United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. United States

Slip Op. 26-71
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND
FORESTRY, RUBBER,
MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED
INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS
INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO,
CLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant,
and
PRINX CHENGSHAN TIRE (THAILAND)
CO., LTD. and PRINX CHENGSHAN
TIRE NORTH AMERICA, INC.
Defendant-Intervenors.
Before: Gary S. Katzmann, Judge
Court No. 25-00004
PUBLIC VERSION
OPINION
[Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record is denied.]
Dated: July 1, 2026
Nicholas C. Phillips, Schagrin Associates, of Washington, D.C., argued for Plaintiff United Steel,
Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers
International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC. 	Also on the briefs were Roger B. Schagrin, Luke A.
Meisner, and Elizabeth J. Drake.
Sosun Bae, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department
of Justice, of Washington, D.C., argued for Defendant United States. Also on the briefs were Brett
A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Franklin E. White,
Jr., Assistant Director. 	Of counsel on the briefs was Ayat Mujais, Assistant Chief Counsel for
Trade Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, D.C.
Ned H. Marshak, Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt LLP, of New York, N.Y.,
argued for Defendant-Intervenors Prinx Chengshan Tire (Thailand) Co., Ltd. and Prinx Chengshan
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Tire North America, Inc. Also on the briefs were Jordan C. Kahn, Brandon M. Petelin, and Eve
Q. Wang.
Katzmann, Judge: Before the court is a challenge to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s
(“Commerce”) antidumping duty order on truck and bus tires imported from Thailand brought by
Plaintiff United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and
Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC (“USW”), a union representing workers
engaged in production of truck and bus tires in the United States. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3, Feb. 7, 2025,
ECF No. 10; Truck and Bus Tires From Thailand: Final Affirmative Determination of Sales at
Less Than Fair Value and Final Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, in Part, 89
Fed. Reg. 83636 (Dep’t Com. Oct. 17, 2024), P.R. 297 (“Final Determination”). USW challenges
one aspect of the Final Determination: Commerce’s calculation of the financial expense ratio for
Prinx Chengshan Tire (Thailand) Co. Ltd. (“Prinx Thailand”). 1 See Pl.’s Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. on
the Agency R. at 9, Oct. 3, 2025, ECF No. 32 (“Pl.’s Br.”).
This case turns on the level of explanation that Commerce must provide in support of its
determinations imposing antidumping duties. 	USW argues that Commerce “provided no
explanation or analysis concerning [USW’s] claims that Prinx failed to cooperate to the best of its
ability” in reporting its financial expenses, such that Commerce’s determination to calculate the
financial expense ratio without applying an adverse inference is unsupported by substantial
evidence and not in accordance with law. Id. at 7.
Although Commerce must articulate a “rational connection between the facts found and
the choice[s] made,” Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962), the
1 Four Prinx entities are relevant to the instant case. Two—Prinx Thailand and Prinx Chengshan
Tire North America, Inc.—are the Defendant-Intervenors in the action before this court
(collectively, “Prinx”). The other Prinx entities—[[
]] (“Company X”) and [[ 	]] (“Company Y”)—are companies
within Prinx’s corporate structure.
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court “will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be
discerned.” Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974). Here,
the court finds Commerce’s decisional path to be reasonably discernible. 	The court sustains
Commerce’s Final Determination as supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with
law.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Legal Background
Dumping occurs when a foreign company sells a product in the United States for “less than
its fair value.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673; see also Mid Continent Steel & Wire, Inc. v. United States, 941
F.3d 530, 534 (Fed. Cir. 2019). To prevent imported products “from undercutting the domestic
market,” the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, authorizes Commerce to investigate alleged dumping
and, if dumping is found, levy duties on the implicated goods. Sioux Honey Ass'n v. Hartford Fire
Ins., 672 F.3d 1041, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “Sales at less than fair value are those sales for which
the ‘normal value’ (the price a producer charges in its home market) exceeds the ‘export price’
(the price of the product in the United States) . . . .” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 621 F.3d
1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A)). 	If dumping is found—and the
International Trade Commission determines that a domestic industry “(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury” because of importation of the subject merchandise, 19
U.S.C. § 1673(2)(A)—the duty imposed will be “equal to the dumping margin, the amount by
which the [normal value] exceeds the [export price].” Albemarle Corp. & Subsidiaries v. United
States, 821 F.3d 1345, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
A. 	Constructed Value
“Normal value is based on the price at which the merchandise is sold in the exporting
country (the home-market) or, in the alternative, the price at which the merchandise is sold in a
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third country that is not the United States.” Mid Continent, 941 F.3d at 534. “But if the ‘aggregate
quantity’ of merchandise sold in either the exporting country or the third country is less than five
percent of the quantity sold in the United States, Commerce must instead calculate a ‘constructed
value’ of the merchandise.” Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II) and then quoting id.
§ 1677b(a)(4)). “ ‘Constructed value’ approximates a foreign firm's costs of producing and selling
the foreign like product.” Dongkuk S&C Co. v. United States, 134 F.4th 1320, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir.
2025) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)). 2
One of the inputs for the constructed value calculation is the company’s financial expense
ratio, which is “calculated by dividing a producer or exporter’s full-year net financial expenses by
its full-year cost of goods sold.” Suzano S.A. v. United States, 46 CIT __, __, 589 F. Supp. 3d
1225, 1231 (2022); see also Mem. from J. Maeder to R. Majerus, re: Decision Memorandum for
the Preliminary Affirmative Determination in the Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation of Truck
and Bus Tires from Thailand at 15 (Dep’t Com. May 14, 2024), P.R. 218 (“Prelim. IDM”). 3
“Commerce’s established practice is to calculate the respondent’s financial expense ratio based on
the audited financial statements of the highest level of consolidation available” in a respondent’s
corporate structure. 	Mem. from K. Marksberry to S. Fullerton, re: Issues and Decision
Memorandum for the Final Affirmative Determination in the Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation
2 Commerce calculates the constructed value as the sum of: (1) “the cost of materials and
fabrication or other processing of any kind employed in producing the merchandise . . .”; (2) the
“selling, general, and administrative expenses, and . . . profits, [incurred and realized] in
connection with the production and sale of a foreign like product, in the ordinary course of trade,
for consumption in the foreign country”; and (3) the “cost of all containers and coverings of
whatever nature, and all other expenses incidental to placing the subject merchandise in condition
packed ready for shipment to the United States.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e).
