Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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26-cv-1577-RSH-JLB
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JUAN FRANCISCO GONZALEZ-
MONREAL,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General, et
al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-1577-RSH-JLB
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION
[ECF Nos. 2, 3]
On March 12, 2026, petitioner Juan Francisco Gonzalez Monreal filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner
has also filed motions to appoint counsel and for a temporary restraining order. ECF Nos.
2, 3.
Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (the “Habeas Rules”) requires summary
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26-cv-1577-RSH-JLB
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dismissal of a federal habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any
attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” See also
Habeas Rule 1(b) (permitting district courts to apply Habeas Rules to Section 2241 habeas
proceedings); Lane v. Feather, 584 F. App’x 843, 843 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district
court’s application of Habeas Rule 4 to dismiss Section 2241 petition).
Petitioner alleges that he was arrested and taken into immigration custody on
October 20, 2025, and is currently detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in San
Diego, California, pending his removal hearing. ECF No. 1 at 1. Petitioner contends that
pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), he
must be released from immigration custody because there is no significant likelihood that
he can be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. ECF No. 1 at 1-2. In Zadvydas,
the Supreme Court construed 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the statutory provision authorizing
detention of a noncitizen subject to a final order of removal beyond the 90-day removal
period, and concluded that the “statute, read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits
an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about
that alien’s removal from the United States.” Id. at 689. However, Zadvydas does not apply
here because Petitioner is not subject to a final order of removal; instead, he is awaiting his
removal hearing. Nor does the length of Petitioner’s custody to date—less than five
months—without more raise due process concerns of prolonged detention.
Accordingly, the Petition is DISMISSED. In light of this disposition, the Court
DENIES as moot Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel [ECF No. 2] and motion for a
temporary restraining order [ECF No. 3]. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 16, 2026
____________________
Hon. Robert S. Huie
United States District Judge
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