Weber v. State of Colorado, The et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 24-cv-02880-PAB
CHRISTOPHER WEBER,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE STATE OF COLORADO,
JEFFERSON COUNTY, COLORADO,
KATIE DEVRIES, Attorney, Sherman and Howard LLC,
SHERMAN AND HOWARD LLC,
DAVID LITTMAN, Littman Family Law, Mediator on the custody case, then Decision-
Maker,
JEFFREY PILKINGTON, Chief Judge, 1st Judicial Court of Colorado,
LAURA TIGHE, Retired County Judge, Jefferson County,
JOEL SCHAEFER, Jefferson County Magistrate,
NICHOLAS CAMPBELL, Jefferson County Magistrate,
BRIAN BOATRIGHT, Colorado Supreme Court Chief Justice,
SUEANNA JOHNSON, Colorado Court of Appeals Judge for 1 st District,
KYM SORRELLS, Jefferson County Attorney,
THE COLORADO COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE, CCJD,
THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT,
CHRISTOPHER GREGORY, the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline,
JEFFERY WALSH, the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline,
ELIZABETH MILLER, Mother, Ex-wife,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Request for Immediate
Emergency Relief Via Injunction Against the Jefferson County Court [Docket No. 27].
In light of plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court construes his filings liberally. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
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1991). However, a court does not act as an advocate for a pro se litigant. See Hall,
935 F.2d at 1110.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On October 17, 2024, plaintiff Christopher Weber filed this action. Docket No. 1.
Mr. Weber brings seventeen claims for relief based on alleged violations of his
Fourteenth Amendment rights to Due Process and Equal Protection and based on an
alleged civil conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights. Id. at 2–3; Docket No.
1-3 at 1–16. In particular, Mr. Weber alleges that, in custody proceedings between Mr.
Weber and his ex-wife, Elizabeth Miller, over their son, MDW, the Jefferson County
judicial system has deprived him of his constitutional rights for the past five years.
Docket No. 1-3 at 1. Mr. Weber appears to allege that Magistrate Joel Schaefer
improperly appointed David Littman as a mediator and decision-maker in the custody
proceedings despite Mr. Littman not being qualified for these positions. Id. at 1, 13. Mr.
Littman modified the custody arrangement between Mr. Weber and Ms. Miller, including
changes to Mr. Weber’s parenting time and child support obligations. Id. at 1. Mr.
Weber alleges that, despite Magistrate Judge Schaefer later concluding that his
appointment of Mr. Littman was improper, Mr. Littman remained active in the case until
at least November 3, 2021. 1 Id. at 2–3.
1 It is not clear from Mr. Weber’s complaint whether Mr. Littman is still a “decision
maker” in the custody case. Although Mr. Weber claims that the court refused to
remove Mr. Littman from the case, Docket No. 1-3 at 2–3, he also claims that “Jefferson
County allowed a third-party arbitrator to file a child support modification that matches
the parenting time order filed by David Littman.” Id. at 13. This suggests that Mr.
Littman is no longer active in the case and has been replaced by a different arbitrator,
although the new arbitrator appears to have proceeded in a manner consistent with Mr.
Littman’s orders and recommendations.
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Mr. Weber states that, after becoming aware that Magistrate Judge Schaefer had
improperly appointed Mr. Littman, resulting in multiple ultra vires modifications to Mr.
Weber and Ms. Miller’s custody arrangement, members of the Colorado judiciary
conspired with counsel for Ms. Miller “to keep the case unresolved.” Id. at 4. These
judicial officers include Magistrate Judge Nicholas Campbell, Judge Laura Tighe, Chief
Judge Jeffrey Pilkington, Colorado Court of Appeals Judge Sueanna Johnson, former
Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court Brian Boatright, as well as Christopher
Gregory and Jeffery Walsh, acting as members of the Colorado Commission on Judicial
Discipline. Id. at 4–16.
