Skvortsova v. Mayorkas et al

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26-cv-0073-AGS-SBC
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Tatiana SKVORTSOVA,
Petitioner,
v.
Christopher J. LaROSE,
Respondent.
Case No.: 26-cv-0073-AGS-SBC
ORDER REQUIRING RETURN AND
DENYING MOTION TO APPOINT
COUNSEL (ECF 4)
Unrepresented petitioner Tatiana Skvortsova seeks a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 to free her from immigration detention. She also requests appointment of
counsel.
SCREENING
At the initial screening stage, her petition need only make out a claim that is
sufficiently cognizable to warrant an answer or return. See Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it
plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled
to relief”); id., Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
to any “habeas corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary
dismissal of claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038,
1045 (9th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is
not so frivolous or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id.
Since “November 20, 2024,” Skvortsova has “been detained by [Immigration and
Customs Enforcement],” and her “appeal of the immigration judge’s denial of asylum” is
“pending.” (ECF 3, at 5.) She argues that her detention has become unconstitutionally
“[p]rolonged” in violation of her “due process” rights. (Id. at 5–6.)
This challenge warrants an answer. Some courts have concluded that prolonged
detention can violate due process even for those subject to mandatory detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). See, e.g., Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772 (S.D. Cal. 2020)
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26-cv-0073-AGS-SBC
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(“[T]he Court joins the majority of courts across the country in concluding that an
unreasonably prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an individualized
bond hearing violates due process.”).
MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
Skvortsova also requests an appointed attorney. (See ECF 4.) Courts may appoint
counsel for “impoverished habeas petitioner[s]” seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
“[w]henever” “the interests of justice so require.” Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234
(9th Cir. 1984); see 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In making this assessment, courts
evaluate petitioners’ “likelihood of success on the merits” and their “ability . . . to articulate
[their] claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn v.
Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). But the Court need not look further than
Skvortsova’s ability to articulate her claims. She was able to clearly and cognizably
communicate the legal claims in her amended petition and her request for counsel, so the
Court sees no need to appoint an attorney at this stage. If circumstances change, the Court
may reconsider this decision.
CONCLUSION
Skvortsova’s petition survives the required screening, but her request for counsel
appointment is denied. By March 9, 2026, the government must file an answer. Any reply
by the petitioner is due March 16, 2026.
Dated: March 3, 2026
___________________________
Hon. Andrew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
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