Modrekiladze v. LaRose et al

1
26-cv-271-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ZURAB MODREKILADZE,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE; DANIEL
BRIGHTMAN; TODD LYONS;
PAMELA BONDI; U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY; U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-271-JES-DEB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[ECF No. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Zurab Modrekiladze’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Pursuant to the Court’s
order to show cause, Respondents filed a return to the petition and Petitioner filed a
traverse. ECF Nos. 4, 5. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native of Georgia, entered the United States on October 20, 2023 in
order to seek asylum. ECF No. 1 ¶ 2. He claimed credible fear, and was found to have a
positive credible fear determination. Id. He was issued a Notice to Appear and put into
removal proceedings. Id. ¶ 40. On May 17, 2024, he was ordered to be released on parole
Case 3:26-cv-00271-JES-DEB Document 6 Filed 01/29/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 7

2
26-cv-271-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
under the Alternatives to Detention (“ATD) program. ECF No. 1-2 at 2. Since his release,
Petitioner alleges that he had attended all his scheduled hearings and conformed with all
the requirements of his parole. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 41-42. After his release, Petitioner obtained
work authorization and established a life in the United States. Id. ¶ 3. He filed an asylum
application on June 4, 2024. Id.
On October 27, 2025, while Petitioner was making a delivery to the Camp Pendleton
Marine Base, he was held at the entry gate. Id. ¶ 45. After being held for three hours,
officers from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) arrived and re-detained
Petitioner. Id. ¶ 46. Petitioner asserts that he was never given written notice that his parole
was being terminated nor was he given any particularized reasons for why he was being
detained. Id. He is currently being held at the Otay Mesa Detention Center. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus
to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal
law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means
of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections
have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges
to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas
jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
III. DISCUSSION
In his petition, Petitioner argues that his re-detention and the manner under which it
was carried out violates the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), procedural due
process, and the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 52-72. In their return, Respondents did
Case 3:26-cv-00271-JES-DEB Document 6 Filed 01/29/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 7

3
26-cv-271-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
not directly address these arguments and instead only states that Petitioner is a member of
the Bond Eligible Class certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-
SSS-BFM, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). ECF No. 4.
As such, Respondents state that Petitioner is only entitled to a bond hearing. Id. Petitioner
then filed a traverse, arguing that a bond hearing is not the appropriate remedy because his
re-detention itself is illegal and he should be released. ECF No. 5.
A. Bond Hearing
As a threshold issue, the Court will first address the parties’ disagreement regarding
whether a bond hearing is an appropriate remedy. The Court agrees with Petitioner that it
is not. Indeed, in several cases within this district where the petitioner raised a due process
violation regarding re-detention after having been released on parole, the courts have
rejected the same argument made by Respondents that the petitioner is only entitled to a
bond hearing as a member of the Maldonado Bautista class. See Naveen v. LaRose, No.
25-CV-3689 JLS (AHG), 2025 WL 3771900, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2025) (rejecting
Respondents’ argument that petitioner is a class member under Maldonado Bautista and
therefore only entitled to a bond hearing, rendering his other constitutional arguments
moot); Lozada v. Larose et al., No. 25CV3614-LL-KSC, 2026 WL 184205, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. Jan. 23, 2026) (rejecting same argument and releasing petitioner on due process
violation); Garcia v. Noem et al., No. 25CV3759-LL-BLM, 2026 WL 194745 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 26, 2026) (same); Xie v. LaRose, No. 3:25-CV-03649-RBM-MSB, 2026 WL 92066,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2026) (same). Thus, despite Respondents’ concession regarding a
bond hearing,1 the Court finds it appropriate to address the constitutional violations raised
in the petition.
1 The Court notes that while Respondents state that Petitioner is part of the Bond Eligible class in
Maldonado Bautista, at least one court has disagreed. See Xie, 2026 WL 92066, at *1–2 (finding that
petitioner who had previously been apprehended upon arrival and released on conditional parole was not
part of the class). Regardless, however, the Court does agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s re-
Case 3:26-cv-00271-JES-DEB Document 6 Filed 01/29/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 7

4
26-cv-271-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
B. Due Process
Petitioner argues that his re-detention violates procedural due process because he
was not given any notice and an opportunity to be heard when he was re-detained in
October 2025. As stated above, the government does not meaningfully address the
procedural due process issue in its return. See generally ECF No. 4.
“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government from
depriving individuals of their life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). “[T]he Due Process Clause
applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679. “Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—
lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Id. at 690. A person at risk of suffering
a serious loss being given notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner
and at a meaningful time, is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Courts have identified various ways that a petitioner may be granted some form of
parole. The choice is “discretionary and is made on a case-by-case basis.” J.S.H.M v.
Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16,
2025). Parole can be made for humanitarian reasons or for it providing a significant public
benefit under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), or it can be for conditional parole under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). Id.
detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226 rather than § 1225, irrespective of and independently from
Maldonado Bautista. The Court has previously held that where a petitioner is apprehended at the border,
paroled into the country, and had been residing in the country when he was re-detained, his detention is
governed by § 1226. See, e.g., Martinez Lopez v. Noem et al., No: 25-cv-2717-JES-AHG, 2025 WL
3030457, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025) (explaining reasoning and citing cases); Beltran et al. v. Noem
et al., No. 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (holding same);
Garcia, 2026 WL 194745, at *2 (same).
Case 3:26-cv-00271-JES-DEB Document 6 Filed 01/29/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 7