Mr. Weber states that he “filed a motion to modify parenting time in early 2022, in
order to correct the orders on the case that were unlawfully modified by David Littman in
February 2021,” but that the “Jefferson County Court, and the Colorado court system in
general, are deliberately preventing the motion from being resolved in order to avoid the
court looking bad on the record.” Id. at 5–6. Mr. Weber alleges that requested a
“Magistrate Review” of the orders regarding Mr. Weber’s custody rights from Judge
Laura Tighe. Id. at 7–8. After an adverse ruling, Mr. Weber appealed the custody
proceedings, but Colorado Court of Appeals Judge Sueanna Johnson terminated the
appeal with prejudice. Id. at 8. Mr. Weber appears to have also filed complaints with
the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, but he claims that the Colorado
Supreme Court “is participating in, or directing, the attempts to keep the custody case
unresolved and to shut down investigations into misconduct of the judicial officers and
attorneys involved.” Id. at 8, 14–15.
Mr. Weber describes the current state of the custody case as follows:
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The current orders being enforced are massive modifications to decision-making
and parenting time filed unlawfully by private citizen Defendant David Littman,
whose role as Decision-Maker prohibited him from filing orders. . . . The
Jefferson County Court is denying that it allowed David Littman to modify
parenting time (it has not commented on his other filings) on the record, but off
the record it is admitting it did . . . . The Colorado court system cannot claim that
the current orders are in the best interests of the child because no such finding
has ever been made. . . . Despite 5 ½ years of escalating litigation, the Colorado
court system has NEVER taken a position on the best interests of the child, has
not made a determination of appropriate parenting time, [and] has not made a
determination of decision-making or child support. While the Jefferson County
Court denies that it allowed David Littman to modify parenting time, Jefferson
County allowed a third-party arbitrator to file a child support modification that
matches the parenting time order filed by David Littman and is enforcing this
order by garnishing Plaintiff’s wages to pay Mrs. Miller child support for a
parenting time schedule the Jefferson County Court denies is in effect.
Id. at 13.
In addition to monetary damages, Mr. Weber’s complaint asks the Court to (1)
order Jefferson County Court to vacate all orders that were filed in the custody case
within the last five years, (2) order Jefferson County Court to terminate the custody
case, (3) enjoin Jefferson County Court from issuing domestic orders regarding MDW,
(4) order the state of Colorado to provide a plan within sixty days to remedy systematic
corruption within the state’s legal system, and (5) refer the matter to the Colorado Bar
Association to conduct a public investigation into the proceedings in the custody case.
Docket No. 1 at 4–5.
On December 20, 2024, Mr. Weber filed his motion for injunctive relief. Docket
No. 27. In the motion, Mr. Weber states that Ms. Miller has filed a motion for a no-
contact/protection order against Mr. Weber in Jefferson County Court as part of the
ongoing custody dispute. Id. at 1, 3, ¶¶ 4, 9. Mr. Weber claims that Ms. Miller is
unlikely to succeed on her motion because she will not be able to demonstrate that Mr.
Weber “credibly threatened” her. Id. at 2–3, ¶¶ 5–9. He asserts that Mr. Weber and
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Ms. Miller have not had in-person contact for two and a half years and have had no
communication for more than a year. Id., ¶¶ 5–7. Mr. Weber states that he was
scheduled to appear to defend against Ms. Miller’s motion for a protective order on
December 23, 2024. Id. at 1, ¶ 5. Mr. Weber explains that “he is not requesting D.
Colo. rule on the merits of Mrs. Miller’s protection order request.” Id. at 3, ¶ 10.
Instead, “Mr. Weber only wishes to remove these matters from the Jefferson County
Court, which is being sued in this lawsuit for improperly curtailing Plaintiff’s rights.” Id.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that a Citation and Temporary Civil Protection
Order Issued Pursuant to § 13-14-104.5 C.R.S. was issued in the Jefferson County
Court custody case on December 23, 2024. 2 Weber v. Weber, 2017DR30759 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 23, 2024). At a hearing set for January 6, 2025, Mr. Weber has been
ordered to show cause why the temporary protective order should not be made
permanent. Id. at 1.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To succeed on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the movant will suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips
in the movant’s favor; and (4) that the injunction is in the public interest. RoDa Drilling
Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def.
