Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MOHAMMAD BAYANI,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden at
Otay Mesa Detention Center; DANIEL A.
BRIGHTMAN, San Diego Field Office
Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and Removal Operations
(“ICE/ERO”); TODD LYONS, Acting
Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”); KRISTI NOEM,
Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”); PAMELA BONDI,
Attorney General of the United States;
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-0266-JES-VET
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF No. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Mohammad Bayani’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”), filed on January 16, 2026. ECF No. 1
Respondents filed a return on January 22, 2026. ECF No. 3. Petitioner filed a Traverse on
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January 23, 2026. ECF No. 5. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the
Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Iran who fled his home country due to religious persecution.
Pet. ¶¶ 16-17. Petitioner entered the United States on January 5, 2025, and was immediately
detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center, where he has remained detained ever since. Id. ¶
19.
Respondent initially placed Petitioner in expedited removal. Id. When Petitioner
expressed a fear of returning to Iran, he was given a credible fear interview which resulted
in a positive credible fear determination. Id. On March 2, 2025, Petitioner was issued a
Form I-862 and placed in Section 240 removal proceedings. Id.
On May 17, 2025, Petitioner filed an asylum application. Id. ¶ 21. Petitioner’s
counsel was not able to attend an October 2, 2025, hearing due to illness, and the hearing
was rescheduled to January 2, 2026. Id. ¶ 22. The matter was again rescheduled due to
judicial changes, and postponed to March 13, 2026. Id. ¶ 23. Petitioner states that the IJ
stated from the bench that the case would be reassigned in the future, likely resulting in
further delay. Id.
Petitioner requested a bond hearing, which an immigration judge (“IJ”) denied for
lack of jurisdiction on December 15, 2025. Id. ¶ 20.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus
to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal
law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means
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of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections
have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges
to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas
jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
As an initial matter, Respondents argue that the Court does not have jurisdiction over
areas of immigration law, like the decision to initiate removal proceedings against an alien,
designated by law to the executive branch. ECF No. 4 at 3. As discussed in other cases
before this Court and in this District, the Court agrees with the government’s underlying
proposition but finds that it has jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s claims that his detention is
unlawful. See Sanchez v. Noem, 25-cv-2995-JES-BJW, ECF No. 11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
2025); Alegria Palma v. LaRose, 25-cv-1942-BJC-MMP, ECF No. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11,
2025); Mendez Los Santos v. LaRose, 25-cv-2216-TWR-MSB, ECF No. 14 (S.D. Cal. Sept.
4, 2025) (granting petition by minute order); Rokhifirooz v. LaRose et al., No. 25-cv-2053-
RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165 (S.D. Cal Sept. 15, 2025).
B. Due Process
Petitioner argues that his continued detention without individualized justification of
detention itself constitutes a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Pet. ¶ 43.
The Court agrees.
Section 1225(b) anticipates the detention of individuals seeking asylum while their
cases are pending, and does not require bond hearings to do so. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). At the
same time, the Due Process Clause puts serious guardrails on the government’s ability to
detain any person indefinitely without individualized justification of detention itself.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 690. For noncitizens subject to final orders of removal, the
Supreme Court has held that individualized justification is necessary after a six-month
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period in which detention is presumptively reasonable to effectuate removal. Id. The
Supreme Court has made clear that this six-month rule does not apply to noncitizens
without a final order of removal. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 298 (2018) (holding
that the Ninth Circuit had inappropriately applied the canon of constitutional avoidance,
and remanding for consideration of the statutory text and due process concerns). However,
at the time of this opinion, there is no controlling authority reconciling the textually
unlimited mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and this country’s legal
axiom, dating back to the founding generation, that no person may be detained for an
indefinite time without some process justifying their detention itself. See, e.g., U.S. Const.
amend. V, § 1; Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We have grave
doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is
constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the
government’s arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 690 (“A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious
constitutional problem.”); The Federalist No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The practice of
arbitrary imprisonments has been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments
of tyranny.”). Habeas courts are thus called to determine when a person’s detention under
1225(b) is prolonged without explanation such that the due process clause is necessarily
offended by a total lack of individual process as to their detention itself.
