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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
OWEN MUKIIBI KIWANA,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER G. LAROSE, in his
official capacity as Warden of CCA
Detention facility, DANIEL
BRIGHTMAN, in his official capacity as
Field Office Director of the Immigration &
Customs Enforcement and Removal
Operations San Diego Field Office;
KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-3678-JES-SBC
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241;
AND
(2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER.
[ECF Nos. 1, 2]
Before the Court is Petitioner Owen Mukiibi Kiwana’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order. ECF No. 1, (“Pet.”); ECF No. 2, (“TRO”). Pursuant to the Court’s Order
to Show Cause (ECF No. 3.), Respondents filed a Response. ECF No. 5, (“Res.”).
Thereafter, the Court took the matter under submission. For the reasons set forth below,
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the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and DENIES AS MOOT the
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a Ugandan national and citizen that is currently detained in the Otay
Mesa Detention Center. Pet. ¶ 1. In 1985, Petitioner came to the United States and, soon
after, became a lawful permanent resident. ECF No. 5-1, Declaration of Marielle Ceja
(“Ceja Decl.”) ¶ 6. In November 2009, after he was convicted of an aggravated felony,
Petitioner was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and removal
proceedings were initiated against him. Id. ¶ 7; Pet. ¶ 2. On June 29, 2010, Petitioner was
ordered removed by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). ECF No. 5-2 at 8, (“IJ Ord.”). In that
same proceeding, the IJ also denied Petitioner’s withholding of removal claim but granted
his application for deferral of removal under Article III of the Convention Against Torture.
Id.
On July 28, 2010, Petitioner was released from immigration custody on an Order of
Supervision. Ceja Decl. ¶ 10. For the following fifteen years, Petitioner regularly attended
his scheduled ICE check-in appointments in accordance with the Order of Supervision. Pet.
¶ 4. However, on September 17, 2025, Petitioner failed to report for a scheduled check-in
appointment with ICE. Ceja Decl. ¶ 11. On November 3, 2025, ICE revoked Petitioner’s
release and re-detained him. See Ex. 3. That same day, Petitioner was provided with a
Notice of Revocation of Release (“Notice”) and was also afforded an informal interview
the same day. See ECF No. 5-2 at 13, (“Not.”); Id. at 16.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus
to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal
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law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means
of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections
have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges
to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas
jurisdiction. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510,
517 (2003).
Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law
... affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
confinement.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). “The application for the writ usurps
the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives
prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d
1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner seeks habeas and injunctive relief from the Court arguing that his re-
detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In the Response to the
Petition, Respondents raise two arguments as to why the Petition should be denied. First,
Petitioner’s claim is jurisdictionally barred by 8 U.S.C. § (“Section”) 1252. Res. at 3-4.
Second, Petitioner is lawfully detained under Section 1231(a), and the time for which he
has currently been detained, comports with Zadvydas. Id. at 4-10.
A. 	Jurisdiction
The arguments regarding the Court’s jurisdiction are identical to those recently
addressed by the undersigned in Saengphet v. Noem, et al., No. 25-cv-2909-JES-BLM,
2025 WL 3240808, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025). The Court, therefore, adopts its
reasoning as to this issue and incorporates it by reference. See also Martinez Lopez v. Noem
et al., No. 25-cv-2717-JES-AHG, 2025 WL 3030457, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025)
(holding same).
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Accordingly, the Court finds that 8 U.S.C. § 1252's jurisdiction stripping provisions
do not bar this Court from considering Petitioner's habeas petition. Thus, the Court has
jurisdiction to hear this Petition.
B. 	Respondents’ Regulatory Noncompliance Violates Due Process
The issues presented in this case have recently been addressed by several district
courts in this Circuit and across the nation. This Court, along with many others, have
overwhelmingly arrived at these two holdings. First, a DHS Notice that fails to provide
petitioner with adequate notice of the reasons why their release was revoked, violates
federal regulations. See Saengphet, 2025 WL 3240808, at *3-8; see also Sarail A. v. Bondi,
--- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2533673, at *10 (D. Minn. 2025) (“Simply to say that
circumstances had changed or there was a significant likelihood of removal in the
foreseeable future is not enough. Petitioner must be told what circumstances had changed
or why there was now a significant likelihood of removal in order to meaningfully respond
to the reasons and submit evidence in opposition.”); M.S.L. v. Bostock, No. 6:25-cv-01204-
AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *4, 10–11 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025); Hashemi v. Noem, ---
F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 3468694, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2025). This substantially prejudices
petitioner from meaningfully responding to the reasons stated in the Notice, when
challenging their detention in the informal interview. See Saengphet, 2025 WL 3240808,
at *7; McSweeney v. Warden of Otay Mesa Det. Facility, No. 25-cv-02488-RBM-DEB,
2025 WL 2998376, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025); Vo v. Wofford, No. 25-CV-01530-JLT-
SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3718823, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2025).
