USA v. Thomas

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney
Criminal Case No. 1:19-cr-00397-CNS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOEL THOMAS,
Defendant.
ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Joel Thomas’s motions to modify and vacate
special conditions of his supervised release, see, e.g., ECF Nos. 124 and 125, and his
motion to remove the polygraph and visual response testing condition from his supervised
release special conditions, see ECF No. 133. In response to the Court’s order, ECF No.
126, the United States Probation Office and government have filed responses to
Defendant’s motions to vacate, ECF Nos. 130 –32. For the following reasons, the Court
DENIES Defendant’s three motions.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A brief background of this case’s factual and procedural background suffices. On
January 13, 2020, Defendant was sentenced to a below-guidelines sentence of 48
months’ imprisonment, to be followed by 5 years of supervised release, for an offense of
Access with Intent to View Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)
and (b)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, No. 22-1149, 2023 WL 1872585, at *1
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(10th Cir. Feb. 10, 2023) (unpublished) (Thomas I). In February 2024, the United States
Probation Office (the probation office) sought a compliance review hearing, see ECF No.
81, based on concerns regarding Defendant’s compliance with the terms and conditions
of his supervised release, see, e.g., id. Ultimately, the Court revoked Defendant’s
supervised release because, inter alia, Defendant admitted that he violated the terms of
his supervised release, see ECF No. 86. Defendant’s violations included making false
statements to a probation officer as to whether Defendant possessed an unauthorized
phone, amounting to a Grade C violation, and his failure to successfully complete a court-
ordered sex offender treatment program. See ECF No. 118 at 4. Through his plea
agreement associated with the revocation, Defendant admitted that the government could
prove the additional new crime of Access with Intent to View Child Pornography, 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). See ECF No. 110 at 1. This related to his unauthorized purchase
of a phone on which he accessed and downloaded child pornography. Id. at 8-9.
Thus, the Court resentenced Defendant to a term of 60 months, see ECF No. 110
at 2, with a 10-year term of supervised release to follow. See also United States v.
Thomas, No. 25-1280, 2025 WL 3260617, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 24, 2025) (unpublished)
(Thomas II). The Court imposed several special supervised release conditions. See, e.g.,
id. at 30.
II. 	ANALYSIS
Across his motions, Defendant seeks to remove or modify various special
supervised 	release 	conditions 	the 	Court 	imposed 	when 	it 	resentenced Defendant
following its revocation of his initial term of supervised release. See ECF Nos. 124–125,
133. The probation office and the government have filed responses to Defendant’s first
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two motions. See ECF Nos. 130–32. The Court analyzes and explains why it denies
Defendant’s motions in turn.
A. Modifying Conditions 1, 2, 6, and 4
In his first modification motion, Defendant seeks modification of conditions 1, 2, 6,
and 4 of his supervised release. See ECF No. 124 at 1. Construing his motion liberally,
see, e.g., United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 830 (10th Cir. 2008), Defendant seeks
modification on statutory, see ECF No. 124 at 1, and constitutional, id. at 2, grounds. But
the Court agrees with the government that modification of the four conditions identified in
his motion is improper.
First, the Court agrees with the government that a motion filed under 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e)(2)—the statute under which Defendant seeks relief—is “not the proper vehicle to
argue” that a supervised release condition is illegal or unconstitutional. ECF No. 124 at
8. See also United States v. Sestak, No. 23–8006, 2023 WL 7215396, at *1 (unpublished)
(10th Cir. Nov. 2, 2023) (affirming district court’s denial of modification motion because §
3583(e)(2) “does not authorize [district courts] to modify [a defendant’s] supervised
release based on the illegality or unconstitutionality of the imposed term”). Indeed, as the
Tenth Circuit recognized in one of Defendant’s own prior appeals, “any challenge to the
legality of a condition of supervised release must be raised on direct appeal or in a habeas
petition.” Thomas I, 2023 WL 1872585, at *4 (citation modified). So the Court’s inquiry in
limited to asking whether modification of Defendant’s supervised release conditions is
proper. See, e.g., id.