3 Net financial expenses are comprised of various inputs including gains and losses on foreign
currency transactions and translations, net interest expense, valuation and transaction gains and
losses from financial derivatives, and short-term interest income. See Union Steel Mfg. Co., Ltd.
v. United States, 36 CIT 717, 725 n.7, 837 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1316 n.7 (2012).
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of Truck and Bus Tires from Thailand at 56 (Dep’t Com. Oct. 9, 2024), P.R. 290 (“IDM”).
In calculating the financial expense ratio, “Commerce does not rely on the financial
statements of companies operating in a non-market economy.” 	Id. 	A non-market economy
country is “any foreign country that [Commerce] determines does not operate on market principles
of cost or pricing structures, so that sales of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair
value of the merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A). Commerce presumes that entities in non-
market economies are “under foreign government control,” Yangzhou Bestpak Gifts & Crafts Co.
v. United States, 716 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013), and that financial data from non-market
economy entities is unreliable, see, e.g., Downhole Pipe & Equip., L.P. v. United States, 776 F.3d
1369, 1375 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Commerce generally considers . . . financial information
obtained from [non-market economy] producers to be unreliable for determining . . . the normal
value of the subject merchandise.” (quotation marks omitted)). 4
B. 	Facts Otherwise Available
In 	antidumping 	duty 	proceedings, 	Commerce 	“obtains 	most 	of 	its 	factual
information . . . from submissions made by interested parties during the course of the proceeding,”
including information submitted in response to questionnaires prepared by Commerce. 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.301(a); see also id. § 351.301(c)(1). 	If “necessary information is not available on the
record,” or if in an interested party withholds requested information, fails to provide information
by the submission deadlines or in the form or manner requested, significantly impedes a
proceeding, or provides information that cannot be verified, “[Commerce] shall . . . use the facts
otherwise available” to calculate the margin. 	19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a). 	“Commerce can only use
4 Of the countries relevant to this case, only [[ 	]] is designated a non-market economy by
Commerce. 	See Countries Currently Designated by Commerce as Non-Market Economy
Countries, Int’l Trade Admin, www[.]trade[.]gov/nme-countries-list (last visited June 29, 2026).
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facts otherwise available to fill a gap in the record.” Zhejiang DunAn Hetian Metal Co. v. United
States, 652 F.3d 1333, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). A gap in the record may result when a respondent
does not provide market economy information that Commerce needs to calculate the dumping
margin. See, e.g., Ningbo Dafa Chem. Fiber Co. v. United States, 580 F.3d 1247, 1257–58 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (affirming the use of facts available where a respondent did not provide necessary
market economy information).
If Commerce also finds that an interested party has “failed to cooperate by not acting to the
best of its ability to comply with a request for information,” Commerce “may use an inference that
is adverse to the interests of that party in selecting from among the facts otherwise available.” 19
U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(1). 	“Compliance with the ‘best of its ability’ standard is determined by
assessing whether respondent has put forth its maximum effort to provide Commerce with full and
complete answers to all inquiries in an investigation.” Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337
F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(1)). 	“Commerce enjoys broad
discretion when considering whether to apply [an adverse inference].” Appvion, Inc. v. United
States, 39 CIT 1475, 1482,100 F. Supp. 3d 1374, 1382 (2015) (citing PAM, S.p.A. v. United States,
582 F.3d 1336, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
An adverse inference may be partial or total. 	Commerce may apply a partial adverse
inference in selecting among facts available where “deficiencies in [the] responses [are] limited to
a discrete category of information,” whereas a total adverse inference may be appropriate “when
the missing information is core to the antidumping analysis and leaves little room for the
substitution of partial facts without undue difficulty.” 	Mukand, Ltd. v. United States, 767 F.3d
1300, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Nat’l Nail Corp. v. United States, 43 CIT __, __, 390 F. Supp.
3d 1356, 1374–75 (2019).
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II. 	Factual Background
In November 2023, in response to a petition filed by USW, Commerce initiated an
investigation into whether truck and bus tires from Thailand were being sold at less than fair value
in the United States. See Truck and Bus Tires From Thailand: Initiation of Less-Than-Fair-Value
Investigation, 88 Fed. Reg. 77960, 77961 (Dep’t Com. Nov. 14, 2023), P.R. 56 (“Initiation
Notice”). 	Commerce selected Bridgestone Corporation (“Bridgestone”) and Prinx Thailand as
mandatory respondents. 5 See Mem. From F. Montgomery to J. Maeder, re: Respondent Selection
at 1 (Dep’t Com. Dec. 4, 2023), P.R. 69, C.R. 26 (“Respondent Selection”).
Prinx initially reported its financial expenses based on the financial statements of
Company X, explaining that “[Prinx Thailand] is a member of a consolidated group of companies;
thus, the financial expense ratio is based on the consolidated audited fiscal year financial
statements.” Letter from B. Petelin to G. Raimondo, re: Prinx Thailand Section D Questionnaire
Response at 30 (Feb. 5, 2024), P.R. 127, C.R. 178–196 (“Sec. D Resp.”); see also Letter from B.
Petelin to G. Raimondo, re: Prinx Section A Questionnaire Response (Jan. 17, 2024), P.R.
107–111, C.R. 55–85 (“Sec. A Resp.”); Letter from K. Marksberry to Prinx Chengshan Tire
(Thailand) Co., Ltd., re: Less-Than-Fair-Value Investigation of Truck and Bus Tires from
Thailand: Request for Information at D-20 (Dep’t Com. Dec. 13, 2023), P.R. 77–78 (“Initial
5 Commerce generally calculates individual dumping margins for “each known exporter and
producer of the subject merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(1). If it is not practicable to do so,
“Commerce may limit its examination to ‘a reasonable number’ of exporters constituting a
statistically representative sample of all known exporters or accounting for the largest volume of
the subject merchandise from the exporting country.” 	PrimeSource Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. United
States, 111 F.4th 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677f-1(c)(2)). “The exporters
selected for individual examination are referred to as mandatory respondents.” Id.
