Astro Companies, LLC v. WestFax, Inc

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
District Judge S. Kato Crews
Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-02328-SKC-CYC
ASTRO COMPANIES, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
WESTFAX INC, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER (DKT. 72)
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Astro Companies, LLC’s Motion to
Reconsider. Dkt. 72. In its Motion, Plaintiff asks this Court to reconsider its Order
dismissing this case with prejudice based on the Court’s conclusion that online fax
service providers such as Plaintiff are not covered by the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA), 42 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(c). For the following reasons, the Motion
is DENIED.
MOTIONS TO RECONSIDER
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for motions
for reconsideration.” Rivera v. Exeter Finance Corp., no. 15-cv-01057-PAB-MEH, 2019
WL 6173666, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 19, 2019) (citing Hatfield v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’ rs
for Converse Cty., 52 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1995)). The bases for granting
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reconsideration are extremely limited: “[g]rounds warranting a motion to reconsider
include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously
unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.
Thus, 	a 	motion 	for 	reconsideration 	is 	appropriate 	where 	the 	court 	has
misapprehended the facts, a party’s position, or the controlling law. It is not
appropriate to revisit issues already addressed or advance arguments that could have
been raised in prior briefing.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012
(10th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). These motions are committed to the trial court’s
discretion. See Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997).
ANALYSIS
In its Motion, Plaintiff argues this Court clearly erred in its Order because it
(1) lacked jurisdiction to rule on the issue; (2) erred in relying on In the Matter of
Amerifactors Fin. Grp., LLC, 34 F.C.C. Rcd. 11950 (2019) and In re Joseph T. Ryerson
& Son, Inc. Petition for Declaratory Ruling, 35 F.C.C. Rcd. 9474 (2020); and (3) erred
in 	its 	statutory 	interpretation. 	None 	of 	these 	arguments 	articulate 	grounds
warranting reconsideration.
To begin, this Court did not rely on or consider itself bound by Amerifactors or
Ryerson. To be sure, the Court was quite specific that its holding was based entirely
on its interpretation of the statutory language of the TCPA. Dkt. 70, pp.4-6. The Court
cited 	Amerifactors 	and 	Ryerson 	because 	those 	analyses 	supported 	the 	Court’s
conclusions and because the Court found them to be thoughtful and persuasive. Id.
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at p.6 (“Although the Court relies only on the statutory language for its analysis, its
conclusions are buttressed by” Amerifactors.) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Court did in fact have jurisdiction to rule on this matter.
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently confirmed this in McLaughlin Chiropractic
Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146, 162 (2025). There, the Supreme Court
reiterated that in an enforcement proceeding, “[d]istrict courts are not bound by the
agency’s interpretation, but instead must determine the meaning of the law under
ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the
agency’s interpretation.” Id. at 155 (citing Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603
U.S. 369, 402 (2024)). And the Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that
the Hobbs Act binds district courts to an agency’s interpretation of a statute in civil
enforcement proceedings.1 Id. at 168 (the Hobbs Act is silent on judicial review in
enforcement 	proceedings, 	and 	therefore, 	courts 	must 	independently 	determine
whether the agency’s statutory interpretation is correct).
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments are based on its disagreement with the Court’s
statutory analysis and ultimate conclusion. While thoughtfully presented, such
arguments are not an appropriate basis for reconsideration because they were or
could have been made in the briefing regarding the Motion to Dismiss.
1 And even if the Court were obligated to follow agency interpretations, the 2003 FCC
decision upon which Plaintiff relies does not address online fax services like those
implicated in this matter. Indeed, the purpose of Amerifactors was to clarify that very
issue.
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* 	* 	*
Because Plaintiff has not cited any intervening change in the controlling law,
new facts that were previously unavailable, or clear error resulting in manifest
injustice, the Motion to Reconsider is respectfully DENIED.2
DATED: February 9, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
S. Kato Crews
United Stated District Judge
2 In its Notice of Supplemental Authority, Plaintiff requests permission to file a new
motion for reconsideration or amended complaint in light of the Supreme Court’s
ruling in McLaughlin Chiropractic Assoc. v. McKesson Corp. 606 U.S. 146, 162 (2025).
Dkt. 78. This is not an appropriate way to seek such relief. See D.C.COLO.LCivR
7.1(d) (“A motion shall be filed as a separate document.”).
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