Second, the Court disagrees with Defendant that modification of the conditions
identified in his motion is proper. Cf. ECF No. 124 at 1.
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Access to financial information. Regarding the first condition, access to financial
information, see ECF No. 130 at 1, the Court agrees with the government that “ample
evidence . . . support[s] imposition of a financial disclosure condition” such as this. ECF
No. 131 at 10. Of course, the government acknowledges that Defendant is not required
to pay restitution or a fine, see id., but the government and probation office persuasively
observe that maintained imposition of 	this 	condition is 	appropriate based on the
circumstances of Defendant’s underlying offense, violation behavior, and efforts to
conceal both. See ECF No. 130 at 1. Recall, for example, that to this final point Defendant
admitted that he misrepresented to a probation officer his ownership of an unauthorized
smart phone—wrongly contending instead that the phone belonged to his son. See, e.g.,
ECF No. 118 at 4; ECF No. 108 at 5.
Fundamentally, the Court agrees with the government that this condition is an
additional and appropriate tool to “investigate [Defendant’s] conduct,” ECF No. 131 at 11,
which includes making material misrepresentations about his behavior on supervised
release, and that consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, see Thomas I, 2023 WL 1872585,
at *3, confirm that modification is improper. See, e.g., ECF No. 131 at 11 (explaining how
“nature and circumstances” of the case, the “history and characteristics” of Defendant,
and that the condition imposes “no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary” favor
denial of the motion to vacate this condition). That Defendant has, in his words, been
“fiscally responsible,” ECF No. 124 at 6, does not change the fact that this case concerns
his access with intent to view child pornography, nor does it change his pre-release efforts
to conceal such access and his post-release efforts to conceal it, facts that under §
3553(a) do not justify modification of this condition. Such a financial access condition may
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also reveal future purchases of “prohibited items,” such as another phone or unauthorized
Internet capable device, supporting its continued imposition. See United States v. Stan,
No. 23-1174, 2024 WL 4381134, at *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 3, 2024) (unpublished) (citation
modified); see also id. at *3.
At bottom, the Court finds that evidence available at the original sentence, as well
as evidence of Defendant’s subsequent behavior, do not present any “valid reasons” to
modify this supervised release condition, Thomas I, 2023 WL 1872585, at *3 (citation
modified), and so the Court denies Defendant’s request.
Mental Health Treatment. Regarding the second condition, Defendant’s required
participation in mental health treatment, there are no valid reasons to modify this
condition. See id. Defendant contends this condition improperly provides “the probation
officer [with] complete authority to choose the modality, duration and intensity of mental
health treatment,” ECF No. 124 at 13, thus “delegating the duty of imposing [his]
punishment to the probation officer,” id. He further contends the Court failed to justify this
condition with “any findings or compelling circumstances.” Id.
But the Court agrees with the government that “ample evidence” supports
imposition of this mental health treatment condition—as well as, on the flip side, evidence
to deny its modification. ECF No. 131 at 12. For example, in a petition for the Court’s
compliance review hearing, a probation officer noted that one of Defendant’s evaluators
“referenced Narcissistic Personality Disorder, Mental Illness – coexisting anxiety and
depression, and past trauma” as “responsivity factors.” ECF No. 81 at 3. And in its
response to Defendant’s modification motion, the probation office represents that “after
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his violation was identified, [Defendant] self-report[ed] hospitalization to address his
mental health needs and suicidality.” ECF No. 130 at 4.
Moreover, the probation office is correct that, reading the plain language of the
condition, it does not impermissibly delegate the “modality, duration, and intensity,” ECF
No. 124 at 13, of Defendant’s mental health treatment to the probation office. Cf. ECF No.
