Garcia-Henriquez v. Director, Otay Mesa Detention Center et al

1
3:26-cv-00249-RBM-BJW
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
KATYA ALEXANDRA GARCIA-
HENRIQUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Senior
Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et
al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00249-RBM-BJW
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Doc. 1]
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	Petitioner 	Katya 	Alexandra 	Garcia-Henriquez’s
(“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Unlawful and Prolonged Detention
and Request for Immediate Release or, in the Alternative, a Bond Hearing (“Petition”)
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) and Emergency Motion for Expedited Review (Doc.
3). Petitioner claims she is being detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in violation
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 	(Doc. 1 at 1.) 	For the reasons set forth
below, the Petition is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a national of El Salvador, entered the United States on September 24,
2023. (Doc. 1 at 1–2; Doc. 1-2 at 4.) Petitioner was subsequently released pursuant to an
Order of Release on Own Recognizance, issued on a Form I-220A, and placed in removal
Case 3:26-cv-00249-RBM-BJW Document 9 Filed 02/06/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 5

2
3:26-cv-00249-RBM-BJW
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 1-2 at 4.)
On July 10, 2025, an immigration judge continued Petitioner’s case. 	(Doc. 1-2 at
4.) 	Petitioner alleges “that the Department of Homeland Security dismissed the case
because [she] had not been afforded a credible fear interview. (Doc. 1 at 2.) After attending
the immigration hearing and “[u]pon exiting the courthouse,” Petitioner was arrested by
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents “without a judicial
arrest warrant, any violation of her I-220A conditions, [or] any new alleged misconduct.”
(Id. (cleaned up); Doc. 1-2 at 4.) 	Petitioner received a credible fear interview which
resulted in a positive credible fear determination. (Doc. 1 at 2.) Petitioner’s immigration
case was then re-opened, and Petitioner re-filed her asylum application. (Id.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Respondents concede that Petitioner, as a member of the Bond Eligible Class
certified in Bautista v. Santacruz, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
25, 2025), is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and therefore entitled to a bond hearing.
(Doc. 7 at 2.) Because the Parties agree that Petitioner is detained under § 1226, the Court
GRANTS the Petition.
However, the Court disagrees that a bond hearing is the appropriate remedy.
Petitioner requests her immediate release and claims that ICE revoked her release pursuant
Case 3:26-cv-00249-RBM-BJW Document 9 Filed 02/06/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 5

3
3:26-cv-00249-RBM-BJW
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
to the Order of Release on Own Recognizance and re-detained her in violation of due
process. (Doc. 1 at 2.) 1
Courts have recognized that the term “released on their own recognizance” typically
refers to conditional parole. J.S.H.M v. Wofford, Case No. 1:25-CV-01309 JLT SKO, 2025
WL 2938808, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025); see also Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501
F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is apparent that the INS used the phrase ‘release on
recognizance’ as another name for ‘conditional parole’ under § 1226(a).”). This Court has
granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners who were re-detained
several years after having been released pursuant to an Order of Release on Own
Recognizance. In Faizyan v. Casey, the Court applied the due process inquiry in Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and found that Respondents’ summary revocation of the
petitioner’s “conditional parole without an opportunity to be heard deprived [him] of his
due process rights.” Case No.: 3:25-cv-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); see Xie v. LaRose, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03649-RBM-MSB, 2026 WL
92066, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2026); see also Naveen v. LaRose, Case No.: 25-CV-3689
JLS (AHG), 2025 WL 3771900, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2025) (rejecting Respondents’
argument that petitioner is a Bautista class member and therefore only entitled to a bond
hearing); Lozada v. Larose, Case No.: 25cv3614-LL-KSC, 2026 WL 184205, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. Jan. 23, 2026) (rejecting same argument and releasing petitioner on due process
violation); Garcia v. Noem, No. Case No.: 25cv3759-LL-BLM, 2026 WL 194745, at *2–
4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2026) (same). 	The Court “conclude[d] that due process require[d]
[the petitioner] to be released from custody and receive a bond hearing before an
immigration judge before he can be re-detained.” Faizyan, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7.
1 The Court notes that Respondents did not respond to Petitioner’s argument that
immediate release is proper. “Generally, a party waives argument when it fails to respond
to an argument made to the court.” 	United States v. Cabrera, 796 F. Supp. 3d 660, 664
(S.D. Cal. 2025) (citing United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051, 1053 n.1 (9th Cir.
2013)). This alone constitute grounds to grant Petitioner’s immediate release.
Case 3:26-cv-00249-RBM-BJW Document 9 Filed 02/06/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 5

4
3:26-cv-00249-RBM-BJW
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Several district courts have also found due process violations where the petitioners
were released under an Order of Release on Recognizance issued on a Form I-220. 	See
C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, Case No. 1:25-CV-01395 JLT SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *9 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (finding due process violation where the petitioner was originally
released on an order of release on recognizance); Leiva Flores v. Albarran, Case No. 25-
cv-09302-AMO, 2025 WL 3228306, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2025) (finding the same
and requiring hearing before detention).
Like 	in 	Faizyan, 	Petitioner 	was 	released 	on 	an 	Order 	of 	Release 	on 	Own
Recognizance and lived in the United States for almost two years before she was re-
detained. 	Petitioner therefore had a protected liberty interest in remaining free from
detention. 	See Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“[T]he
government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’
upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if they fail to
live up to the . . . conditions of release.’”) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
(1972)). 	“As ICE was not authorized to release [Petitioner] if she was a danger to the
community or a flight risk, the Court must infer from [the] release that ICE determined she
was neither.” Id. at 1034. Petitioner also alleges that she was not provided with an arrest
warrant or informed of any violation of release conditions or any new allegations of
misconduct to justify her re-detention. 	(Doc. 1 at 2.) 	Respondents provide no evidence
that Petitioner was afforded any notice or opportunity to be heard regarding the revocation
of her conditional parole. (See generally Doc. 7.)
Accordingly, the Court adopts its reasoning in Faizyan and applies it here. For those
same reasons, ICE’s revocation of Petitioner’s release on recognizance without a pre-
deprivation or bond hearing violated her due process rights and rendered her detention
unlawful. 	To the extent Respondents argue that Petitioner is entitled only to a bond
hearing, this argument “misapprehend[s] the purpose of a pre-detention hearing: if
Petitioner is detained, he will already have suffered the injury he is now seeking to avoid.”
Jorge M.F. v. Jennings, 534 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2021); see also E.A. T.-B.
Case 3:26-cv-00249-RBM-BJW Document 9 Filed 02/06/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 5

5
3:26-cv-00249-RBM-BJW
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1324 (W.D. Wash. 2025).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody,
subject 	to 	the 	conditions 	of 	her 	preexisting 	Order 	of 	Release 	on 	Own
Recognizance.
2. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner shall
receive a hearing before an immigration judge pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to
determine whether detention is warranted. Respondents shall bear the burden of
establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to
the community or a risk of flight. 2
3. The Motion to Expedite (Doc. 3) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: February 6, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
2 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See E.A. T.-B, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1324;
Duong v. Kaiser, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2689266, at *7–10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19,
2025); Lepe v. Andrews, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 2716910, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2025).
Case 3:26-cv-00249-RBM-BJW Document 9 Filed 02/06/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 5