Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
HUIQIANG XU,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela BONDI, in her official capacity as
Attorney General of the United States, et
al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-1765-GPC-DEB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF No. 1]
Petitioner Huiqiang Xu (“Petitioner”) is a noncitizen currently detained at the Otay
Mesa Detention Center. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”) ¶ 5. On March 20, 2026, Petitioner filed a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging her continued
detention without bond and naming the Attorney General of the United States and several
other individual agency officials as respondents (“Respondents”). ECF No. 1. For the
following reasons, the Court GRANTS the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court
VACATES the hearing set for April 3, 2026.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Petitioner entered the United States on February 20, 2023. Pet. ¶ 28. On March 8,
2023, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability under §
212(a)(6)(A)(i). Id. ¶ 29. Petitioner was then “released from immigration custody on parole
issued under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).” ECF No. 4 (“Ret.”) at 2. 1
On February 4, 2025, an immigration judge initially denied his and his family’s
applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Pet. ¶ 33. On November 4, 2025, the
Board of Immigration Appeals vacated the prior decision and remanded for further
proceedings. Id. ¶ 35. There is currently no final order of removal against Petitioner. Id. ¶
26. Additionally, for approximately three years, Petitioner has been a law-abiding member
of his community with no criminal history. Id. ¶ 31.
On February 28, 2026, Petitioner was detained by Respondents, while Petitioner was
working as an Uber driver. Id. ¶ 37. He was transferred to the Otay Mesa Detention Center.
Id.
B. Procedural Background
On March 20, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his continued immigration detention. ECF No.
1. On March 25, 2026, Respondent filed a response to the habeas petition. ECF No. 4
(“Ret.”).
Petitioner presents two main arguments. Pet. ¶¶ 54-67. First, Petitioner alleges that
his detention without a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Pet. ¶¶ 59-67. Petitioner’s second claim alleges that Respondent violated the
INA by detaining him under the incorrect statutory authority. Id. ¶¶ 54-58.
1 Page numbers reflect CM/ECF pagination.
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Petitioner requests that the Court grant the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,
ordering his release. Pet. at 12. Petitioner alternatively requests that the Court order
Respondent to provide her with an immediate bond hearing before an IJ. Id. Petitioner also
requests the award of Petitioner’s attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to
Justice Act, as well as under any other basis justified under law. Id. at 13.
II. 	STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. Standard & Expedited Removal Proceedings
An arriving noncitizen seeking admission into the United States at a U.S. Port of
Entry is “processed either through expedited removal proceedings or through regular
removal proceedings.” 	Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 507 (9th Cir.
2019). The regular removal procedure is also known as “section 240 proceedings.” 240
proceedings involve an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge and the ability
for the individual to apply for asylum if she would be persecuted upon return to her home
country. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1), (b)(1); Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103, 108 (2020). Noncitizens seeking asylum are guaranteed due process under the
5 th Amendment throughout this process. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
The DHS Secretary has discretion to release a noncitizen on parole during this
process. In one procedure, an arriving asylum seeker may be paroled “for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). A separate
procedure puts the immigrant in conditional parole. Id. § 1226(a). In either case, to release
a noncitizen from custody requires a case-by-case determination, where the noncitizen
must “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a
danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is “likely to appear for any future
proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8).
The second, more streamlined process is expedited removal, governed by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225. Under these proceedings, noncitizens can be ordered removed by an immigration
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officer “without further hearing or review.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Because of the
truncated 	procedure, 	expedited 	removal 	is 	limited 	to 	noncitizens 	meeting 	several
requirements. First, a noncitizen is potentially eligible for expedited removal if he (1)
sought to procure immigration status or citizenship via fraud or false representations or
(2) “at the time of application for admission,” failed to satisfy certain documentation
requirements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), 1182(a)(7).
Second, expedited removal is further cabined to noncitizens who 1) are categorized as
“arriving in the United States,” or 2) have “not been admitted or paroled into the United
States” and cannot affirmatively show they have been “physically present in the United
States 	continuously 	for 	the 	2-year 	period 	immediately 	prior 	to 	the 	date 	of 	the
determination 	of 	inadmissibility.” 	Id. 	§ 	1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii). 	Within 	that 	second
requirement, the Attorney General can designate the population of noncitizens subject to
expedited removal. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I).
Once detained under expedited removal, if the noncitizen indicates an intention to
apply for asylum and the asylum officer finds the fear to return to be credible, the
applicant’s claim will be fully considered in a standard removal hearing. Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. 103, 110 (2020).
