Jackson v. Larose et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JESSE BENJAMIN ANTHON
JACKSON,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Warden of
Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 3:26-cv-00392-BTM-VET
ORDER ON HABEAS PETITION
Case 3:26-cv-00392-BTM-VET Document 9 Filed 02/23/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
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Pending before the Court is Petitioner Jesse Benjamin Anthony Jackson’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
A. 	Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Jamaica. 	Petitioner was admitted into the
United 	States 	on 	a 	temporary 	visa 	in 	June 	2007. 	Petitioner 	was 	charged 	with
removability in a Notice to Appear in November 2012. 	In September 2013, an
immigration judge (IJ) granted Petitioner withholding of removal to Jamaica.
In June 2019, Petitioner was convicted of Possession with Intent to Sell or
Dispense to a Non-Dependent under Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 21a-278(b) and was
sentenced to seven years in prison. In 2024, Petitioner left the United States and returned
to Jamaica. 	Petitioner returned to the United States at the San Ysidro port of entry on
January 2, 2026, and was taken into custody. 	On January 26, 2026, an IJ granted the
Government’s motion to reopen removal proceedings and terminate the withholding of
removal.
Petitioner 	contends 	that 	the 	Government 	is 	unlawfully 	detaining 	him. 	The
Government first contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
On the merits, the Government argues that under 8 U.S.C § 1226(c), Petitioner must be
detained because his Connecticut conviction is for an offense relating to a controlled
substance.
B. 	Discussion
The Court rejects the Government’s jurisdictional argument. Section 1252(g) bars
judicial review over challenges “to the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” 	But Petitioner’s
challenge does not fall within that language. Instead Petitioner challenges the lawfulness
of his custody, and this Court has jurisdiction over that issue. 	Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S.
392, 401-02 (2019) (maintaining jurisdiction on appeal following district court decisions
to review legal challenge to decision to deny bond hearings); Ibarra-Perez v. United
States, 154 F.4th 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2025) (explaining that Section 1252(g) does not
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preclude jurisdiction over legal, non-discretionary questions); Flores-Torres v. Mukasey,
548 F.3d 708, 711-13 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling that Section 1525 does not strip jurisdiction
over habeas claims). This Court has jurisdiction because Petitioner is not challenging his
removal, the execution of a removal order, or a discretionary decision by the Attorney
General. 	See Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have
limited [1252(g)]’s jurisdiction-stripping power to actions challenging the Attorney
General’s discretionary decisions to initiate proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute
removal orders.”). 	Rather, Petitioner solely challenges the lawfulness of his detention
without a bond hearing. 	That claim falls outside 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). 	There is
jurisdiction to review the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) requires the Attorney General to take into custody noncitizens
“inadmissible by reason of having committed any offense covered in section 212(a)(2) [8
USCS § 1182(a)(2)].” Section 1182(a)(2)(A), in turn, covers state offenses “relating to a
controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 802)).” The Government contends that Petitioner has one qualifying offense, that
is, his conviction for Possession with Intent to Sell or Dispense to a Non-Dependent
under Connecticut Gen. Stat. § 21a-278(b).
The Court finds that the Government has waived any argument that Petitioner is
lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, as it has not raised that basis for Petitioner’s
detention. 	The Court will solely consider the Government’s Section 1226(c) argument
for detention. To determine whether Petitioner’s state offense is “relating to a controlled
substance” under Section 1182(a)(2)(A), the Court must assess whether the offense
applies only to substances covered by federal law. 	See Raja v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 823,
827 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[A] categorical approach applies to determine whether a state
conviction constitutes a predicate offense relating to a controlled substance within the
context of a removal decision under § 1182(a)(2)(A).”); Mielewczyk v. Holder, 575 F.3d
992, 995 (9th Cir. 2009) (using categorical approach to hold that the California schedule
is broader than the federal schedule); Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222, 1232 n.6 (9th
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Cir. 2008) (finding that a state offense qualified under Section 1182(a)(2) because the
substance was “a ‘controlled substance’ within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 802(6).”).
Federal courts in Connecticut have determined that controlled substances under
Section 21a-278(b) are broader than the substances in the federal schedule. United States
v. Smith, No. 21cr202 (JBA), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15820 (D. Conn. Jan. 31, 2023);
United States v. Lopez, 536 F. Supp. 2d 218 (D. Conn. 2008). Indeed, the Government in
Lopez agreed that Connecticut included controlled substances that were not included in
the federal schedules. 536 F.Supp. 2d at 221 (“The Government acknowledges that these
two drugs [(benzylfentanyl and thenylfentanyl)] are absent from the federal schedules.”).
This Court agrees with and adopts those holdings from Smith and Lopez.
The Court could next apply the modified categorical approach to assess whether
Petitioner’s conviction was for a substance listed in the federal schedule. 	See United
States v. De La Torre-Jimenez, 771 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying
modified categorical approach to controlled substances); Mielewczyk, 575 F.3d at 995
(same); accord Chery v. Garland, 16 F.4th 980, 985-86 (2d Cir. 2021) (same). 	There is
insufficient evidence in the record, however, on that issue. 	Neither party has included
state court documents evidencing the substance Petitioner was convicted for. 	Thus, the
issue has not been fully developed. 	Indeed, the Government has not been given an
opportunity to respond to Petitioner’s argument that the modified categorical approach is
inapplicable here and also not met.
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No 	later 	than 	March 	9, 	2026, 	Respondents 	must 	either 	(1) 	file 	state 	court
documents evidencing that Petitioner was convicted for a substance listed in the federal
schedule or (2) grant Petitioner a bond hearing for an IJ to determine whether Petitioner
is a flight risk or a danger to the community. 	If Respondents file a response, then
Petitioner may submit a reply by March 16, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 23, 2026
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