Estate of Jeffrey Melvin v. City of Colorado Springs, Colorado et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Magistrate Judge Maritza Dominguez Braswell
Civil Action No. 20–cv–00991–CMA–MDB
ESTATE OF JEFFREY MELVIN, by and through its personal representative Jeffrey Melvin Sr.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO,
DANIEL PATTERSON, in his individual capacity, and
JOSHUA ARCHER, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.
ORDER
Magistrate Judge Maritza Dominguez Braswell
This matter comes before the court on Defendants Joshua Archer [“Defendant Archer” or
“Officer Archer”], Daniel Patterson [“Defendant Patterson” or “Officer Patterson”] [together,
“Officer Defendants”], and the City of Colorado Springs, Colorado’s [“the City”] [together with
Officer Defendants, “Defendants”] “Motion to Stay Discovery and to Vacate the Final Pretrial
Conference.” ([“Motion to Stay”], Doc. No. 126.) Plaintiff has filed an expedited Response,
contesting Defendants’ Motion to Stay. (Doc. No. 129.) Having reviewed the Motion and
associated briefing, the applicable case law, and being otherwise advised in its premise, the court
DENIES the Motion to Stay.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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Plaintiff Estate of Jeffery Melvin ([“Melvin Estate” or “Mr. Melvin”], brings this action
for alleged violations of Mr. Melvin’s federal constitutional rights. On April 26, 2018, Mr.
Melvin died after an encounter with Colorado Springs Police Officers Daniel Patterson and
Joshua Archer in which he was detained, pepper sprayed, and repeatedly tasered. (Doc. No. 30.
¶¶ 19–34.) Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint on April 8, 2020. (See Generally
Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiff later filed an Amended Complaint on July 1, 2020. (See Generally Doc.
No. 30.) Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) excessive use of force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment against the Officer Defendants and (2) failure to train against
the City of Colorado Springs. (Id.)
The Honorable Christine M. Arguello referred the case to Magistrate Judge Kathleen
Tafoya pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) on June 17, 2020. (Doc. No. 25.) After
Judge Tafoya’s retirement, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. (Doc. No. 117.) On
September 29, 2021, Judge Arguello denied the City’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 92.) On
August 11, 2022, the Officer Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claims, arguing they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. No. 123.)
This Motion to Stay, joined by all Defendants, was filed after the motion for summary
judgment, and seeks to stay all discovery until the Officer Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is ruled upon. (Doc. No. 126.) Discovery is currently set to conclude on October 20,
2022. (Doc. No. 122.) Defendants also seek to vacate the final pretrial conference, currently
scheduled for January 30, 2023. (Id.) Defendants argue that the Court should impose a stay
because “the burden and prejudice to Defendants, the Court’s convenience and interest in judicial
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economy and efficiency, and the interests of the public all outweigh Plaintiff’s general interest in
prosecuting the claims.” (Id. at 10–11.)
LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for the stay of proceedings while a
motion for summary judgment is pending. Whether to stay discovery during a proceeding is left
to the trial court’s discretion. Wang v. Hsu, 919 F.2d 130, 130 (10th Cir. 1990). The power to
stay “is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on
its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N.
Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (citing Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
760, 763 (1931)). In this judicial district, however, discovery stays are an exception rather than
the rule. Bustos v. United States, 257 F.R.D. 617, 623 (D. Colo. 2009) (“This District generally
disfavors stays of discovery.”). Even in cases where defendants raise a qualified immunity
defense, courts within the District of Colorado generally disfavor a stay of all discovery. See,
e.g., Estate of Ronquillo v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2016 WL 10842586, at *3 (D. Colo. Nov. 14,
2016) (“[Q]ualified immunity does not protect an official from all discovery, but only from that
which is ‘broad-reaching.’”) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 593, n.14 (1998)
(emphasis in original)); Wanstall v. Armijo, 2014 WL 4636457, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2014)
(“[A] qualified immunity defense does not automatically bar all discovery.”).
Upon a showing of good cause, a protective order is appropriate to stay discovery to
“protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). When considering a stay of discovery, Courts in this district
generally consider the following factors: (1) the plaintiff’s interests in proceeding expeditiously
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with the civil action and the potential prejudice to the plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on the
defendants in going forward; (3) the convenience to the Court; (4) the interests of persons not
parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the public interest. String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus
Shows, Inc., 2006 WL 894955, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2006) (citing FDIC v. Renda, 1987 WL
348635, at *2 (D. Kan. Aug. 6, 1987)).