130 at 4; ECF No. 124 at 11 (quoting special condition, which specifies that the “probation
office, 	in 	consultation 	with 	the 	treatment 	provider, 	will 	supervise 	[Defendant’s]
participation in the [mental health treatment] program” (emphasis added)); Simply stated,
the condition provides that the probation office shall “approve” the mental health treatment
program, but does not impermissibly delegate enforcement of the “rules and regulations”
of such program to the probation office, nor does it vest in the probation office the sole
supervisory role of Defendant’s treatment progress—that power also resides with the
“treatment provider.” See, e.g., ECF No. 124 at 11; United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686,
696 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bear, 769 F.3d 1221, 1231 (10th Cir. 2014) (reading
“the [mental health assessment and treatment] condition as not delegating to the
probation officer the authority to impose conditions that implicate [the defendant’s]
significant liberty interests” and concluding district court did not err in imposing it (citation
modified)).
For these reasons, and considering the nature and circumstances of this child
pornography case, coupled with the history and characteristics of Defendant—which
include mental health complications that warrant treatment and his prior suicidality—and
the fact that this treatment condition is not a too-great deprivation of his liberty, the Court
denies Defendant’s motion to modify this supervised release condition.
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Access to Internet-Capable Device. Regarding the sixth condition, Defendant
challenges it on the grounds such condition is essentially a vague “occupational
restriction.” ECF No. 124 at 14. Defendant and the government refer to arguments
attendant to the fifth special condition of Defendant’s supervised release in arguing
whether imposition of this sixth condition is proper. See id.; ECF No. 131 at 14.
Considering the entirety of the parties’ briefs, the Court declines to modify or vacate this
supervised release condition. The Court agrees that imposition of this sixth condition is
proper where Defendant admits that he attempted to cast blame on others—chiefly his
own son—for possession of an unauthorized phone. See, e.g., ECF No. 118 at 4. Thus,
considering the nature and circumstances of this child pornography case, coupled with
the history and characteristics of Defendant—which, as pertinent to the Court’s analysis
of this condition, include Defendant’s prior and admitted false representations to the
probation office about his access to an unauthorized phone—the Court concludes that
modification or removal of this condition is not proper, notwithstanding Defendant’s
argument that it is tantamount to an “occupational restriction,” which it is not. Compare
ECF No. 124 at 14, with ECF No. 130 at 2 (explaining that this sixth condition prohibits
Defendant’s access to an “Internet capable device that belongs to another person” in
order to “circumvent” other restrictions (emphasis added)); and ECF No. 124 at 11
(acknowledging the same).
At bottom, the Court agrees with the government that there is a reasonably direct
relationship between Defendant’s conduct, the underlying offense, and this condition such
that it is reasonably necessary. See ECF No. 132 at 5.
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Pre-Approval for Engaging in Occupation, Business, Professional, or Volunteer
Activities that Require Internet Access. Finally, Defendant requests that the Court vacate
the fourth condition of his supervised release, see ECF No. 124 at 25, on the grounds
that in imposing this condition the Court did not find that Defendant’s “occupation
contributed or had a direct relationship to [his] previous criminal activity,” id. at 28. The
Court disagrees. As the government observes, ample evidence supports imposition of
this condition, including evidence that Defendant was able to secure employment through
which he accessed, and was certainly able to access, several unauthorized Internet
capable devices. See, e.g., ECF No. 130 at 4. This condition, as the others the Court has
analyzed above, is reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the underlying
offense, coupled with the history and characteristics of the Defendant, which include, as
discussed above, misrepresentations about his access to unauthorized devices. This is
particularly true where, as here, Defendant committed the underlying crimes using
computers and the Internet. See, e.g., Thomas I, 2023 WL 1872585, at *5. Nor, the Court
notes, is this condition—like Defendant’s sixth condition of supervised release—a
condition that categorically bans Defendant from accessing the Internet. It only requires
Defendant to secure pre-approval before doing so, bolstering the Court’s conclusion that
modification is unjustified. Cf. United States v. Blair, 933 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2019).
* * *
The Court has considered, as it must, the relevant statutory factors and this case’s
factual background. See, e.g., Thomas I, 2023 WL 1872585, at *3 (citing § 3553(a)).
Doing so compels the conclusion that Defendant has failed to show there are any “valid
reasons,” id., to modify the four conditions that he challenges in his first motion. Cf. ECF
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No. 124. Accordingly, the Court denies his first motion to vacate and modify the four
challenged conditions of his supervised release.
