Escobedo Gonzalez v. Larose et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MARIBEL ESCOBEDO GONZALEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior
Warden Core Civic, Otay Mesa, CA, et
al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00299-RBM-DEB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Doc. 1]
On January 20, 2026, Petitioner Maribel Escobedo Gonzalez (“Petitioner”) filed a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) and
a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 2). 	Petitioner claims
she is being detained in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1
¶¶ 39–50.) For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a Mexican national, was ordered removed from the United States on June
4, 1999, and physically removed on June 8, 1999. 	(Doc. 1 ¶ 2; see Doc. 1-2 at 5.)
“Petitioner last reentered the U.S. without inspection on June 8, 1999,” and has not left the
United States since. (Doc. 1 ¶ 2.)
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On or around April 6, 2013, Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence.
(See Doc. 1-2 at 5.) 	On May 14, 2013, Petitioner was released from the Metropolitan
Correctional Center to Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (“ICE”) custody pursuant
to an immigration detainer. (Doc. 1-2 at 6; Doc. 1 ¶ 3.) Petitioner was issued a Notice of
Intent/Decision to Reinstate a Prior Order of Removal and she later claimed a fear of
returning to Mexico. (See Doc. 1-2 at 3, 6; Doc. 1 ¶ 3.) Petitioner was held in Respondents’
custody for over a year until she was released pursuant to an Order of Supervision on
November 26, 2014. (Doc. 1 ¶ 3; see Doc. 1-2 at 8.) On April 11, 2019, an immigration
judge granted Petitioner’s request for deferral of removal to Mexico under the Convention
Against Torture. (Doc. 1 ¶ 3; see Doc. 1-2 at 9.)
On December 18, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained while attending a regularly
scheduled check-in with ICE. (Doc. 1 ¶ 5; see Doc. 5-2 at 3.) Petitioner filed the instant
Petition on January 20, 2026. 	(Doc. 1.) 	Pursuant to this Court’s Order (see Doc. 3; see
also Doc. 6), Respondents filed the Response in Opposition to Habeas Petition and Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order (“Response”) on January 27, 2026. 	(Doc. 5.) 	On
February 3, 2026, Petitioner filed a Reply to Respondents’ Response in Opposition to
Petitioner’s Habeas Petition and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (Doc. 6.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that her continued detention and anticipated removal to a third
country 	violate 	the 	Fifth 	Amendment’s 	Due 	Process 	Clause. 	(Doc. 	1 	¶¶ 39–50.)
Respondents argue that: (1) ICE “may remove Petitioner to a third country that will accept
Petitioner’s removal” because removal to other countries is “impracticable, inadvisable, or
impossible”; (2) “it would be premature to conclude that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future”; and (3) “Petitioner’s concern that she will
not receive adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to her third country
removal is not borne out by the evidence in this case.” (Doc. 5 at 5–6.)
The Court has consistently rejected the same arguments in response to habeas
petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners. For example, in Azzo v. Noem, the Court
held that Respondents: (1) failed to satisfy their burden under Zadvydas; and (2) must
provide Petitioner with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before removing
him to a third country. 	Case No.: 3:25-cv-03122-RBM-BJW, 2025 WL 3535208, at *2
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025). 	As to the Zadvydas claim, the Court found the petitioner
adequately demonstrated there was “good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” because ICE had been unable
to deport him or “even identify a third country to deport him to.” 	Id. at *3 (citation
omitted). The respondents also failed to sufficiently rebut the petitioner’s showing under
Zadvydas because they had “not even identified a third country to which they plan to
remove [the petitioner], much less submitted a travel document or provided an estimate for
how long it would take this unidentified third country to respond.” 	Id. at *4. The Court
also rejected the respondents’ argument concerning third country removal “[b]ecause [the
respondents] actively [sought] to remove [the petitioner] to a third country.” Id. at *6.
Like in Azzo, Petitioner’s current detention is no longer presumptively reasonable
because she was detained for over a year in 2014 and nearly two months in 2026. (Doc. 1
¶¶ 3–5.) Petitioner has also met her initial burden under Zadvyvas to show good reason to
believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
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Specifically, Petitioner has established that she was granted deferral of removal from
Mexico under CAT and that Respondents have been unable to identify a country that will
accept Petitioner for removal in the past 12–13 years. (Doc. 6 at 3.)1 To rebut this showing,
Respondents, 	as 	in 	Azzo, 	claim 	“ICE 	has 	worked 	expeditiously 	to 	effectuate 	her
resettlement in a third country” and that “these efforts are ongoing.” (Doc. 5 at 5.)
The Court therefore adopts its reasoning in Azzo and applies it here. For those same
reasons, Petitioner’s continued detention is no longer reasonable or authorized by statute
and is therefore unlawful. 	Because Respondents have yet to identify a possible third
country for Petitioner’s removal and “‘offered little more than generalizations regarding
the likelihood that removal will occur,’ . . . the Court finds that they have not met their
burden to ‘respond with evidence sufficient to rebut’ Petitioner’s showing.” 	Azzo, 2025
WL 3535208, at *4 (quoting Kamyab v. Bondi, Case No. C25-389RSL, 2025 WL 2917522,
at *4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 14, 2025)); see also Ndandu v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02939-RBM-
MSB, 2026 WL 25848, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (finding ICE’s “good faith” efforts
to secure a travel document, without more, do not render detention reasonable).
Additionally, because Respondents actively seek to remove Petitioner to a third
country (see Barroga Decl. ¶¶ 12–15), the Court finds Respondents’ argument concerning
Petitioner’s third country removal claim unavailing. The Court also adopts its reasoning
in Azzo concerning the third country removal claim and reaches the same conclusion:
Petitioner must be provided adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before being
removed to a third country. See Azzo, 2025 WL 3535208, at *7–8 (adopting reasoning and
1 Relying on the Declaration of Denise E. Barroga, a deportation officer, Respondents
suggest that the removal order became final on August 1, 2022, and that Petitioner was
released on an Order of Supervision on September 12, 2023. 	(Doc. 5 at 2; see Doc. 5-1
¶¶ 5–8.) 	However, these statements contradict Petitioner’s I-213 form dated April 11,
2013, the Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order dated May 14, 2013, and the
immigration judge’s order issued on April 11, 2019, which are attached as exhibits to the
Petition. (See Doc. 1-2 at 3–6, 9.) Because of these inconsistencies, and in the absence of
evidence supporting these statements, the Court declines to rely on them.
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conclusion in Esmail v. Noem, Case No. 2:25-cv-08325-WLH-RAO, 2025 WL 3030589,
at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025)); see also G.A.A. v. Chestnut, Case No. 1:25-cv-01102-
EPG-HC, 2025 WL 3251316, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025) (“Despite [respondents’]
assurances,” there is still “a sufficiently imminent risk that Petitioner will be subjected to
improper process in relation to any third country removal”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly:
1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody,
subject to her preexisting Order of Supervision.
2. Respondents and their officers, agents, employees, attorneys, and persons acting
on their behalf or in concert with them are PROHIBITED from removing
Petitioner to a third country without notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard, following the process laid out in D.V.D. v. United States Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Civil Action No. 25-10676-BEM, 2025 WL 1453640 (D. Mass.
May 21, 2025).2
3. The TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: February 17, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See Louangmilith v. Noem, — F. Supp.
3d —, 2025 WL 2881578, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025); Kumar v. Wamsley, CASE NO.
C25-2055-KKE, 2025 WL 3204724, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 17, 2025).
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