Singh v. Noem et al

1
3:26-cv-00261-RBM-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
PRABHJIT SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as
Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00261-RBM-MSB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Doc. 1]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Prabhjit Singh’s (“Petitioner”) Verified
Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Incorporated Memorandum of Law
(“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner claims he is being detained
by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in violation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
(Id. ¶¶ 8, 29–37.) For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a citizen of India, entered the United States without inspection on or
around April 25, 2023. 	(Doc. 1 at 3, Preliminary Statement ¶ 1.)1 Petitioner claimed
1 The Court notes the paragraph numbering in the Petition restarts after the “Facts” section.
(See Doc. 1 at 4.) As such, the Court cites the paragraph numbers as listed in the Petition
and the corresponding CM/ECF electronic pagination unless otherwise noted.
Case 3:26-cv-00261-RBM-MSB Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 5

2
3:26-cv-00261-RBM-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
asylum and “was issued a Notice to Appear dated April 26, 2023, charging him with being
an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.” (Id.) “Upon
information and belief, at that time, ICE made a determination that Mr. Singh was neither
a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and released him.” (Id. ¶¶ 1, 3.) 	On July 10,
2025, Petitioner was re-detained while attending a routine ICE check-in at its Santa Ana
office. 	(Id. at 4, Facts ¶¶ 1, 4.) 	Plaintiff alleges that ICE did not have a warrant for his
detention at the time of his arrest. 	(Id. ¶ 1.) 	Plaintiff remains detained at the Imperial
Regional Detention Facility and his asylum application is still pending before the Board of
Immigration Appeals. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 5.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims that his continued detention violates the INA and the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 	(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 9, 29–37.) 	Respondents concede that
Petitioner, as a class member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Bautista v. Santacruz,
— F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), is detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), and entitled to a bond hearing. 	(Doc. 4 at 2.) 	Because the Parties agree that
Petitioner is detained under § 1226, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
However, Petitioner argues that the Court should order his immediate release and
for Respondents to not re-detain him without a pre-deprivation hearing. 	(Doc. 1, Prayer
Case 3:26-cv-00261-RBM-MSB Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 5

3
3:26-cv-00261-RBM-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
for Relief ¶ 6; Doc. 5 at 1.) The Court agrees. 2
The Due Process Clause prohibits deprivations of life, liberty, and property without
due process of law. 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all
‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is
lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
“[A]lthough in some circumstances the initial decision to detain or release an individual
may be within the government’s discretion, the government’s decision to release an
individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely,
that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if they fail to live up to the conditions of release.’”
Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (applying analysis in the parole context)).
To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient to satisfy the Due
Process Clause, the Court applies the three-part test established in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be affected
by the official action;” (2) the “risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” Id. at 335.
In this case, all three factors support a finding that Petitioner’s re-detention without
notice, reasoning, or an opportunity to be heard deprived Petitioner of his due process
rights. First, Petitioner has a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody given
that he was released in April 2023. 	Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of those
2 Respondents did not respond to Petitioner’s argument that immediate release is proper.
“Generally, a party waives argument when it fails to respond to an argument made to the
court.” United States v. Cabrera, 796 F. Supp. 3d 660, 664 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (citing United
States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051, 1053 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013)). 	Therefore, this alone
may be grounds to grant Petitioner’s immediate release.
Case 3:26-cv-00261-RBM-MSB Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 5

4
3:26-cv-00261-RBM-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
rights is high. “Civil immigration detention is permissible only to prevent flight or protect
against danger to the community.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (citing Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690). 	Respondents do not dispute that ICE previously determined Petitioner did
not pose a risk of flight or a danger to the community and point to “no evidence that these
findings have changed.” 	Salazar v. Casey, Case No.: 25-CV-2784 JLS (VET), 2025 WL
3063629, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (citing Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168,
1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the
noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”)). 	Indeed, Petitioner has
demonstrated that he was complying with his required check-ins at the time that he was re-
detained. (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 4.) Third, Respondents’ interest in detaining Petitioner without
a hearing is low. 	As the court in Pinchi noted, “[d]etention for its own sake, to meet an
administrative quota, or because the government has not yet established constitutionally
required pre-detention procedures is not a legitimate government interest.” 792 F. Supp.
3d at 1036; see Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [the petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that due process requires Petitioner to be released
from custody and receive a bond hearing before an immigration judge before he can be re-
detained. To the extent Respondents argue that Petitioner is entitled only to a bond hearing,
this argument “misapprehend[s] the purpose of a pre-detention hearing: if Petitioner is
detained, he will already have suffered the injury he is now seeking to avoid.” Jorge M.F.
v. Jennings, 534 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2021); see also E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley,
795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 2025).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly:
1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody with
the same conditions he was subject to immediately prior to his detention on July 10,
2025.
Case 3:26-cv-00261-RBM-MSB Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 5

5
3:26-cv-00261-RBM-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner shall
receive notice of the reasons for his re-detention and a hearing before an immigration
judge to determine whether detention is warranted. 	Respondents shall bear the
burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a
danger to the community or a risk of flight.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: February 4, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:26-cv-00261-RBM-MSB Document 6 Filed 02/04/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 5