Rajpal v. Brightman et al

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3:26-cv-00230-RBM-MSB
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RAJPAL RAJPAL,
Petitioner,
v.
DANIEL A BRIGHTMAN, Field Office
Director of Enforcement and Removal
Operations, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00230-RBM-MSB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Docs. 1, 2]
Pending before the Court are Petitioner Rajpal Rajpal’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. 1) and Petition for Temporary Restraining Order
(“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 2). 	For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the
Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen and national of India. (Doc. 1 ¶ 7.) He fled India to escape
political persecution and entered the United States without inspection on or about July 5,
2018. 	(Id. ¶ 8.) 	“After entry, he was encountered by U.S. Border Patrol and was then
released on October 18, 2018 after a bond amount of $15,000 was paid.” (Id.) Petitioner
was re-detained by Respondents on November 27, 2025 while dropping his friend off at a
mechanic. 	(Id. ¶ 9.) 	On January 6, 2026, his request for a custody redetermination was
denied pursuant to Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). (Id. ¶ 10.)
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On January 15, 2026, Petitioner filed the Petition (Doc. 1) and TRO Motion (Doc. 2).
That same day, the Court set a briefing schedule. 	(Doc. 3.) 	On January 23, 2026,
Respondents filed their Return to Petition. (Doc. 5.) On January 26, 2026, Petitioner filed
his Reply in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Doc. 6.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that his continued detention without a bond hearing violates the
Immigration and Nationality Act, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the
Administrative 	Procedure 	Act, 	and 	the 	Suspension 	Clause. 	(Doc. 	1 	¶¶ 	38–82.)
Respondents concede that Petitioner, as a class member of the Bond Eligible Class certified
in Bautista v. Santacruz,1 is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond
hearing. (Doc. 5 at 2.) Because the Parties agree that Petitioner is detained under § 1226
and entitled to a bond hearing, the Court grants the Petition.
IV. 	CONCLUSION2
The Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS:
1 See Bautista v. Santacruz, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25,
2025).
2 The Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining grounds for relief.
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1. Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) within seven days of the entry of this Order.3 At the bond hearing,
Respondents 	shall bear the burden 	of establishing, by 	clear and 	convincing
evidence,4 that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.5
2. If the bond hearing is not conducted within seven days of the entry of this Order,
Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody until it is determined that his
detention is warranted under § 1226(a).
3. The TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: January 27, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 See Arce-Cervera v. Noem, Case No. 2:25-cv-01895-RFB-NJK, 2025 WL 3017866, at
*7–8 (D. Nev. Oct. 28, 2025).
4 See Sadeqi v. LaRose, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3154520, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12,
2025) (“Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which
Respondents must justify her continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing
evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”)
(citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds
by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) (explaining that “the substantial liberty
interest at stake” warranted placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and
convincing evidence that [a noncitizen] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to
justify denial of bond”).
5 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See Duong v. Kaiser, — F. Supp. 3d —,
2025 WL 2689266, at *7–10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, — F. Supp. 3d
—, 2025 WL 2716910, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025).
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