Bellinsky v. Galan et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Case No. 23-cv-03461-PAB-STV
JACOB BELLINSKY,
Plaintiff,
v.
RACHEL ZINNA GALAN, individually,
STEVEN JAMES LAZAR, individually,
ANDREW NEWTON HART, individually,
JOHN EVAN KELLNER, individually,
EVA ELAINE WILSON, individually,
RAIF EDWIN TAYLOR, individually,
GINA PARKER, individually,
GARY MICHAEL KRAMER, individually,
PALMER L. BOYETTE, individually,
THERESA MICHELLE SLADE, individually,
MICHELLE ANN AMICO, individually,
BRIAN DALE BOATRIGHT, individually, and,
STATE OF COLORADO, corporately,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objections to September 15, 2025
Order (Doc. 109) Reinstating Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 113] and Plaintiff’s Rule
72(a) Statement of Objections to Magistrate Judge Varholak’s September 18, 2025 Oral
Orders Denying Motions to Lift Discovery Stays [Docket No. 117]. Defendants the State
of Colorado, Terri Meredith, Ryan Paul Loewer, Jeffrey Pilkington, Bryce David Allen,
and Brian Dale Boatright (collectively, the “State Defendants”) filed a response. Docket
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No. 119. Defendants Rachel Zinna Galan and Steven James Lazar joined the State
Defendants’ response. Id. at 1. Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 121.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On December 29, 2023, plaintiff Jacob Bellinsky filed this case. 1 Docket No. 1.
On March 6, 2024, defendants filed a motion to stay discovery and to stay all
proceedings pending the Court’s resolution of the state defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Docket No. 51. The magistrate judge granted the motion. Docket No. 69 at 2.
On August 22, 2024, the Court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss all of
plaintiff’s claims without prejudice pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Docket No. 81 at 12-25. On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit vacated the Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Docket No. 89 at 13. The Tenth Circuit held that the Court erred by failing to determine
whether plaintiff’s “underlying domestic relations case had fallen into a Sprint category”
before finding that Younger abstention applies. Id. at 12. The Tenth Circuit noted that,
if plaintiff’s case “didn’t fall into a Sprint category, the district court would need to
consider the remaining arguments asserted in the defendants’ motions to dismiss.” Id.
The Tenth Circuit held that the Court erred in finding that Rooker-Feldman bars
plaintiff’s claims because plaintiff “wasn’t subject to any adverse judgments in state
court when he sued in federal court and (2) he isn’t challenging the state-court
judgments.” Id. On September 15, 2025, the Court reopened this case, vacated its
1 Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally
without serving as his advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991).
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order dismissing plaintiff’s claims, and reinstated defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Docket No. 109 at 2.
On August 21, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to “lift any remaining discovery stays
in this action.” Docket No. 99 at 1. In plaintiff’s motion, he argued that the court must
lift the discovery stay in this action because the Tenth Circuit’s order “bars defendants
from relitigating on remand issues that the Tenth Circuit has already decided, including
abstention arguments that underpinned the original stay.” Id. at 6. 	The magistrate
judge held a telephonic motions hearing and status conference. See Docket No. 114.
At the hearing, the magistrate judge denied plaintiff’s motion to lift the discovery stay.
See id. at 1.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The district court reviews a magistrate judge’s order on a non-dispositive motion
under a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(a). Under this standard of review, a magistrate judge’s ruling should not
be rejected merely because the Court would have decided the matter differently. See
Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). The clearly erroneous
standard requires a district court to affirm a magistrate judge’s decision unless, “on the
entire evidence[, the district court] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464
(10th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948));
see also Allen v. Sybase, Inc., 468 F.3d 642, 658 (10th Cir. 2006). “Under the ‘contrary
to law’ standard, the reviewing court sets aside the magistrate order only if it applied an
incorrect standard or applied the appropriate legal standard incorrectly.” Swan Glob.
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Invs., LLC v. Young, No. 18-cv-03124-CMA-NRN, 2019 WL 2171457, at *3 (D. Colo.
May 17, 2019) (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted).