B. Modifying Conditions 5, 9, and 10
Defendant moves to modify the fifth, ninth, and tenth conditions of his supervised
release. See generally ECF No. 125. The Court addresses and rejects his modification
arguments in turn. And, construing his motion liberally, see Pinson, 542 F.3d at 830, to
the extent that Defendant challenges these conditions on constitutional grounds, see ECF
No. 125 at 4, the Court rejects his constitutional arguments for the same reasons it did so
in its analysis of his prior motion.
Use 	of 	Computers 	and 	Internet 	Capable 	Devices. 	Defendant 	argues 	that
imposition of the fifth condition of his supervised release is improper because it runs afoul
of Blair, 933 F.3d 1271, and thus violated § 3583. See ECF No. 125 at 4. But the Court
agrees with the government that—even construing Defendant’s argument as attendant to
both his fifth and sixth conditions—this argument is unavailing. These conditions, as
discussed in the Court’s analysis of Defendant’s first motion, do not impose categorial
bans on Defendant’s access to computers or Internet capable devices. Defendant himself
acknowledges as much, as he must. See id. at 1 (reciting fifth special condition which
limits use of computers to those that probation office “authorizes”). This authorization-
limitation is, simply put, not a ban, and therefore Blair does not support Defendant’s
argument—nor does it render the fifth and sixth conditions of Defendant’s supervised
release invalid. Cf. Blair, 933 F.3d at 1277; ECF No. 132 at 8. Indeed, the condition
prohibits the probation office itself from engaging in overbroad restrictions, bolstering the
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Court’s conclusion that the condition is not improper: “The probation officer may not
prohibit lawful Internet use . . . .” ECF No. 130 at 2 (emphasis added).
Thus, considering the nature of this case and Defendant’s characteristics, as the
Court did in its prior analysis of Defendant’s challenge to his sixth condition of supervised
release, there is no valid reason to vacate or modify this fifth condition of supervised
release. At bottom, this condition is “reasonably calculated to prevent” Defendant from
using the Internet to access or store child pornography, Blair, 933 F.3d at 1280, and
imposes no greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary to ensure deterrence and
safety. See ECF No. 132 at 8.
Moreover, to the extent that Defendant appears to further challenge the seventh
condition of his supervised release, see ECF No. 125 at 11, the Court agrees with the
government that such challenge is unavailing, see ECF No. 132 at 9. The nature and
circumstance of the underlying child pornography offense, necessitating both sentencing
and then resentencing based on his violations of his supervised release, as well as the
history 	and 	characteristics 	of 	Defendant, 	which 	include 	Defendant’s 	use 	of 	and
membership 	in 	websites 	dedicated 	to 	the 	distribution 	and 	advertisement 	of 	child
pornography, see, e.g., ECF No. 132 at 9, where Defendant was an active participant,
support imposition of this keystroke monitoring condition. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has
previously affirmed imposition of such a condition in this case. See Thomas I, 2023 WL
1872585, at *5. The record here continues to support imposition of this condition,
especially where Defendant’s criminal activity—contrary to his suggestion—does have a
relationship to his access and use of Internet capable devices. Cf. ECF No. 125 at 11.
Nor is the Court persuaded that this condition is tantamount to an occupational restriction,
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especially where—as noted now numerous times in this Order and throughout this case—
Defendant used the Internet and Internet capable devices to commit the underlying
crimes that resulted in imposition of his original sentence and later revocation of his
supervised release. Cf. id. at 12.