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Questionnaire”). 6
Commerce sent a supplemental questionnaire asking Prinx to elaborate on “which company
operating in a market economy represents the highest level of consolidation” and to “[p]rovide a
revised financial expense rate calculation based on” that company. Letter from A. Sepulveda to
E. Wang, re: First Section D Supplemental Questionnaire at 9 (Dep’t Com. Apr. 3, 2024), P.R.
154, C.R. 331 (“Sec. D Suppl. Questionnaire”). In response, Prinx stated that “[Company Y] is
the company operating in a market economy and represents the highest level of consolidation with
respect to the [Prinx Thailand]” and submitted additional audited financial statements for
Company Y. 	Letter from B. Petelin to G. Raimondo, re: Prinx Section D Supplemental
Questionnaire Response at 12–13 (Apr. 22, 2024), P.R. 184, C.R. 358 (“Sec. D Suppl. Resp.”).
USW submitted pre-preliminary comments arguing that Prinx misreported its net interest
expense as a negative rather than a positive figure, improperly lowering its dumping margin. See
Letter from L. Meisner to G. Raimondo, re: Pre-Preliminary Comments on Prinx Chengshan Tire
(Thailand) Co., Ltd.’s INTEX Calculation at 2 (May 2, 2024), P.R. 201, C.R. 435 (“USW’s
Pre-Prelim. Cmts.”). USW did not initially challenge the use of financial statements for Company
Y more broadly. See generally id. Prinx responded that it had “made an inadvertent clerical error”
and “mistakenly reported revenues as positive and expenses as negative” and agreed Commerce
should reverse the positive and negative signs. 	Letter from B. Petelin to G. Raimondo, re:
Response to Petitioner’s Pre-Preliminary Comments on INTEX Calculation at 2 (May 6, 2024),
P.R. 206, C.R. 438 (“Prinx’s Pre-Prelim. Resp.”).
On May 20, 2024, Commerce issued preliminary results in which Commerce calculated a
6 While Commerce selected Prinx Thailand as a mandatory respondent, Prinx responded on behalf
of both Prinx Thailand and its affiliated U.S. reseller, Prinx Chengshan Tire North American, Inc.
See Respondent Selection at 1; Sec. A Resp. at 1.
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0.00 percent dumping margin for Prinx. 	See Truck and Bus Tires From Thailand: Preliminary
Affirmative Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, Preliminary Negative Determination
of Critical Circumstances, and Postponement of Final Determination, 89 Fed. Reg. 43806, 43807
(Dep’t Com. May 20, 2024), P.R. 233. Commerce used the financial statements of Company Y to
calculate Prinx’s financial expense ratio, although Commerce revised Prinx’s reported financial
expense ratio by reversing the positive and negative signs, as both parties agreed was appropriate.
See Prelim. IDM at 13.
On September 11, 2024, Commerce released the results of its verification of Prinx’s
expenses, in which Commerce stated that it reviewed Prinx’s financial expense calculation
worksheet and the audited financial statements of Company Y. 	See Mem. from C. Winfield to
File, re: Verification of the Cost Response of Prinx Chengshan Tire (Thailand) Co., Ltd. at 16–17
(Dep’t Com. Sep. 11, 2024), P.R. 271, C.R. 560 (“Verification Report”).
USW filed a case brief on September 16, 2024, arguing that, with respect to Prinx’s
financial expense ratio, Commerce should: (1) refuse to use Company Y’s financial statements
because Company Y operates in a non-market economy; (2) determine that Prinx failed to
cooperate to the best of its ability because it “knowingly flout[ed]” instructions to provide financial
statements for a company operating in a market economy; and (3) apply an adverse inference to
Prinx’s financial expense ratio, specifically a rate double the preliminary financial expense ratio
Commerce calculated for Bridgestone. 	See Letter from L. Meisner to G. Raimondo, re:
Petitioner’s Case Brief at 38–44 (Sep. 16, 2024), P.R. 277, C.R. 563 (“USW’s Case Br.”). USW
also argued that Commerce should apply a total adverse inference to calculate the dumping margin
for Prinx, or a partial adverse inference to deficiencies in Prinx’s reporting that were discovered at
verification. See id. at 28, 34. Prinx filed a rebuttal brief, arguing that Company Y operates in a
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market economy, that Prinx’s submission of Company Y’s financial statements was reasonable,
and that the adverse inference USW proposed would improperly rely on Bridgestone’s proprietary
information. 	See Letter from B. Petelin to G. Raimondo, re: Prinx’s Rebuttal Case Brief at 3,
24–26 (Sep. 20, 2024), P.R. 279, C.R. 564.
Commerce issued its final determination on October 17, 2024, calculating a dumping
margin of 12.33 percent for Prinx. See Final Determination, 89 Fed. Reg. at 83637. Commerce
determined that it could reliably use “the vast majority” of Prinx’s data and declined to apply a
total adverse to calculate Prinx’s dumping margin. IDM at 43. With respect to Prinx’s financial
expense ratio, Commerce determined that it could not rely on Company Y’s financial statements
because “[Company Y] also operates in [a non-market economy]” and applied facts otherwise
available. 	Id. at 56; see also Mem. from C. Winfield to S. Arthur, re: Cost of Production and
Constructed Value Calculation Adjustments for the Final Determination – Prinx Chengshan Tire
(Thailand) Co., Ltd. at 2 (Dep’t Com. Oct. 9, 2024), P.R. 293, C.R. 570 (“Cost Calculation Mem.”).
Commerce rejected USW’s argument that Prinx did not cooperate to the best of its ability and
declined to apply an adverse inference to calculate Prinx’s financial expense ratio. 	See IDM at
55–56. As facts otherwise available, Commerce used financial statements of Prinx Thailand itself,
as opposed to financial statements of an entity at a higher level of consolidation. See id. at 56. 7
III. 	Procedural History
USW brought this action on February 7, 2025. 	See Compl. 	On March 10, 2025, Prinx
moved to intervene as Defendant-Intervenors, and the court granted the motion. See Consent Mot.
7 Commerce did apply a partial adverse inference to Prinx’s warranty expenses, unreported bank
charges, and market rebates. 	See IDM at 33–44. 	Those determinations are not at issue in the
instant case.
