Barnett v. Compass Group USA, Inc.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 24-cv-03256-RMR-CYC
INGRID E. BARNETT,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMPASS GROUP USA, INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
______________________________________________________________________________
Cyrus Y. Chung, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Unopposed Motion to Compel
Arbitration, Continue Scheduling Conference, and Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration. ECF
No. 14. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants the motion in part, denies the motion as
moot in part, and recommends that the plaintiff be compelled to engage in arbitration regarding
the claims she asserts in this case and that this case be administratively closed.
ANALYSIS
A. 	Arbitration
This is an employment matter in which the plaintiff alleges that a wholly owned
subsidiary of the defendant discriminated against her, including by allegedly illegally terminating
her employment. See generally ECF No. 1. The defendant asks the Court to compel arbitration.
ECF No. 14 at 1. The plaintiff does not oppose that request, and the request appears proper.
The defendant attaches as an exhibit to the motion, for example, a document titled
“Mutual Arbitration Agreement,” signed by the plaintiff on May 13, 2021. ECF No. 14-1. The
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agreement provides, in pertinent part:
I and Compass Group USA, Inc. and its subsidiaries, sectors, affiliates, and
divisions (collectively, “Compass Entities”) mutually agree to utilize binding
individual arbitration as the sole and exclusive means to resolve all legal claims
between us, including without limitation those that may arise out of or be
related to my employment, compensation, or termination of employment. I and
the Compass Entities waive our rights to bring a claim against the other in a court
of law and in doing so, specifically waive our rights to a jury. Except as provided
below, any claim, dispute, and/or controversy that I may have against the
Compass Entities (or their directors, officers, employees, or agents), or that the
Compass Entities may have against me, shall be submitted to and determined
exclusively by binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),
except that if for any reason arbitration is unavailable under the FAA, then the
law of the state in which I last worked for any of the Compass Parties shall govern
this Agreement. The FAA applies to this Agreement because my employer’s
business involves interstate commerce.
The only exceptions to the requirement of binding arbitration are claims (1)
arising under the National Labor Relations Act that are brought before the
National Labor Relations Board, (2) for unemployment insurance or medical or
disability benefits under a plan that provides its own process for dispute resolution
(although claims for retaliation are covered by this Agreement), (3) to enforce this
Agreement, compel arbitration, or enforce, modify, or vacate an arbitrator’s
award, and (4) claims for which this Agreement would be invalid as a matter of
federal law, or state or local law that is not preempted by federal law.
ECF No. 14-1 at 2 (emphasis added). Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), a district court
must stay or dismiss judicial proceedings when a written agreement provides that the subject of
the litigation must be submitted to arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 3. Further, Section 4 of the FAA
provides that a party may petition the district court that would have jurisdiction under Title 28
over a dispute arising between the parties that is subject to a written arbitration agreement “for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.” Id.
§ 4.
As the Supreme Court has made clear, “[t]he FAA reflects the fundamental principle that
arbitration is a matter of contract.” Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).
As a result, courts must enforce arbitration agreements “according to their terms.” Id. Further,
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“[t]he FAA is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.” Hill v. Ricoh Ams. Corp., 603 F.3d 766, 771 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks
omitted). If there is uncertainty as to whether a claim is arbitrable, “any doubts concerning the
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Sanchez v. Nitro-Lift Techs.
L.L.C., 762 F.3d 1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). On the other hand,
arbitration is a contractual matter, and parties are not required to submit claims to arbitration that
they have not contractually agreed to submit. Id. The question of whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate is to be decided by the court. AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475
U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
The defendant asserts, and the plaintiff does not dispute, the existence of a valid and
enforceable arbitration agreement. See ECF No. 14-1. Likewise, the plaintiff does not contest
that the claims asserted in this lawsuit are within the scope of the parties’ agreement and suitable
for arbitration. Upon review of the arbitration agreement and the unrebutted arguments set forth
in the defendant’s motion, it is clear that a valid arbitration agreement exists, see E.E.O.C. v.
Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (“Employment contracts, except for those covering
workers engaged in transportation, are covered by the FAA.”), and that the plaintiff’s claims fall
within its scope, see id. (“Absent some ambiguity in the agreement, . . . it is the language of the
contract that defines the scope of disputes subject to arbitration.”). Therefore, the Court
recommends that the District Court compel the plaintiff to pursue her claims through arbitration.