2 See St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169,
1172 (10th Cir. 1979) (“federal courts, in appropriate circumstances, may take notice of
proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those
proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”); United States v. Ahidley, 486
F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (“we may exercise our discretion to take judicial
notice of publicly-filed records in our court and certain other courts concerning matters
that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand”).
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Council, Inc., 555 US. 7, 20 (2008)); see Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir.
2010)). “[B]ecause a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the right to relief
must be clear and unequivocal.” Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distribution,
LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Greater Yellowstone Coal. v.
Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Granting such “drastic relief,” United States ex rel. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Okla. v. Enter. Mgmt. Consultants, Inc., 883 F.2d 886, 888–89 (10th Cir. 1989),
“is the exception rather than the rule.” GTE Corp. v. Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 678 (10th
Cir. 1984).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The Court construes Mr. Weber’s motion as a motion for a preliminary injunction
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 enjoining the Jefferson County Court
from ruling on Ms. Miller’s motion for a protective order. 3
Mr. Weber’s motion is deficient for three reasons: the injunctive relief he seeks is
moot, (2) the Younger abstention doctrine prohibits the Court from exercising jurisdiction
over his motion, and (3) Mr. Weber has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on
the merits of his claims.
3 In his motion, Mr. Weber does not identify the specific injunctive relief he seeks.
See Docket No. 27. Mr. Weber states that he wants to “remove these matters from
Jefferson County Court.” Id. at 3, ¶ 10. However, because Mr. Weber states that “he is
not requesting D. Colo. rule on the merits of Mrs. Miller’s protection order request,” the
Court does not interpret Mr. Weber’s motion as an attempt to remove the custody
proceedings to federal court. Id. Mr. Weber could not remove the custody proceeding
to federal court because “[f]ederal courts do not have jurisdiction over cases involving
divorce, child custody, and related issues.” Vogel v. Soliman, No. 10-cv-01204-REB-
MJW, 2010 WL 2163764, at *1 (D. Colo. May 27, 2010) (citing Vaughan v. Smithson,
883 F.2d 63, 64 (10th Cir. 1989) (“It is now well established that federal courts do not
have diversity jurisdiction to grant a divorce or annulment, determine support payments,
or award custody of a child.”)).
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“Under Article III of the Constitution [federal courts] may only adjudicate actual,
ongoing controversies.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988); see also Wiley v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 612 F.2d 473, 475 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting that mootness “has
its constitutional origin in the ‘case or controversy’ limitation of Article III”). In
determining whether a claim is moot, “[t]he crucial question is whether granting a
present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the real world.”
Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d
1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). The
requirement of a live controversy exists at all stages of a case, not simply at the
inception of the case. Nat’l Advertising Co. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 912 F.2d 405, 411
(10th Cir. 1990). When it becomes “impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief
whatever to a prevailing party, [the court] must dismiss the case, rather than issue an
advisory opinion.” Fleming v. Gutierrez, 785 F.3d 442, 445 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Stevenson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5, 762 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2014).
In his motion, Mr. Weber states that he “is now scheduled to appear in court
December 23, 2024, to defend himself from charges that Mrs. Miller claims she is
‘credibly threatened’ by Mr. Weber.” Docket No. 27 at 1, ¶ 5. The Jefferson County
Court has ruled on Ms. Miller’s motion and has issued a temporary protective order.
Weber, 2017DR30759 at 1. As such, the event that Mr. Weber seeks to enjoin, namely,
the ruling on Ms. Miller’s motion for a protective order, has occurred, and his motion is
moot.
Even if Mr. Weber’s motion is not moot, given that there is a hearing on January
6, 2024 as to whether to make the protective order permanent, Mr. Weber’s requested
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relief is prohibited by the Younger abstention doctrine. In Younger v. Harris, the
Supreme Court ruled that a federal district court’s injunction of a pending state court
criminal prosecution violated “the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or
enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.” 401 U.S.