5
26-cv-271-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
While courts have recognized these as distinct procedures, they have consistently
applied the same procedural due process analysis to petitioners under these forms of parole.
In the context of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), courts have held that such parole status entitles
the petitioner to certain due process rights under both procedural due process and the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123,
1146 (D. Or. 2025) (finding violation under APA); Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F.
Supp. 3d 128, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 2025) (finding violation under procedural due process).
Similarly, for conditional release under § 1226(a), the court in Pinchi explained similar
procedural due process rights:
[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected
a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a
danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining
at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria. The regulations
authorizing ICE to release a noncitizen from custody require that the
noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release
would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is
“likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). “Release
[therefore] reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is
not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v.
Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). [Petitioner] was apprehended by ICE
officers when she crossed the border into the United States . . . ICE then
released her on her own recognizance. As ICE was not authorized to release
[Petitioner] if she was a danger to the community or a flight risk, the Court
must infer from [the] release that ICE determined she was neither.
[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody constituted an “implied promise” that
her liberty would not be revoked unless she “failed to live up to the conditions
of her release.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The
regulatory framework makes clear that those conditions were that she remain
neither a danger to the community nor a flight risk. . . . Accordingly,
[Petitioner’s] private interest in retaining her liberty is significant.
Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034-35.
In this case, Petitioner’s release form states that he was released from ICE custody
on “Parole with ATD.” ECF No. 1-2 at 2. ATD stands for “Alternatives to Detention” and
Case 3:26-cv-00271-JES-DEB Document 6 Filed 01/29/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 7

6
26-cv-271-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
is a program that was “designed ‘to provide supervised release and enhanced monitoring
for a subset of foreign nationals subject to removal whom ICE has released into the United
States.’” Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL
2495767, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025) (citation omitted). “These aliens are not
statutorily mandated to be in DHS custody, are not considered threats to public safety or
national security, and have been released either on bond, their own recognizance, or
parole pending a decision on whether they should be removed from the United States.” Id.
(citation omitted).
Courts have consistently held that noncitizens who have been granted some form of
parole with ATD have a protected interest in their liberty, cognizable under due process.
See, e.g., E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1321 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (finding
that petitioner who was released subject to ATD conditions “undoubtedly” has an
“established interest in his liberty”); Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01035
JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025) (“When an immigrant is
placed into parole status after having been detained, a protected liberty interest may
arise.”); J.S.H.M v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *14
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025) (similarly finding liberty interest). Courts have found such liberty
interest even where violations of the ATD conditions have occurred, so such liberty
interests are at “full force” where, as here, no violations of the conditions have been alleged
against Petitioner. See Herna v. Chestnut et al., No. 1:25-CV-01919-JLT-SAB (HC), 2026
WL 177801, at *4 n.2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2026).
Thus, the Court agrees with all the foregoing courts and similarly holds that
Petitioner has procedural due process rights arising from his existing parole.2 Petitioner has
2 The form substantiating Petitioner’s parole does not state which statutory provision governs his parole.
Parole with ATD appears to be possible under either humanitarian parole or conditional parole. See
Martinez Hernandez, 2025 WL 2495767, at *2 (petitioner granted parole with ATD under conditional
parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226); J.S.H.M, 2025 WL 2938808, at *1 (petitioner granted parole with ATD
under humanitarian parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)). Under either provision, however, as the Court
has noted above, a petitioner has due process rights that stem from the granted parole.
Case 3:26-cv-00271-JES-DEB Document 6 Filed 01/29/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
6 of 7

7
26-cv-271-JES-DEB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
stated that he received no notice when he was re-detained and given no opportunity to be
heard. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 46-47. In their briefing, Respondents do not contradict this, providing
no evidence that Petitioner received any notice or opportunity to be heard. See generally
ECF No. 4. Petitioner claims that he complied with the conditions of his release, which
Respondents do not dispute. ECF No. 1. ¶ 42. Accordingly, the Court joins these courts
and finds that Respondents violated Petitioner’s due process rights when they re-detained
him on October 27, 2025.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas
corpus. Because the Court grants the petition on the Due Process ground and concludes
that Respondents’ revocation of Petitioner’s parole violates procedural due process,
Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody, subject to
any conditions of his preexisting parole that existed at the time he was re-detained. The
Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by February 3, 2026, confirming that
Petitioner has been released.
Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 29, 2026
Case 3:26-cv-00271-JES-DEB Document 6 Filed 01/29/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
7 of 7