Jugraj v. Warden of Imperial Regional Detention Facility et al

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26-cv-0799-AGS-VET
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Jugraj Bir SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN OF THE IMPERIAL
REGIONAL DETENTION FACILITY, et
al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-0799-AGS-VET
ORDER REQUIRING RETURN
Petitioner Jugraj Singh seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
challenging his immigration detention. At this stage, he need only make out a claim that is
sufficiently cognizable to warrant a response. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly
appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to
any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary
dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038,
1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is
not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id.
On “April 27, 2016,” Singh, an “Indian citizen,” entered the United States and “was
released on an immigration bond.” (ECF 1, at 3.) Years later, on “December 16, 2025,” he
was apprehended at a traffic checkpoint and has since been in immigration detention
“without a bond hearing.” (Id.) Singh is now challenging the government’s decision to
subject him to mandatory detention under “8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).” (Id.) He asserts that his
case is instead governed by “§ 1226(a)”—which authorizes release on bond or conditional
parole. (Id.) Since he has not received a bond hearing or other process under § 1226(a), he
claims that his detention is “in violation of the law.” (Id. at 13.)
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26-cv-0799-AGS-VET
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This challenge has sufficient potential merit to warrant a response. Although the only
Court of Appeals to address this question has rejected Singh’s position, see Buenrostro-
Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, __ F.4th ___, 2026 WL 323330, at *4 (5th Cir. Feb. 6,
2026), functionally identical cases across the country have succeeded in great number, see,
e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, ___ F. Supp. 3d. ___, No. 25-cv-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL
3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that, in “350” of the “362” opinions to
address this issue, the petitioners “prevailed, either on a preliminary or final basis,” and
these cases were “decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different
courts”); Mosqueda v. Noem, No. 5:25-cv-02304 CAS (BFM), 2025 WL 2591530, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2025) (“[P]etitioners are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims
because section 1226(a), not section 1225(b)(2), likely governs their detention.”); Vazquez
v. Feeley, No. 2:25-cv-01542-RFB-EJY, 2025 WL 2676082, at *11 (D. Nev. Sept. 17,
2025) (same); Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (“[T]he government’s position belies the statutory text of the
INA, canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency
practice.”).
So, by February 17, 2026, the government is ordered to file a return to Kumar’s
petition. Kumar must file any traverse by February 24, 2026. The Court will hold oral
arguments on March 3, 2026, at 3:00 p.m.
Dated: February 10, 2026
___________________________
Hon. Andrew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
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