37, 41 (1971). Younger abstention requires “that federal courts not interfere with state
court proceedings by granting equitable relief – such as injunctions of important state
proceedings or declaratory judgments regarding constitutional issues in those
proceedings – when such relief could adequately be sought before the state court.”
Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999). Thus, after Younger, even
when a federal court would otherwise have jurisdiction to grant declaratory or equitable
relief, the court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction when a judgment on the claim
would interfere with ongoing state criminal or civil proceedings. D.L. v. Unified Sch.
Dist., 392 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Courthouse News Serv. v.
N.M. Admin. Off. of Cts., 53 F.4th 1245, 1256 (10th Cir. 2022) (“Younger applies to the
following three categories of state cases: (1) state criminal prosecutions, (2) civil
enforcement proceedings, and (3) civil proceedings involving certain orders that are
uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.”
(citations and quotation omitted)).
The Supreme Court has established a three-part analysis for abstention under
Younger. When a case filed in federal court raises the possibility of federal-court
interference with state processes, the federal court must abstain if (1) there is an
ongoing state judicial, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) which implicates important
state interests, and (3) in which there is an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional
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challenges. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,
431–32 (1982); Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211,
1215 (10th Cir. 2003). Younger abstention is not discretionary and, if abstention
applies, a court must dismiss the claim without prejudice. D.L. Unified, 392 F.3d at
1228. The Tenth Circuit has “consistently applied Younger to child custody cases.”
Morkel v. Davis, 513 F. App’x 724, 728 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (collecting
cases). “And, courts may address Younger abstention sua sponte.” Tereza v. Garland,
2021 WL 5510243, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 24, 2021) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S.
132, 143 n.10 (1976) (“abstention may be raised by the court Sua Sponte.”)).
The Tenth Circuit has held that the first prong of the Younger abstention analysis,
whether there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding, is determined based on the time
when the federal action was filed. Dauwe v. Miller, 364 F. App’x 435, 437 (10th Cir.
2010) (unpublished) (citing Bear v. Patton, 451 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 2006)). State
proceedings end, and are therefore no longer ongoing, when a lower state court issues
a judgment and the losing party allows the time for appeal to expire. Bear, 451 F.3d at
642 (citing Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo
de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 24–25 (1st Cir. 2005)). Here, Mr. Weber’s complaint
indicates that the proceedings in the state custody case are ongoing. Docket No. 1-3 at
5. Mr. Weber has filed a motion to modify parenting time to correct the court’s orders
entered after Mr. Littman’s involvement. Id. Moreover, the custody proceedings remain
ongoing given the protective order against Mr. Weber. The order is a temporary
restraining order, and the matter is set for another hearing on January 6, 2025. Weber,
2017DR30759 at 1. Therefore, the first prong of the Younger abstention analysis is
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satisfied because there was an ongoing state proceeding at the time that Mr. Weber
filed this case and because it is clear that the proceedings remain ongoing.
The Court will next consider the second prong of the Younger abstention
analysis, whether the state custody case implicates important state interests. All
seventeen of the claims asserted in Mr. Weber’s federal complaint, including the ones
alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution, are claims challenging orders in the
Jefferson County custody case. Docket No. 1-3 at 1–16, see Dauwe, 364 F. App’x at
436–37 (affirming Younger abstention where plaintiff alleged that state judges’ adverse
rulings violated his right to due process, equal protection, and access to the courts
under the U.S. Constitution because plaintiff’s “pleadings clearly reflect[ed] an attempt
to have the federal courts review and invalidate rulings made in his state cases”). The
Tenth Circuit has held that “the resolution of child custody matters has been
acknowledged as an important state interest.” Morkel, 513 F. App’x at 729 (citing Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2004) (“the whole subject of
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the United States”). The “comity considerations of the
Younger doctrine are particularly vital in child custody proceedings, which are ‘an
especially delicate subject of state policy.’” Id. (quoting Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d
1386, 1393 (10th Cir. 1996)). Therefore, the Court finds that Mr. Weber’s custody case
implicates an important state interest and satisfies the second prong of the Younger
abstention analysis.
