Slick Slide LLC v. Reed et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-01649-CNS-NRN
SLICK SLIDE LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
EDWIN L. REED and
CHAD L. REEVES,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court are the parties’ summary judgment motions and Plaintiff Slick
Slide LLC’s (Slick Slide’s) expert exclusion motion. ECF Nos. 75–77. The Court DENIES
Slick Slide’s exclusion motion. ECF No. 75. The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES
IN PART Slick Slide’s partial summary judgment motion. ECF No. 76. The Court GRANTS
the Reed Defendants’ summary judgment motion. ECF No. 77. In doing so, the Court
presumes familiarity with this case’s factual and procedural background, the parties’
briefing, and the governing legal standards. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Fed. R. Evid. 702.
I. 	ANALYSIS
A. Slick Slide’s Exclusion Motion
Slick Slide moves to exclude the report and testimony of Defendants’ expert
Nathan MacDonald. See, e.g., ECF No. 75 at 1. In doing so, Slick Slide challenges only
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Mr. McDonald’s qualifications, arguing that Mr. MacDonald is unqualified to serve as an
expert. See id. at 5 (“MacDonald is not qualified as a designer of slides.” (citation
modified)); id. at 6 (“That Mr. MacDonald is an engineer and has been involved in the
design of products generally is not sufficient to qualify him to testify in a design patent
infringement case, on the issue of obviousness, with respect to . . . slides.”) The Court
disagrees.
The parties recite the controlling legal standard, with which the Court presumes
familiarity. See, e.g., ECF No. 75 at 3; ECF No. 80 at 6; Banks v. Munir, No. 1:20–cv–
03729–CNS–MDB, 2023 WL 2914811, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 12, 2023). And given that Slick
Slide challenges only Mr. MacDonald’s expert qualifications, see ECF No. 75 at 5, the
Court focuses its exclusion analysis there, explaining why exclusion on this basis is
improper.
Slick Slide argues that “Mr. MacDonald is not qualified to offer an opinion regarding
obviousness” because he “has never designed a slide, the subject matter of the ‘821
patent, as well as the subject matter of both references that he suggests could be
combined.” ECF No. 75 at 5. Slick Slide further argues that Mr. MacDonald is only a
“general 	engineering 	consultant,” 	id. 	with 	limited 	engineering 	experience 	that
fundamentally—and, from Slick Slide’s perspective, fatally—lacks slide design, id. at 6–
7.
The Court agrees with Defendants the record makes clear that Mr. MacDonald has
the “necessary qualifications to testify as an ‘ordinary designer’” in this case. ECF No. 80
at 8. Mr. MacDonald is a registered Professional Engineer, see ECF No. 80-1 at 4, with
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over twelve years of mechanical engineering consultant experience, see id., and who has
numerous relevant certifications and licenses, id. at 36. His professional experience
includes “tak[ing] part in the design, manufacture, and review of numerous products,
including ziplines, drop rides, slingshot rides, alpine slides, alpine coasters, roller
coasters, water slides, rope swing slides, pendulum swing rides, and more.” ECF No. 80-
1 at 4. He has served as the lead engineer on numerous projects, including “ziplines,
exercise equipment . . . aerial lifts, and other hydraulic pneumatic, and electronic
equipment,” id. at 34, and has extensive experience with amusement rides and devices,
id.
If Mr. MacDonald’s declaration, report, and curriculum vitae were insufficient to
demonstrate his qualifications to opine as an expert in this matter—and they are sufficient
to do so—his deposition testimony provides confirmation of his qualifications. See
generally ECF No. 80-2. Mr. MacDonald testified he has “actually done a couple of . . .
safety review[s]” for waterslides,” id. at 20–21 (citation modified), and that as a “result of
[his] education, [his] training and [his] experience and because [he] knows enough,”
including “what standards [a slide] has to meet [and] how to do all the structural analysis
and the testing that’s required for [the slide]” that he “would have no issue doing” a slide
design “whatsoever,” id. at 27. See also Hart v. City of La Junta, No. 1:23–cv–00134–
DDD–MDB, 2025 WL 981556, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 19, 2025) (“[T]he language of Rule
702 and Tenth Circuit precedent make clear that the ‘specialized knowledge’ required for
expert testimony ‘can be acquired through ‘experience’ and ‘training.’” (citation modified)).
