Qiu v. Larose et al

1
26-cv-1033-JES-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WEI QIU,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LaROSE; GREGORY
J. ARCHAMBEAULT; KRISTI NOEM;
PAMELA BONDI; and EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-1033-JES-MSB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[ECF No. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Wei Qiu’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Pursuant to the Court’s order to show
cause, Respondents filed a return to the petition, and Petitioner filed a reply. ECF Nos. 4,
5. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native of China, originally entered the United States on December 15,
2023, near Tecate, California. ECF No. 1-2 at 4. Petitioner was found removable and was
served with a Notice to Appear at that time. Id. Petitioner appears to have been released
after his detention upon entry on his own recognizance. Id. at 11 (Immigration Judge Order
recognizing that he was released on his own recognizance). Since, he has lived in the
Case 3:26-cv-01033-JES-MSB Document 6 Filed 02/25/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 6

2
26-cv-1033-JES-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
greater Los Angeles area, where he works as an Uber driver and has built connections to
the community. ECF No. 1 ¶ 48.
Petitioner was re-detained on December 6, 2025, when dropping off a customer. Id.
¶ 46. He is currently being detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center. Id. at 49. Petitioner
claims that he sought a bond hearing, but was denied by the Immigration Judge upon a
finding of lack of jurisdiction based on Matter of Yajure Hurtado. Id. ¶ 52.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in
that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
(2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview
of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see
also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
III. DISCUSSION
In his petition, Petitioner brings two claims: (1) Violation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act based on the characterization under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) rather than §
1226(a) of his re-detention; and (2) Violation of Due Process based on his re-detention
without notice, an individualized assessment of risk, and opportunity to be heard. Id. ¶¶
54-63. He requests release from custody. Id. at 17. In their return, Respondents state that,
pursuant to Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp.
3d ---, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C.
Case 3:26-cv-01033-JES-MSB Document 6 Filed 02/25/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 6

3
26-cv-1033-JES-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
§ 1226(a) and is entitled to a bond hearing. ECF No. 4. Respondents do not address the
second claim Petitioner brings regarding due process.
A. Bond Hearing
As a threshold issue, the Court will first address whether a bond hearing is an
appropriate remedy. In the reply, Petitioner argues that it is not and the Respondents failed
to address the constitutional concerns raised in the petition. ECF No. 5.
The Court agrees with Petitioner. Indeed, in several cases within this district where
the petitioner raised a due process violation regarding re-detention after having been
released on parole, the courts have rejected the same argument made by Respondents that
the petitioner is only entitled to a bond hearing based on Maldonado Bautista. See Naveen
v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-3689 JLS (AHG), 2025 WL 3771900, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 30,
2025) (rejecting Respondents’ argument that petitioner is a class member under Maldonado
Bautista and therefore only entitled to a bond hearing, rendering his other constitutional
arguments moot); Lozada v. Larose et al., No. 25CV3614-LL-KSC, 2026 WL 184205, at
*2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2026) (rejecting same argument and releasing petitioner on due
process violation); Garcia v. Noem et al., No. 25CV3759-LL-BLM, 2026 WL 194745
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2026) (same); Xie v. LaRose, No. 3:25-CV-03649-RBM-MSB, 2026
WL 92066, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2026) (same). Thus, despite Respondents’ concession
regarding a bond hearing, the Court finds it appropriate to address the constitutional
violations raised in the petition.
B. Due Process
Petitioner argues that his re-detention violates procedural due process because he
was not given any notice, an individualized assessment of risk, and opportunity to be heard
when he was re-detained in December 2025. As stated above, Respondents do not
meaningfully address the procedural due process issue in their return. See generally ECF
No. 4.
“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from
depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of
Case 3:26-cv-01033-JES-MSB Document 6 Filed 02/25/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 6

4
26-cv-1033-JES-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause
applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of suffering
a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner
and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Courts have identified various ways that a petitioner may be granted some form of
parole. The choice is “discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis.” J.S.H.M v.
Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16,
2025). Parole can be made for humanitarian reasons or for it providing a significant public
benefit under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), or it can be for conditional parole under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). Id. Courts have recognized that typically, the term “released on their own
recognizance” or “OREC” refers to conditional parole. Id.; see also Ortega-Cervantes v.
Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the phrase
‘released on recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a)”);
Castellon, 2025 WL 2373425, at *4; Faizyan v. Casey, No. 3:25-CV-0884-RBM-JLB,
2025 WL 3208844, at *1 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025).
While courts have recognized these as distinct procedures, they have consistently
applied the same procedural due process analysis to petitioners under these forms of parole.
In the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), courts have held that such parole status entitles
the petitioner to certain due process rights under both procedural due process and the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123,
1146 (D. Or. 2025) (finding violation under APA); Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F.
Supp. 3d 128, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (finding violation under procedural due process).
Similarly, for conditional release under § 1226(a), the court in Pinchi explained similar
procedural due process rights:
Case 3:26-cv-01033-JES-MSB Document 6 Filed 02/25/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 6

5
26-cv-1033-JES-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected
a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a
danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining
at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria. The regulations
authorizing ICE to release a noncitizen from custody require that the
noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release
would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is
“likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). “Release
[therefore] reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is
not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v.
Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). [Petitioner] was apprehended by ICE
officers when she crossed the border into the United States . . . ICE then
released her on her own recognizance. As ICE was not authorized to release
[Petitioner] if she was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court
must infer from [the] release that ICE determined she was neither.
[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody constituted an “implied promise” that
her liberty would not be revoked unless she “failed to live up to the conditions
of her release.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The
regulatory framework makes clear that those conditions were that she remain
neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. . . . Accordingly,
[Petitioner’s] private interest in retaining her liberty is significant.
Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034-35. Several district courts have followed suit and found
due process violations where the petitioners in the cases were specifically identified to be
released under Order of Release on Recognizance with an accompanying I-220 form. See
C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 3, 2025) (finding due process violation where petitioner was originally released on
OREC); Leiva Flores v. Albarran, No. 25-CV-09302-AMO, 2025 WL 3228306, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025) (similarly finding procedural due process violation for petitioner
released on OREC and requiring hearing before detention); Faizyan, 2025 WL 3208844,
at *7 (same).
The Court agrees with all the foregoing courts and similarly holds that Petitioner has
procedural due process rights arising from his existing conditional parole. In their briefing,
Respondents provide no evidence that Petitioner was afforded any notice or opportunity to
Case 3:26-cv-01033-JES-MSB Document 6 Filed 02/25/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 6

6
26-cv-1033-JES-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
be heard regarding the revocation of said parole. See generally ECF No. 4. Accordingly,
the Court joins these courts and finds that Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process
rights when they re-detained him in December 2025.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas
corpus. Because the Court grants the petition on the Due Process ground and concludes
that Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s parole violates procedural due process,
Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to
any conditions of his preexisting parole that existed at the time he was re-detained. The
Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by March 2, 2026, confirming that
Petitioner has been released.
The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 25, 2026
Case 3:26-cv-01033-JES-MSB Document 6 Filed 02/25/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
6 of 6