GPS Monitoring and Residential Reentry Center. Defendant challenges the ninth
and tenth conditions of his supervised release, attendant to his GPS monitoring and
placement in a residential reentry center (RRC), respectively. See, e.g., ECF No. 125 at
19; ECF No. 130 at 2. The Court agrees with the government and the probation office
that 	imposition 	of 	these 	conditions 	are 	proper 	based 	both 	on 	the 	nature 	and
circumstances of the offense as well as Defendant’s history and characteristics, which
include his “secret keeping behaviors” during his original term of supervised release,
which resulted in its subsequent revocation, id. at 5, as well as his continued resistance
to supervision, id. These conditions are reasonably related to managing both Defendant’s
risk in the community and ensuring behavioral monitoring upon his return to the
community. See ECF No. 132 at 12. The Court’s conclusion is bolstered again where, as
here, Defendant has attempted in the past to shift blame to others for his conduct,
necessitating such monitoring conditions. Notably, Defendant did not object to the
imposition of the tenth condition of his supervised release—as he did not object to others
that he now challenges—underscoring that its modification is unwarranted, particularly
where imposition of Defendant’s conditions is supported by the record. See, e.g., United
States v. Doty, 150 F.4th 1351, 1355 (10th Cir. 2025).
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C. Modifying Condition 3
Finally, Defendant appears in his second modification motion, as well as in his
Motion to Remove Polygraph and Visual Response Testing from Special Conditions of
Supervised Release, ECF No. 133, to challenge his third condition of supervised release.
See id. (requesting the Court to “remove polygraph testing and visual response testing
from the Court’s imposed special conditions of supervised release” (citation modified));
see also ECF No. 125 at 27. Construing both motions liberally, see Pinson, 542 F.3d 830,
the Court denies Defendant’s Motion to Remove Polygraph and Visual Response Testing
from Special Conditions of Supervised Release, ECF No. 133, and declines to grant him
permission to choose his own treatment provider and polygraph agency, see ECF No.
125 at 27.
Imposition of the third condition of Defendant’s supervised release is supported by
the record, and there is no valid reason to modify it. See Thomas I, 2023 WL 1872585, at
*3. Imposition of this condition is proper in light of the nature and circumstances of the
underlying offense, as well as the history and characteristics of Defendant, who has
committed offenses involving child pornography and made misrepresentations regarding
his 	access 	to 	unauthorized 	devices 	through 	which 	he 	could 	access 	the 	same.
Participation in approved evaluation and treatment programs that include polygraph and
visual testing do not constitute overbroad liberty deprivations, nor does the condition as
written—as discussed above in the Court’s analysis of Defendant’s first motion—
improperly 	delegate 	too 	much 	authority 	to 	the 	probation 	office 	in 	the 	condition’s
implementation. Cf. ECF No. 130 at 2.
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Fundamentally, this condition is necessary in light of this case’s background and it
is appropriate to continue the monitoring of Defendant and to ensure deterrence as well
as Defendant’s rehabilitation, see ECF No. 132 at 6, and the Court declines to modify it,
despite Defendant’s insistence that imposition of such condition is unsupported by the
record, which clearly is not the case, cf. ECF No. 133 at 2. Arguments attendant to any
controversies as to the use of polygraph tests do not bear on the Court’s analysis under
the 	governing 	legal 	framework, 	which 	focuses, 	inter 	alia, 	on 	the 	Defendant’s
characteristics, the need for deterrence, and the need to protect the public. See, e.g.,
Thomas I, 2023 WL 1872585, at *3; United States v. Begay, 631 F.3d 1168, 1175 (10th
Cir. 2011). Nor do such arguments support Defendant’s position that the Court should
remove this condition of supervised release. See ECF No. 133 at 3. Defendant’s
arguments that he should be able to choose his own provider and agency likewise fail to
persuade. Cf. ECF No. 125 at 27.
* * *
As 	with 	the 	Court’s 	analysis 	of 	Defendant’s 	first 	modification 	motion, 	after
considering the relevant legal framework and factual background, the Court denies
Defendant’s second modification motion. The Court also denies Defendant’s third motion,
on the grounds set forth in such motion, as well as for the related and liberally construed
reasons set forth in Defendant’s second modification motion.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Consistent 	with 	the 	above 	analysis, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	Defendant’s 	three
modification motions. ECF Nos. 124, 125, 133.
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DATED this 20th day of March 2026.
BY THE COURT:
________________________________
Charlotte N. Sweeney
United States District Judge
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