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At bottom, the Court agrees with Defendants that they have met their burden of
showing Mr. MacDonald is qualified as an expert. This is not a case, contrary to Slick
Slide’s contention, where Mr. MacDonald has “admitted inexperience and unfamiliarity
with the very subject” of this lawsuit. Sport Dimension, Inc. v. Coleman Co., 820 F.3d
1316, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis added); see also ECF No. 75 at 4 (citing Sport
Dimension, 820 F.3d at 1323). Nor is this a circumstance where Mr. MacDonald offers
“nothing more than his generalized experience as” a mechanical engineer. Dorman
Prods., Inc. v. Paccar, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 663, 688 (E.D. Pa. 2016), as amended (Oct.
17, 2016) (emphases added); see also ECF No. 75 at 7 (citing Dorman Products, 201 F.
Supp. 3d at 688–89). Cf. Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356,
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Testimony proffered by a witness lacking the relevant technical
expertise fails the standard of admissibility under Fed. R. Evid. 702.”); ECF No. 80 at 11.
Finally, to the extent that the exclusion motion challenges Mr. MacDonald’s
specialized knowledge “with respect to the subject matter of this particular case—slides,”
ECF No. 75 at 6, or the obviousness of the ‘821 patent, “questions regarding the extent
of an expert’s specialized knowledge in a field go to the weight of the expert’s testimony,
not to its admissibility.” Raytheon Co. v. United States, No. 05–448C, 2009 WL 1373959,
at *1 (Fed. Cl. May 13, 2009) (citation modified); Hart, 2025 WL 981556, at *1 (“[A]s long
as an expert stays within the reasonable confines of his subject area, our case law
establishes a lack of specialization does not affect the admissibility of the expert opinion,
but only its weight.” (citation modified)); Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 245 (3d
Cir. 2008). Cf. ECF No. 82 at 4–7. Slick Slide is free to cross-examine Mr. MacDonald at
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trial as to his qualifications and opinions. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
509 	U.S. 	579, 	596 	(1993) 	(“Vigorous 	cross-examination, 	presentation 	of 	contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” (citation modified)).
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Slick Slide’s
exclusion motion. ECF No. 75.
B. Slick Slide’s Partial Summary Judgment Motion
Slick Slide moves for partial summary judgment “on several issues relating to the
patent infringement claims: patent infringement, patent validity, and patent enforceability.”
ECF No. 76 at 1. As a threshold matter, Defendants’ response reveals the key issue
underlying the summary judgment motion is whether a triable issue of material fact exists
as to patent validity—specifically, whether the ‘821 patent is “invalid as obvious.” ECF No.
81 at 5; id. at 16. Put differently, Defendants admit, as to patent infringement, that the
Reeves Defendants (defined as Defendant Chad Reeves and TryJax Construction, LLC)
“sold seven (7) Accused Products,” and that “the Accused Products fall within the scope
of the claim of the asserted ‘821 Patent.” ECF No. 81 at 7; see also ECF No. 84 at 6 (“In
their response . . . the Reeves Defendants conceded that they made the sales in question
to these customers.”).1 And Defendants admit that “they are no longer pursuing their
Seventh Defense (Unenforceability) that the ‘821 Patent is not enforceable . . . .” Id. at
15; ECF No. 83 at 15. Accordingly, based on these representations, summary judgment
1 The Court agrees with Defendants that Slick Slide’s partial summary judgment motion predominantly
concerns the Reeves Defendants’ conduct. See ECF No. 81 at 20.