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to Intervene as of Right, Mar. 10, 2025, ECF No. 20; Order, Mar. 11, 2025, ECF No. 25. 8
On October 3, 2025, USW filed a motion for judgment on the agency record. See Pl.’s Br.
Defendant the United States (“the Government”) and Prinx each filed responses in opposition. See
Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the Agency R., Oct. 3, 2025, ECF No. 36 (“Gov’t Br.”);
Def.-Inters.’ Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. for J. on the Agency R. Pursuant to USCIT Rule 56.2, Feb. 9,
2026, ECF No. 38 (“Def.-Inters.’ Br.”). USW filed a reply on March 6, 2026. See Pl.’s Reply Br.
in Supp. of its Mot. for J. on the Agency R., Mar. 6, 2026, ECF No. 40 (“Pl.’s Reply”).
On March 19, the court issued written questions to the parties, to which the parties
responded. See Ct.’s Qs for Oral Arg., Mar. 19, 2026, ECF No. 43; Pl.’s Resp. to the Ct.’s Qs for
Oral Arg., Apr 1, 2026, ECF No. 48 (“Pl.’s OAQ Resp.”); Def.-Inters’ Resp. to the Ct.’s Qs, Apr.
1, 2026, ECF No. 50 (“Def.-Inters.’ OAQ Resp.”); Def.’s Resp. to Ct.’s Qs for Oral Arg., Apr. 1,
2026, ECF No. 52 (“Gov’t OAQ Resp.”). The court held a partially closed oral argument on April
8, 2026. ECF No. 54. Following oral argument, the parties submitted supplemental briefing to
the court. See Pl.’s Post-Arg. Subm., Apr. 20, 2026, ECF No. 55 (“Pl.’s Suppl. Br.”); Def.-Inters.’
Post Oral Arg. Br., Apr. 20, 2026, ECF No. 58 (“Def.-Inters.’ Suppl. Br.”); Def.’s Post-Arg. Subm.,
Apr. 20, 2026, ECF No. 60 (“Gov’t Suppl. Br.”). All relevant filings are now before the court.
8 Bridgestone separately challenged the Final Determination, and the court granted a motion by
USW to intervene in that case. 	See Compl., Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. United
States, 	No. 	24-00263 	(Dec. 	23, 	2024), 	ECF 	No. 	10; 	Consent 	Mot. 	to 	Intervene 	as
Defendant-Intervenor, Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. United States, No. 24-00263
(Jan. 13, 2025), ECF No. 14; Order, Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. United States, No.
24-00263 (Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 18. 	The Government moved to consolidate the cases, and
Bridgestone opposed the motion. See Def.’s Mot. to Consolidate Cases, Mar. 4, 2025, ECF No.
18; Pl.’s Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. to Consolidate, Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. United
States, No. 24-00263 (Mar. 25, 2025), ECF No. 38. The court denied the motion to consolidate.
See Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC v. United States, 49 CIT __, __, 790 F. Supp. 3d 1369,
1380–81 (July 3, 2025). The case brought by Bridgestone is currently pending before the court.
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JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) and 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(a)(2). 	19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1) provides the standard of review: “[t]he court shall hold
unlawful any determination, finding or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 	Id. 	“Substantial evidence”
refers to “such ‘evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’ ” 	SeAH Steel VINA Corp. v. United States, 950 F.3d 833, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
(quoting Downhole Pipe, 776 F.3d at 1374). 	“[S]ubstantial evidence includes ‘reasonable
inferences from the record.’ ” Id. at 845 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750
F.2d 927, 933 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 	“Commerce's determination may be supported by substantial
evidence of record even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from evidence in the
record.” Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1033, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quotation
marks omitted and alteration accepted).
Commerce acts contrary to law if it does not provide “an explanation of the basis for its
determination that addresses relevant arguments, made by interested parties who are parties to the
investigation.” 	19 U.S.C. § 1677f(i)(3)(A). 	Commerce must also comply with the general
requirement that agencies articulate a “rational connection between the facts found and the
choice[s] made,” Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168, with the caveat that the court “will
uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned,”
Bowman Transp., 419 U.S. at 286; see also NMB Singapore Ltd. v. United States, 557 F.3d 1316,
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 	“Conclusory statements that do not explain how a determination was
reached are . . . insufficient.” In re Section 301 Cases, 46 CIT __, __, 570 F. Supp. 3d 1306, 1338
(2022) (citing Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 626 F.3d
84, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). Commerce’s explanation should account for “contradictory evidence or
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evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn.” 	Suramerica de Aleaciones
Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 44 F.3d 978, 985 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
USW challenges as unsupported by substantial evidence and not in accordance with law
Commerce’s determination that Prinx cooperated to the best of its ability in reporting information
necessary to calculate its financial expense ratio. See Pl.’s Br. at 9–10. 9 USW argues that “all the
record evidence showed that Prinx repeatedly calculated its financial expense ratio on the basis of
companies that operated in non-market economies”—Company X and Company Y—“despite
receiving notice from Commerce that it should calculate the ratio based on companies operating
in market economies.” 	Id. at 17. 	USW challenges Commerce’s determination that Prinx
cooperated to the best of its ability, arguing that Commerce “failed to support its finding with
substantial evidence” and failed to adequately explain its determination. Id. at 10.
The Government and Prinx ask the court to sustain Commerce’s cooperation determination
as supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. See Gov’t Br. at 7; Def.-Inters.’
Br. at 8. 	Prinx argues that record evidence supports Commerce’s determination because “Prinx
provided the information requested in the form and manner required and cooperated to the best of
9 As a precondition to applying facts otherwise available, Commerce determined that necessary
information is missing from the record because Company Y operates in a nonmarket economy and
“Commerce does not rely on financial statements of companies operating in a non-market
economy.” Cost Calculation Mem. at 2–3; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a); Zhejiang DunAn, 652
F.3d at 1348. 	While Prinx disagrees with Commerce’s decision to not use Company Y’s
consolidated financial statement as the basis for calculating Prinx’s financial expense ratio, Prinx
does not challenge that determination. See Def.-Inters.’ Br. at 7 n.2. Because no party challenges
Commerce’s application of facts otherwise available, under the principle of party presentation the
court does not reach the question of whether the determination that necessary information is
missing from the record is supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law. 	See
Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7, 9 (2025) (per curiam).
