Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
KAI WANG,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden at
Otay Mesa Detention Center,
Respondent.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-01130-BTM-BJW
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF NO. 1]
Pending before the Court is Kai Wang’s amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART
and DENIES IN PART the petition and orders Wang’s immediate release from custody.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Wang arrived at the U.S. border on June 13, 2024. (ECF No. 6-1, Ex. A (“Decl.”),
¶ 1.) He turned himself in to immigration officials, who detained him for four days. (Id.)
He was released into the country on June 17, 2024, and ordered to report to Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) every six months. 	(Id. ¶ 1–2.) 	Wang reported as
ordered. (Id. ¶ 2.) Later, Wang applied for asylum and attended his first court hearing in
April 2025. (Id. ¶ 7.)
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On November 29, 2025, Wang was working as a driver for Uber. 	(Id. ¶ 3.) 	He
picked up two soldiers and drove them to a military base in Oceanside, CA. 	When they
arrived, Wang was asked by the base officials to identify himself. 	(Id.) 	Once they
discovered that he was not a permanent resident, they sent him to an ICE office. (Id.) A
Chinese-speaking officer told Wang, “This is not Biden time. It’s Trump time. If you don’t
have a green card, you are going to be sent to do a quick proceeding.” (Id.) He was then
arrested. 	(Id. ¶ 3–4.) 	He was not provided paperwork that explained the reasons for his
redetention. (Id. ¶ 4.) Although an officer showed “something” to Wang on a cell phone,
Wang did not understand because he reads “very little English.” (Id. ¶ 4, 6.) When Wang
tried to explain that he shouldn’t be arrested, they replied that he was “resisting arrest,”
which “scared” Wang into silence. (Id. ¶ 8.)
Wang remains in detention. (See id. ¶ 9.) He filed a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus on February 19, 2026, and an amended petition on March 6, 2026. 	(ECF No. 1;
ECF No. 6 (“Am. Pet.”).)
II. 	DISCUSSION
The Petitioner makes two claims. First, he argues that the Respondent violated the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) when he improperly revoked the Petitioner’s
humanitarian parole. (Am. Pet., 3–5.) Second, he argues that the Respondent violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by revoking the Petitioner’s parole without
notice and an opportunity to be heard. 	(Id. at 10–15.) 	The Petitioner requests that the
Court grant him release on either claim. 	The Respondent contends that the Petitioner is
entitled only to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 	(ECF No. 7 (“Return”), at 2.)
The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A. 	Types of Parole
Before deciding whether the Petitioner’s parole was improperly revoked, the Court
must determine whether the Petitioner received parole. 	Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, an applicant for admission into the country may be given parole “for
urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
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Applicants may also be “released on their own recognizance,” which typically refers to
conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See Besalti v. LaRose, 2026 WL 242042, at
*2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026); Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir.
2007) (“[The Petitioner] was conditionally paroled under the authority of § 1226(a) rather
than paroled into the United States under the authority of § 1182(d)(5)(A).”) An applicant
given 	conditional 	parole 	may 	be 	“subject 	to 	certain 	conditions 	such 	as 	reporting
requirements.” 	J.S.H.M v. Wofford, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025).
The decision to provide parole is “discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis.” Id.
Although the Court finds that the Petitioner received parole, it cannot determine the
type of parole he received. 	Rather than detain the Petitioner, the ICE exercised its
discretion to release him into the country four days after his arrival. 	The Petitioner also
reported semiannually to ICE while living in the country for almost a year and a half. This
appears not to be mandatory detention that “people caught immediately at the border are
subject to” but a form of parole. 	(ECF No. 8 (“Traverse”), at 2.) 	Yet the parties do not
provide documentation that shows which parole the Petitioner was given. 	Without the
usual 	exhibits 	attached 	with 	habeas 	petitions—a 	Notice 	to 	Appear, 	employment
authorization forms or identification cards, an Order of Release on Recognizance, or ICE
records of inadmissibility—the Court cannot determine whether the Petitioner received
humanitarian or conditional parole.
Because the Court cannot determine whether the Respondent’s revocation of parole
violated a particular statute or regulation, the Petitioner’s first claim is denied without
prejudice. See Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 969 n.16 (9th Cir. 2004) (“In . . . federal
habeas proceedings, it is the petitioner who bears the burden of proving his case.”).