ANALYSIS
Defendants offer two reasons for staying discovery pending the resolution of their Motion
for Summary Judgment. First, they argue that the court should stay all discovery because the
Officer Defendants, sued in their individual capacities, have asserted qualified immunity
defenses to suit in their Motion for Summary Judgment. Second, Defendants argue that the
String Cheese factors weigh in favor of staying discovery until the court rules on their Motion for
Summary Judgment.
I. 	Qualified Immunity
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “an injured person [may] seek damages against an individual
who has violated his or her federal rights while acting under color of state law.” Estate of Booker
v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 411 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cillo v. City of Greenwood Village, 739
F.3d 451, 459 (10th Cir. 2013)). In response to a § 1983 suit, an individual defendant may assert
a qualified immunity defense. Qualified immunity “shields public officials . . . from damages
actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law.” Gann v. Cline,
519 F.3d 1090, 1092 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). A successful qualified immunity
defense provides “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Martin v. County
of Santa Fe, 626 F. App’x 736, 740 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392
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F.3d 410, 414 (10th Cir. 2004). Immunity from suit can include avoiding “pretrial matters [such]
as discovery.” Id. However, “asserting a qualified immunity defense is not necessarily “a bar to
all discovery.” Rome v. Romero, 225 F.R.D. 640, 643 (D. Colo. 2004). Indeed, the court may
consider certain relevant factors in determining whether to grant a stay of discovery based on
qualified immunity.
Relevant here is the timing of the Motion to Stay. As Plaintiff points out in its Response,
the period for discovery, which has been open for quite some time, is nearly over.1 Indeed,
Plaintiff represents that the vast majority of remaining discovery will involve the City, with few
direct requirements of the Officer Defendants who are asserting qualified immunity. (Doc. No.
129.) The timing of the Motion to Stay somewhat undercuts the Officer Defendants’ qualified
immunity argument. Because the Motion has been brought so late in discovery—after much or
all discovery directly involving the Officer Defendants—a stay based on qualified immunity
would seemingly do little to protect them from the “burdens of litigation.” Martin, 626 F. App’x
at 740. The Officer Defendants have already participated in the litigation substantially, and the
most taxing involvement appears completed.
Also relevant here is that a qualified immunity defense would not be dispositive of all
claims in the proceeding. The City acknowledges that it cannot invoke qualified immunity on the
failure to train claim. (Doc. No. 126 at 5.) And though the City argues that Plaintiff’s claim
against the City is “inextricably intertwined” with the claim against the Officer Defendants—and
thus it is also entitled to a stay of discovery on the same basis—a successful qualified immunity
defense does not necessarily shelter a municipality from liability, depending on the grounds for
1 Discovery is scheduled to close on October 20, 2022. (Doc. No. 122.)
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which qualified immunity is granted. (Doc. No. 126 at 5.); see Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kan.,
997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[A] finding of qualified immunity does not [necessarily]
shelter a municipality from liability.”). The case against the City could continue even if the
Officer Defendants were granted qualified immunity. In other words, the Officer Defendants’
invocation of qualified immunity, in and of itself, does not warrant a stay of discovery. Cf. Lopez
v. Gonzales, No. 18-cv-03233-MEH, 2020 WL 417590, at *1–2 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2020)
(granting a motion to stay discovery in part because the pending qualified immunity defense “if
granted, could fully dispose of” the case and writing that “good cause may exist to stay discovery
if a dispositive motion has been filed that could resolve the case” (citation omitted)). Next, the
court considers whether a stay is warranted based on the String Cheese balancing test factors.
II. 	String Cheese Factors
Courts in the District of Colorado typically consider five factors when deciding whether
to grant a motion to stay: (1) the plaintiff’s interests in proceeding expeditiously with the civil
action and the potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on the defendants in
going forward; (3) the convenience to the court; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the
civil litigation; and (5) the public interest. String Cheese Incident, LLC, 2006 WL 894955, at *2.
After reviewing these factors, the court will decline to order a stay of discovery.
a. 	Plaintiff’s Interest
Plaintiff has a strong interest in proceeding expeditiously with its case. Sanchez v.