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B. 	Request for a Stay
The defendant asks the Court to stay this matter while the parties engage in arbitration.
ECF No. 14 at 6. This request is unopposed. Id. As noted above, the FAA provides for stays of
proceedings in federal district courts when an issue in the proceeding is referable to arbitration.
See 9 U.S.C. § 3. As indicated above, the agreement mandates arbitration for the plaintiff’s
claims in this case. In such an instance, the Court shall stay the case. Id. Therefore, a stay is
mandatory. Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 476 (2024) (“When § 3 says that a court ‘shall . . .
stay’ the proceeding, the court must do so.” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3)). Accordingly, the Court will
grant the motion’s request for a stay.
C. 	Administrative Closure
Given the indefinite timing of the arbitration process and the potential that arbitration
could resolve all outstanding issues between the parties, administrative closure pursuant to
D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2 is appropriate, subject to reopening for good cause. Indeed, courts in this
District have found administrative closure of cases appropriate while the parties proceed with
arbitration. See, e.g., Aragon v. U-Haul Co of Colo., 550 F. Supp. 3d 933, 934 (D. Colo. 2021)
(adopting recommendation that case be administratively closed while the parties participate in
arbitration); Prosser v. Whayne & Sons Enters., Inc., No. 14-CV-01764-KLM, 2015 WL 128534,
at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 8, 2015) (“[A]lthough a stay of proceedings in this matter is warranted, the
circumstances presented here make this case eminently more suited for administrative closure,
given the fact that arbitration should resolve all outstanding issues.”); Workalemahu v. Heritage
Club, No. 14-cv-02396-RM-MEH, 2015 WL 293261, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 21, 2015) (adopting
recommendation that case be administratively closed and compelling arbitration). Indeed, Tenth
Circuit has expressly recognized that “[u]se of the administrative-closure mechanism allows
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district courts to remove from their pending cases suits which are temporarily active elsewhere
(such as before an arbitration panel) or stayed (such as where a bankruptcy is pending).”
Patterson v. Santini, 631 F. App’x 531, 534 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).
Given that the parties will be proceeding with arbitration and the duration of the
arbitration process is unknown, it is in the best interest of the parties and in the interest of
judicial economy to administratively close this case, subject to reopening for good cause under
the Local Rule. For these reasons, this Court respectfully recommends that this matter be
administratively closed pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2, with leave to reopen for good cause
shown.
D. 	Request to Continue Scheduling Conference
On March 7, 2025, the Court sua sponte vacated the March 10, 2025 Scheduling
Conference. ECF No. 19. As a result, the portion of the motion that asks the Court to continue
the March 10, 2025 Scheduling Conference is denied as moot.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Unopposed Motion
to Compel Arbitration, Continue Scheduling Conference, and Stay Proceedings Pending
Arbitration, ECF No. 14, is GRANTED in part and DENIED as moot in part.
It is hereby ORDERED that the portion of the motion asking the Court to continue the
Scheduling Conference to a later date is DENIED as moot.
It is further ORDERED that the portion of the motion requesting that this case be stayed
is GRANTED. This case is STAYED until further order of the court.
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In addition, the Court RECOMMENDS1:
(1) That the District Court compel the plaintiff to pursue her claims through arbitration,
(2) That this case be ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR
41.2, with leave to reopen for good cause shown, and
(3) The parties be granted leave to file a request to reopen or a motion to dismiss this
action within 14 days after the conclusion of the arbitration.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of March, 2025, at Denver, Colorado.
BY THE COURT:
____________________________________
Cyrus Y. Chung
United States Magistrate Judge
1 Be advised that all parties shall have fourteen days after service hereof to serve and file any
written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is
assigned. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings
or recommendations to which the objections are being made. The District Court need not
consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. A party’s failure to file such written
objections to proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party
from a de novo determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and
recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676-83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Additionally, the failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations
within fourteen days after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved party from appealing
the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by
the District Court. Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Moore v.
United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991)). Finally, all parties must consult and comply
with the District Judge’s practice standards for any specific requirements concerning the filing
and briefing of objections.
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