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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ZHILBERT KHACHIKIAN,
Petitioner,
v.
JEREMY CASEY, Warden, Imperial
Regional Detention Facility; JOSEPH
FREDEN, Acting Field Office Director,
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; TODD M. LYONS,
Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM,
Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; and PAMELA
BONDI, Attorney General of the
United States,
Respondents.
Case No.: 25cv3737-GPC(JLB)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
On December 23, 2025, Zhilbert Khachikian (“Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking to be released from his unlawful
detention at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in Calexico, California. (Dkt. No.
1, Pet.) Respondents file a return on January 2, 2026, and Petitioner filed a traverse on
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January 6, 2026. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 9.) Based on the reasoning below, the Court GRANTS
the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Background
Petitioner, a 72 year old Iranian man of Armenian ethnicity, entered the United
States at or near San Ysidro, California without being admitted or paroled after inspection
by an Immigration Officer around February 3, 1999 and has been residing in the U.S.
continuously since that time. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 28; Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶ 6.) On
June 24, 1999, Petitioner was issued a notice to appear for removal proceedings under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 240 charging him with being inadmissible
and subject to removal pursuant to INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled or who has arrived in the United States
at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General. (Dkt. No. 8-2,
Perez Decl. ¶ 7.)
On October 25, 1999, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in Los Angeles, California,
entered a removal order against Petitioner, in part due to lack of sufficient evidence.
(Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 32; Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶ 8.) The IJ stated in open court and in
the removal order that if Petitioner could procure additional information about
membership in the Bahai faith or receipt of a Bahai ID, he could file a motion to
reconsider the decision. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 32.)
On November 8, 1999, Petitioner appealed the IJ’s order to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and the appeal was dismissed on April 15, 2002. (Id. ¶ 33;
Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶¶ 10, 11.) On July 25, 2002, Petitioner filed a motion to
reopen with the BIA which was denied on July 22, 2003. (Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶¶
12, 13.) On August 20, 2003, Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the
motion to reopen with the BIA which was denied on October 2, 2003. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15.)
On August 20, 2003, Petitioner petitioned for review with the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, and while the Ninth Circuit issued a stay of removal throughout the duration
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of proceedings, the petition was denied on February 11, 2005 and a mandate issued on
April 5, 2005. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 35; Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶¶ 16, 17.)
On or about August 25, 2008, ICE detained Petitioner on the final order of removal
and released him under an Order of Supervision and Unsupervised Parole (“OSUP”)
program. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 37; Dkt. No. 1-2, Pet., Ex. A1; Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶
18.) The OSUP program required periodic check-ins with ICE, but otherwise allowed
Petitioner to live freely and move about, engage in gainful employment, and participate
as a contributing member to society, as long as he continued to update ICE of any
permanent changes in address or phone number. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 37.) Petitioner
continued to live a full life became a contributing member of society, and raised a family
which now includes U.S. citizen grandchildren. (Id. ¶ 36.)
In 2025, ICE placed Petitioner under an additional Intensive Supervision
Appearance Program (“ISAP”), requiring additional check-ins using apps, phone calls
and other requirements. (Id. ¶ 38.) ISAP initially placed a GPS ankle bracelet on
Petitioner, but due to medical reasons ISAP agreed to remove the ankle bracelet. (Id.)
Petitioner was still allowed to live freely and move about, engage in gainful employment,
and participate as a contributing member to society, as long as he continued to update
ICE of any permanent changes in address or phone number. (Id.) For the past 17 years,
Petitioner has complied with all OSUP and ISAP requirements without any issue. (Id. ¶
39.)
On November 16, 2025, while Petitioner was at the home of his in-laws in Los
Angeles, ISAP employees asked him to come out of the home so they could verify some
information. (Id. ¶ 42.) The statement was a mere pretext to detain him because once
Petitioner stepped outside the gated community, multiple ISAP employees were waiting
1 The Order of Supervision attached is dated May 21, 2012, no August 25, 2008. (Dkt. No. 1-2, Pet, Ex.
A.)
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for Petitioner, and they arrested him without any further explanation and took him to an
ICE detention facility. (Id.)
On the following day, November 17, 2025, Petitioner was served with a Notice of
Revocation of Release (“Notice”) while in ICE custody at 300 N. Los Angeles Street.