B. 2025 Designation for Expedited Removal
The Attorney General has delegated the office’s expedited removal designation
power to the DHS Secretary. Before January 2025, DHS had only designated noncitizens
as eligible for expedited removal if they were identified as “arriving,” had arrived by sea
within the last two years, or had been apprehended within 14 days of entry and 100 miles
of the border. See Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section
235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68924, 68924
(Nov. 13, 2002); Designating Aliens For Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877, 48879
(Aug. 11, 2004). In January 2025, DHS published the 2025 Designation, authorizing
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expedited removal to be exercised to the “full scope of its statutory authority.” Designating
Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139, 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025). DHS has stated
that this full scope applies to noncitizens “who are encountered anywhere in the United
States more than 100 air miles from a U.S. international land border, and who have been
continuously present in the United States for at least 14 days but for less than two years.”
Id.
In its implementation of the 2025 Designation, “the Government began targeting
for expedited removal people already in section 240 removal proceedings, many of whom
are pursuing asylum and other collateral relief” and executing “courthouse arrests.” Make
the Rd. New York v. Noem, No. 25-CV-190 (JMC), 2025 WL 2494908, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug.
29, 2025). The DHS’ typical procedure for these courthouse arrests consist of “moving
orally (without any advance notice) to dismiss the individual's pending section 240
proceedings, then arresting the individual at the courthouse immediately upon the
dismissal of their section 240 proceedings, and then, finally, placing the individual in
expedited removal proceedings through which they can be deported far more quickly, and
with far less process, than they would have been in the section 240 proceedings.” Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims his detention violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
and the INA. Pet. ¶¶ 54-67. Respondent have not opposed the petition, acknowledging
“this Court, and Courts in this District, have repeatedly reached the opposite conclusion
[as Respondents] under the same and/or similar facts.” Ret. at 2. At the same time,
Respondent reserves the right to appeal. Id. Though Respondent has not opposed the
petition, the Court will conduct a full analysis of the issues given Respondent’s
reservation.
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A. Fifth Amendment Due Process
i. 	Entitlement to Due Process Rights
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Though
noncitizens do not enjoy constitutional protections outside our borders, once a noncitizen
“enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to
all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
Under this wide umbrella, “[i]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens
to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306
(1993).
Here, Petitioner has “passed through our gates” and “may be expelled only after
proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process
of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). Because
Petitioner has developed an interest in remaining during his time here, “the procedures
used to remove him must adequately protect” that interest. Make the Rd. New York v.
Noem, No. 25-CV-190 (JMC), 2025 WL 2494908, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025).
This instant case stands in contrast to Thuraissigiam. There, the respondent was a
noncitizen detained close to the border and shortly after unlawful entry, and keeping those
characteristics in mind, the Supreme Court held that those “in respondent's position ha[ve]
only those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Dep't of
Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020) (emphasis added). This
holding only reinforced the precedent that noncitizens “on the threshold of initial entry
stand[ ] on a different footing” than those who have “passed through our gates.” Mezei,
345 U.S. 212.
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In this case, Petitioner is not an “arriving” noncitizen but one that has been
physically present in the United States for over three years. This substantial amount of
time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before
removal. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 87 (1903) (finding a noncitizen was entitled
to due process before removal despite having spent only four days in the US).
ii. 	Government’s Adherence to Due Process
Generally, due process protections depend on the situation and must account for (1)
the private interest at issue, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through
the procedures used, and (3) the Government's interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 334–35 (1976). Here, Petitioner alleges that he was detained while his asylum
application was pending and while on parole without any opportunity to be heard prior to
being arrested and detained. Pet. ¶¶ 54-67.
First, Petitioner has a private interest in remaining free, which developed over the
more than three years he resided in the United States. Pet. ¶ 28. See Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 482-483 (1972); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). This
liberty interest applies to Petitioner, even in his parole status. For example, Morrissey—
though analyzing the criminal parole context—found that “the liberty of a parolee,
although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its
termination inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee and often others…[thus it] must be seen
within the protection of the [Fifth] Amendment.” 408 U.S. at 482.
In the deportation context, detention has minimum due process protections.
Generally, detention is seen “as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process,”
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003), and the government holds the discretion to
detain an immigrant pending removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). However, that discretion is not
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unbounded. Detention pending 	removal proceedings has “two regulatory goals”—
ensuring future appearances and preventing danger to the community. Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). This logically also extends to the granting of parole and its
revocation. Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“[Petitioner’s]
release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the
government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and
[Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those
criteria.”). These primary goals provide guidance for the floor of due process afforded to
noncitizens for detention and parole.
