Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ABDIAS ST. FORT,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, SENIOR
WARDEN,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26cv519-LL-SBC
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF No. 5]
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Abdias St. Fort’s Amended Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 5). Also before the Court
is Respondents’ Return in Opposition to the Habeas Petition (“Response,” ECF No. 7).
Petitioner also filed a Traverse. ECF No. 8. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
GRANTS in part Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 5).
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a Haitian national, came to the United States on June 30, 2024 through a
CBP One appointment to seek asylum. Pet. at 2. On June 30, 2024, Petitioner was given
humanitarian parole (the same day that he had his CBP One appointment) and he was
released into the United States. Pet. at 3. Petitioner’s parole is to remain active until June
29, 2026. Id. Since his release, Petitioner has complied with all conditions of his release.
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Id. at 1. Despite this, on July 17, 2025, Petitioner was arrested and re-detained by ICE
outside of immigration court after a hearing in his case. Id. at 3. Petitioner was not given
an explanation as to what was happening or why he was being re-detained. Id. at 2-3.
Petitioner 	alleges 	that 	his 	detention 	violates 	Due 	Process 	and 	the 	Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”). Id. at 3-10. Petitioner’s Petition seeks immediate release subject
to the same conditions of his humanitarian parole. Id. at 10.
Respondents in their Return state that “[i]t is the government’s position that
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), because Petitioner was
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” Return at 2 (internal
citations omitted). Petitioner argues that he is entitled to release because the government
violated his due process rights and the APA by revoking his humanitarian parole without
notice or an opportunity to be heard. Pet. at 3-10.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that revocation of his parole, without “notice, reasoning, or an
opportunity to be heard violates his due process rights.” Pet. at 5. The Court agrees.
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The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July
25, 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual
may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an
individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely,
that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of
release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when
ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings,
after that individual is released from custody [he] has a protected liberty interest in
remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, No.
22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents contend that “[i]t is the government’s position that Petitioner is subject
to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), because Petitioner was present in the United
States without being admitted or paroled.” Response at 2. The Court disagrees. On the same
day that Petitioner had his CBP One Appointment, Petitioner was granted humanitarian
parole and was released into the United States. Pet. at 2, 9; see also Exhs. A, B. At the time
of Petitioner’s release, he was determined to not be a danger to the community or a flight
risk. 	Pet. at 2, 9; see also Exhs. A, B. Petitioner has complied with all conditions of his
release and has attended all required ICE check-ins and court hearings. Pet. at 2-3.
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Petitioner has applied for asylum, has attended his immigration hearings, and has no
criminal history. ECF No. 5-1, Decl. of Abdias St. Fort, ¶ 4. Petitioner has a protected
liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4
(“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a
determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no
longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an
‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This
substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due
process before removal.”); Matute v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL
2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding petitioner had a protected liberty interest
in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient
to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 	See
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 	Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.” Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody in light of his initial release.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
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Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in continuing to work and continuing
the process of seeking asylum. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the
conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and
friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing him a reason and without an opportunity to be heard.
Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner should be released because he posed no
danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is no evidence that these findings
have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017)
(“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to
the community or a flight risk.”). Petitioner has no criminal record, has not been arrested
or otherwise in criminal trouble and has a pending application for aslyum. ECF No. 5-1,
Decl. of Abdias St. Fort, ¶ 4. “Once a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal
agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings.”
Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760. “Rather, the federal agents must be able to present
evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in
fact dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Id.
Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their response,
do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant revocation
of his parole. 	See generally Response. “Where, as here, ‘the petitioner has not received
any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’
because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine
whether there is any valid basis for [his] detention.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5
(quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D.
Cal. July 11, 2025)).
Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795,
at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
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government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Response.
Therefore, because Respondents revoked Petitioner’s parole in violation of the Due
Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v. Larose et al., No. 25-
cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. at 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting a TRO based on a
procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre-deprivation
hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (granting a writ of habeas corpus
releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process
grounds).1
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS in part Petitioner’s Amended Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 5). The Court further ORDERS Respondents to
immediately release Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting
release. The Court ORDERS, prior to any revocation of Petitioner’s parole or re-detention
of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for the revocation or his re-
detention and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine whether detention is
warranted. The Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing
1 The Court need not address Petitioner’s claim arising under the APA because the Petition can be resolved
on due process grounds. However, the Court notes that other courts have found violations of the APA
based on similar grounds. See, e.g., Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (finding revocation of
petitioner’s parole arbitrary and capricious because respondents did not state any reasons for the
revocation); Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *3 (“Petitioner’s parole was revoked without an individualized
determination or provided reasoning, which violated the APA.”).
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evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.2 The Clerk of
Court SHALL CLOSE the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 17, 2026
2 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025
WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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