(Id. ¶ 43.) The document stated, “ICE has determined that you can be removed from the
United States pursuant to the outstanding order of removal against you. On July 22,
2003, you were ordered removed to IRAN by an Immigration Judge and you are subject
to an administrative final order of removal. You were released on an order of supervision
on or about August 25, 2008. ICE has determined the purpose of your release has been
served and it is appropriate to enforce the removal order.” (Dkt. No. 1-3, Pet., Ex. B at 2
(emphasis removed).2) The Notice advised Petitioner that he would promptly be given an
informal interview during which he could respond to the reasons for revocation and
provide relevant evidence that removal is unlikely. (Id.)
On November 17, 2025, DHS conducted an informal interview where Petitioner
was offered an opportunity to make a statement concerning the revocation of the order of
supervision but he did not; instead, he orally stated that he would wait for his attorney.
(Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶ 20; Dkt. No. 8-3, Respts’ Table of Exs., Ex. A at 4.) In the
traverse, Petitioner, through counsel, states that Petitioner was not afforded an interview
with a meaningful opportunity to discuss or respond to the Notice and was never
provided the factual or legal reasons for the revocation of his release. (Dkt. No. 9-1,
Darbinian Decl. ¶¶ 4-6.) According to Petitioner’s counsel, Petitioner did not refuse to
response or waive his right to be heard when he stated, “I will wait for my lawyer”;
rather, Petitioner invoked his right to counsel. (Id. ¶ 7.)
On information and belief, prior to his detention, Petitioner was given no
notice of ICE’s or ISAP’s intention to detain him, and he was not provided with any
2 Page numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination.
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reasonable information about why his OSUP was revoked. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶ 44.) On
information and belief, Petitioner was arrested and detained without any warrant, and any
documentation and the Notice was only prepared after his detention. (Id. ¶ 45.) On
information and belief, ICE had no particularized evidence that Petitioner can be
repatriated or deported to Iran at the time he was detained and continue to have no
particularized evidence that Petitioner can be removed at this time. (Id. ¶ 46.) On
information and belief, Petitioner has not received an individualized hearing before a
neutral decisionmaker to assess whether his recent detention is warranted due to danger
or flight risk. (Id. ¶ 47.)
On November 17, 2025, Petitioner’s counsel reached out to ICE and requested to
speak with anyone who could speak on the matter, in particular the ICE deportation
officer or supervisor assigned to Petitioner’s case. (Id. ¶ 48.) Nobody from ICE
responded. (Id.) On November 18, 2025, Petitioner’s counsel visited the detention
center at 300 N. Los Angeles Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012 where Petitioner was being
detained at the time, and managed to speak with Supervisory Deportation Officer
Casillas. (Id. ¶ 49.)
Supervisor Casillas advised Petitioner’s counsel that they were unaware why
Petitioner was detained, that the ISAP team was the one who brought Petitioner to their
facility, that the Los Angeles facility was a temporary holding facility, that Petitioner
would soon be transferred to a larger detention center, and that counsel would need to
follow up with the deportation officer assigned to his case. (Id.) Around November 20,
2025, Petitioner was transferred by ICE to the Imperial Regional Detention Facility,
where he remains to date. (Id. ¶ 50; Dkt. No. 1-4, Pet., Ex. C.) Petitioner’s counsel
repeatedly contacted ICE for an update, and ICE continued to remain nonresponsive until
November 24, 2025 when counsel learned that the ICE ERO employee assigned to
Petitioner’s case was Deportation Officer Salvador Perez (“DO Perez”). (Dkt. No. 1, Pet.
¶ 51.) Petitioner’s counsel spoke with DO Perez on November 24, 2025 who told her by
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phone that there was an outstanding order of deportation to remove Petitioner to Iran, and
he will be contacting the country of Iran for necessary paperwork. (Id. ¶ 52.)
Petitioner’s counsel advised DO Perez that the U.S. does not have diplomatic
relations with Iran, and requested a reconsideration of release as he cannot be removed to
Iran. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 54.) Petitioner’s counsel provided additional information about
Petitioner’s mature age and medical issues, his fear of removal to Iran, and further
explained why ICE lacked authority to detain Petitioner as the removal period had ended
long ago and no event had made his removal reasonably foreseeable. (Id. ¶ 54.) In
addition, Petitioner’s counsel explained that Petitioner planned to file a new motion to
reopen his removal proceedings with new evidence of changed circumstances and
persecution on account of his Bahai faith, including but not limited to his acquisition of a
Bahai ID as referenced on the IJ’s removal order in 1999. (Id.)