As to the third prong of the Younger abstention analysis, whether there is
adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in state proceedings, the Tenth Circuit has
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noted that, “[a]s a general matter, ‘Colorado law does not bar [federal constitutional]
claims,’” finding abstention appropriate where “no particular reason appears why the
objections advanced [in federal court] could not be given fully adequate consideration in
the state courts.” Dauwe, 364 F. App’x at 437 (quoting Crown Point I, 319 F.3d at
1215); see also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425–26 (1979) (“Certainly, [Younger]
abstention is appropriate unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the
Constitutional claims.”). Here, the constitutional and civil conspiracy claims in Mr.
Weber’s complaint ask the Court to review and invalidate orders in the Jefferson County
Court custody case. Mr. Weber’s complaint states that he appealed aspects of the
custody proceedings, but that the appeal was terminated with prejudice. Docket No. 1-3
at 8. Mr. Weber does not identify whether he raised his constitutional challenges to the
Jefferson County Court’s orders on appeal. However, even if he did not, Mr. Weber
does not explain why he could not have raised those issues on appeal or otherwise filed
his constitutional claims in state court. Thus, not only is there adequate opportunity to
raise federal claims in state proceedings as a general matter, but Mr. Weber appears to
have had such an opportunity. The Court finds that the third prong of the Younger
abstention analysis is satisfied. Because all three prongs of the Younger abstention
analysis are satisfied, the Court would abstain from granting the injunctive relief Mr.
Weber seeks even if the motion was not moot.
Finally, Mr. Weber’s motion for a preliminary injunction fails on the merits. As
discussed above, to be entitled to a preliminary injunction, Mr. Weber must show a
likelihood of success on the merits. RoDa Drilling, 552 F.3d at 1208. Mr. Weber’s
motion does not explain why he has shown a likelihood of success on the merits
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concerning any of his seventeen claims for relief. See Docket No. 27. Thus, the Court
would deny his motion for a preliminary injunction even if the motion was not moot and
even if the Younger abstention doctrine did not apply. See Oklahoma v. United States
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 107 F.4th 1209, 1228 n.19 (10th Cir. 2024) (“Given
Oklahoma’s failure to show a likelihood of success, we need not consider the other
elements of a preliminary injunction.” (citing Warner v. Gross, 776 F.3d 721, 736 (10th
Cir. 2015)). For all these reasons, the Court denies Mr. Weber’s motion for emergency
injunctive relief. 4
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that the Request for Immediate Emergency Relief Via Injunction
Against the Jefferson County Court [Docket No. 27] is DENIED. It is further
4 The Court concludes that it can appropriately resolve the present motion
without a hearing. See Sgaggio v. Weiser, No. 22-cv-01791-PAB, 2022 WL 3700723,
at *4 n.2 (D. Colo. Aug. 26, 2022) (denying preliminary injunction motion without a
hearing); Zeller v. Ventures Tr. 2013-I-NH, No. 15-cv-01077-PAB-NYW, 2015 WL
4720313, at *5 n.2 (D. Colo. Aug. 10, 2015) (denying preliminary injunction motion
without a hearing) (citing Prosper, Inc. v. Innovative Software Techs, 188 F. App’x 703,
706 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion
in failing to hold a hearing on motion for preliminary injunction); Reynolds & Reynolds
Co. v. Eaves, 1998 WL 339465, at *3 (10th Cir. June 10, 1998) (table decision)
(rejecting argument that court was required to hold evidentiary hearing on motion for
preliminary injunction)); see also D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(h); Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (“By
rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs,
without oral hearings.”).
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ORDERED that, on or before January 10, 2025, plaintiff Christopher Weber
shall show cause why the Court should not abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the
claims in his complaint and why this case should not be dismissed without prejudice.
DATED December 27, 2024.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge
____	__	__	__	__	__	_____	__	__	___________	__	__	__	_______________________________	_________________
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