Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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3:26-cv-01119-CAB-JLB
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAMAD ALIYEV,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-01119-CAB-JLB
ORDER GRANTING HABEAS
PETITION
[Doc. No. 1]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Samad Aliyev’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. No. 1 (“Petition”).] Petitioner claims that he
is detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in violation of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments and the Administrative Procedure Act. He seeks immediate release.
Respondents filed a response, [Doc. No. 4], and Petitioner filed a traverse, [Doc. No. 5].
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS a writ of habeas corpus and ORDERS
Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from custody under the same conditions of
release that existed immediately prior to his February 13, 2026 detention.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is an Azerbaijani national who entered the United States with his family
on November 10, 2022, presented himself to immigration authorities, and was granted
parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) until November 9, 2023. [Petition at 2; Doc. No. 4 at
2.] 	The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) commenced removal proceedings
against Petitioner, classifying him as an arriving alien and charging him as inadmissible
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). [Doc. No. 4-1 at 2; Doc. No. 4 at 2.] Since that time,
Petitioner received work authorization and filed for asylum. [Petition at 2, 12.]
On February 13, 2026,1 Petitioner was working as an Uber driver and got a pick-up
request at Camp Pendleton. [Id. at 3.] He drove up to the base entrance and was questioned
by the military personnel at the gate; they detained him until ICE arrived and took
Petitioner into custody. 	[Id.] 	Petitioner remains detained at the Otay Mesa Detention
Center. [Id.]
Respondents do not refute any of Petitioner’s asserted facts. 	[See generally Doc.
No. 4.]
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus challenges the legality of a petitioner’s custody and seeks
to secure release from that illegal custody. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court may
grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” The petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating that he is in illegal custody. See Martinez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2740-BJC-
BJW, 2025 WL 3171738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents challenge this Court’s jurisdiction based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and
1 Respondents state that Petitioner was detained on February 14, 2026. [Doc. No. 4 at 2.] The difference
is immaterial to the case and so the Court proceeds with Petitioner’s asserted date.
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§ 1252 (b)(9). 	[Doc. No. 4 at 2–4.] 	Because Petitioner challenges the legality of his
detention 	and 	not 	the 	merits 	of 	his 	immigration 	proceedings, 	the 	Court 	finds 	no
jurisdictional challenge from either statute. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294
(2018) (holding that § 1252(b)(9) did not present a jurisdictional bar to the review of claims
by detainees who were denied bond hearings and subjected to mandatory detention
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226); Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402 (2019) (holding
§ 1252(b)(9) was not a jurisdictional bar to challenge of detention authority under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c)); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)
(explaining that § 1252(g) “applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General
may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders’” and does not bar the “many other decisions or actions that may be part of
the deportation process” (emphasis in original)); see also Ibarra-Perez v. United States,
154 F.4th 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2025) (“The Supreme Court has instructed that we should read
§ 1252(g) narrowly.”).
B. 	Merits
Immigration 	officials 	may 	parole 	certain 	noncitizens 	into 	the 	United 	States
“temporarily under such conditions [immigration officials] may prescribe . . . for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit[.]” 	8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). 	DHS’s
implementing regulations provide that parole is automatically terminated without written
notice 	at 	the 	expiration 	of 	the 	time 	for 	which 	parole 	was 	authorized. 	8 C.F.R.
§ 212.5(e)(1)(ii). Here, Petitioner does not dispute that his parole expired on November 9,
2023. 	[Doc. No. 5 at 19; Doc. No. 1-3 at 2.] 	Respondents therefore argue that under
§ 1182, Petitioner has rightly been “return[ed] to the custody from which he was
paroled”—namely, mandatory detention as an applicant for admission under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). [Doc. No. 4 at 4–5.]
That does not end the question, however. Petitioner claims a liberty interest under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which was violated when he was detained
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without individualized consideration of his circumstances and an opportunity to contest his
detention. Respondents do not address this constitutional claim.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms
of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). 	Though the government may have
significant discretion to detain or release a noncitizen initially, “the government’s decision
to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that
individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if they fail to live up to the
conditions of release.’” 	Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025)
(cleaned up) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
Indeed, many courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that the expiration of parole does
not extinguish a petitioner’s entitlement to due process. 	See Osaretin v. Warden, Otay
Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 25-CV-3612-JES-MSB, 2026 WL 280077, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3,
2026) (“Courts have repeatedly held that liberty interests do not expire when parole
does.”); D.L.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01996-DC-JDP (HC), 2026 WL 145646, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2026); Martinez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-3308 JLS-MSB, 2025 WL
3677938, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025); Astafev v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Ctr.,
No. 3:26-CV-00313-RBM-AHG, 2026 WL 654247, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2026);
Quiroz, v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-866 JLS-DEB, 2026 WL 673822, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10,
2026); Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-CV-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at
*5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025); Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1137
(W.D. Wash. 2025); Rodriguez Cabrera v. Mattos, 808 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1167 (D. Nev.
2025).
Here, the Court also finds that Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his release.
Upon arrival, he was determined to not be a danger to the community or a flight risk.
[Petition at 16.] There is no evidence that this determination has changed since Petitioner’s
arrival. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody
after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was
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neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in
remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”); Saravia v. Sessions, 280
F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905
F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). And though his parole expired approximately two years prior
to his recent detention, Respondents offer no evidence that during that time officials tried
to detain Petitioner. Petitioner thus justifiably continued to rely on and take advantage of
his 	continued 	freedom 	by 	pursuing 	his 	asylum 	case, 	seeking 	and 	receiving 	work
authorization, integrating into his community with his family, and complying with the
terms of his release.
Having found that Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Court proceeds to
determine the protections required before he can be deprived of that interest. Petitioner
asserts that he was entitled to notice and a pre-deprivation hearing prior to his re-detention.
[Doc. No. 5 at 19.] Respondents contend that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). [Doc. No. 4 at 4–5.] The Court agrees with Petitioner.
The Supreme Court “usually has held that the Constitution requires some kind of a
hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 113, 127 (1990). 	The Court reaches that same conclusion here by analyzing
the factors from Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 	These factors are: (1)
“the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id.
The Court finds that all three Matthews factors support that Petitioner is entitled to
be notified of the individualized reasons for his detention and to have an opportunity to be
heard in opposition before he is detained. 	First, as discussed above, Petitioner has a
significant private interest in remaining out of custody. Second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of his interest is high as no procedures were used to ensure that Petitioner was
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not erroneously deprived of his liberty interest. 	He was detained without any warning
simply because he responded to an Uber pick-up request at a military base. Petitioner has
no criminal record, a pending asylum application, and has complied with the terms of his
release for the last three years. 	Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner
without notice, reasoning, and a hearing is low. 	In particular, Respondents make no
argument supporting the need for Petitioner’s exigent detention without any procedural
protections—for example that he now poses a danger to the community or intends to
imminently flee—or that requiring notice, reasoning, and a pre-detention hearing would be
too burdensome on Respondents.
Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that Petitioner is detained in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and so GRANTS a writ of habeas corpus.
The 	Court 	declines 	to 	address 	Petitioner’s 	additional 	claims 	based 	on 	the 	Fourth
Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Petitioner a writ of habeas corpus and ORDERS Respondents
to immediately release Petitioner from custody under the same conditions of release that
existed immediately prior to his February 13, 2026 detention. 	The Clerk of Court shall
close the case.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 12, 2026
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