B. 	Due Process Parole Rights
The Fifth Amendment entitles noncitizens1 “to due process of law in deportation
proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). 	Once a noncitizen “passe[s]
1 This order uses the term “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory term “alien.” 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3); see Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222, 226 n.2 (2020).
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through our gates,” he may be removed “only after proceedings conforming to traditional
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.” 	Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953). 	Due Process also “protects noncitizens from
unlawful detention during their removal proceedings.” Esquivel Pacheco v. LaRose, 2026
WL 242300, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690
(2001)). Here, the Petitioner challenges the revocation of his parole, regardless of which
parole he was given, and his current detention as contrary to his due process rights.
To determine the “specific dictates of due process” in this situation, the Court must
consider three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 	The Court adopts the reasoning in the
decisions Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146 (S.D. Cal. 2025), and Esquivel Pacheco
v. LaRose, 2026 WL 242300 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026), and applies it here.
First, the Petitioner acquired a protectable interest in being free from imprisonment
once he was paroled into the country. The record does not specify the Respondent’s reason
for granting him parole. But by exercising his discretion to do so, the Respondent made
“at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if [the Petitioner] fails to live
up to the parole conditions.” 	Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). 	The
Petitioner relied on that promise and complied with his reporting conditions for the year
and a half he lived in the country. This created a “protectable expectation of his due process
rights in his removal proceedings and the fair procedures this country guarantees.” Noori,
807 F. Supp. 3d at 1165. That expectation of due process extends to his parole revocation.
Second, the Respondent’s process of revoking the Petitioner’s parole created a
substantial risk that the Petitioner’s liberty interest would be erroneously deprived. 	The
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Petitioner was given no prior notice that he would be placed under arrest. He was provided
no paperwork or explanation for the arrest. He was merely told that the new administration
would send him to “a quick proceeding” because he wasn’t a permanent resident. 	And
when the Petitioner attempted to rebut the revocation of his parole, he was told he was
resisting arrest. 	The record contains no indication that the Respondent arrested the
Petitioner because he failed to report as ordered or had become a danger or flight risk that
needed to be detained. Rather, it appears the Respondent “breached the ‘implicit promise’
made to Petitioner that he would enjoy this liberty as long as he did nothing to forfeit it.”
Esquivel Pacheco, 2026 WL 242300, at *6.
Third, the Respondent has not demonstrated a significant interest that justifies
maintaining his current procedures. 	The Court acknowledges that sending a notice to
appear 	or 	holding 	a 	predeprivation 	hearing 	“poses 	some 	degree 	of 	‘fiscal 	and
administrative burden.”’ 	Esquivel Pacheco, 2026 WL 242300, at *6 (quoting Rodriguez
Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1209 (9th Cir. 2022)). Yet that burden must be balanced
against the Petitioner’s liberty interest and the procedural protections afforded that interest.
Taken together, the Petitioner’s interest outweighs the Respondent’s.
The Petitioner entered the country on parole and was ordered to adhere to the
conditions of that parole. In turn, “it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn
square corners when it deals with” him. Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021).
The Respondent violated the Petitioner’s due process rights by “detaining [him] without
justification.” Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1158 (D. Minn. 2025). The
Respondent does not allege that Wang is a danger to the community or a flight risk or that
he violated the conditions of his parole. The writ must issue to release him from custody.
The petition is granted on the second claim.
C. 	Bond Hearing
The Court grants relief on the Petitioner’s second claim and need not reach the
Respondent’s argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing under Section 1226(a). 	The
Court also need not reach the arguments raised in oppositional briefs that the Respondent
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“incorporates by reference.” (Return, 4 n.2.) “Arguments raised only in footnotes, or only
on reply, are generally deemed waived.” Est. of Saunders v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue,
745 F.3d 953, 962 n.8 (9th Cir. 2014).
III. 	CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED on the second claim and the
writ is ISSUED. 	The Respondent shall immediately release Wang from custody on his
preexisting conditions. 	The first claim is DENIED without prejudice. 	The parties shall
file a statement as to the satisfaction of the writ by March 20, 2026, at 5 p.m. The Court
retains jurisdiction to enforce the writ.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 18, 2026
___________________________
Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz
United States District Judge
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