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its ability by submitting complete and accurate responses to Commerce’s questions.” Def.-Inters.’
Br. at 2. 	The Government argues that “Commerce . . . identified record information supporting
Prinx’s position” that Company Y had market economy ties and explained its determination by
reference to prior proceedings with similar fact patterns. Gov’t Br. at 11. The Government further
argues that Commerce was not required to apply an adverse inference to Prinx, based on the
discretion afforded by 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b), and that Commerce’s rationale was reasonably
discernible. See id. at 10–11, 12.
For the reasons that follow, the court holds that the challenged determination is (1)
supported by substantial evidence and (2) in accordance with law. 	The court therefore denies
USW’s motion and sustains the Final Determination.
I. 	Substantial 	Evidence 	Supports 	Commerce’s 	Determination 	that 	Prinx
Cooperated to the Best of its Ability
The court finds that the record contains substantial evidence of Company Y’s market
economy operations, which “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support” Commerce’s
determination that Prinx cooperated to the best of its ability in reporting its financial expense ratio.
SeAH Steel, 950 F.3d at 840 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 	The court is
unpersuaded that Prinx “receiv[ed] notice” that Commerce would not rely on Company Y’s
financial statements, as USW argues. 	Pl.’s Br. at 17. 	The court also concludes that Prinx’s
submission of timely, verifiable information supports Commerce’s determination that Prinx
cooperated to the best of its ability.
First, substantial evidence supports the determination that Prinx’s submission of Company
Y’s financial statements complied with Commerce’s requests for information as written. 	In the
initial questionnaire, Commerce asked Prinx to “calculate [its] financial expense based on the
consolidated audited fiscal year financial statements of the highest consolidation level available”
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without specifying that the consolidated entity must operate in a market economy. 	Initial
Questionnaire at D-15 (emphasis omitted). In the supplemental questionnaire, Commerce asked
Prinx to provide financial statements for the “company operating in a market economy [that]
represents the highest level of consolidation” for calculating Prinx Thailand’s financial expense
ratio. Sec. D Suppl. Questionnaire at 9. Commerce also instructed Prinx to “[p]rovide a revised
financial expense rate calculation based on the market economy financial statements at the highest
consolidation level.” Id. There is evidence in the record that Company Y operates in a market
economy; its market economy operations include manufacturing and sales of tire products in
Thailand and the United States. 10 See Sec. A Resp. at Ex. A-6b-10_2; Sec. D Suppl. Resp. at Ex.
SD-12.b. 	Company Y also has market economy ties that Company X does not, notably that its
financial statements are prepared in accordance with the reporting standards of a market
economy. 11 See Sec. A Resp. at Ex. A-6b-9_1, Ex. A-6b-10_1. The compliance of Company Y’s
financial statements with the reporting standards of a market economy constitutes substantial
evidence that Prinx’s submission Company Y’s financial statements complied with Commerce’s
request for “market economy financial statements.” See Sec. D Suppl. Questionnaire at 9.
USW asserts that it was “an indisputable and undeniable fact on the record known to Prinx
that [Company Y] operated in . . . a non-market economy.” Pl.’s Br. at 5. While it is true that there
10 	Financial 	statements describe 	Company Y as 	“an 	investment 	holding 	company” 	with
“subsidiaries . . . [that] are principally engaged in the manufacturing and sales of tire products” in
both a nonmarket economy, [[ 	]], and several market economies, including “[[
]].” Sec. D Suppl. Resp. at Ex. SD-12.b; see also Def.-Inters.’
Br. at 5; Def.-Inters.’ OAQ Resp. at 2.
11 Unlike Company X, Company Y’s ties to market economies include: financial statements
prepared in accordance with [[ 	]] and the disclosure
requirements of the [[ 	]]; [[
]]; and incorporation in [[ 	]]. Compare Sec. A Resp., Ex. A-6b-9_1
with Sec. A Resp., Ex. A-6b-10_1; see also Cost Calculation Mem. at 2–3.
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is extensive record evidence that Company Y operated in a non-market economy, this fact does not
negate 	the 	record 	evidence 	of 	Company Y’s 	market 	economy 	operations. 	Commerce’s
supplemental questionnaire did not specify that the company “operating in a market economy”
could not also operate in a non-market economy. 	See Sec. D Suppl. Questionnaire at 9;
Def.-Inters.’ OAQ Resp. at 3 (“A company can ‘operate’ in multiple countries.”). After considering
record evidence of Company Y’s ties to both market and non-market economies, Commerce
ultimately determined that “[Company Y] also operates in [a non-market economy]” and that
Company Y’s “financial statements cannot serve as the basis for Prinx’s financial expense ratio
calculation.” IDM at 56; see also Cost Calculation Mem. at 3. Commerce did not make an inverse
determination that Company Y does not operate in a market economy. See generally IDM at 56;
Cost Calculation Mem. at 2–3. The evidence that Company Y “operat[es] in a market economy,”
Sec. D Suppl. Questionnaire at 9, even if it also has extensive non-market economy ties, supports
a determination that Prinx cooperated in responding to Commerce’s request for information. 12
Second, it is not clear that Prinx should have known that Commerce would not rely on the
financial statements of Company Y. 	Despite abundant record evidence of Company Y’s
non-market economy ties, the record suggests that Commerce did not initially view these ties as
12 Prinx argues that “it is not clear whether [Company Y’s] principal place of business is [[
]].” 	Def.-Inters.’ OAQ Resp. at 2. 	While financial
statements submitted by Prinx list Company Y’s [[ 	]], a
non-market economy, Sec. A Resp. at Ex. A-6b-11_2, Prinx points to evidence that Company Y’s
“principal activities are investing, including listing and trading shares in [[ 	]]” and that
it is incorporated in [[ 	]], both market economies, Def.-Inters.’ OAQ Resp. at
2. Because this case turns on whether Commerce’s determination that Prinx cooperated with its
request for financial statements of a company “operating in a market economy” is supported by
substantial evidence, the court need not decide whether Company Y’s principal place of business
is in a market or non-market economy. See Sec. D Suppl. Questionnaire at 9 (emphasis added).