Petitioner’s counsel also requested that ICE reconsider Petitioner’s detention,
especially in light of his medical issues. (Id. ¶ 55.) Further, ICE could continue to
process any request for travel authorization without Petitioner in detention because ICE
was already constantly aware of Petitioner’s whereabouts under the concurrent OSUP
and ISAP programs and GPS monitoring through Petitioner’s phone. (Id.) DO Perez
said he would raise this request with his supervisor, but for now his job was to continue
procuring documents from Iran, and Petitioner would remain in custody. (Id. ¶ 56.) DO
Perez advised counsel that that he does not know how long the process will take, but
Petitioner’s removal was not immediate nor imminent because he still needed to obtain
paperwork and travel documentation for Petitioner. (Id.)
On December 8, 2025, the Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”)
requested that Petitioner complete Form I-217, Information for Travel Document or
Passport, related with a travel document request to the Iran Interests Section of the
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Embassy of Pakistan but he refused to comply.3 (Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶ 21.)
Despite his refusal, ERO completed the form using information available to it in DHS
records and databases. (Id. ¶ 22.) On December 22, 2025, ERO forwarded a finalized
travel document request to the Iran Interests Section in Washington D.C. which is
currently pending. (Id. ¶ 23.) DHS has been successful in effectuating final orders of
removal to Iran via charter flight; in Fiscal Year 2025, DHS removed 135 Iranian
nationals to Iran.4 (Id. ¶ 26.) DHS believes there is a significant likelihood of
Petitioner’s removal to Iran in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Id. ¶ 27.)
The petition challenges the legality of Petitioner’s immigration detention on the
following grounds: (1) that his revocation of release was unlawful because Respondents
did not provide evidence that he can be immediately removed to Iran in the reasonably
foreseeable future; (2) that his revocation of release violated 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) for
failing to provide notice and reasons for his detention and to conduct an initial interview;
(3) that his detention is unlawful because his removal is not reasonably foreseeable as
contemplated by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); (4) that his detention violates
his due process rights because he was not provided with an individualized determination
of danger or flight risk; (5) that his removal is unlawful to a third country;5 and (6)
declaratory judgment. (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. ¶¶ 65-105.) Respondents argue Petitioner’s
3 Due to the lack of formal diplomatic relations between the United State and Iran since 1980, the Iran
Interests Section of the Pakistan Embassy manages the diplomatic and consular affairs of Iran in the
United States. (Dkt. No. 8-2, Perez Decl. ¶ 21 n. 1.)
4 See ICE Annual Report Fiscal Year 2024, at p. 99,
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY2024.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2026) (reporting that
removals to Iran ranged from 10 to 27 per fiscal year during fiscal years 2019–2024).
5 Respondents argue Petitioner’s fifth claim that his removal to a third country is unlawful does not raise
a case or controversy and should be denied as moot because they are not seeking to remove him to a
third country and are instead working to remove him to Iran, his home country. (Dkt. No. 8 at 4-5.) In
response, Petitioner maintains that Respondents have not affirmatively denied any intent to remove
Petitioner to a third country; however, if they do not intend to remove petitioner to a third country,
Petitioner agrees the claim is moot. (Dkt. No. 9 at 2-3.) Because Respondents have submitted travel
documents to the Iran Interests Section of the Pakistan Embassy to have him removed to Iran rather than
a third country, the Court agrees with Respondents and DENIES the fifth claim as moot.
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detention is lawful because he has not established there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future under the ruling in Zadvydas. (Dkt. No. 8 at
6-10.6) They also contend that ICE complied with 8 U.S.C. § 241.13(i) by serving
Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release on November 16, 2025, and conducting
an informal interview which Petitioner declined to participate in. (Id. at 12-16.) They
also maintain that Petitioner’s refusal to cooperate with ICE’s efforts to obtain a travel
document authorizes his continued detention. (Id. at 10-11.)
Discussion
A. Legal Standard
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a writ of habeas corpus may be granted to any petitioner
who demonstrates that she is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
473 (2004). The writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within
the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004).
As explained by the Supreme Court, “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by
a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of
the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
484 (1973); Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2023) (habeas actions
limited to challenges of the legality or duration of confinement). A prisoner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.” See Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009).
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Respondents maintain that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) because Petitioner’s claims necessarily arise “from the decision
or action by the Attorney General to . . . execute removal orders.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 5-6.)
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Petitioner replies he is not challenging either the validity of his removal order of 1999 or
whether Respondents can execute on the removal order; instead, he is challenging the
legality of his unlawful detention. (Dkt. No. 9 at 3.)
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) states that, with limited exceptions, “no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
or execute removal orders against any alien[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added);
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). In that light, §
1252(g) is a narrow statutory provision that concentrates on those three discrete actions.