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in Slick Slide’s favor as to infringement and enforceability is proper, and the only issue for
the Court to decide is whether a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the ‘821 is
obvious and therefore invalid. Explained below, the Court agrees with Defendants that a
factual dispute as to the patent’s obviousness exists, demanding partial denial of Slick
Slide’s summary judgment motion as to patent validity. See, e.g., ECF No. 81 at 5.2
While 	Slick 	Slide 	correctly 	argues 	that 	patents 	are 	presumed 	valid, 	“[t]he
presumption of validity may be rebutted by the showing of obviousness.” 	Milgo Elec.
Corp. v. United Bus. Commc’ns, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 654 (10th Cir. 1980) (citation
modified); Stuff v. Field Optics Rsch., No. 2:20–cv–00345–DBB–DBP, 2024 WL 2804576,
at *3 (D. Utah May 31, 2024), appeal dismissed sub nom. Really Right Stuff v. Field Optics
Rsch., No. 2024–2045, 2024 WL 3934790 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 26, 2024) (“Obviousness
renders a claim invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103.”); Kong Co., LLC v. Bounce Enters., LLC,
No. 1:22-CV-02001-DDD-SBP, 2025 WL 2208136, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 27, 2025)
(explaining obviousness “four-factor framework” (citing LKQ Corp. v. GM Global Tech.
Operations LLC, 102 F.4th 1280, 1295–1300 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (en banc)). And “if the
patent is indeed invalid, and shown to be so under proper procedures, there is no liability.”
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 575 U.S. 632, 644 (2015) (citation modified).
2 Defendants appear to argue that denial of Slick Slide’s exclusion motion creates triable issues of fact as
to both infringement and validity. See ECF No. 81 at 5. But the Court agrees with Slick Slide that these
issues demand distinct doctrinal and factual inquiries. See, e.g., ECF No. 83 at 2 n.1; Pandrol USA, LP v.
Airboss Ry. Prods., Inc., 320 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[P]atent infringement and invalidity are
separate and distinct issues.”); Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (“Though an invalid claim cannot give rise to liability for infringement, whether it is infringed is an
entirely separate question capable of determination without regard to its validity.”).
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The Court need not extensively analyze the “obviousness” framework, see, e.g.,
Kong, 2025 WL 2208136, at *7, because the Court agrees with Defendants that the nature
of Slick Slide’s summary judgment challenge has created a paradigmatic battle of the
experts, rendering summary judgment on the issue of obviousness—and therefore patent
validity—improper. Compare ECF No. 76 at 15, with ECF No. 81 at 19. Slick Slide
compares the opinions of its own expert, Mr. Cook, with the opinions of Mr. MacDonald.
See ECF No. 76 at 15; ECF No. 83 at 6. In arguing that Defendants “only presented a
single view of the primary reference,” ECF No. 76 at 15, chiefly a “front perspective view
of the Banana Flip slide,” id. at 16, Slick Slide cites excerpts from Mr. MacDonald’s report,
see id. (citing ECF No. 76-6 at 34). Slick Slide cites the same report in arguing “there is
no record-supported reason to modify the DoLuSu slide.” ECF No. 76 at 19 (citing ECF
No. 76-6 at 20). And tellingly, Slick Slide argues in its summary judgment motion that Mr.
MacDonald is “not qualified to render an opinion [about] an ordinary designer of slides.”
ECF No. 76 at 16 (citation modified); id. (“Because Mr. MacDonald is not qualified . . .
and because Defendants’ obviousness argument is solely based on that unqualified
opinion, judgment of validity is warranted.”); id. at 22.
At bottom, reading Slick Slide’s motion in its entirety, it’s clear that Slick Slide’s
validity arguments are premised entirely on challenges to the admissible opinions of Mr.
MacDonald. And because those opinions are admissible, triable issues of material fact
exist as to the ‘821 patent’s obviousness and, by extension, its validity. See, e.g., Stuff,
2024 WL 2804576, at *3; Banks, 2023 WL 2914811, at *10 (“[A]s explained in the Court’s
discussion of [the] exclusion motion, [the expert’s] opinions are admissible. Therefore,
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because [the expert’s] opinions are admissible . . . summary judgment is improper.”);
Salama v. City of Pueblo, No. 1:23–cv–01663–CNS–MDB, 2025 WL 1794458, at *2 (D.