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precluding it from using Company Y’s financial statements. 13 Commerce relied on Company Y’s
financial statements in its Preliminary Determination, and Commerce conducted verification of
Prinx’s financial expense ratio calculation using Company Y’s financial statements. See IDM at
56; Prelim. IDM at 13; Verification Report at 16. It was not until USW raised the issue of Company
Y’s non-market economy ties in its case brief that Commerce reconsidered its use of Company Y’s
financial statements. See IDM at 56; Cost Calculation Mem. at 2–3; see also USW’s Case Br. at
38–43. 	USW did not introduce any new evidence of Company Y’s non-market economy
operations. See generally USW’s Case Br. Commerce ultimately agreed with USW that it could
not rely on Company Y’s financial statements, see Cost Calculation Mem. at 2–3, but it reached
this determination after reconsidering the existing record evidence of Company Y’s market and
non-market economy ties.
As the Government explained in response to the court’s written questions, “Commerce is
not often faced with scenarios in which it must determine the operating location of an individual
entity in administrative proceedings involving a market economy country,” in this case, Thailand.
Gov’t OAQ Resp. at 1. 	“[A]s such, [Commerce] does not have a preset list of factors and its
inquiry is fact-specific.” Id. 	USW likewise acknowledges that “Commerce’s past decisions do
not enumerate specific factors that the agency uses to determine whether a company operates in a
market economy.” Pl.’s OAQ Resp. at 2.
USW argues that Prinx nonetheless should have known that Commerce would not rely on
13 	Prinx’s initial questionnaire response indicated that Company Y had [[
]] as Company X. 	See Sec. A Resp. at Ex. A-2c-2. 	Prinx’s supplemental questionnaire
response further indicated that that Company Y had ties to a nonmarket economy, including
[[ 	]] and [[
]]. See Sec. D Suppl. Resp. at Ex. SD-12.b. Additionally, the names of
all four Prinx entities involved in this case, including Company Y, include a [[
]].
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the financial statements of Company Y because Commerce’s supplemental questionnaire gave
Prinx “notice” that Commerce would not rely on the financial statements of a company operating
in a non-market economy. Pl.’s Br. at 17; Pl.’s Reply at 10. USW also asserts that this should have
been apparent to Prinx because Commerce rejected the financial statements of an entity that
operates in a non-market economy for purposes of calculating the financial expense ratio in a prior
proceeding, and that “any reasonable understanding of the standard [for entities operating in a
non-market economy] would embrace Company Y.” Pl.’s OAQ Resp. at 2 (citing Mem. from C.
Marsh to R. Lorentzen, re: Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review of Seamless Refined Copper Pipe and Tube from
Mexico; 2012-2013 at 12, Case No. A-201-838, Bar Code: 3282367-02 (Dep’t Com. June 5,
2015)). However, as the Government correctly notes, “[a]lthough Commerce rejected Company
X’s financial information, Commerce did not—in its supplemental questionnaire—define or
describe what it would consider to be ‘operating’ in a market economy.” Gov’t OAQ Resp. at 3
(citing Sec. D Suppl. Questionnaire at 9). Nor did Commerce specify that the consolidated entity
could not simultaneously be operating in, or based in, a non-market economy. See id.
Commerce had ample evidence of Company Y’s non-market economy ties in the record
when it prepared the Preliminary Determination and conducted verification. See Sec. A Resp. at
Ex. A 6b 10_2; Suppl. Sec. D Resp. at Ex. SD 12.b. Yet Commerce did not initially indicate that
Company Y’s non-market economy ties posed a problem. This suggests that it was not necessarily
clear to Prinx that Commerce would not rely upon Company Y’s financial statements. 	See
Def.-Inters.’ Br. at 8. 	While the standard of cooperation to the best of a respondent’s ability
“assumes that importers are familiar with the rules and regulations that apply to the import
activities,” Nippon Steel, 337 F.3d at 1382, here there is not a clear rule that Commerce will not
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rely on the financial statements of entities that operate in both non-market and market economies,
see Gov’t OAQ Resp. at 1. A reasonable mind could therefore conclude that Prinx cooperated to
the best of its ability in calculating its financial expense ratio based on Company Y’s financial
statements.
Finally, the financial expense information that Prinx submitted was timely and verifiable.
Commerce determined that Prinx did not withhold the relevant information, nor did Prinx “fail[]
to provide such information in a timely manner or in the format requested.” 14 	IDM at 40; cf.
Chandan Steel Ltd. v. United States, 48 CIT __, __, 729 F. Supp. 3d 1357, 1363 (2024), aff'd, No.
2025-1291, 2026 WL 1601627 (Fed. Cir. June 4, 2026) (sustaining application of an adverse
inference where the respondent “through repeated errors, failed to submit on a timely basis a
complete, and therefore satisfactory, database” of sales information). 	Commerce successfully
verified Prinx’s calculation of its financial expense ratio, including by tracing the inputs used in
the calculation back to Company Y’s audited financial statements. 	See IDM at 56; Verification
Report at 16. There is no indication that Prinx concealed Company Y’s non-market economy ties
from Commerce; to the contrary, the evidence of Company Y’s non-market economy ties was
placed on the record by Prinx. Cf. Papierfabrik Aug. Koehler SE v. United States, 38 CIT 1239,
1243–45, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1310–12 (2014), aff'd, 843 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (sustaining
application of an adverse inference where a respondent concealed and omitted relevant information
from its response). 	Prinx also demonstrated willingness to correct a minor error and offered to
resubmit its response when that error was identified by USW. See Prinx’s Pre-Prelim. Resp. at 2.
The timeliness and verifiability of Prinx’s responses, along with its willingness to correct a minor
14 Commerce identified three exceptions to its determination that Prinx had not withheld
information; the financial expense ratio was not among the three exceptions. See IDM at 40, 43.
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error, support finding that Prinx cooperated to the best of its ability in that it “conduct[ed] prompt,
careful, and comprehensive investigations of all relevant records.” Nippon Steel, 337 F.3d at 1382.