Reno, 525 U.S. at 482. Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful
practices merely because they are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Ibarra-
Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2025). This section does not apply to
“general collateral challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the
agency.” Id. (internal quotation mark and citation omitted).
Here, Petitioner contests his detention resulting from violations of the
government’s mandatory duties under certain statutes, regulations, and the Constitution;
therefore, the Court has jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of Petitioner's detention.
See Dearinger ex re. Volkova v. Reno, 232 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1252(g)
restricts judicial review of deportation orders but “28 U.S.C. § 2241 remains an available
remedy to those challenging executive detention.”) Thus, § 1252(g) does not present a
jurisdictional bar to the instant petition.
C. Failure to Comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)
In Counts 1 and 2, Petitioner argues that ICE unlawfully revoked his release in
violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Respondents contend they complied with § 241.13
by providing Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release one day after he was
detained, and provided him with an informal interview. (Dkt. No. 8 at 13-14.) They also
argue there are changed circumstances with ICE’s recent ability to schedule removal
flights to Iran. (Id. at 14.)
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It is recognized that government agencies are required to follow their own
regulations. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954);
United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672, 683 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is a well-known maxim
that agencies must comply with their own regulations.”) (quoting Ramon–Sepulveda v.
INS, 743 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1984)). Where an immigration “regulation is
promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a federal
statute,” like the opportunity to be heard, “and [ICE] fails to adhere to it, the challenged
[action] is invalid . . . .” Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 388 (D. Mass. 2017)
(quoting Waldron v. I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted)).
Courts “have found that when ICE fails to follow its own regulations in revoking release,
the detention is unlawful, and the petitioner's release must be ordered.” Truong v. Noem,
No. 25-cv-2597-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2988357, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2025)
(collecting cases).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) governs the detention of individuals with a final order of
removal and provides that a noncitizen must be removed within 90 days. 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(1)(A). Once the removal period passes and the “alien does not leave or is not
removed . . . the alien, pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations
prescribed by the Attorney General.” Id. § 1231(a)(3).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court determined that it is “presumptively reasonable”
for DHS to detain a noncitizen for six months following entry of a final removal order
while it works to remove the individual from the United States. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
701. Section 1231(a)(6), however, implicitly limits a noncitizen’s detention to a period
reasonably necessary to bring about that individual’s removal from the United States, and
does not permit “indefinite” detention. Id. at 688. Detention is indefinite if there is “no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701. When
detention becomes indefinite, the noncitizen must be released on supervision. Id. at 699-
700.
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Both parties discuss the application of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) in
this case. Petitioner argues that he has made the initial showing that his removal is not
significantly likely, (Dkt. No. 1, Pet. 83), while Respondents contend that Petitioner has
failed to establish “that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 8.) However, the burden-shifting framework and
presumptive reasonableness under Zadvydas do not apply to Petitioner’s situation of re-
detainment after he was issued a final order of removal, detained and subsequently
released on conditions. See Phouvieng K. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01512-KES-SAB
(HC), 2025 WL 3265504, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (“Zadvydas does not apply
when a noncitizen has been ordered removed, is subsequently released on an order of
supervision because the removal order could not be executed, and is then re-detained
later.”) (citing Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 150 (D. Mass. 2025) and Escalante
v. Noem, No. 9:25-CV-00182-MJT, 2025 WL 2206113, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025));
Tadros v. Noem, No. 25-cv-4108, 2025 WL 1678501, at *3 (D.N.J. June 13, 2025)
(same); Kazemi v. Casey, Case No.: 25cv1926 DMS (DEB), 2025 WL 3179746, at *2
(S.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025) (Zadvydas presumption of reasonable detention does not apply to
re-detention; instead, the government bears the burden that the petitioner “may be
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.”)
Zadvydas involved the initial detainment of a noncitizen awaiting removal and was
never released following a final order of removal. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. In that
context, the Supreme Court held that once an alien has been detained for six months and
“provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to
rebut that showing.” Id.
Here, Petitioner’s 90-day removal period expired years ago in 2002 when the order
of removal became final, (Dkt. No. 1, Pet 79), and in 2008, he was released with
conditions under OSUP and later ISAP. See 8 C.F.R. 241.13(h). Therefore, the
applicable provision for the revocation of Petitioner’s release is 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i).