Second, the Government lacks regulatory authority to revoke a noncitizen’s release,
and violates its own regulations, when it is unable to show sufficient evidence that a
determination took place before, or at, the time it re-detained petitioner, based on changed
circumstances, which justified the revocation of petitioner's release. See Saengphet, 2025
WL 3240808, at *4-7; see also Rokhfirooz v. Larose, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL 2646165,
at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2025); Tran v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02391-BTM-BLM, 2025 WL 3005347,
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at * 2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025). The Court, therefore, adopts its prior reasoning stated in
Saengphet, with respect to these holdings, by reference.
The Government contends that Petitioner’s detention is lawful because 8 C.F.R. §
241.13 	authorized 	it 	to 	revoke 	his 	release 	as 	it 	determined, 	based 	on 	“changed
circumstances” that it stated in the Notice, there was a “significant likelihood that the alien
may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R § 241.13(i)(2); see Notice;
Ceja Decl. ¶ 12. The Court disagrees and finds that the Government violated its own
regulations when it revoked Petitioner’s release because it failed to: (1) provide Petitioner
with a Notice that adequately informed him of the reasons his release was revoked; (2)
show sufficient evidence that prior to, or at the time of Petitioner’s re-detention, a
determination based on changed circumstances took place which justified the revocation
of Petitioner's release; and (3) provide Petitioner with a meaningful opportunity to contest
his detention, when it conducted the informal interview on the same day it provided him
the Notice. Respondents’ conduct violated Petitioner's due process rights.
1. 	Lack of Adequate Notice
The Notice Respondents provided to Petitioner is wholly conclusory as it fails to
sufficiently inform Petitioner why his release was revoked. See Sarail, 2025 WL 2533673,
at *10. This is evidenced by the Notice’s general reference to Petitioner’s alien file and
removal order but failure to state any specific facts that constitute changed circumstances
in support of ICE’s determination that there is “significant likelihood that the alien may be
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See 8 C.F.R § 241.13(i)(2); see Not. The
Court acknowledges that Respondents’ second proffered changed circumstance is a
specific fact about Petitioner’s conduct, while on he was on supervised release. See Ceja
Decl. ¶ 12; see also Not. However, there are no accompanying facts or information that
explain why or how this fact constitutes a violation of the conditions of Petitioner’s release
or even affects Respondents’ ability to remove Petitioner in the reasonably foreseeable
future.
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The regulatory scheme permits a noncitizen an opportunity to contest their re-
detention, in the informal interview. See 8 C.F.R § 241.13(3). But to do so successfully,
Petitioner must adequately “respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the [Notice].”
Id. When a noncitizen is not informed of the reasons for which they were re-detained, it is
essentially impossible for them to adequately respond to them and secure their own
freedom. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (“The
purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, and
permit adequate preparation for, an impending hearing.”); see also McSweeney, 2025 WL
2998376, at *6 (“Petitioner could not have meaningfully responded to the proffered reasons
for revocation when he had not yet even been informed of those reasons.”).
Here, the Notice lacked any details and/or specific facts to sufficiently inform
Petitioner of the reasons for which Respondents revoked his release, as required by their
own regulations. Therefore, the Court finds that the Government violated 8 C.F.R §
241.13(3).
2. 	Lack of Regulatory Authority
The Notice fails to establish, and the Government has failed to produce any evidence
of its pre-detention determination which relied on, any changed circumstances that would
make it significantly likely that Petitioner may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future. 8 C.F.R § 241.13(i)(2); see Not. Thus, the Government lacked the regulatory
authority to revoke Petitioner’s release when it did so.
In the Notice, Respondents proffered two changed circumstances that support
“ICE’s determination that Petitioner can be expeditiously removed from the United States”:
(1) the unexecuted order of removal; and (2) Petitioner’s failure to report to a scheduled
check-in appointment. Ceja Decl. ¶ 12; see Not. The Court addresses each in turn.
a. 	Respondents’ First Proffered Changed Circumstance
On June 29, 2010, Petitioner was ordered removed to Uganda. IJ Ord. Both
Petitioner and DHS waived their right to appeal. Id. Therefore, the June 2010 decision is a
final order of removal. See Id.; Garcia v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2015). This
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means that Petitioner’s final order of removal has been in place for the last fifteen years.