Colo. June 30, 2025) (“Such a dispute, involving competing expert opinions, presents the
classic battle of the experts and it is up to a jury to evaluate what weight and credibility
each expert opinion deserves.” (citation modified)); HealthONE of Denver, Inc. v.
UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1189 (D. Colo. 2012) (“A battle of the
experts generally requires a trial and a trier of fact to resolve.” (citation modified)).
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Slick Slide’s
partial summary judgment motion as to its validity challenges, but grants Slick Slide’s
motion as to its enforceability and infringement challenge. See, e.g., Pandrol, 320 F.3d at
1365.
C. The Reed Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion
The Reed Defendants (defined as Defendant Edwin Reed, Trampoline Park
Gurus, LLC, and Adventure Park Contractors, LLC) argue they are entitled to summary
judgment of “no infringement,” ECF No. 77 at 9, of “no induced infringement,” id. at 11,
and of “no copyright infringement,” including no induced copyright infringement, id. at 12–
13. Central to these arguments is the Reed Defendants’ core factual contention that they
have undisputably “never sold, offered to sell, imported, or used any recreational slide
accused of infringement in this action,” id. at 9, as well as that “[i]t is undisputed that the
Reed Defendants were not aware” of the ‘821 patent or Slick Slide’s claims until the
original complaint was filed, id. at 11. See also id. at 13 (arguing that Slick Slide “can point
to no evidence in the record that Mr. Reed (a) knew of the copyrights, or (b) knew that
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there 	was 	infringing 	conduct 	by 	another 	party”). 	The 	Court 	considers 	the 	Reed
Defendants’ arguments in turn, concluding that summary judgment is proper in the Reed
Defendants’ favor as to each.
First, as to direct infringement, a defendant directly infringes a patent if it “‘makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented inventions, within the United States or imports
into the United States any patented invention’ without authority.” Portus Signapore Pte
Ltd & Portus Pty Ltd. v. Owlet, Inc., No. 2:24–cv–00343–TS–JCB, 2025 WL 1517813, at
*2 (D. Utah May 28, 2025) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)). But contrary to Slick Slide’s
argument, the summary judgment record does not create a “dispute over material facts”
that therefore “creat[es] a genuine issue for trial” as to the Reed Defendants’ alleged
direct patent infringement based on their sale of or offer to sell any of the accused slides.
ECF No. 79 at 11. The parties’ briefs confirm that central to resolution of the direct
infringement issue is whether the Reed Defendants, through Mr. Reed, ever made such
a sale or offer to sell. See ECF No. 77 at 9; ECF No. 79 at 13–14. And Mr. Reed testified
in his deposition that he was simply “facilitating,” ECF No. 79-2 at 5, by communicating
the price of the Wichita slide from Chad Reeves to Mr. Gram, id. From Mr. Reed’s
deposition:
Q. At the top of Exhibit 5, page 1, which is REEVES_202, you are
forwarding an e-mail string to David Mason and Chad Reeves.
Correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And in particular, it appears that you are forwarding to Mr. Mason
and Mr. Reeves an e-mail that you sent to Mr. Gram on November
15, 2022. Correct?
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A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And could you read out loud the e-mail that you wrote to
Mr. Gram.
A. “Hey, Joe. Looks like the double slide would be 51K to the U.S.,
shipping in the U.S., and install is additional. Thoughts? Wichita slide
would be 37K. Hopefully leaving you some money to recoup. Still
have not seen quote for this slide from you. Mats are additional.”
Q. Thank you.
A. Um-hmm.
Q. When you proposed to Joe that the Wichita slide will be $37,000,
is that the price for the slide that Mr. Gram was to purchase and resell
to the Aviate project?
[Counsel]: Objection as to form.
A. The price actually came from Chad. So I was, again, facilitating.
So Chad had the pricing on the slides. And so that was the price that
Chad was putting forward for the Wichita slide.