The court will sustain Commerce’s determination “even if it is possible to draw two
inconsistent conclusions from evidence in the record.” 	Am. Silicon Techs., 334 F.3d at 1037
(quotation marks omitted and alteration accepted). While Commerce ultimately did not rely on
Company Y’s financial statements, the court holds Commerce’s determination that Prinx’s
cooperated to the best of its ability in calculating its financial expense ratio using Company Y’s
financial statements to be supported by substantial evidence.
II. 	Commerce Adequately Explained Its Determination that Prinx Cooperated to
the Best of its Ability
In its discussion of Prinx’s financial expense ratio, Commerce stated that it “disagree[d]”
with USW’s argument that “Prinx failed to cooperate to the best of its ability to provide
information in the form and manner requested by Commerce . . . .” 	IDM at 55–56. 	Reading
Commerce’s Issues and Decision Memorandum as a whole, along with the Cost Calculation
Memorandum cited therein, the court holds that Commerce adequately explained its determination
because its rationale is reasonably discernible. See NMB Singapore, 557 F.3d at 1319.
As a preliminary matter, the court holds that Commerce was required to explain its
determination that Prinx cooperated to the best of its ability in response to USW’s argument to the
contrary. In antidumping investigations, Commerce is required to include in its final determination
“an explanation of the basis for its determination that addresses relevant arguments[] made by
interested parties.” 	19 U.S.C. § 1677f(i)(3)(A); see also NMB Singapore, 557 F.3d at 1320.
Because USW made the argument to Commerce that Prinx failed to cooperate to the best of its
ability in reporting its financial expense ratio such that application of an adverse inference was
warranted, see USW’s Case Br. at 38, Commerce was required to provide “an explanation of the
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basis for its determination” that Prinx cooperated to the best of its ability. 	19 U.S.C.
§ 1677f(i)(3)(A); see also Pl.’s OAQ Resp. at 6–7. 15
Three portions of Commerce’s IDM and related Cost Calculation Memorandum are
relevant to assessing the adequacy of its explanation. 	In addressing Prinx’s cooperation in
reporting its financial expense ratio, Commerce provided the following explanation in the IDM:
In Prinx’s Supplemental Section D Response, Prinx provided the company that it
contended was operating in a market economy that represented the highest level of
consolidation with respect to the results of Prinx [Company Y] and provided a
revised financial expense rate calculation based on this company’s FY 2023 audited
consolidated financial statements. In the Preliminary Determination, we relied on
Prinx’s revised financial expense ratio based on [Company Y’s] consolidated
financial statements and later verified the calculation of the ratio during the cost
verification.
While Commerce’s established practice is to calculate the respondent’s financial
expense ratio based on the audited financial statements of the highest level of
consolidation available, Commerce does not rely on the financial statements of
companies operating in a non-market economy. 	After further review of the
information on the record of this proceeding, we agree with the petitioner that
[Company Y’s] consolidated financial statements cannot serve as the basis for
Prinx’s financial expense ratio calculation in the final determination because this
company also operates in [a non-market economy].
IDM at 56 (footnotes omitted). Commerce also explained its selection of facts otherwise available
and referred to the Cost Calculation Memorandum for “additional details.” 	Id. Two aspects of
this explanation are significant. 	First, Commerce explained that it had initially relied upon and
verified the financial expense ratio calculation using Company Y’s financial statements, which
15 The Government also argues that “Commerce’s broad discretion as to whether to apply an
adverse inference ‘does not require that [it] show that an [interested party] cooperated to the best
of its ability every time it determines that [facts available with an adverse inference] should not be
applied.’ ” Gov’t Br. at 11 (quoting Appvion, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 1382). While Commerce may
decline to apply an adverse inference to a noncooperative respondent, here Commerce did not
“purport to rely on its discretion under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) to not apply an adverse inference”
and must explain its “affirmative factual finding” that Prinx cooperated to the best of its ability in
calculating its financial expense ratio. Assan Aluminyum Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. v. United States,
47 CIT __, __, 624 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1377–78 (2023) (quotation marks omitted and alteration
accepted).
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suggests that it was not obvious to Commerce—nor should it have been obvious to Prinx—that
Company Y’s financial statements were not usable. 	See id. 	Second, Commerce stated that it
agreed that “[Company Y] also operates in” a non-market economy, id. (emphasis added); the use
of the word “also” implies Commerce viewed Company Y as operating in both a market and non-
market economy.
In the Cost Calculation Memorandum, Commerce discussed record evidence of Company
Y’s ties to market and non-market economy countries—including Company Y’s place of
incorporation, reporting standards for its financial statements, principle place of business, address,
and qualifications—and explained its determination that Company Y’s financial statements could
not be used because it operates in a non-market economy. 16 See Cost Calculation Mem.at 2–3.
Finally, in the portion of the IDM containing Commerce’s determination not to apply a
total adverse inference, Commerce discussed Prinx’s overall cooperation. Commerce determined
that “for the majority of Prinx’s submissions, the record demonstrates that Prinx cooperated with
Commerce’s numerous requests for information, provided the requested information by the
established deadlines in the form and manner requested, provided information that was largely
verifiable, and did not significantly impede Commerce’s ability to timely and accurately conduct
16 Commerce explained:
After further reviewing the information on the record of this proceeding, we found
that [Company Y’s] consolidated financial statements are prepared in accordance
with [[ 	]] and state that the company
was incorporated in [[ 	]]. 	However, the financial statements
also state that [Company Y] [[
]]. 	Further, the financial
statements of one of [Company Y’s] affiliates . . . state that [Company Y’s]
principal place of business . . . [[ 	]] . . . . Furthermore, in the schedule
showing its affiliated companies, Prinx listed [Company Y’s] address [in a
nonmarket economy].
Cost Calculation Mem. at 2–3 (footnotes omitted).
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this investigation . . . .” IDM at 41. Commerce also stated that—with the exception of three parts
of the calculation for which it applied a partial adverse inference—where there were errors in
Prinx’s reporting, “the values reported by Prinx were substantiated by at least a portion of Prinx’s
record and reasonable.” Id.
Taken together, the court finds Commerce’s rationale for determining that Prinx cooperated
to the best of its ability to be reasonably discernible. 	See NMB Singapore, 557 F.3d at 1319.
