Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
EVGENII KOSHELEV,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN DOE, WARDEN OF THE OTAY
MESA DETENTION CENTER;
ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,
SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE), A
COMPONENT OF DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-1529-JES-MSB
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241; and
(2) DENYING AS MOOT
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
IMMEDIATE RELEASE
[ECF NOs. 1, 2]
Before the Court is Petitioner Evgenii Koshelev’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), and Motion for Immediate
Release or, alternatively, for a Bond Hearing (“Motion”). ECF Nos. 1, (“Pet.”), 2. Pursuant
to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, Respondents (the “Government”) filed the Response,
a Notice which expressed their non-opposition to a bond hearing for Petitioner. ECF No.
5.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
On March 20, 2026, the Court issued an order in which it: (1) set forth the factual
background of this Petition; (2) found that it had jurisdiction over this matter; (3) found
that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing; and (4) ordered the parties to provide
supplemental briefing regarding which detention statute (i.e., 8 U.S.C. §§ (“Section”) 1225
or 1226) governed Petitioner’s detention. See ECF No. 6. The Court made this request to
determine which standard would apply in Petitioner’s bond hearing. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in
that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
(2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview
of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see
also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The pro se drafted Petition contains several factual gaps. See generally Pet. For
example, the circumstances surrounding where and how he was detained, and whether he
had some immigration status prior to his current detention are absent. Id. As a result, the
Court construed the Petition liberally and inferred that Petitioner could reasonably be
detained under either detention statute. See Evgenii Koshelev, V. Doe, No. 3:26-CV-1529-
JES-MSB, 2026 WL 785536, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026).
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On March 24, 2026, Respondents filed supplemental briefing, stating the following:
“Petitioner entered the United States on or about September 13, 2023 and was released on
parole on October 28, 2023. It is Respondents’ position that Petitioner is currently detained
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).” ECF No. 7. The Government’s response makes clear
that Petitioner had an immigration status—here, he was granted parole—prior to being
detained in October 2025. Petitioner’s prior parole status gives the Court pause in ordering
Petitioner’s bond hearing because this remedy would be inferior to that which would be
available resulting from an unlawful deprivation of a liberty interest. See Pinchi v. Noem,
792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (holding that noncitizen’s parole cannot be
revoked without first affording them with notice and an opportunity to be heard).
The Court finds that this issue has been addressed by the undersigned in a recent
decision, Gergawi v. Larose. No. 3:25-CV-3352-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 3719321, at *2-4
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025). Therefore, the Court, elects to follow the reasoning it stated in
Gergawi and incorporates it by reference. Id.
In 2023, Petitioner was released on parole from Respondents’ custody. See ECF No.
7. The Court notes that it is unspecified whether he was granted parole under 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5)(A) or conditional parole under Id. § 1226(a)(2). However, the Court need not
clarify this detail because the procedural safeguards for both are the same. See, e.g., 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (proscribing the revocation of parole unless a government official
gives notice and makes certain findings); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) (proscribing same);
Gergawi, 2025 WL 3719321, at *3-4 (finding that conditional parole may only be revoked
after first providing noncitizen with notice and an opportunity to be heard). Therefore, the
Court finds that Respondents’ conduct—releasing Petitioner on parole—resulted in
Petitioner’s acquisition of a liberty interest in remaining out of immigration custody. See
Gergawi, 2025 WL 3719321, at *3-4; see also Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1031.
Petitioner claims that, to date, he has not received a bond hearing and that “[t]he
Government has failed to show any changed circumstances, violation of conditions, or
lawful justification warranting continued confinement.” Pet. at 2. Accordingly, the Court
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finds that the Respondents failed to provide Petitioner with notice and opportunity to be
heard prior to revoking his parole, when he was detained in October 2025. In doing so,
Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights. C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-
01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025); Leiva Flores v.
Albarran, No. 25-cv-09302-AMO, 2025 WL 3228306, at *5; Faizyan v. Casey, No.: 3:25-
cv-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2025). As a result, the
Court will order Petitioner’s immediate release.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above:
(1) The Court GRANTS Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241;
(2) In light of the Court’s ruling on the Petition, it DENIES AS MOOT the
Petitioner’s Motion for Immediate Release.
(3) Because 	the 	Court 	GRANTS 	the 	Petition 	and 	concludes 	that
Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner's parole violates procedural due
process, Respondents 	are 	ORDERED 	to 	IMMEDIATELY 	release
Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions of her preexisting
conditional parole;
(4) The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report on or before
March 30, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released; and
(5) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 26, 2026
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