Huan et al v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RAO HUAN, YE SONG, AND LIU
XIAYING,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security,
PAMELA JO BONDI, Attorney General,
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
JESUS ROCHA, Acting Field Office
Director, San Diego Field Office,
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden of
Otay Mesa Detention Facility,
Respondents.
Case No.: 	26-CV-512 JLS (DEB)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS
(ECF No. 1)
Presently before the Court is Petitioners Rao Huan’s, Ye Song’s, and Liu Xiaying’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also
before the Court are Respondents Kristi Noem’s (Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security), Pamela Jo Bondi’s (Attorney General), Todd M. Lyon’s (Acting Director,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement), Jesus Rocha’s (Acting Field Office Director, San
Diego Field Office), and Christopher LaRose’s (Warden of Otay Mesa Detention Facility)
(collectively, “Respondents”) Response in Opposition to Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No.
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6) and Petitioners’ Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 7). For the reasons set forth below, the
Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioners’ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
BACKGROUND
Petitioners are three women from China who entered the United States in the Spring
of 2025 seeking asylum. Pet. at 2. Each Petitioner claims that their continued detention
violates Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 6–10.
I. 	Petitioner Rao Huan
Petitioner Rao Huan (“Huan”) entered the United States without inspection on April
2, 2025. 	Ret. at 2. 	On May 21, 2025, Huan had a positive Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”) assessment determination, which she withdrew after finding out her mother was
seriously ill. 	Pet. at 2. 	Huan requested to return to China. 	Id. 	Huan was given a final
order of removal on September 11, 2025. Ret. at 2. On September 9, 2025, Enforcement
and Removal Operations (“ERO”) submitted a travel document request to ERO’s Removal
and International Operation. 	Id. 	The last time ERO followed up on this request was on
January 20, 2026. Id.
II. 	Petitioner Ye Song
Petitioner Ye Song (“Song”) entered the United States without inspection on April
2, 2025. Ret. at 2. On May 21, 2025, Song was found to have a negative CAT assessment,
and a final order of removal was entered. 	Id. 	On July 3, 2025, ERO submitted a travel
document request to ERO’s Removal and International Operations. Id. The last time ERO
followed up on this request was October 1, 2025. Id.
III. 	Petitioner Xiaoying Liu
Petitioner Xiaoying Liu (“Liu”) entered the United States without inspection on
March 16, 2025. 	Id. at 3. 	On July 15, 2025, Liu was found to have a negative CAT
assessment, and a final order of removal was entered. 	Id. 	On September 26, 2025, ERO
submitted a travel document request to ERO’s Removal and International Operations. Id.
The last time ERO followed up on this request was December 15, 2025. Id.
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LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
When an alien is denied asylum, granted withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3), and ordered removed, they must be detained for ninety days (90) pending the
government’s efforts to secure their removal to a third country. See 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).
This ninety-day period is referred to as the “removal period.” § 1231(a)(1)(A). After the
removal period, this statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period
reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States” and “does
not permit indefinite detention.” 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001). 	A six-
month period of post-removal detention constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of
detention.” Id. at 701. After this six-month period passes, the petitioner has the burden to
“provide[] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If petitioner satisfies their initial burden, it then shifts
to the Government to rebut that showing. Id. “[F]or detention to remain reasonable, as the
period 	of 	prior 	post-removal 	confinement 	grows, 	what 	counts 	as 	the 	‘reasonably
foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” 	Id. 	“[O]nce removal is no longer
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reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699.
In that case, the alien’s release may be conditioned on any of the various forms of
conditioned release. Id. at 700.
“[T]he removal period begins when an alien is ‘ordered removed,’ and the removal
order becomes ‘administratively final.’” 	Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 534
(2021).
Section 1231(a)(1)(B) states that:
The removal period begins on the latest of the following:
(i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively
final.
(ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court
orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s
final order.
(iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an
immigration process), the date the alien is released from
detention or confinement.
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).
Here, Song has been detained for seven months post final order of removal, and Liu
has been detained for nine months post final order of removal.1 Traverse at 3. Huan has
been detained for five months post final order of removal, but “[a]t no point did the
Zadvydas Court preclude a noncitizen from challenging their detention before the end of
the presumptively reasonable six-month period.” Trinh v. Homan, 466 F. Supp. 3d 1077,
1092 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (collecting cases); see also Ndandu v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2939-
RBM-MSB, 2026 WL 25848, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (finding that the six-month
presumption is rebuttable and finding petitioner rebutted the presumption while only being
detained for three months); Hernandez v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-2020-EPG-HC, 2026 WL
350829, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026) (rebutting presumption after five month
1 Respondents do not contest that the six-month presumptively reasonable period has passed for Song and
Liu. See generally Ret.; see also Traverse at 3.
