Manchas v. City and County of Denver, Colorado et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Regina M. Rodriguez
Civil Action No. 23-cv-02789-RMR
ZACHARY MANCHAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO,
JOSEPH STEWART, in his individual capacity,
SELENA BIBIANA FAILE, in her individual capacity,
MIA SANCHEZ, in her individual capacity, and
JASON SIMMONS, in his individual capacity,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants City and County of Denver, Joseph
Stewart, 	Mia 	Sanchez, 	Jason 	Simmons, 	and 	Selena 	Bibiana 	Faile 	(collectively,
“Defendants”) Motion to Bifurcate Trial and Stay Certain Discovery, ECF No. 39. The
Motion is fully briefed. For the reasons stated below, the Motion is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
On June 12, 2022, Plaintiff Zachary Manchas (“Plaintiff”) was leaving a bar in
downtown Denver when he observed Denver Police Officers pull over a vehicle driven by
a person of color. Officer Bibiana Faile and Officer Stewart immediately pointed their guns
1 The factual background of this action is discussed at length in the Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge on the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. See ECF No. 56, accepted and adopted at ECF
No. 58. The Court briefly discusses the background as relevant to this order.
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at the driver and began screaming directives. Concerned about the escalating and
aggressive nature of the interaction—and suspecting the officers’ actions were race-
based—Plaintiff began filming the arrest on his phone. In addition to filming, Plaintiff
immediately began to criticize Officer Stewart’s and Officer Bibiana Faile’s tactics,
including their decision to point their weapons at a vehicle in the middle of a crowded
street. The interaction between Plaintiff and the officers continued until Officers Stewart
and Bibiana Faile arrested Plaintiff and took his phone. Officers Simmons and Sanchez
were also on-scene and assisted in Plaintiff’s detention. Plaintiff was charged with
interference and spent the night in jail. Months later, the charges against Plaintiff were
dismissed.
On October 25, 2023, Plaintiff initiated this action. Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint asserts various 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims against the City and
County of Denver (the “City of Denver”) and City of Denver Police Officers Stewart,
Bibiana Faile, Sanchez, and Simmons (the “Individual Defendants”). See ECF No. 45.
Plaintiff alleges § 1983 claims for violation of his First and Fourth Amendment rights, as
well 	as 	state 	law 	claims 	pursuant 	to 	C.R.S. 	§ 	13-21-131, 	against 	the 	Individual
Defendants. Plaintiff asserts § 1983 municipal liability (or “Monell”) claims against the City
of Denver, arguing that the City of Denver has a custom, practice, or policy of committing
First and Fourth Amendment violations against individuals who film or criticize the police
and fails to adequately train and supervise its officers.
On February 2, 2024, the Defendants filed the present motion, seeking an order
bifurcating the trial of Plaintiff’s constitutional and state law claims against the Individual
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Defendants from the municipal liability claims against the City of Denver. ECF No. 39.
Defendants also seek a stay of Plaintiff’s municipal liability claims for the pendency of the
underlying case. Id.
The Individual Defendants and the City of Denver also filed separate motions to
dismiss. ECF Nos. 26, 28. On April 22, 2024, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge
Varholak’s recommendation that both motions to dismiss be denied. ECF Nos. 56, 58.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to
expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more issues,
claims, crossclaims, and counterclaims, or third-party claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
Although the trial court has discretion to order separate trials, that does not mean that
severance is the norm or even a common occurrence. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b)
advisory comm. notes (noting that bifurcation should not be “routinely ordered,” but “it is
important that it be encouraged where experience has demonstrated its worth”); 8
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 42.40[4][a] at 42-46 (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2010)
(“[I]t should be noted that bifurcation and separate trials are not the normal course of
events, and a single trial will usually be more expedient and efficient.”). Indeed,
“[b]ifurcation is the exception; not the rule.” L-3 Comms. Corp. v. OSI Sys., Inc., 418 F.
Supp. 2d 380, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
“[T]he presumption is that the [non-movant] ... should be allowed to present [its]
case in the order [it] chooses. The burden is on the [movant] to convince the court that a
separate trial is proper in light of the general principle that a single trial tends to lessen
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the delay, expense and inconvenience to all parties.” Engen v. Colorado Mills Mall Ltd.
P'ship, No. 09-CV-01281-REB-KLM, 2010 WL 2232422, at *1 (D. Colo. May 28, 2010)
(quoting Patten v. Lederle Laboratories, 676 F. Supp. 233, 238 (D. Utah 1987)).
Separation must further the goals of Rule 42(b); the parties’ desire to proceed in a certain
order is not paramount. See York v. AT&T, 95 F.3d 948, 957–58 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Such
decisions [on bifurcation] must be made with regard to judicial efficiency, judicial
resources, and the likelihood that a single proceeding will unduly prejudice either party or
confuse the jury.”). Further, severance under Rule 42(b) should not prejudice one party.
Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993).
In determining whether to grant a stay of discovery, courts consider the following
factors: (1) the interests of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously with the civil action and
the potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on the defendants; (3) the
convenience to the court; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and
(5) the public interest. String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., No. 1:02-CV-
01934-LTB-PA, 2006 WL 894955, at *3 (D. Colo. March 30, 2006).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Defendants argue that that bifurcation and a stay of discovery on Plaintiff’s
municipal liability claims is warranted because: (1) bifurcation will preserve judicial
convenience and economy; (2) plaintiff’s claims against the Individual Defendants are
separable from his municipal liability claims; and (3) bifurcation is necessary to avoid
undue prejudice to the Individual Defendants.
