “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Selby
Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)). As such, if the Court “can reasonably read the pleadings to state a
valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail,” it will do so “despite the plaintiff’s failure to
cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence
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construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d
1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110). So construed, the plaintiff could
be invoking tolling to avoid dismissal. This requires consideration of Colorado’s tolling
provisions. Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995).
In Colorado, a limitations period can be statutorily tolled if the plaintiff is “a minor under
eighteen years of age, a mental incompetent, or a person under other legal disability and who
does not have a legal guardian.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-81-101(3); Mwangi v. Norman, No. 16-cv-
00002-CMA-NYW, 2016 WL 7223270, at *7 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2016), recommendation
adopted, 2017 WL 11917464 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 2017). None of these statutory provisions apply,
nor does the plaintiff contend otherwise. See Graham v. Teller Cnty., 632 F. App’x 461, 463–64
(10th Cir. 2015) (discussing application of statute).
“[E]quitable tolling can” also “pause a ‘limitations period when flexibility is required to
accomplish the goals of justice.’” Whitefield v. Exec. Dir. of Colo. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 24-1185,
2024 WL 4212320, at *2 (10th Cir. Sept. 17, 2024) (unpublished) (quoting Morrison v. Goff, 91
P.3d 1050, 1053 (Colo. 2004)). This includes “situations in which either the defendant has
wrongfully impeded the plaintiff’s ability to bring the claim or truly extraordinary circumstances
prevented the plaintiff from filing his or her claim despite diligent efforts.” Braxton v. Zavaras,
614 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hartman, 911 P.2d
1094, 1096 (Colo. 1996)). But the plaintiff “does not provide any information that any Defendant
in this lawsuit prevented the filing of this lawsuit, despite general problems he alleges he has had
with respect to his” law library access. Ellis v. Denver Cnty. of City, No. 22-cv-01874-RM-KAS,
2024 WL 3950932, at *6 (D. Colo. Aug. 27, 2024), recommendation adopted, Ellis v. Denver
Cnty. of City, No. 22-cv-01874-RM-KAS, ECF No. 100 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2024). Neither does
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he argue that this case presents the sort of exceptional or extraordinary circumstances that
warrant tolling. See Dean Witter, 911 P.2d at 1096–97 (collecting cases). And “[o]nce the statute
of limitations is raised as an affirmative defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
statute has been tolled.” Garrett v. Arrowhead Improvement Ass’n, 826 P.2d 850, 855 (Colo.
1992). He fails to meet that burden. As a result, equitable tolling is not appropriate.
The bid for equitable tolling fails for an additional reason. “[A] plaintiff seeking to
benefit from equitable tolling must ‘make[ ] good[ ]faith efforts to pursue the claims when
possible,’” Whitefield, 2024 WL 4212320 at *2 (quoting Dean Witter, 911 P.2d at 1097
(modifications in Whitefield)), even if he “can demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or
wrongful conduct that prevented him from filing a claim.” Rediger v. Crowther, No. 22-cv-
01223-LTB-GPG, 2022 WL 17818389, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 4, 2022), recommendation adopted,
2022 WL 17818390 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2022); see Lamebull v. City and Cnty. of Denver, No. 22-
1009, 2022 WL 2951689, at *2 (10th Cir. July 26, 2022) (unpublished). He has not shown any
such diligence. He attempts to excuse that insufficient showing by complaining about his law-
library access at CSP, ECF No. 39 at 3, but his second amended complaint makes clear that he
transferred to Sterling Correctional Facility, ECF No. 9 at 6, without explanation of what
impeded his ability there to file his complaint before the limitations period expired. Like
represented litigants, pro se litigants must comply with any statutes of limitations applicable to
their claims, even if obstacles stand in their way. See Ombe v. Cook, 861 F. App’x 182, 184-85
(10th Cir. 2021). He offers no evidence of his diligence other than a general statement that he did
not act in bad faith. ECF No. 39 at 3. That will not do.
Nor can it be said that the limitations issue here caught the plaintiff unaware. He attached
a letter to his original complaint indicating that he was working on his complaint in June 2024
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and attempting to excuse the tardy filing by referring to recently-received medical records. ECF
No. 1-2. But “it is not necessary that a claimant know all of the evidence ultimately relied on for
the cause of action to accrue.” Baker, 991 F.2d at 632. Filing did not need to await those records.
And the plaintiff’s statement that he had drafted a complaint by June 2024 only underscores that
he could have timely filed his complaint.
What is more, the dates affixed to the original complaint and the letter attached thereto —
November 24 and 23, 2024, respectively, ECF No. 1 at 11; ECF No. 1-2 — further evince
awareness of the statute of limitations. The dates appear inaccurate — the November 23, 2024
letter refers to a November 23, 2024 receipt of documents as occurring “just days ago,” ECF No.
1-2 at 2, and the complaint was sent via Federal Express two-day delivery with a guaranteed
delivery on December 23, 2024, ECF No. 1-4 at 3 — and calculated instead to try to reflect
action just before the November 25, 2024 expiration of the statute of limitations. “The purpose of
a statute of limitations is to promote justice, discourage unnecessary delay, and forestall the
prosecution of stale claims.” Hickerson v. Vessels, 316 P.3d 620, 623–24 (Colo. 2014) (quotation
marks omitted). Dismissal of the late-filed complaint, especially where the plaintiff appears to
know the limitations deadline, serves that purpose here.
To be sure, there is a prison mailbox rule that applies to section 1983 cases. Price v.
Philpot, 420 F.3d 1158, 1164 (10th Cir. 2005). However, it is the plaintiff’s obligation to
establish timely filing under the rule and the plaintiff provides nothing indicating how it ought to
apply here. Id. at 1166–67. It therefore does not guard against dismissal.
In short, this case was filed almost a month after the limitations period expired and
neither statutory nor equitable tolling applies. As a result, the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the
statute of limitations and this case must be dismissed.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS4 that the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), ECF No.
26, be GRANTED and that the claims against the defendants be DISMISSED without
prejudice because they are barred by the statute of limitations.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of December, 2025, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:
____________________________________
Cyrus Y. Chung
United States Magistrate Judge
4 Be advised that all parties shall have fourteen days after service hereof to serve and file any
written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is
assigned. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings
or recommendations to which the objections are being made. The District Court need not
consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. A party’s failure to file such written
objections to proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party
from a de novo determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and
recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676–83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). Additionally, the failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations within fourteen days after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved
party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are
accepted or adopted by the District Court. Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir.
2008) (quoting Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991)). Finally, all parties
must consult and comply with the District Judge’s practice standards for any specific
requirements concerning the filing and briefing of objections.
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