Mtiulishvili v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LEILA MTIULISHVILI,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior Warden,
Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-387-RSH-JLB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HEABEAS
CORPUS
On January 20, 2026, petitioner Leila Mtiulishvili, proceeding pro se, filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1.
Petitioner, a citizen of Russia, is detained by U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement
(“ICE”) at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in San Diego, California. See id. at 1; ECF No.
4 at 1. Respondents have filed a return. ECF No. 4. As set forth below, the Court grants the
Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On March 26, 2025, Petitioner applied for admission to the United States from
Mexico at the San Ysidro, California Port of Entry. Id. at 1. Petitioner did not possess entry
documents, and was taken into custody and initially placed in expedited removal
proceedings. Id. at 1–2. She stated that her purpose in coming to the United States was to
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seek protection, and claimed a fear of persecution if returned to Russia. ECF No. 4-1 at 4.
Petitioner was ultimately placed in full removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a,
and in connection with those proceedings she applied for asylum and related relief. ECF
No. 4 at 2.
On November 19, 2025, Petitioner appeared before an immigration judge for an
individual merits hearing. Id. The immigration judge denied her requests for relief and
ordered her removed to Russia. Id. On December 15, 2025, Petitioner appealed that order
to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Id. Her appeal is pending. Id.
Petitioner was 18 years old at the time of her arrest, and remains in custody.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which provides
that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration
officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled
to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this
title.” The issue presented here is whether, in the circumstances of this case and at this
point in time, applying this mandatory detention regime violates Petitioner’s due process
rights.
Respondents argue that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of
Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), Petitioner has no due process
rights beyond those that Congress has provided, and that her due process claim therefore
fails. ECF No. 4 at 5–6. In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court rejected a habeas petitioner’s
argument that the due process clause conferred rights to challenge his expedited removal
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beyond those established by Congress, stating that “an alien at the threshold of initial entry
cannot claim any greater rights under the Due Process Clause.” 591 U.S. at 107. The
petitioner in that case had “attempted to enter the country illegally and was apprehended
just 25 yards from the border.” Id. The Supreme Court determined that the “political
department of the government” had plenary authority to admit or exclude aliens seeking
initial entry, and thus “an alien in respondent’s position has only those rights regarding
admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Id. at 139–40.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Thuraissigiam, some district courts have
adopted Respondents’ reasoning to dismiss or deny habeas petitions in the context of
arriving aliens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b). See Petgrave v.
Aleman, 529 F. Supp. 3d 665, 679 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (“As far as Petitioner is concerned,
whatever procedure Congress has authorized is sufficient due process.”); Gonzales Garcia
v. Rosen, 513 F. Supp. 3d 329, 536 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Petitioner is on the threshold of
initial entry into the United States and . . . he accordingly is not entitled to procedural
protections beyond those provided by statute.”).
Most courts have ruled otherwise. See Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State
Annex Det. Facility, No. 25-cv-98-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25,
2025) (“Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process
requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) … ‘essentially
all district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention
pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the
right to due process.’”) (quoting Martinez v. Clark, No. C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL
5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019)); Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772
(S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the majority of courts across the country in concluding
that 	an 	unreasonably 	prolonged 	detention 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(b) 	without 	an
individualized bond hearing violates due process.”). This Court agrees with the majority
position that a person detained under Section 1225(b) may assert a due process challenge
to prolonged mandatory detention without a bond hearing.
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This Court likewise agrees with those district courts that interpret Thuraissigiam as
circumscribing an arriving alien’s due process rights to admission, rather than limiting that
person’s ability to challenge detention. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 825 (W.D.
Pa. 2025) (“Nowhere in [Thuraissigiam] did the Supreme Court suggest that arriving aliens
being held under § 1225(b) may be held indefinitely and unreasonably with no due process
implications, nor that such aliens have no due process rights whatsoever.”); Hernandez v.
Wofford, No. 25-cv-986-KES-CDB (HC), 2025 WL 2420390, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
2025) (“Although the Supreme Court has described Congress’s power over the ‘policies
and rules for exclusion of aliens’ as ‘plenary,’ and held that this court must generally ‘defer
to Executive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area,’ it is well-established
that the Due Process Clause stands as a significant constraint on the manner in which the
political branches may exercise their plenary authority’—through detention or otherwise.”)
(citations omitted); Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The
holding in Thuraissigiam does not foreclose Plaintiffs’ due process claims which seek to
vindicate a right to a bond hearing with certain procedural protections.”).
In determining whether Petitioner’s detention has become prolonged, the Court
applies a six-factor balancing test used by some district courts. See Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp.
3d at 773–74; Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019). That
test considers: (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future
detention; (3) conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the
detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the
likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. See Kydyrali,
499 F. Supp. 3d at 773–74.
Here, Petitioner has been detained for over 10 months. This duration of detention
does not presumptively establish unreasonably prolonged detention, but neither does it
prevent constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Zarei v. LaRose, No. 26-cv-308-GPC-MMP,
2026 WL 252585 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2026) (“While close to ten months of detention does
not presumptively establish unreasonably prolonged detention, it is also not so little time
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as to preclude constitutional scrutiny.”). District courts have taken different positions on
whether detention of this length weighs in favor of or against granting a bond hearing.
Compare Hoyos Amado v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 25-cv-2687-LL-DDL, 2025 WL
3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (“Courts have found detention over seven months
without a bond hearing weighs toward a finding that it is unreasonable.”) (collecting cases),
with Miagkikh v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-3755-CAB-BJW, 2026 WL 237742, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 29, 2026) (“Here, the first factor weighs against Petitioner given that she has been
detained for nine months.”). In any case, Petitioner’s length of detention here is not
determinative.
Petitioner’s conditions of detention favor setting a bond hearing. Courts in this
district 	have 	found 	that 	conditions 	at 	the 	Otay 	Mesa 	Detention 	Center 	are
“indistinguishable from penal confinement,” and that this factor weighs in favor of
petitioners’ due process arguments of prolonged detention. Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at
773; see Hoyos Amado, 2025 WL 3079052, at *6. The Court also considers evidence of
Petitioner’s medical and psychological conditions while in custody at Otay Mesa Detention
Center, including the report submitted by a licensed social worker, along with the fact that
Petitioner was 18 years old when she was taken into custody over ten months ago.
The likely duration of future detention also favors Petitioner here, where her appeal
has recently been filed and no further dates appear to have been set. The remaining factors
are neutral. The Court does not assign responsibility to either party for the length of time
taken to reach this stage of the proceedings; similarly, on the record presented, the Court
is not in a position to assess the likelihood that the proceedings will result in a final order
of removal.
On balance, the Court determines that the applicable factors indicate that Petitioner’s
detention without a bond hearing has become unreasonable and violates due process.
Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents
must justify her continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that
Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released. See Singh v.
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Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake”
warranted placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and convincing
evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of
bond”); see also Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785–86 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating that “the
BIA properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that Martinez is a danger to the community” with respect to a bond
hearing for a noncitizen detained under § 1226(c)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents are directed to
arrange 	an 	individualized 	bond 	hearing 	for 	petitioner 	Leila 	Mtiulishvili 	before 	an
immigration court within fourteen (14) days of this order as described above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 10, 2026
____________________
Hon. Robert S. Huie
United States District Judge
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