Specifically, it is reasonably discernible that Commerce considered Prinx’s calculation of its
financial expense ratio based on Company Y’s financial statements to be cooperative in light of
record evidence that Company Y operated in a market economy and consistent with the timeliness,
verifiability, 	and 	overall 	completeness 	of 	Prinx’s 	responses 	to 	Commerce’s 	requests 	for
information. Furthermore, Commerce’s explanation cited its more detailed discussion of record
evidence in the Cost Calculation Memorandum, which belies USW’s argument that Commerce
“did not reconcile the decision it reached with the evidence” in the record. Pl.’s Br. at 10.
The court is not persuaded by USW’s remaining arguments that Commerce’s explanation
was inadequate.
First, USW argues that Commerce’s explanation relied on its statement that “Prinx
provided the company that it contended was operating in a market economy,” see IDM at 56, and
that “[i]t is not reasonably discernible why Prinx’s ‘contention’ of a matter constitutes cooperation
to the best of its ability.” Pl.’s Reply at 3–4. But this statement formed only part of Commerce’s
explanation of its determination. The court reads the statement that Prinx “contended” Company
Y operated in a market economy in context with the following sentence, in which Commerce
explained that it verified Company Y’s financial statements, and alongside the evidence that
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Commerce cited in the Cost Calculation Memorandum of Company Y’s market economy ties.
IDM at 56 & n.270 (citing Cost Calculation Mem.).
Second, 	USW argues 	that 	Commerce’s 	explanation 	of 	its 	total 	adverse 	inference
determination is inapplicable to its partial adverse inference determination. 	Pl.’s Reply at 4–5.
However, USW itself acknowledges that Commerce’s total adverse inference determination “was
made other than with regard to a few discrete issues for which Commerce applied partial [adverse
facts available],” and the financial expense ratio was not one of those issues. 	Id. at 4 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Additionally, contrary to USW’s assertion that the standard for applying
a total adverse inference is “higher,” see Pl.’s Reply at 8, the statutory standard for applying both
partial and adverse facts available is that a respondent “failed to cooperate by not acting to the best
of its ability to comply with a request for information.” 	19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). 	While a total
adverse inference may be applied when the gaps in the record are “core to the antidumping
analysis,” the definition of cooperation is the same. Compare Nippon Steel, 337 F.3d at 1382–83
(defining cooperation to the best of a respondent’s ability in the context of a partial adverse
inference), with Mukand, 767 F.3d at 1306–07 (applying the standard described in Nippon Steel
in the context of a total adverse inference). Alone, the total adverse inference explanation perhaps
would not suffice to address the discrete issue raised by USW, but the court considers Commerce’s
statements about Prinx’s overall cooperation to be helpful in discerning Commerce’s rationale for
not applying an adverse inference to Prinx’s financial expense ratio. 	Alongside the specific
discussion of the financial expense ratio calculation contained in the IDM and the Cost Calculation
Memorandum, see IDM at 55–56; Cost Calculation Mem. at 2–3, Commerce’s discussion of
Prinx’s overall cooperation contributes to making Commerce’s explanation reasonably discernible.
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Finally, USW argues that Commerce’s determination that Prinx cooperated to the best of
its ability in reporting its financial expense ratio is not in accordance with law because “Commerce
offered only conclusory statements.” 	Pl.’s Br. at 10. 	In support of this proposition, USW cites
Assan Aluminyum Sanayi ve Ticaret A.S. v. United States, 47 CIT __, 624 F. Supp. 3d 1343 (2023).
See id. at 18. 	In that case, the court held that Commerce did not adequately explain its
determination to not apply an adverse inference where the agency “summarily asserted that [the
respondent] acted to ‘the best of its ability’ while enumerating—without any attempt to
reconcile—evidence that seemingly detracts from this conclusion,” and where it was “not
‘reasonably discernible’ what evidence supports the agency's conclusions.” Assan, 624 F. Supp.
3d at 1377. This case is distinguishable from Assan because here Commerce did evaluate evidence
that seemingly detracts from its conclusion: evidence that Company Y operates in a non-market
economy. 	See Cost Calculation Mem. at 3. 	Commerce seemingly attempted to reconcile this
evidence with evidence that Company Y also operates in market economies and struck a middle
ground by applying facts otherwise available without an adverse inference. See id. at 2–3; IDM
at 56. It is also reasonably discernible that Commerce relied on evidence contained in the financial
statements on the record that Company Y operates in a market economy. 	See Cost Calculation
Mem. at 2–3. Furthermore, whereas in Assan Commerce found that the respondent cooperated to
the best of its ability despite providing “no . . . documentation” necessary to “confirm the validity
of” certain adjustments to the dumping margin calculation, Assan, 624 F. Supp. 3d at 1377
(quotation marks omitted), here Prinx provided responses to the relevant questions that Commerce
relied on and verified without issue. 	Unlike in Assan, and contrary to USW’s argument,
Commerce’s explanations here are not so threadbare as to be conclusory.
Though Commerce’s explanation may not be perfectly clear, as USW argues, Commerce’s
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explanation need only be reasonably discernible, see NMB Singapore, 557 F.3d at 1319, a standard
Commerce meets here. It may have been preferable for Commerce to explain, for example, that it
determined that Prinx’s use of Company Y’s financial statements complied with Commerce’s
request for information because Company Y operates in both non-market and market economies.
However, because the court holds that Commerce’s “path may reasonably be discerned,” the court
“will uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity.” 	Bowman Transp., 419 U.S. at 286; see also
NMB Singapore, 557 F.3d at 1323 (“While a more substantial explanation from Commerce might
have been helpful to us or preferable to [the parties], its absence here is not grounds for us not to
affirm because we can nonetheless reasonably discern the path of Commerce's decision.”).
CONCLUSION
The court holds to be supported by substantial evidence Commerce’s determination that
Prinx cooperated to the best of its ability in calculating its financial expense ratio. The court also
holds that the determination is in accordance with law because Commerce’s rationale is reasonably
discernible. For the foregoing reasons, Commerce’s Final Determination is sustained. Judgment
will enter accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ 	Gary S. Katzmann
Gary S. Katzmann, Judge
Dated: July 1, 2026
New York, New York
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