See IJ Ord. Said another way, Respondents’ ability to deport Petitioner, pursuant to his
removal order, has remained unchanged since 2010. See Id. Thus, the Court finds that
Petitioner’s “unexecuted order of removal” cannot possibly be construed as a changed
circumstance for purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Ceja Decl. ¶ 12.
b. 	Respondents’ Second Proffered Changed Circumstance
The Court struggles to understand how Respondents’ second proffered changed
circumstance supports ICE’s determination that there is “significant likelihood that the
alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See Id.; see also Not.; 8 C.F.R
§ 241.13(i)(2). This fact would certainly justify revocation of Petitioner’s release for
violating a condition of his release, if attending every scheduled check-in appointment was
a condition of his release. See 8 C.F.R § 241.13(i)(1). However, the Government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s release is not based on that ground. See Not. It should also be
noted that the Court was not provided a copy of Petitioner’s order of supervised release.
Therefore, it is unable to determine whether Petitioner’s missed check-in violated a
condition of his supervised release.
Nevertheless, in its Response, the Government makes clear that its intent is to
remove Petitioner to a third country. See Res. at 7-8; Ceja Decl. ¶¶ 14-15. However, on
this record, the Court is unable to ascertain the logical and/or legal relevance of Petitioner
missing a scheduled ICE check-in and Respondent’s ability to remove Petitioner to a third
county in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Petitioner’s deferral of removal status prevents him from being deported to Uganda,
until and unless his deferral of removal is terminated. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17; IJ Ord. An
individual’s deferral of removal can only be terminated through either the Government’s
//
//
//
//
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successful undertaking of a lengthy re-litigation process1 or the occurrence of one of two
highly unlikely events.2 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.17(d)-(f). None of which, in the Court’s
view, is likely to be successfully carried out within the reasonably foreseeable future.
Therefore, at this time, Respondents’ only available means to deport Petitioner is removal
to a third country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(E)(vii); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17.
In its Response, the Government outlined the internal and external processes
involved with removing a noncitizen to a third country. See Res. at 7-8; see also Ceja Decl.
¶ 15. However, conspicuously absent from the Response, and more importantly from the
Notice, is an explanation of how this missed check-in, increased the success rate of this
arduous process, specifically for Petitioner, in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Not.;
see generally Res. Without this or any additional information, the Court cannot find that
“Petitioner’s failure to report to a scheduled check-in appointment” as a changed
circumstance for purposes of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Ceja Decl. ¶ 12.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) “requires that [DHS’s] determination is made before the
removable alien has had his release revoked.” Tran, 2025 WL 3005347, at *2; see
also Sphabmixay v. Noem, No. 25CV2648-LL-VET, 2025 WL 3034071, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 30, 2025). Even if Respondents made a determination on the likelihood of Petitioner’s
removal before revoking his release, the Court concludes that it would not have been made
on account of change circumstances, let alone those stated in the Notice. This conclusion
is based on two findings.
First, 	the 	Government 	avers 	that 	Petitioner’s 	September 	17, 	2025, 	conduct,
constitutes changed circumstances. Ceja Decl. ¶¶ 11-12. Despite this assertion, it waited
1 Deferral of removal can be terminated if the Government obtained a favorable “de novo determination,
based on the record of proceeding and initial application in addition to any new evidence.” 8 C.F.R. §
1208.17(d); Such a determination is subject to appeal by either party. Id.
2 Deferral of removal can also be terminated when requested by Petitioner. Id. § 1208.17(e). Or if
diplomatic assurances against torture were obtained by the Secretary of State from the country of which
removal to is being deferred Id. § 1208.17(f).
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forty-seven days after this incident occurred—and for Petitioner to voluntarily report to
ICE—to re-detain him. See ECF No. 5-2 at 4.
Second, the Court previously established that currently, the only permissible avenue
for the Government to deport Petitioner is removal to a third country. Which from the
Government’s briefing, appears will likely take a significant amount time to accomplish.
See Res. at 7-8. And despite its knowledge of this, the Government did not take any action
to identify a third country that is willing to accept Petitioner, when he missed his check-in.
Rather, it waited nearly sixty days, and until after he was re-detained, to even submit an
internal request to identify such a country.
The Government’s inaction for such a lengthy span of time since the occurrence of
the proffered “changed circumstance” cuts against the reasonable likelihood that it was
relied upon by DHS when it made its determination. Further, Respondents provide no
evidence of an actual determination of changed circumstances that justified the revocation
of Petitioner’s release. See generally Res. Thus, the Court finds that Respondents’
proffered justifications stated in the Notice fail to satisfy the regulatory criteria, as set forth
in 8 C.F.R § 241.13(2)
Accordingly, the Court holds that the Government failed to comply with its own
regulations when it revoked Petitioner’s release—and therefore, lacked the legal authority
to do so. See Saengphet, 2025 WL 3240808, at *5; see also Rokhfirooz, 2025 WL 2646165,
at *3; see also Tran, 2025 WL 3005347, at *2.
3. 	Lack of a Meaningful Opportunity to be Heard
The Court finds that the Government violated its regulations when it conducted
Petitioner’s informal interview on the same day that it issued him the defective Notice. See
ECF No. 5-2 at 13-16. Doing so under the imposed time constraints, deprived Petitioner of
a meaningful opportunity to contest his detention, which violated his due process rights.