Orders regarding discovery are typically non-dispositive matters. See
Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 566 (10th Cir. 1997). Therefore, the Court will review
plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate judge’s rulings from the September 18 hearing
under the clearly erroneous or contrary to law standard. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiff’s Objection to the Court’s September 15 Order
Plaintiff purports to file “objections” to the Court’s September 15 order pursuant
to Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 2 See
Docket No. 113 at 1. However, Rule 72(a) and § 636 permit plaintiff to file objections to
the magistrate judge’s orders, not to orders of the district court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Accordingly, there is no legal basis for plaintiff to
object to the September 15 order pursuant to Rule 72(a) or § 636(b)(1).
To the extent that plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its September 15 order,
the Court will deny the motion. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically
provide for motions for reconsideration. See Hatfield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for
Converse Cnty., 52 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1995). Instead, motions for reconsideration
2 Plaintiff’s filing exceeds the page limitations imposed by the Court’s Practice
Standards. See Practice Standards (Civil Cases), Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer, § III.A
(“All motions, objections (including objections to the recommendations or orders of
United States Magistrate Judges), responses, and briefs shall not exceed fifteen
pages.”). In the future, the Court will strike plaintiff’s filings that fail to comply with the
Court’s Practice Standards.
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fall within a court’s plenary power to revisit and amend interlocutory orders as justice
requires. See Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Thompson Theatres, Inc., 621 F.2d 1088,
1090 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)); see also Houston Fearless Corp. v.
Teter, 313 F.2d 91, 92 (10th Cir. 1962). In order to avoid the inefficiency that would
attend the repeated re-adjudication of interlocutory orders, judges in this district have
imposed limits on their broad discretion to revisit interlocutory orders. See, e.g.,
Montano v. Chao, No. 07-cv-00735-EWN-KMT, 2008 WL 4427087, at *5-*6 (D. Colo.
Sept. 28, 2008) (applying Rule 60(b) analysis to the reconsideration of interlocutory
order); United Fire & Cas. Co. v. McCrerey & Roberts Constr. Co., No. 06-cv-00037-
WYD-CBS, 2007 WL 1306484, at *1-*2 (D. Colo. May 3, 2007) (applying Rule 59(e)
standard to the reconsideration of the duty-to-defend order). Regardless of the analysis
applied, the basic assessment tends to be the same: courts consider whether new
evidence or legal authority has emerged or whether the prior ruling was clearly in error.
See Echon v. Sackett, No. 14-cv-03420-PAB-NYW, 2019 WL 8275344, at *2 (D. Colo.
Feb. 12, 2019); cf. Alpenglow Botanicals, LLC v. United States, 894 F.3d 1187, 1203
(10th Cir. 2018) (“a motion for reconsideration is appropriate where the court has
misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling law”). Motions to
reconsider are generally an inappropriate vehicle to advance “new arguments, or
supporting facts which were available at the time of the original motion.” Servants of the
Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000).
First, plaintiff argues that the September 15 order, “[b]y sua sponte reviving those
defective motions [to dismiss] wholesale, the Court has now further adopted the frauds
as its own, compounding the misconduct and perpetrating additional fraud upon its own
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docket.” Docket No. 113 at 4. Plaintiff argues that the “Tenth Circuit’s July 22, 2025
mandate required ‘further proceedings,’ not resurrection of stale motions.” Id. at 4-5.
Plaintiff contends that, rather than reinstating defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Court
should have denied the motions. See id. at 7-12. The Tenth Circuit’s order does not
support plaintiff’s argument. The Tenth Circuit did not instruct the Court to deny the
motions to dismiss. Rather, the Tenth Circuit held that the Court “erred by failing to
determine whether the underlying domestic relations case had fallen into a Sprint
category” and that, if the Court concludes that the domestic relations case does not fall
into a Sprint category, it “would need to consider the remaining arguments asserted in
the defendants’ motions to dismiss.” Docket No. 89 at 12. Furthermore, the Tenth
Circuit held that Rooker-Feldman does not bar plaintiff’s claims and, therefore, the Court
has jurisdiction over such claims. See id. at 12-13. Thus, it was proper for the Court to
reinstate the motions to dismiss in accordance with the Tenth Circuit’s order and
judgment.