Because this unresolved issue necessarily counterbalances the government’s interest
in efficient removals against noncitizens’ interest in liberty, courts across the country have
adopted a balancing test to determine when the constitution requires process regarding
detention even absent a final order of removal. In Banda v. McAleenan, the court articulated
a series of considerations for cases involving prolonged detention of noncitizens not subject
to final orders of removal. 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019). The factors are
as follows: “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future
detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by
the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings cause by the government; and (6) the
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likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal.” Id. The
court there found that the petitioner was entitled to relief where (1) he was detained for 17
months; (2) his appeal was in process with the Board of Immigration Appeals and still
subject to later Ninth Circuit review; (3) the parties had not submitted evidence regarding
the conditions of detention; (4) Petitioner was not at fault for delays due to the need for an
interpreter; (5) the government was to blame for the slow process of securing a translator;
and (6) it was unclear how likely it was that proceedings would result in removal. Id. at
1118-20. These factors have since been used by courts across this country, including this
Court and others in this district. See Markosian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3494-JES-BLM, 2026
WL 25850 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (granting request for a bond hearing for a petitioner
held for twelve months under 1225(b)’s mandatory detention provision); Guatam v. Corr.
Corp of Am., No. 3:25-CV-3600-JES-DEB, 2026 WL 25846 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (same
for one year detention); Amado v. United States Dep't of Just., No. 25CV2687-LL-DDL,
2025 WL 3079052 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (same for thirteen months); Abdul Kadir v.
Larose, No. 25CV1045-LL-MMP, 2025 WL 2932654 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025) (same);
Sadeqi v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2587-RSH-BJW, 2025 WL 3154520 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12,
2025) (granting request for a bond hearing for a petitioner held for eleven months under
1225(b)’s mandatory detention provision). These factors are also in keeping with, and
expand upon, an earlier test from a district court in this Circuit which reviewed total length
of detention, likelihood of future detention, and delays in the removal proceedings caused
by the government and petitioner. Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal.
2022). The Court finds the Banda factors a comprehensive summary of considerations in
prolonged detention claims without final orders of removal, and uses them here as a lens
through which to evaluate the constitutionality of Petitioner’s detention without process
regarding detention.
Courts consider the first factor, time in detention to date, to be the most important in
determining the necessity of process regarding detention. See Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at
1118 (“the length of detention, which is the most important factor”); Amado v. United
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States Dep't of Just., No. 25CV2687-LL-DDL, 2025 WL 3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov.
4, 2025) (“The total length of detention to date is considered the most important factor.”).
“In general, ‘[a]s detention continues past a year, courts become extremely wary of
permitting continued custody absent a bond hearing.’” Gonzalez v. Bonnar, No. 18-cv-
05321-JSC, 2019 WL 330906, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2019) (alteration in original); see
also Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (“Petitioner has been in
immigration detention ... approximately one year. District courts have found shorter
lengths of detention ... without a bond hearing to be unreasonable.”); Tonoyan v. Andrews,
No. 1:25-CV-00815-SKO-HC, 2025 WL 3013684, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2025)
(“Petitioner has been detained approximately 11 months. This period ... qualifies as
prolonged.”). In this case, Petitioner has been detained for over a year. Pet. ¶ 18. This factor
thus weighs in favor of finding that Petitioner has a right to due process regarding his
detention. See also Masood v. Barr, No. 19-CV-07623-JD, 2020 WL 95633, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 8, 2020) (finding detention for nearly nine months weighs in favor of the
petitioner); Cabral v. Decker, 331 F. Supp. 3d 255, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding detention
of over seven months weighed in petitioner’s favor); Perez v. Decker, No. 18-CV-5279
(VEC), 2018 WL 3991497, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2018) (finding detention of over nine
months weighed in petitioner’s favor); Brissett v. Decker, 324 F. Supp. 3d 444, 452
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (finding detention of over nine months weighed in petitioner’s favor).