Q. And you communicated that price to Mr. Gram?
A. Yes.
Id. at 4–5.3 Evidence in the summary judgment record, quoted in Mr. Reed’s deposition,
confirms the accuracy of his testimony. See ECF No. 79-1 at 42. And to the extent that
Mr. Reed communicated with Mr. Fung, Mr. Reed testified that when he did so that he
was “still facilitating.” Id. at 11; see also id. at 12–13 (“Making an introduction for Chad
[Reeves] that this is a person that possibly could provide him with the slides, so . . .”); id.
3 The Court considers Mr. Reed’s answer to counsel’s objected-to question. An objection on the basis of
“form” without further clarification or elaboration is insufficient, and to the extent necessary the Court—
based on this insufficiency—overrules it. See, e.g., Vargas v. Fla. Crystals Corp., Case No. 16–81399–CV–
MARRA/MATTHEWMAN, 2017 WL 1861775, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 5, 2017); Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City,
Iowa v. Abbot Labs., 299 F.R.D. 595, 601–02 (N.D. Iowa 2014), rev’d sub nom., Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux
City, Iowa v. Day, 800 F3d 936 (8th Cir. 2015).
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at 13 (“Still facilitating.”); id. at 13 (“I asked Chad if he was interested. He was. And so I
made that introduction, and they started moving through it.” (emphasis added)).
To be sure, drawing inferences in Slick Silde’s favor, this certainly amounts to Mr.
Reed being “involved” in the Aviate Project. ECF No. 79 at 12. But “involvement”—here,
simple facilitation—is insufficient to create a triable issue of material fact as to whether
the Reed Defendants themselves engaged in direct infringement. Cf. § 271(a). Some of
Slick Slide’s own briefing confirms the tenuousness of the Reed Defendants’ involvement
in the at-issue sales from a direct infringement perspective. See ECF No. 79 at 12 (“[T]he
Reed Defendants received from the customer the designs for . . . . [the] slides accused
of infringement.” (citation modified)). And even Mr. Reed’s email to Mr. Reeves about
whether “we can bid from this” as to the “Wichita remodel,” ECF No. 79 at 12 (quoting
ECF No. 79-1 at 89), is insufficient to create a factual dispute as to direct infringement,
where—even drawing inferences in Slick Slide’s favor— such an email on its face does
not amount to an offer to sell or purchase the remodel or slide. See, e.g., MEMC Elec.
Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“We have defined liability for an ‘offer to sell’ under section 271(a) according to the norms
of traditional contractual analysis. Thus, the defendant must communicate a manifestation
of 	willingness 	to 	enter 	into 	a 	bargain, 	so 	made 	as 	to 	justify 	another 	person 	in
understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.” (citation
modified)). So too with the “Richland Hills 3rd slide option” email thread that Slick Slide
identifies. See ECF No. 79 at 14. There, Mr. Reeves states simply that Mr. Reed was an
intermediary—not someone who was engaged in any kind of sale or offer to sell. See
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ECF No. 79-1 at 48 (“Ed [Reed] was overwhelmed and did not get us all the information
need[ed] for the customers and the[y] were unwilling to sign the contracts.” (citation
modified)). The same is true with Mr. Reed’s communications with Mr. Gram about “the
double slide.” ECF No. 79-1 at 42; but see ECF No. 79-2 at 5 (“The price actually came
from Chad.”).
At bottom, just because Mr. Reed discussed or facilitated the terms of an offer or
transaction between other parties in which he and the Reed Defendants were not
ultimately—or ever—themselves involved as parties or signatories does not implicate the
Reed Defendants as direct patent infringers. Cf. MEMC Electronic, 420 F.3d at 1376.
Stated simply, the messenger cannot be tried for direct patent infringement. Especially
where Slick Slide has created no triable issue of material fact that the Reed Defendants
sold or offered to sell the accused infringing slides. Accordingly, summary judgment in
the Reed Defendants’ favor as to direct infringement is proper.
