Miagkikh v. LaRose et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
TATIANA MIAGKIKH,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-3755-CAB-BJW
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Doc. No. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Tatiana Miagkikh’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	[Doc. No. 1 (“Petition”).] 	Petitioner claims that she is detained by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) without a bond hearing in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. [Id. at 12–15.] Respondents filed a response to the Petition. [Doc. No.
4.] The Court finds this matter appropriate for determination on the papers. See S.D. Cal.
CivLR 7.1.(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On April 21, 2025, Petitioner, a Russian citizen, applied for admission to the United
States at a port of entry. [Petition at 7.] She did not possess valid documentation allowing
her to legally enter and was thus taken immediately into immigration custody and placed
in expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). 	[Id.] 	Petitioner
expressed a fear of returning to Russia, was interviewed, and received a positive credible
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fear determination. [Petition at 7.] She was issued a Notice to Appear on July 28, 2025,
which effectively vacated her expedited removal proceedings. 	[Id.] 	Over the next five
months, Petitioner’s master calendar hearing was re-scheduled multiple times, and finally
re-assigned to a new Immigration Judge (“IJ”). 	[Id. at 7–8.] 	At a December 23, 2025
hearing, the IJ set the matter for an individual merits hearing on March 19, 2026. [Id. at
9.]
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus challenges the legality of a petitioner’s custody and seeks
to secure release from that illegal custody. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court may
grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” The petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating that he is in illegal custody. 	See Martinez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2740-
BJCBJW, 2025 WL 3171738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents contend that 28 U.S.C. § 1252(g) bars judicial review of Petitioner’s
claim 	because 	her 	detention 	arises 	from 	the 	government’s 	decision 	to 	commence
proceedings. [Doc. No. 4 at 4.] Because Petitioner’s claim challenges her detention and
not the decision to commence or adjudicate removal proceedings or execute removal
orders, the Court is satisfied of its jurisdiction and proceeds to the merits. See Reno v. Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (“It is implausible that the
mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of
referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings.”); see also Arce v. United
States, 899 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have limited [§ 1252(g)]’s jurisdiction-
stripping power to actions challenging the Attorney General’s discretionary decisions to
initiate proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute removal orders.”)
///
///
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B. 	Due Process Claim
Petitioner has now been in ICE custody at Otay Mesa Detention Center (“OMDC”)
for approximately nine months and argues that her detention without a bond hearing
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [Petition at 14–15.] Respondents
counter that the relevant statutory language of § 1225(b)(2) and Supreme Court precedent
require Petitioner’s detention until her removal proceedings are resolved, including her
claim for asylum, and that Petitioner is not entitled to a bond hearing. [Doc. No. 4 at 5–
10].
Starting first with the statutory language, there can be no dispute that the plain
language of § 1225(b) mandates detention. The Supreme Court has said as much, first in
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) and then in Thuraissigiam. In Jennings, the
Supreme Court reasoned:
Read most naturally, §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) thus mandate detention of
applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded. 	Section
1225(b)(1) aliens are detained for “further consideration of the application for
asylum,” . . . . Once those proceedings end, detention under § 1225(b) must
end as well. Until that point, however, nothing in the statutory text imposes
any limit on the length of detention. And neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2)
says anything whatsoever about bond hearings.
Id. at 297. 	The Supreme Court affirmed this conclusion in Thuraissigiam, stating that
“[w]hether an applicant who raises an asylum claim receives full or only expedited review,
the applicant is not entitled to immediate release. . . . Applicants who are found to have a
credible 	fear 	may 	also 	be 	detained 	pending 	further 	consideration 	of 	their 	asylum
applications.” 591 U.S. at 111.
Nonetheless, given that Jennings and Thuraissigiam decided only the statutory
requirement for detention under § 1225(b) and not the constitutional question, this Court
and numerous others have held that a petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b) may give rise
to a due process claim considering the particular facts of the case. E.g., L.R.G. v. LaRose,
3:25-CV-3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. No. 13 at 6 (citing Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256
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(9th Cir. 2018)); Sadeqi v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2587-RSH-BJW, 2025 WL 3154520 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 12, 2025); 	Maksin v. Warden, Golden State Annex, No. 1:25-CV-00955-SKO
(HC), 2025 WL 2879328, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025) (“Several courts including the
Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit, as well as numerous district courts, have found that
unreasonably long detention periods may violate the due process clause.” (collecting
cases)).
This Court has used the Banda test as a framework for analyzing a due process
challenge to prolonged detention under § 1225(b), which considers the following six
factors: (1) the total length of detention to date, which is the most important factor; (2) the
likely duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in removal
proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in removal proceedings caused by the
government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order
of removal. 	Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019).
Though the parties disagree whether Petitioner is detained under § 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2),
[compare 	Doc. 	No. 	4 	at 	5 	(“Petitioner 	is 	mandatorily 	detained 	under 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2).”), with Doc. No. 5 at 3 (“Miagkikh’s . . . [s]ubjection to § 1225(b)(1)
[n]otwithstanding[.]”), the due process analysis is the same.
Here, the first factor weighs against Petitioner given that she has been detained for
nine months. 	See Sibomana v. LaRose, No. 22-CV-933-LL-NLS, 2023 WL 3028093, at
*4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2023) (finding that courts are typically wary of continued custody
without a bond hearing when detention extends beyond one year). As to the second factor,
Petitioner has an individual merits hearing scheduled for March 19, 2026, [Petition at 9],
and so it is currently unclear how long detention could continue; thus, this factor is neutral.
The third factor weighs for Petitioner as she is detained at a secure facility with her
movement restricted and she alleges that she has received insufficient medical care and is
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suffering medical issues as a result.1 [Petition at 9–10.] The fourth and fifth factors favor
Petitioner because her master hearing was re-scheduled multiple times over the past nine
months, including for a new IJ months into her proceedings. 	The final factor is neutral
because Petitioner’s claim has not been adjudicated by the IJ and the Court takes no
position on the merits of Petitioner’s asylum claims. See Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120
(finding sixth factor neutral where petitioner’s asylum application was on appeal and court
had insufficient information to determine whether petitioner may be removed).
In sum, factors two and six are neutral, factors three, four, and five weigh for
Petitioner, and factor one—the most important—weighs against her. 	The Court thus
concludes that at this stage Petitioner’s continued detention under § 1225(b) is not
unreasonable such that due process requires she be given a bond hearing.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the Petition for a writ of habeas
corpus.
The Clerk of Court shall close the case.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 29, 2026
1 Though Petitioner makes no substantive claim for release based on inadequate medical care, the Court
notes that “requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983
action” rather than a habeas petition which is meant for “[c]hallenges to the validity of any confinement
or to particulars affecting its duration[.]” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004).
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