Further, Petitioner has a Fifth Amendment right to due process of law in
deportation proceedings. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Here, Petitioner was
initially provided due process for his removal proceedings following his entry into the
United States on February 20, 2023. Pet. ¶¶ 28-29. He was able to enter the country and
was given parole, which reflected a determination he was not a flight risk or a danger to
the community. Opp. at 2. He has timely applied for asylum and complies with all laws.
Pet. ¶¶ 31-36. The proceedings have created a protectable expectation of his due process
rights in his removal proceedings and the fair procedures this country guarantees. Thus,
Petitioner was entitled to due process in his parole revocation. Particularly, he was entitled
to both notification of revocation and the reasoning for revocation, if not also an
opportunity to be heard and contest the determination.
Second, the procedures used present a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of
those interests and are not outweighed by the Government’s interest. In Make the Rd. New
York v. Noem, which considers the application of the 2025 Designation, the court
determined that “[b]efore removing someone through expedited removal, the Government
must make several threshold determinations: whether the individual has been continually
present in the United States for two years; whether they have previously been admitted or
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paroled; whether they are inadmissible on one of the grounds that make them eligible for
expedited removal; whether they have a credible fear of persecution; and whether they are
a citizen, lawful permanent resident, refugee, or asylee.” No. 25-CV-190-JMC, 2025 WL
2494908, at *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025). Each of these determinations present a
substantial risk of error and harm to Petitioner’s interests in remaining at liberty. This is
especially true in regard to the credible fear interview—where individuals might not be
appropriately referred for the interview or not afforded an effective opportunity to be
heard—and the continual presence determination. Id. at *15-17.
Respondents have also failed to demonstrate a significant interest in Petitioner’s
detention. ICE did not provide Petitioner individualized notice or reasoning prior to his
arrest and detention on February 28, 2026, and Respondent has presented no legitimate
reason for why those decisions were made. Petitioner does not have a criminal record and
is complying with all removal proceedings. Pet. ¶¶ 31, 36. There is no indication that he
is a flight risk or presents a danger to the community, which strike at the core, guiding
goals for parole, and Respondent has not supplied any additional information to the
contrary. Denying Petitioner notice and reasoning on revocation of his parole took away
a meaningful opportunity to contest and violated due process. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d
at 1032-35; Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1146-47 (D. Or. 2025) (D. Or. July
9, 2025).
Finally, “[t]he Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and
repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods.,
511 	U.S. 	244, 	267 	(1994). 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	has 	limited 	retroactivity 	under
the Due Process Clause under its “prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation.”
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 30 (1994) (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.
v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984)). Abiding to this principle, “administrative
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rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
The 2025 Designation’s language does not clearly require that it be applied to
individuals who entered the United States prior to its effective date. Therefore, executing
the Designation over Petitioner who entered the country before the Designation’s effective
date violated the Due Process Clause.
For those reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner’s due process rights have been
violated.
B. Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
Petitioner argues that the INA was violated when Respondents detained him under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Pet. ¶¶ 54-58.
The application of expedited removal is limited to noncitizens who meet several
requirements. One of those requirements cabins initiation of expedited removal to
noncitizens who (1) are categorized as “arriving in the United States,” or (2) have “not
been admitted or paroled into the United States” and cannot affirmatively show they have
been 	“physically present in 	the United States continuously for the 2-year period
immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii); see also Coalition for Human Immigrant Rights v. Noem, No. 25
Civ. 872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *30 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025).
Petitioner is no longer an “arriving” noncitizen after having resided here for over
three years. In addition, beyond the fact that he has been present in this country for a 3-
year period, he also has been paroled into the United States. Therefore, the Court finds
that Petitioner could not be subject to § 1225.
In sum, Respondent’s actions violated the INA.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the reasoning above, the Court GRANTS the petition for writ of habeas
corpus. The parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report within 72 hours of this
Order’s filing, confirming Petitioner’s release. Further, in aid of the Court’s jurisdiction,
which is hereby retained, the Court ORDERS pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1651, that Respondent shall not cause Petitioner to be re-detained during the pendency of
her removal proceedings without prior leave of this Court. The Clerk of Court SHALL
enter judgment in Petitioner's favor and close this case.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 26, 2026
2 In his prayer for relief, Petitioner requests an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s
fees. Pet. at 7. Petitioner’s counsel may submit an appropriate EAJA fee application
within 30 days of the issuance of this Order.
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