Second, plaintiff argues that the Court’s September 15 order failed to consider
plaintiff’s filing, see Docket No. 107, that opposed the Court reinstating the motions to
dismiss. Docket No. 113 at 4. The Court did consider plaintiff’s filing. However, as
discussed previously, there is no basis for plaintiff’s argument that it is improper for the
Court to reinstate the motions to dismiss.
Third, plaintiff “renews his standing objection to any adjudication by Chief Judge
Brimmer or Magistrate Judge Varholak.” See id. at 16. The Court will not consider this
argument because the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Court’s order denying plaintiff’s
motions for recusal. See Docket No. 89 at 7.
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Because plaintiff fails to provide new evidence, new legal authority, or otherwise
show that the September 15 order was in error, the Court will deny plaintiff’s motion. 3
B. Plaintiff’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s September 18 Order
Plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s September 18 orders denying plaintiff’s
motion to lift the stay on discovery and motion for recusal. 4 Docket No. 117 at 1-2.
First, plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erred in denying the motion to lift the stay
because defendants did not respond to the motion, and therefore, plaintiff’s motion
“should have been deemed confessed and granted” pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR
7.1(d). Id. at 2. Nothing in Local Rule 7.1(d) mandates that plaintiff’s motion must be
granted because defendants did not file a response. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d).
Moreover, defendants did oppose plaintiff’s motion at the September 18, 2025 motions
hearing. See Docket No. 114; Docket No. 119 at 3.
Second, plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge misapplied the String Cheese
factors in determining whether a stay was proper. See Docket No. 117 at 3-11. Courts
3 In his filing, plaintiff seeks sanctions against “both Defendants, and where
appropriate, judicial officers whose actions have perpetrated fraud and adopted fraud
upon the court.” See Docket No. 116 at 21. The Court will not consider this request
because plaintiff fails to move for relief in accordance with the Local Rules of the District
of Colorado. See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d) (“A motion shall be filed as a separate
document.”).
4 The magistrate judge held a hearing on the same day, September 18, 2025, to
address matters in both Case No. 23-cv-03163 and this case, Case No. 23-cv-03461.
See Docket No. 114; Bellinsky v. Galan, Case No. 23-cv-03163, Docket No. 117.
Although plaintiff orally moved for the magistrate judge’s recusal in Case No. 23-cv-
03163, see Bellinsky v. Galan, Case No. 23-cv-03163, Docket No. 117 at 1, he did not
do so in this case. See Docket No. 114. Therefore, the Court will not consider plaintiff’s
objection to the magistrate judge’s denial of the motion to recuse. See Docket No. 117
at 12-14. To the extent plaintiff moved for recusal in both cases, the Court overrules
plaintiff’s argument for the reasons described in Bellinsky v. Galan, Case No. 23-cv-
03163.
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in this district consider the following factors (the “String Cheese factors”) in determining
whether a stay is appropriate: (1) the plaintiff’s interests in proceeding expeditiously with
the civil action and the potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on the
defendant; (3) the convenience to the court; (4) the interests of persons not parties to
the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest. Springmeadows Condo. Ass’n v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-cv-02199-CMA-KMT, 2014 WL 7005106, at *1 (D. Colo.
Dec. 9, 2014) (citing String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., No. 05-cv-
01934-LTB-PAC, 2006 WL 894955, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2006)).
The magistrate judge found that the String Cheese factors weighed in favor of a
stay. He determined that the first factor – plaintiff’s interest in proceeding expeditiously
– weighed against a stay. The magistrate judge found that the second and third factors
– the burden on defendants and the convenience to the Court – weighed heavily in
favor of granting a stay because defendants presented immunity defenses in the
motions to dismiss that could potentially dispose of the entire case. The magistrate
judge noted that the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009),
stated that the purpose of the qualified immunity defense is to avoid “disruptive
discovery.” The magistrate judge found Iqbal’s rationale applicable in this case given
the state defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity. Regarding the fourth factor – the
interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation – the magistrate judge found that
this factor did not weigh in favor of one party or another. Finally, the magistrate judge
found that the fifth factor – the public interest – weighed in favor of a stay because the
public has an interest in the Court determining immunity issues before allowing a case
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to proceed to discovery. The magistrate therefore denied plaintiff’s motion to lift the
stay. See Docket No. 114.
