Darji v. Larose et al

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26-CV-549 JLS (DEB)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RAM BAHADUR DARJI,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Waren of
Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-CV-549 JLS (DEB)
ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 1)
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Ram Bahadur Darji’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also before the Court
is Respondents Christopher LaRose’s (Senior Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Center),
Todd Lyons’s (Acting Director of Immigration Customs Enforcement), Sirce Owen’s
(Acting Director for Executive Office for Immigration Review), Kristi Noem’s (Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security), and Pamela Bondi’s (Attorney General of
the United States) (collectively, “Respondents”) Return in Opposition to the Habeas
Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 4), and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 5). 	See
generally Docket. 	For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1).
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a Nepalese citizen, fled Nepal due to persecution and torture on account
of his political opinion. 	Pet. at 4. 	Petitioner arrived in the United States on October 7,
2023, without inspection or a valid entry document and informed them he had a fear of
return. Id. Petitioner was released on conditional parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 “after
a determination that he was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community.” 	Id.
Petitioner then lived in the United States for the next two years without issue. Id. at 5. He
received work authorization, a U.S. Social Security Card, and a California driver’s license,
complied with all terms of his conditional parole, attended all court hearings, timely filed
his asylum application, and obeyed all laws of the United States. 	Id. 	Petitioner was
working as a partner and chief chef at a Nepalese restaurant prior to his re-detention. 	Id.
On January 19, 2026, Petitioner was a passenger in a car traveling from Los Angeles to
San Diego when they exited the freeway looking for a restroom. 	Id. 	The exit they chose
led directly to the Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton. 	Id. 	When they approached the
gate, they were stopped by guards who refused to let them turn around and leave. 	Id.
Instead, the guard took Petitioner’s driver’s license, asked about his immigration status,
and detained him. Id. A few hours later, ICE officers arrived and arrested Petitioner. Id.
Petitioner was not informed why he was detained or what change in circumstances justified
his re-detention. Id. at 6.
Respondents 	only 	argue 	that 	Petitioner 	is 	entitled 	to 	a 	bond 	hearing 	under
Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 25-CV-1873-SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025
WL 3289861 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025),1 and is not entitled to release. Ret at 2. Petitioner
argues that he is entitled to release because the government violated his due process rights
by revoking his parole without notice or an opportunity to be heard. Traverse at 4.
1 On December 18, 2025, the Bautista court entered final judgment finding that July 8, 2025, DHS Notice
redefining who is considered an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), is unlawful
under the Administrative Procedure Act. Maldonado Bautista, No. 25-CV-1873-SSS-BFM, ECF No. 94.
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LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without justification or
consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. at
17. The Court agrees.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July
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25, 2025) (citations omitted). 	Although the initial decision to detain or release an
individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to
release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that
individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the
. . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending
removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody [he] has a protected
liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing
Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents contend that because of Maldonado Bautista, Petitioner is detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is only entitled to a bond hearing—making his other
constitutional claims moot. Ret at 2. The Court disagrees. Upon arrival, Petitioner was
determined to not be a danger to the community or a flight risk and was released on
conditional parole. Pet. at 4. Petitioner has complied with all conditions of his release and
has attended all required ICE check-ins and court hearings. 	Id. 	Petitioner has work
authorization, has lived in the community without issue for two years, is employed as chief
chef at a restaurant, and has applied for asylum. 	Id. at 5. The relief Petitioner is entitled
to is not limited to a bond hearing; Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining
out of custody. 	See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4 (“[Petitioner’s] release from
ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that
she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong
interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 2025
WL 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been]
present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is
afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Matute v.
Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3,
2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his release).
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As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient
to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 	See
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 	Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his conditional parole.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 	Petitioner has an interest in remaining with his family and
continuing the process of seeking asylum. 	See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject
to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family
and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an
opportunity to be heard. 	Pet. at 17. 	Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner
should be paroled because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk,
there is no evidence that these findings have changed. 	See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the
government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”).
Petitioner has no criminal record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble,
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has work authorization, and is working towards asylum status. Pet at 5. “Once a noncitizen
has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he
is subject to removal proceedings.” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760. “Rather, the federal
agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely,
evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Id.
Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their response,
do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant
reconsideration of his parole. See generally Ret. “Where, as here, ‘the petitioner has not
received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is
high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine
whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.” 	Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5
(quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D.
Cal. July 11, 2025)) (cleaned up).
Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,
at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret.
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole in
violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.
Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. at 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025)
(granting a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole
without a pre-deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting
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a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her
preexisting parole on due process grounds).2
I. 	Attorney’s Fees
Petitioner’s counsel still requests costs and attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to
the Equal Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Pet at 36. The EAJA provides in part:
A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within
thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an
application for fees and other expenses which shows that the
party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award
under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an
itemized statement from any attorney . . . representing or
appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended
and 	the 	rate 	at 	which 	fees 	and 	other 	expenses 	were
computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the
United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the
position of the United States was substantially justified shall be
determined on the basis of the record . . . which is made in the
civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under
the EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment.
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2 The Court need not address Petitioner’s claim arising under the APA because the Petition can be resolved
on due process grounds. However, the Court notes that other courts have found violations of the APA
based on similar grounds. See, e.g., Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (finding revocation of
petitioner’s parole arbitrary and capricious because respondents did not state any reasons for the
revocation); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *3 (“Petitioner’s parole was revoked without an individualized
determination or provided reasoning, which violated the APA.”).
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from
custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole. The Court ORDERS, prior to
any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for
revocation of his parole and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine whether
detention is warranted. The Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and
convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.3
The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by February 12, 2026, confirming
that Petitioner has been released.
The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under
the EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment. Petitioner’s attorney is directed
to submit an attorney fee application and corresponding billing records within thirty (30)
days of this Order, and Respondents are instructed to file any opposition within fourteen
(14) days of Petitioner’s attorney fee application.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 6, 2026
3 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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