Zhang v. Lyons et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ZHEN ZHEN ZHANG,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et
al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-CV-1073 JLS (SBC)
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AND (2) DENYING AS
MOOT MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER
(ECF Nos. 1, 2)
Presently before the Court are Petitioner Zhen Zhen Zhang’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1) and Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO,” ECF No. 2). 	The Court has also received
Respondents’ Return to Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 5) and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,”
ECF No. 6). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2).
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a citizen of China, alleges that she has been detained by the United States
Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) division at the Otay Mesa Detention Center since September 11, 2025. Pet. ¶ 1.
Petitioner entered the United States on August 22, 2024, at the San Ysidro Port of Entry.
Id. ¶ 3. 	Petitioner was briefly detained and released on parole. 	Id. ¶ 4. 	Respondents
thereafter initiated removal proceedings. 	Id. ¶ 5. 	Petitioner has attended regularly
scheduled in-person and at-home check-ins with ICE. 	Id. ¶ 4. 	On September 11, 2025,
Petitioner alleges that ICE detained her “without notice or an opportunity to be heard.” Id.
¶ 6. 	Petitioner alleges that her detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Administrative Procedures. See generally id.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(citations omitted).
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Due Process
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of her without justification or
consideration of her individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. 	Pet.
¶ 9. The Court agrees.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July
25, 2025) (citations omitted). 	Although the initial decision to detain or release an
individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to
release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that
individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the
. . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending
removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected
liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing
Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Petitioner was released on parole after entering the United States. Pet. ¶ 4. Petitioner
is not a newly arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the border, as Petitioner has been in
the United States since 2024. Id. Petitioner is not merely an “applicant for admission” at
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the border with minimal due process rights; Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in
remaining out of custody.1 See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4 (“[Petitioner’s]
release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the
government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and
[Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those
criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but
one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time
indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”);
Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient
to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 	See
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 	Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved
1 The Court notes that although Petitioner’s parole has expired, see Pet. ¶ 45, Petitioner’s liberty “interest
did not expire along with [her] parole agreement.” Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130,
1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025). “Once established, Petitioner’s interest in liberty is a constitutional right which
may only be revoked through methods that comport with due process, such as a hearing in front of a
neutral party to determine whether Petitioner’s re-detainment is warranted.” 	Id. (citing Padilla v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023)). Therefore, the expiration of
Petitioner’s parole does not impact the liberty interest in her release. See, e.g., Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No.
1:25-CV-01471-KES-SAB (HC), 2025 WL 3254999, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (finding the
expiration of petitioner’s parole did not extinguish his liberty interest); Quiroga-Chaparro v. Warden of
Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-CV-1731 AC, 2025 WL 3771473, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31,
2025) (same); Kazybayeva v. Warden of Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 26-CV-0421-GPC-MMP, 2026 WL
280478, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2026) (same).
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and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.” Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s release without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of her due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to her release. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in continuing to live at home, work, and care for her
spouse. 	See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of [her] parole,
[she] can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the
other enduring attachments of normal life.”); see also Pet. ¶ 44.
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
release was revoked without providing her a reason for revocation or giving him an
opportunity to be heard. Pet. ¶¶ 6–7. Since DHS’s determination that Petitioner should be
granted release because she posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk,
there is no evidence that these findings have changed. 	See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the
government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). “Once
a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting [her]
merely because [she] is subject to removal proceedings. 	Rather, the federal agents must
be able to present evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that
the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp.
3d at 1760. 	Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their
response, do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant
reconsideration of his deferred action status. 	See generally Ret. 	“Where as here, ‘the
petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an
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opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL
1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)) (cleaned up).
Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,
at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret.
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking her release in
violation of the Due Process Clause, her detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.
Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting
a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre-
deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting a writ of habeas
corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due
process grounds). 	As the Court finds release on due process grounds appropriate, the it
need not address Petitioner’s remaining claims.
I. 	Attorney’s Fees
Petitioner has requested costs and attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Pet. at 27. The EAJA provides in part:
A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within
thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an
application for fees and other expenses which shows that the
party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award
under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an
itemized statement from any attorney . . . representing or
appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended
and 	the 	rate 	at 	which 	fees 	and 	other 	expenses 	were
computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the
United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the
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position of the United States was substantially justified shall be
determined on the basis of the record . . . which is made in the
civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under
the EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (ECF No. 2), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release
Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of her preexisting parole with no
additional requirements. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that
Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for revocation of her release and a hearing
before a neutral decision maker to determine whether detention is warranted. 	The
Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.2 The Parties are ORDERED
to file a Joint Status Report by March 30, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been
released. Lastly, Petitioner’s attorney is directed to submit an attorney fee application and
corresponding billing records within thirty (30) days of this Order, and Respondents are
instructed to file any opposition within fourteen (14) days of Petitioner’s attorney fee
application.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 9, 2026
2 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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