Second, as to induced or indirect patent infringement, a plaintiff must show that
“there has been direct infringement by a third party and that the alleged infringer
affirmatively induced that infringement with knowledge that the induced acts constituted
patent infringement.” Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. Hikma Pharms. USA Inc., 104 F.4th 1370,
1377 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (citation modified). See also Portus Signapore, 2025 WL 1517813,
at 	*4 	(explaining 	the 	same 	and 	observing 	“[i]nduced 	infringement 	claims 	require
knowledge of the patent in suit and knowledge of patent infringement” (citation modified)).
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As 	a 	preliminary 	matter, 	the 	Court 	agrees 	with 	Slick 	Slide 	that 	Mr. 	Reed
undisputably had knowledge of the ‘821 patent as of March 14, 2023. See ECF No. 79 at
14. He testified to this fact himself:
Q. Okay. So on March 14, 2023, Mr. Minton is texting you U.S.
Design Patent 973,821; correct?
[Counsel objects to form.]
A. Yes.
ECF No. 79-2 at 27. Although the Reed Defendants argue Mr. Reed was not aware of the
patent until June 2023, see ECF No. 77 at 11, his own testimony flatly contradicts this,
and thus it is no basis for granting summary judgment on the induced infringement issue
in the Reed Defendants’ favor. Compare id., with Addiction & Detoxification Inst. L.L.C. v.
Carpenter, 620 F. App’x 934, 938 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“To state a claim for induced
infringement, a plaintiff must [show] that the defendant knew of the patent and that the
induced acts constitute patent infringement.” (citation modified)).
However, the Court agrees with the Reed Defendants that Slick Slide has not
created a triable issue of material fact that, armed with knowledge of the ‘821 patent, the
Reed Defendants induced a third party or third parties, such as the Reeves Defendants,
to engage in patent infringement. See, e.g., ECF No. 77 at 12; ECF No. 84 at 8 (“[T]he
documents and testimony cited by Plaintiff to claim the Reed Defendants induced
infringement are from evidence prior to obtainment of said knowledge.”). Indeed, the
Court agrees with the Reed Defendants that, even construing the summary judgment
record in Slick Slide’s favor, the evidence that Slick Slide marshals in support of its
induced infringement theory pre-dates March 14, 2023—the date that Mr. Reed testified
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he learned of the ‘821 patent. See ECF No. 79-2 at 27; see also ECF No. 84 at 8
(collecting evidence); ECF No. 79 at 6–7. And to the extent any communications that Slick
Slide identifies post-date March 2023, the Reed Defendants correctly observe that they
were not sent from Mr. Reed. See ECF No. 84 at 9. For example, on August 11, 2023,
Diana Reeves sent an email to David Mason, cc’ing Mr. Reed. See ECF No. 79-1 at 97.
Being passively copied on another person’s message hardly rises to the level of inducing
patent infringement. See, e.g., Mitek Sys., Inc. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 139 F.4th
1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“[L]iability under § 271(b) requires an affirmative act
encouraging infringement.” (citation modified)); ECF No. 79-1 at 92.
Fundamentally, 	decisional 	law 	teaches 	that 	a 	defendant 	must 	induce 	the
infringement after learning of the patent itself. See, e.g., Amarin Pharma, 104 F.4th at
1377; Portus Signapore, 2025 WL 1517813, at *4. And here, evidence in support of any
purported inducement pre-dates when Mr. Reed learned of the ‘821 patent. Accordingly,
Slick Slide cannot, based on the summary judgment record, sustain a claim based on
induced infringement against the Reed Defendants, and summary judgment in the Reed
Defendants’ favor as to induced infringement is proper.
Third, as to copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish both “ownership of a
valid copyright” and “copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Blehm
v. Jacobs, 702 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation modified); Purzel Video GmbH
v. Biby, 13 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1137 (D. Colo. 2014) (same). The Reed Defendants do not
challenge this first copyright infringement element, and so the only issue before the Court
is whether Slick Slide has created a triable issue of material fact as to whether the Reed
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Defendants “copied” constituent elements of any copyright. See ECF No. 77 at 13; Blehm,
702 F.3d at 1199.
Slick Slide has not created such a triable issue. As a preliminary matter, explained
above Slick Slide is wrong to argue that “the Reed Defendants offered to sell an infringing
recreational slide for the Aviate Project.” ECF No. 79 at 15. And where Slick Slide argues
that the Reed Defendants “used and distributed [Slick Slide’s] copyrighted materials,” id.
at 17, the summary judgment record does not support Slick Slide’s characterization of Mr.