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8 C.F.R. § 241.137 governs the release and revocation of release for noncitizens
subject to a final removal order who are indefinitely detained. As to revocation of
release, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) provides that a noncitizen’s supervised release may be
revoked and may be returned to custody “if, on account of changed circumstances, the
Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the alien may be removed in
the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2); Sun v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-
02433-CAB-MMP, 2025 WL 2800037, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2025) (“ICE's own
regulations thus place the burden on ICE to show changed circumstances that make
removal significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.”). The procedures
mandated by the regulations provide:
(3) Revocation procedures. Upon revocation, [1] the alien will be notified of
the reasons for revocation of his or her release. [2] The Service will conduct
an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service
custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for
revocation stated in the notification. [3] The alien may submit any evidence
or information that he or she believes shows there is no significant
likelihood he or she be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that
he or she has not violated the order of supervision. [4] The revocation
custody review will include an evaluation of any contested facts relevant to
the revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined warrant
revocation and further denial of release.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).
According to § 241.13(i)(2), ICE must first determine that “on account of changed
circumstances,” the noncitizen is likely to be removed in the foreseeable future. See 8
C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Here, the Notice of Revocation of Release served on Petitioner
states his release was revoked pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 because “ICE has
determined that you can be removed from the United States pursuant to the outstanding
order of removal against you. On July 22, 2003, you were ordered removed to IRAN by
7 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 codified how Zadvydas should apply. See Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to
Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg. 56967 (Nov. 14, 2001).
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an Immigration Judge and you are subject to an administrative final order of removal.
You were released on an order of supervision on or about August 25, 2008. ICE has
determined the purpose of your release has been served and it is appropriate to enforce
the removal order.” (Dkt. No. 1-3, Pet., Ex. B at 2.) This Notice does not assert or
explain that Petitioner is likely to be removed in the foreseeable future in violation of §
241.13(i)(2).8
Further, § 241.13(i)(2) requires that the re-detention determination that there is a
significant likelihood that Petitioner may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future
must be made before his release is revoked. See Tran v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-02391-BTM-
BLM, 2025 WL 3005347, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (explaining that ICE's
determination regarding the foreseeability of removability must be “made before the
removable alien has had his release revoked”). Here, the re-detention was not “on
account of” changed circumstances, given that Respondents concede that no travel
document for Petitioner has been obtained at the time of detention and ERO sent final
travel documents to the Iran Interests Section on December 22, 2025, five weeks after
being detained on November 16, 2025. See Duong v. Charles, No. 1:25-cv-01375-SKO,
2025 WL 3187313, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (finding no evidence of changed
circumstances where the government “did not even submit a request to Vietnam for travel
8 To the extent that Respondents may argue, in the event Petitioner is released under this order and re-
detained, that there is a significant likelihood that Petitioner may be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future because they have submitted final travel documents to the Iran Interests Section at the
Pakistan Embassy on December 22, 2025 and that they have been successfully able to remove Iranian
citizens for several years, Respondents have not provided data as to how long the deportation process
takes, how many pending Iranian citizens are currently waiting to be removed, and what type of
deportations are given priority. In reply, Petitioner relies on a number of news articles concerning the
number and method of repatriation of Iranian nationals to Iran, the fragility of the relationship between
the U.S. and Iran, and a statement by Mr. Abolfazl Mehrabadi, Director of Iran’s Interest Section in
Washington D.C., arguing that his case is not a priority for imminent removal and there is not a
significant likelihood that he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. (Dkt. No. 9 at 4-7.)
Therefore, in the event of re-detention upon release, Respondents must establish “there is a significant
likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future” as such a showing has not
yet been demonstrably made. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2).
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documents” until a month after re-detaining petitioner); Sphabmixay v. Noem, No. 25-cv-
2648-LL-VET, 2025 WL 3034071, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025) (finding no evidence
of changed circumstances where the government “did not even submit a request to Laos
for travel documents” until a week after re-detaining petitioner).
Next, in violation of § 241.13(i)(3), the Notice did not inform Petitioner of the
reasons for the revocation of his release. Merely stating that the “purpose of your release
has been served” does not inform Petitioner of the “changed circumstances” that created
a “significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See 8 C.F.R. §
241.13(i)(2), (3); Phakeokoth v. Noem, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02817-RBM-SBC, 2025 WL
3124341, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2025) (quoting Sarail A. v. Bondi, 25-cv-2144
(ECT/JFD), 2025 WL 2533673, at *10 (D. Minn. 2025) (“[s]imply [stating] that
circumstances had changed or there was a significant likelihood of removal in the
foreseeable future is not enough.”)) Petitioner must be told “what circumstances had
changed or why there was now a significant likelihood of removal in order to
meaningfully respond to the reasons and submit evidence in opposition.” Phakeokoth,