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the United States, including
aliens, whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas,
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533 U.S. at 679. “The interest in being free from physical detention” is “the most elemental
of liberty interests.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529; see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
755 (1987) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention ... is the carefully limited
exception.”); see also Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1207 (2022) (“An
individual's private interest in freedom from prolonged detention is unquestionably
substantial.”) (citations omitted). A person at risk of a suffering a serious loss being given
notice and an opportunity to be heard, in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time,
is the essence of procedural due process. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Federal regulations require that after a noncitizen is re-detained, and are provided
with a Notice, the Government will “promptly” conduct their informal interview. See 8
C.F.R § 241.13(i)(3). During this interview, the noncitizen has an opportunity to contest
their detention by adequately responding to the stated reasons in the Notice. Id. To
overcome the Notice’s stated justifications, “[t]he [noncitizen] may submit any evidence
or information that he or she believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or she has not violated the order
of supervision.” Id.
Government agencies are required to follow their own regulations. United States ex
rel Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 852 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts have found that when the Government
fails to follow its own regulations when revoking release, the detention is unlawful, and
the petitioner's release must be ordered. See Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137,
169-170 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 387 (D. Mass. 2017);
M.S.L. v. Bostock, No. 6:25-CV-01204-AA, 2025 WL 2430267, at *11 (D. Or. Aug. 21,
2025); Truong v. Noem et al., No. 25-cv-2597-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2988357, at *6 (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 22, 2025).
Here, Petitioner was re-detained on November 3, 2025, at 12:30 p.m. ECF No. 5-2
at 3. And on that same day, Respondents not only provided Petitioner with his Notice, but
also conducted his informal interview. Id. at 13-16.
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The Court acknowledges that the regulations require the informal interview to take
place “promptly” after a noncitizen is re-detained. 8 C.F.R § 241.13(3). However, when
the informal interview is conducted on the same day that the Notice is issued, the
Government essentially bars the noncitizen from being able to submit any evidence or
information that may show that the revocation of their release is unlawful. See id. This
conduct directly violates 8 C.F.R § 241.13(3).
Unfortunately, Petitioner’s circumstances were even worst. He was subjected to an
extremely brief timeline and was forced to blindly contest his detention because his Notice
was defective, as it lacked sufficient detail and/or facts. See supra, at III-A-1. This resulted
in substantial prejudice to Petitioner, who was deprived of an “opportunity to be heard, in
a meaningful manner and at a meaningful time.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
The Court, therefore, finds that the Government failed to provide Petitioner a
meaningful opportunity to contest his detention, as required by its regulation. Id.; 8 C.F.R
§ 241.13(i)(3). Which in turn, violated his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. See
Bonitto v. Bureau of Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 547 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
(finding that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 reflects the Zadvydas Court’s concerns and “provide
necessary procedural safeguards to ensure the detention of an alien beyond the removal
period 	comports 	with 	due 	process 	requirements. Because 	these 	regulations 	confer
important rights upon aliens ordered removed, DHS is bound by these regulations.”).
C. 	Zadvydas Claim and Temporary Restraining Order
Having ruled on the Petition, on the merits, the Court declines to address Petitioner’s
Zadvydas arguments or apply the Winter factors to determine whether to issue a TRO.
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The Court, therefore,
DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
In sum, the Government failed to follow its own regulations when it failed to: (1)
provide Petitioner with adequate notice of the reasons why his release was revoked,
substantially prejudicing him from meaningfully challenging his detention in the informal
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interview; and (2) show sufficient evidence that prior to, or at the time of Petitioner’s re-
detention, a determination based on changed circumstances took place which justified the
revocation of Petitioner's release; and (3) provide Petitioner with a meaningful opportunity
to contest his detention, when it conducted the informal interview on the same day that it
provided him the Notice. The Government’s noncompliance resulted in a violation of
Petitioner's due process rights. Accordingly, Petitioner's habeas Petition is GRANTED and
Petitioner is ordered RELEASED.
Based on the foregoing:
(1) 	The Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241;
(2) 	As Petitioner’s sought after relief was GRANTED, the Court DENIES
AS MOOT the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order;
(4) 	Respondents are ORDERED to immediately RELEASE Petitioner
from custody, under the same conditions as previously imposed, and to
FILE 	a Notice of Compliance, no later than January 19, 2026,
confirming that Petitioner has been released;
(5) 	In the event Petitioner seeks further habeas relief arising from the
Government’s conduct related to its future execution of his removal
order, Petitioner must FILE a new Petition; and
(6) 	The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this suit upon receipt of
Respondents’ Notice of Compliance.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 14, 2026
Case 3:25-cv-03678-JES-SBC Document 7 Filed 01/14/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
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