Reed’s behavior. While the Court and the Reed Defendants agree with Slick Slide that
Mr. Reed—drawing all inferences from the summary judgment record in Slick Slide’s
favor—“reviewed and passed along drawings,” ECF No. 84 at 10, such behavior does not
rise 	to 	the 	level 	of 	copying 	copyrighted 	material 	required 	to 	sustain 	a 	copyright
infringement claim. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823,
833 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Ultimately, to prove factual copying, the plaintiff must come forward
with sufficient evidence that a reasonable factfinder, taking together the evidence of
access and the similarities between the programs, could find that the second work was
copied from the first.” (citation modified)); McRae v. Smith, 968 F. Supp. 559, 562 (D.
Colo. 1997) (“Proof of copying is crucial to any claim of copyright infringement because
no matter how similar the two works may be (even to the point of identity), if the defendant
did not copy the accused work, there is no infringement . . . .” (citation modified)); Gen.
Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141 (5th Cir. 2004) (“First, the plaintiff must, as
a factual matter, prove that the defendant actually used the copyrighted material to create
his own work.” (citation modified)). Slick Slide’s own response brief bolsters the Court’s
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conclusion. See ECF No. 79 at 20 (“[T]he Reed Defendants not only distributed Slick
Slide’s confidential materials . . . .” (citation modified)); see also, e.g., ECF No. 79-1 at 3.
For these reasons, Slick Slide has failed to create a triable issue of material fact as to the
Reed Defendants’ purported copyright infringement.
For substantially the same reasons, the Court likewise agrees with the Reed
Defendants that Slick Slide has failed to create triable issues of material fact as to induced
copyright infringement. See ECF No. 77 at 5; id. at 13. To do so, Slick Slide must
fundamentally create factual dispute as to whether Mr. Reed “materially contributed to the
infringing conduct of another.” Viesti Assocs., Inc. v. Pearson Educ., Inc., No. 12–cv–
02240–PAB–DW, 2013 WL 4052024, at *7 (D. Colo. Aug. 12, 2013); see also id. (setting
forth elements for “contributory copyright infringement”); Antarctica Films Argentina, S.A.
v. Gaia, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1207 (D. Colo. 2023) (same). Mr. Reed’s acts of
reviewing and passing along drawings and documents—essentially facilitating—do not
meet the standard for contributory or induced copyright infringement. Cf. Antarctica Films,
662 F. Supp. 3d at 1207 (concluding plaintiff “sufficiently alleged an intent to induce
infringement” where “together with . . . allegations of direct infringement [that plaintiff]
alleged that [defendant] took affirmative steps with the intent to foster [another’s]
infringement” 	(citation 	modified)); 	Viesti, 	2013 	WL 	4052024, 	at 	*7 	(“Although 	the
complaint states that [defendant] ‘transmitted’ the photographs, simple transmission does
not equate inducement because this element premises liability on purposeful, culpable
expression and conduct that is shown by affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.”
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(citation modified)); ECF No. 77 at 13. Accordingly, summary judgment in the Reed
Defendants’ favor as to Slick Slick’s claim for induced copyright infringement is proper.
Therefore, and for the reasons set forth above, the Court grants the Reed
Defendants’ summary judgment motion.
II. 	CONCLUSION
Consistent with the above analysis, the Court DENIES Slick Slide’s exclusion
motion. ECF No. 75. The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Slick Slide’s
partial 	summary 	judgment 	motion. 	ECF 	No. 	76. 	The 	Court 	GRANTS 	the 	Reed
Defendants’ summary judgment motion. ECF No. 77.
DATED this 17th day of December 2025.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
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