2025 WL 3124341, at *4 (quoting Sarail A., 2025 WL 2533673, at *10).
In addition, ICE's conclusory explanation for revoking Petitioner’s release “did not
offer him adequate notice of the basis for the revocation decision such that he could
meaningfully respond at [any] post-detention informal interview,” as required under §
241.13. See Diaz v. Wofford, Case No. 1:25-CV-01079 JLT-EPG, 2025 WL 2581575, at
*8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2025) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also McSweeney
v. Warden of Otay Mesa Det. Facility, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02488-RBM-DEB, 2025 WL
2998376, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025) (granting habeas petition because “Petitioner
could not have meaningfully responded to the proffered reasons for revocation when he
had not yet even been informed of those reasons”). Therefore, while the parties dispute
whether an informal interview took place, if one had occurred, Petitioner would not have
been able to respond meaningfully to the reasons for his revocation of his release without
being provided reasons for the revocation. Further, because Petitioner was not provided
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with the reasons for his release, he did not an opportunity to submit evidence and
subsequently was not afforded an evaluation and determination of contested facts. See 8
C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).9
Petitioner has therefore shown that ICE violated its own rule under § 241.13(i)(2)
and (3) given the lack of any evidence of a changed circumstance prior to Petitioner's re-
detainment.10 As such, the Court GRANTS the petition for writ of habeas corpus and that
Petitioner be released subject to the conditions in his previous order of supervision. See
Constantinovici v. Bondi, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL 2898985, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10,
2025) (citing Rokhfirooz v. Larose, Case No.: 25-cv-2053-RSH-VET, 2025 WL 2646165,
at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2025) (granting a habeas petition and ordering the petitioner's
release where the Government failed to comply with § 241.13); Hoac v. Becerra, No.
2:25-cv-01740-DC-JDP, 2025 WL 1993771, at *4 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 2025) (finding
petitioner was likely to succeed on his unlawful re-detention claim because “there is no
indication that an informal interview was provided”); Ceesay, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 164
9 The government also argues that Petitioner’s refusal to cooperate with ICE’s efforts to obtain travel
documents authorizes his continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). (Dkt. No. 8 at 10-12.)
Petitioner replies that he has not refused cooperation but has informed ICE officers that he has an
attorney and for ICE officers to communicate to his counsel. (Dkt. No. 9 at 7.) In fact, on November
24, 2025, Petitioner’s counsel informed DO Perez that she represented Petitioner and to forward any
communication to her as Petitioner’s counsel. (Dkt. No. 9-2, Darbinian Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) However, no
documents, including the Form I-217 that ICE provided to Petitioner to fill out on December 8, 2025
was provided to his counsel. (Id. ¶ 4.) Nonetheless, Petitioner argues that the alleged refusal to
cooperate is now moot because Respondents were able to complete and submit final travel documents
using its own resources. (Dkt. No. 9 at 7.)
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C) provides, that “[t]he removal period shall be extended beyond a period of 90
days and the alien may remain in detention during such extended period if the alien fails or refuses to
make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien's departure or
conspires or acts to prevent the alien's removal subject to an order of removal.” Here, because
Respondents were able to submit final travel documents on December 22, 2025, their argument is moot.
10 In the Traverse, for the first time, Petitioner argues that the Notice of Revocation of Release is not
valid because it was signed by Deportation Officer R. Romero and Supervisory Detention Deportation
Officer T. Gaeta in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2) which requires that a decision to revoke a
noncitizen’s release must be made either by an “Executive Associate Commissioner” or by a “district
director. (Dkt. No. 9 at 9; Dkt. No. 1-3, Pet., Ex. B.) However, because the government has not had an
opportunity to response, the Court declines to address a new issue raised by in the Traverse.
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(“[B]ecause ICE did not follow its own regulations in deciding to redetain [the
petitioner], his due process rights were violated, and he is entitled to release.”)).11
Conclusion
Based on the above, the Court GRANTS the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The Government shall immediately release Petitioner from custody on the November 16,
2025 revocation of release and arrest. Petitioner shall comply with all conditions that
were in effect before his November 16, 2025 re-detainment. The parties must also file a
joint status report to confirm that Petitioner has been released on or before January 12,
2026. The Clerk of Court shall close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 8, 2026
11 In light of the Court’s ruling, the Court need not address the fourth and sixth claims.
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