Hartley, No. 13-cv-01945-WJM-CBS, 2016 WL 7176718, at *7 (D. Colo. Apr. 26, 2016) (“[A]
private citizen is entitled to claim the timely protection of the law.”). While it’s true that
“virtually all plaintiffs” have a “general” interest in proceeding quickly, here, this interest
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appears particularly pressing. Edwards v. Zenimax Media, Inc., No. 12-cv-00411-WYD-KLM,
2021 WL 1801981, at *2 (D. Colo. May 17, 2012). This case, stemming from the death of an
individual over four years ago, was initiated over two years ago and discovery is finally coming
to a close. Delaying it further would undoubtedly impact Mr. Melvin’s family, who has already a
substantial amount of time waiting to know whether anyone will be found liable for Mr.
Melvin’s death. Delaying this case via a stay would be prejudicial to Plaintiff.
b. 	The Burden on Defendants
Defendants contend that they would be subject to a significant burden if discovery is
allowed to continue while the court considers the Officer Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. Defendants point to (1) extensive expert discovery, (2) a likely 30(b)(6) deposition of
the city, and (3) the drafting of a proposed final pretrial order as significant efforts that could all
be for naught, depending on the court’s ruling on the pending summary judgment motion. (Doc.
No. 126 at 7–9.) Plaintiff argues in response that Defendant simply describes the “ordinary
burdens [of] litigating a case” and further notes that awarding summary judgment to the Officer
Defendants would not necessarily be dispositive of the entire case. (Doc. No. 129 at 10,
11); Lester v. Gene Express, Inc., 09-cv-02648-REB-KLM, 2010 WL 743555, at *1 (D. Colo.
Mar. 2, 2010).
While the Court acknowledges the heavy workload that can come with litigating a case
such as this, it cannot say that Defendants’ burden without a stay outweighs the prejudice to
Plaintiff with one. At this stage in the litigation, particularly considering the length of time this
case has been pending, Plaintiff’s interest in moving the case forward is quite high. Further, as
discussed above, a grant of qualified immunity to the Officer Defendants would not necessarily
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be dispositive of all claims in this suit. Hinton, 997 F.2d at 782 (articulating instances when a
successful qualified immunity defense would and would not preclude associated municipal
liability). Even if the Officer Defendants prevailed on their summary judgment motion, extensive
discovery may still be required.
c. 	The Court’s Convenience
The District’s general rule to avoid discovery stays while a dispositive motion is pending
recognizes that there are “burdens to the court and to the public in delaying, potentially for
months, those cases where a [dispositive] motion is filed.” Sutton v. Everest Nat’l Ins. Co., 07-
cv-00425-WYD-BNB, 2007 WL 1395309 at *2 (D. Colo. May 9, 2007). While every motion to
stay comes with different considerations, stays—and the delay that comes with them—are
usually not convenient. See Patterson v. Santini, 11-cv-01899-RM-KLM, 2014 WL 349085 at *3
(D. Colo. Jan. 31, 2014) (“It is not convenient for the Court to have stale cases cluttering its
docket.”). “The [c]ourt is inconvenienced by an ill-advised stay because the delay in prosecuting
the case which results from the imposition of a stay makes the Court’s docket less predictable
and, hence, less manageable.” Lester, 2010 WL 743555, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2010) (adding
that this is particularly the case when “the stay is tied to…pending motion on which ultimate
success is not guaranteed”). This factor weighs against a stay of discovery.
d. 	Interest of Non-Parties
This factor is neutral as neither party has identified any specific non-parties who may be
affected by a stay.
e. 	Public Interest
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Finally, the public interest tends to cut against a stay. While the public indeed has an
interest in “avoiding wasteful efforts by the court and the litigants,” it also has an interest in
moving matters forward, and a more substantial interest in learning about the policies and
practices of the Colorado Springs Police Department to ensure it is “operating within the bounds
of the law.” Est. of Burnett v. City of Colorado Springs, No. 21-cv-01708-WJM-KMT, 2022 WL
21860, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2022); Morgan v. Clements, 12-cv-00936-REB-KMT, 2013 WL
950876, at *5 (D. Colo. Mar. 12, 2013). Further, going forward with discovery while the court
considers the Officer Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will not be unusually wasteful.
Because, as noted above, the Officer Defendants have put forward a qualified immunity defense
relatively late in the course of discovery, the money, time, and resources that a stay could save
are likely to be less than in other matters.
In sum, the Court finds that neither Defendants’ qualified immunity argument nor
the String Cheese factors demonstrate that a stay of discovery is warranted. Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery and to Vacate the Final Pretrial Conference (Doc. No.
126.) is DENIED.
Dated this 1 st day of September, 2022.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
Maritza Dominguez Braswell
United States Magistrate Judge
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