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Courts in this District have confronted motions for bifurcation and stay of discovery
on municipal liability claims under similar circumstances. In most instances, this District
has declined to bifurcate. See, e.g., Parmar v. City of Aurora, Colorado, No. 20-CV-2801-
WJM-NRN, 2021 WL 1662719, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 28, 2021); Est. of Melvin by & through
Melvin v. City of Colorado Springs, Colorado, No. 20-CV-00991-CMA-KMT, 2021 WL
50872, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 5, 2021); Valdez v. Motyka, No. 15-CV-0109-WJM-STV, 2020
WL 3963717, at *1 (D. Colo. July 13, 2020). As Judge Arguello observed in Melvin,
bifurcation of these type of actions “is uncommon in this jurisdiction.” 2021 WL 50872, at
*1.
Despite the trend against bifurcation in this jurisdiction, Defendants support their
argument with a single case from this District where the court granted a motion to
bifurcate. See Talley v. City & Cnty. of Denver, No. 16-CV-02327-JLK, 2021 WL 5514592,
at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 29, 2021). Defendants’ reliance on Talley is misplaced. In that case,
the procedural posture was a crucial factor in Judge Kane’s decision to bifurcate. In
granting the motion, Judge Kane noted that discovery had already been completed, and
stated that he “likely would not have granted bifurcation at any earlier point in time.” Id. at
*3. Judge Kane also ensured there would be minimal delay by requiring the parties to
prepare for both cases simultaneously and setting the trials in succession. Id. Here,
discovery is ongoing, and the parties have sought and received multiple discovery
extensions. Thus, the rationale of Talley undermines, rather than supports, Defendants’
argument for bifurcation.
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After 	considering 	the 	parties’ 	arguments, 	the 	Court 	is 	not 	persuaded 	that
bifurcation and a stay of discovery is warranted in this case. First, the Court does not find
that bifurcation will meaningfully promote judicial convenience and economy. Rather,
“[b]ifurcation of Plaintiff’s individual and municipal liability claims would allow the case to
languish on the Court’s docket, potentially for years, and would be inconsistent with the
Court’s obligation to oversee ‘the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.’” Melvin, 2021 WL 50872 at *2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). And
although the municipal liability claims broaden the scope of discovery, the Court does not
find that this results in substantial inefficiency or inconvenience to the Court. To the
contrary, “staying discovery on the Monell claims would merely substitute some discovery
disputes for others; disputes concerning which discovery requests relate to the individual
versus municipal liability claims would follow an order granting Defendants’ Motion.”
Melvin, 2021 WL 50872 at *2.
Second, while it is true that the individual and municipal liability claims have
different legal standards and different evidentiary requirements, the claims are not so
unrelated or separable as to require bifurcation. Plaintiff’s theory of municipal liability is
straightforward and closely connected to Plaintiff’s individual liability theories against the
Individual Defendants. At issue here are the Individual Defendants’ actions and the City
of Denver’s policies and training regarding those actions. Thus, there will be substantial
overlap in the evidence and witnesses necessary for both sets of claims. See Parmar v.
City of Aurora, Colorado, 2021 WL 1662719, at *2 (“Bifurcation in this case, where there
is close connection and overlap between the individual and entity liability claims, would
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be costly, waste time, and result in duplicative litigation.”); Valdez v. Motyka, 2020 WL
3963717, at *1 (finding bifurcation is not warranted where the plaintiff was “limited to two
Monell theories (which are arguably a single theory), and the evidence with which he may
pursue those theories is relatively straightforward, not voluminous” and were “closely
connected to his individual liability theory against [Plaintiff].”).
Further, Defendants’ argument that bifurcation is appropriate because a finding of
municipal liability against the City of Denver is dependent on an underlying finding of a
constitutional violation by the Individual Defendants has been rejected by another court
in this District. See McClain, 2021 WL 307505, at *2. (“Defendants' contention that an
underlying constitutional violation by one of the individual Defendants is required in order
to impose municipal liability on the City of Aurora is not an accurate reflection of the law.”).
While it is generally the case that “there must be a must be a constitutional violation, not
just an unconstitutional policy, for a municipality to be held liable,” this is not always true.
See, e.g., Crowson v. Washington Cty. Utah, 983 F.3d 1166, 1191 (10th Cir. 2020);
Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985). The parties dispute whether
that is the case here. At this stage, however, the Court does not find it appropriate to
bifurcate on the mere possibilities that (1) the Individual Defendants are not found liable
and (2) that such a finding forecloses a finding of municipal liability against the City of
Denver.
Finally, the Court does not find that bifurcation would cause undue prejudice to the
Individual Defendants. The Individual Defendants are concerned that they would be
prejudiced by the admission of evidence related to the municipal liability theories but
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unrelated to the individual liability theories. Specifically, the Individual Defendants worry
about the admission of evidence of unrelated arrests of other individuals, the Officers’
conduct during unrelated uses of force, and DPD training and policies. But these risks
can be mitigated by the use of jury instructions and verdict forms. See Melvin, 2021 WL
50872 at *3 (“[T]o the extent that Defendants may be prejudiced by jurors confusing or
conflating issues, such prejudice can be mitigated through the jury instructions and verdict
form.”); Taylor v. Workman, 554 F.3d 879, 893 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Jurors are presumed to
follow their instructions.”). On the other hand, Plaintiff would be prejudiced by having to
spend years on one trial only to potentially restart the process for the second. See Melvin,
2021 WL 50872, at *3 (“Plaintiff has an interest in expeditiously proceeding with discovery
on the municipal liability claims and would be prejudiced by an indefinite stay of that
discovery.”); McClain, 2021 WL 307505, at *5 (“Plaintiffs have a powerful interest in
avoiding an open-ended, indefinite stay and proceeding expeditiously with their case.”)
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate
Trial and Stay Certain Discovery, ECF No. 39, is DENIED.
DATED: May 21, 2024
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
REGINA M. RODRIGUEZ
United States District Judge
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