Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
YOLANDO JUAREZ-JUAREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26cv1319-LL-BJW
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[ECF No. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Yolando Juarez-Juarez’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”)]. Respondents filed a Response [ECF
No. 4, (“Ret.”)], and Petitioner filed a Traverse [ECF No. 5]. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is an asylum seeker from Mexico who is currently detained at Otay Mesa
Detention Center. Pet. ¶ 1. On or about February 15, 1997, Petitioner entered the United
States without inspection. Id. ¶ 2. On or about April 13, 2011, Petitioner was arrested and
detained. Id. On or about April 14, 2011, Respondents initiated removal proceedings
against Petitioner, and Petitioner applied for asylum before the San Diego Immigration
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Court. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6. On or about May 5, 2011, the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”) ordered the release of the Petitioner on bond. Id. ¶ 35; ECF No. 1-2. On
December 10, 2014, the EOIR Immigration Court administratively closed removal
proceedings. Pet. ¶ 7. On July 31, 2025, the removal proceeding was placed back on the
active docket at the request of DHS. Id. ¶ 8. Petitioner attended a hearing in front of the
Immigration Court on or about November 25, 2025, and a continued master calendar
hearing was scheduled for May 12, 2026. Id. ¶ 9. On February 6, 2026, Petitioner was
arrested and detained by ICE on his way to work without any explanation. Id. ¶¶ 10, 38–
39. 	Petitioner 	alleges 	that 	his 	detention 	violates 	the 	Fifth 	Amendment 	and 	the
Administrative Procedure Act. Id. ¶¶ 41–57. He seeks a writ of habeas corpus directing an
immediate release. Id. at 13.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he is “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally,
“the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive
detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” Hamdi, 542
U.S. at 536 (quoting I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without notice or a
hearing violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the APA. Pet. ¶¶ 41–57.
Respondents do not dispute that no notice or hearing was provided; instead they argue that
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), because Petitioner was
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled. Ret. at 2. Because the Court
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finds that Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim is meritorious and justifies Petitioner’s
release, the Court will only address this claim in this Order.1
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is well established that
the 	Fifth 	Amendment 	entitles 	[noncitizens] 	to 	due 	process 	of 	law 	in 	deportation
proceedings.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 306 (1993)). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing
before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113,
127 (1990).
The Court finds that having been previously released on parole, Petitioner has a
protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention. “Even individuals who face
significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty the government wields
significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F.
Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to
detain 	or 	release 	an 	individual 	may 	be 	within 	the 	government’s 	discretion, 	“the
government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’
upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[]
to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 482 (1972)) (alterations in original).
1 Because the Petition can be resolved on due process grounds, the Court declines to reach
Petitioner’s claims of APA violation. However, the Court notes that other courts have
found violations of the APA in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-
CV-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *3, 13 (“Petitioner’s parole was revoked
without an individualized determination or provided reasoning, which violated the APA.”);
Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept.
26, 2025) (finding revocation of the petitioner’s parole arbitrary and capricious because
respondents did not state any reasons for the revocation).
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As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 	To determine which procedures are constitutionally
sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court considers the following factors:
(1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.
Here, Petitioner alleges that he was detained without any explanation as to why his
parole was revoked. Pet. ¶ 39. For almost fifteen years after being released on bond,
Petitioner lived in the community, maintained employment, and pursued immigration
relief. Traverse at 6. In turn, Respondents have not shown that Petitioner violated his bond
conditions or explain why the bond was revoked that would justify his renewed detention.
See generally Ret.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the revocation of
Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be heard denied
Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has a significant
liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp.
3d at 1032 (“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen
pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a
protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” (citations omitted)). Freedom from
detention is a fundamental part of due process protection. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872
F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[F]reedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty
protected 	by 	the 	Due 	Process 	Clause.’” 	(quoting 	Foucha 	v. 	Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an
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opportunity to be heard. After the initial determination that Petitioner should be paroled
because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, Respondents have
not produced any argument or evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v.
Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v.
Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018) 	(“Release reflects a determination by the
government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). There
is no indication that Petitioner has failed to abide by the conditions of his release. “Once a
noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely
because he is subject to removal proceedings.” Id. “Rather, the federal agents must be able
to present evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the
noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk . . . .” Id. The risk of erroneous
deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is high because neither the government nor Petitioner has
had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for his detention. Pinchi,
792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (citation omitted). It follows that the probable value of additional
procedural safeguards, such as notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, is also high.
Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is low. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“[T]he government has
articulated no legitimate interest that would support arresting [petitioner] without a pre-
detention hearing.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01206-KES-SKO (HC),
2025 WL 2817795, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963,
970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the government wishes to re-arrest [petitioner] at any
point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a
hearing is low.”). There is no indication that providing proper notice, reasoning, and a pre-
deprivation hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome on the government.
See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“In immigration court, custody hearings are routine
and impose a minimal cost.” (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00801-KES-SKO
(HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025))).
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Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole without
notice or a pre-deprivation hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is
unlawful. See, e.g., Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (finding the petitioner’s parole was
revoked without notice and a hearing and without a showing of a change of circumstances,
thus violating her due process rights and rendering her detention unlawful). The proper
remedy for the unlawful detention is Petitioner’s immediate release subject only to the
conditions of his preexisting parole. See Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *1 (finding DHS
violated the petitioner’s due process rights by revoking his parole without notice or a
hearing and ordering his immediate release); Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (ordering
immediate release after the petitioner was detained while out on bond without notice or
pre-deprivation hearing).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition.2
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, and ORDERS
that Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody subject only to the
conditions of his preexisting parole. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in Petitioner’s
favor and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 11, 2026
2 In his prayer for relief, Petitioner requests attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, which the Court DENIES without prejudice. Pet. at 13.
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