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detention); Mohammad v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3424-AB-DBT, 2025 WL 3768581, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025) (rebutting presumption after four month detention); Uzzhina v.
Chestnut, No. 25-CV-1594-DAD-SCR, 2025 WL 3458787, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2,
2025) (“The fact that a noncitizen has been held in-custody less than six months does not
foreclose a claim that his or her detention is unlawful under Zadvydas.”); Munoz-Saucedo
v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 396 (D.N.J. 2025) (“Although some courts have read
Zadvydas as creating a bright-line rule—one that effectively allows the government to
detain a person for at least six months without judicial review, even if there was no
possibility of removal—a close reading of Zadvydas does not support that interpretation.”).
The Court finds that the six-month period is a presumption that can be rebutted, and that
Petitioners have rebutted the presumption.
Petitioners have demonstrated that there is “good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 701. Petitioners argue that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future for three reasons. Traverse at 3. First, in the months since Petitioners’
final orders of removal, “ICE has not submitted a request for a travel document to China
for any of the Petitioners.” Id. Rather, ICE has only “submitted a travel document request”
to “ERO’s Removal and International Operations,” which is the “agency headquarters in
Washington.” 	Id. 	Second, the government has not explained why it has taken so long to
“complete the internal process of preparing a request for a travel document,” nor have they
provided any timeline for when they expect the request to be submitted to China. Id. Third,
“ICE has named China one of the top 15 most uncooperative countries in the world.” Pet.
at 9.
In sum, Petitioners argue that “[b]ecause China is notoriously uncooperative, and
because ICE has made no progress in persuading China to accept the petitioners, they have
met their initial burden.” Id. at 10. The Court agrees. See, e.g., Ghasedi v. Wamsley, 2025
WL 3699705, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2025) (finding the initial burden satisfied where
the government had not set a timeframe for removal, did not have an active relocation
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request to a third country, did not communicate with a third country about removal, and
had designated the country as uncooperative).
Because Petitioners have shown good reason to believe they will not be removed in
the reasonably 	foreseeable future, the burden 	now 	shifts 	to Respondents 	to 	rebut
Petitioner’s showing. 	Zadvydas, 533 at 701. 	Respondents argue that Petitioner cannot
show there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future
because they are still in the process of obtaining travel documents to China for all three
Petitioners and have successfully removed Chinese nationals in the past. 	Ret. at 5–6.
Respondents, however, do not point to any evidence that they have communicated with
China or taken any steps beyond internally sending a request for removal. 	See generally
id. Further, the successful removal of Chinese nationals in the past may demonstrate that
“there is at least some possibility that [China] will accept Petitioner[s] at some point.”
Nguyen v. Scott, 796 F. Supp. 703, 725 (W.D. Wash. 2025). However, “that is not the same
as significant likelihood that [they] will be accepted in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701); see also Yang v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-2205-DAD-
AC (HC), 2025 WL 2791778, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (“Respondents’ citation to
an isolated reported instance of the Chinese government accepting deportees does not, by
itself, demonstrate [likelihood of removal] regarding petitioner in particular.”); Singh v.
Gonzales, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1220 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (finding respondents had not
met their burden where they “merely assert[ed] that it ha[d] followed up on its request for
travel documents”).
The Court concludes that Respondents have failed to rebut Petitioners’ showing that
there is no significant likelihood of removal. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART2
the Petition.
2 Because there is no significant likelihood Petitioners will be removed to a third country in the reasonably
foreseeable future, the Court declines to address Petitioners’ request for an injunction. Pet. at 13. The
Court notes, however, that any kind of third country removal like the one Petitioners fear would likely
“present due process issues.” Azzo v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-03122-RBM-BJW, 2025 WL 3535208, at *8
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioners’ Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release
Petitioners from custody. 	The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by
February 19, 2026, confirming that Petitioners have been released. As this concludes the
litigation in this case, the Clerk of Court SHALL CLOSE the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 13, 2026
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025) (quoting Esmail v. Noem, No. 25-cv-08325-WLH-RAO, 2025 WL 3030589, at
*6-7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025)).
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