The Court finds that, under the contrary to law standard, the magistrate applied
the correct legal standard, namely, the String Cheese factors. The Court also finds,
under the clearly erroneous standard, that there is no clear error in the magistrate
judge’s order staying this action pending resolution of the motions to dismiss. The
magistrate judge methodically reviewed each String Cheese incident factor. The Court
finds no clear error in the magistrate judge’s weighing of the String Cheese factors. See
also Cook v. Whyde, No. 20-cv-02912-PAB-STV, 2021 WL 981308, at *2-3 (D. Colo.
Mar. 15, 2021) (finding no clear error in a magistrate judge’s order staying discovery
because the magistrate judge carefully reviewed each String Cheese factor and plaintiff
failed to cite any error in the magistrate judge’s evaluation of the String Cheese factors).
Third, plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge “demonstrates judicial adoption
and ratification of fraud on the docket” by “refusing to address Plaintiffs documented
objections and instead deferring to an order that reinstated fraudulent motions.” See
Docket No. 117 at 11. Plaintiff contends that the magistrate judge should have
independently considered plaintiff’s objection to the Court’s September 15 order. See
id. Plaintiff, however, does not identify a legal standard pursuant to which the
magistrate judge should have considered plaintiff’s objection to an order that was not
issued by the magistrate judge. Therefore, he fails to show that the magistrate judge
“applied an incorrect standard or applied the appropriate legal standard incorrectly.”
See Young, 2019 WL 2171457, at *3. Moreover, as discussed regarding plaintiff’s
motion directed at the Court’s September 15 order, the Court finds no basis to
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reconsider the reinstatement of the motions to dismiss and thus no basis for plaintiff’s
objection.
Accordingly, the Court will overrule plaintiff’s objection to the magistrate judge’s
September 18 order.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
It is therefore
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objections to September 15, 2025 Order (Doc. 112)
Reinstating Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 113] is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Rule 72(a) Statement of Objections to Magistrate
Judge Varholak’s September 18, 2025 Oral Orders Denying Motions to Lift Discovery
Stays [Docket No. 117] is OVERRULED. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Exceed Page Limits for
Preservation of Deficient Hearing Record and Full Consideration Of Objections To Sept.
18, 2025 Oral Orders [Docket No. 118] is DENIED as moot. 5 It is further
5 On September 29, 2025, the Cout struck plaintiff’s 69-page objection to the
magistrate judge’s September 18 orders for violating the Court’s Practice Standards on
page limitations. See Docket No. 115. Plaintiff refiled a 15-page, compliant objection
on September 29, 2025. See Docket No. 117. Plaintiff filed a motion asking the Court
to “consider both: (1) Plaintiff’s 15-page condensed ‘Rule 72(a) Statement of Objections’
filed September 30, 2025, and (2) the complete 60+ page ‘Notice & Formal Objections’
filed September 29, 2025 (re-filed as Exhibit 7 of the condensed objections), together as
a unified submission.” Docket No. 118 at 2. The Court has reviewed plaintiff’s 69-page
objection, Docket No. 117-7, and finds that it merely reraises the arguments in plaintiff’s
15-page objection, which the Court will overrule, and does not otherwise show that the
magistrate judge’s September 18 orders were contrary to law. Therefore, the Court will
deny plaintiff’s motion as moot. The Court further finds it proper to deny plaintiff’s
motion to exceed page limitations in light of the fact that the Court will grant plaintiff
leave to file a reply in support of his objection, see Docket No. 120, and has considered
plaintiff’s reply, Docket No. 121.
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ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Rule 72(a)
Objections [Docket No. 120] is GRANTED.
DATED November 19, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
Chief United States District Judge
_____________________________
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