Regarding the second factor, Petitioner’s immigration appeal could be pending for a
long time yet, as his case has not yet had a final hearing and further delays are anticipated
by the immigration court. Pet. ¶ 23. Further, Petitioner may still appeal his case to the Ninth
Circuit, which, as the Banda court noted, could take an additional significant period of
time. See Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. This factor also weighs in favor of granting
relief.
Regarding the third factor, conditions of confinement, Petitioner states that his
mental health is at risk due to his continued detention. Pet. ¶ 31. While Petitioner has no
criminal history (id. ¶ 42), he is detained at Otay Mesa, which is not meaningfully
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distinguishable from penal confinement. See Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772
(S.D. Cal. 2020). This factor weighs in favor of granting relief.
Regarding the fourth factor, the petitioner’s responsibility for delay, Petitioner’s
counsel asked for a continuance of his hearing due to illness, which extended the timeline
by four months. Pet. ¶ 22. As courts have repeatedly noted, a petitioner’s pursuit of
defenses to removal should not be held against a determination that they are entitled to due
process. Liban M.J. v. Sec'y of Dep't of Homeland Sec., 367 F. Supp. 3d 959, 965 (D. Minn.
2019) (“Petitioner is entitled to raise legitimate defenses to removal ... and such challenges
to his removal cannot undermine his claim that detention has become unreasonable.”);
Abduraimov v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00843-EPG-HC, 2025 WL 2912307, at *9 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 14, 2025) (finding this factor neutral where Petitioner requested continuances and
the government exercised its right to appeal, and collecting cases). The Court notes that
detainees require the assistance of counsel to effectively raise defenses to removal in
immigration cases, and that counsel requesting continuances for illness is common.
Petitioner may face a challenge in finding a prompt and available court date following the
requested continuance, through no fault of his own. Thus, the fourth factor weighs very
slightly against granting relief.
Regarding the fifth factor, the government’s responsibility for the delay, Petitioner
asserts that judicial reassignment has resulted in a three month delay to his case already,
and that future delay due to further reassignment is likely pursuant to an IJ’s statements
from the bench. Pet. ¶ 23. This factor weighs slightly in favor of granting relief.
The sixth factor is likelihood that Petitioner’s proceedings will result in removal.
The Court does not have enough information to determine the likelihood that his
proceedings will result in removal, but notes that it is possible he will be granted
withholding or other relief based on his prior credible fear determination and his statements
regarding his religious persecution in Iran. See Pet. ¶¶ 16-17. This factor weighs in
Petitioner’s favor.
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In conclusion, the relevant considerations here weigh heavily in favor of Petitioner’s
claim that due process requires individual findings regarding his detention. The Court thus
GRANTS the Petition on due process grounds. Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing in
accordance with this order.
At that hearing, Respondents must justify Petitioner’s continued detention by clear
and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or would pose a danger to the
community if released. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011),
abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 138 S.Ct. 830, 200
L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) (holding that such burden was proper to determine bond in immigration
cases); Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785–86 (9th Cir. 2024) (same); Sadeqi v. LaRose,
No. 25-CV-2587-RSH-BJW, 2025 WL 3154520, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025) (ordering
same bond hearing standard in immigration 2241 petition); Abdul Kadir v. Larose, No.
25CV1045-LL-MMP, 2025 WL 2932654, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025) (same); Idiev v.
Warden of the Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-CV-01030-SKO (HC), 2025
WL 3089349, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2025) (same).
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
(1) Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED;
(2) The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing
within ten days of this Order. At the hearing, the IJ may not deny Petitioner
bond on the basis that he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), but must find
by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to
the community; and
(3) Respondents are ORDERED to File a Notice of Compliance within ten days
of providing Petitioner with a bond hearing, including apprising the Court of
the results of that hearing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 26, 2026
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