Guatam v. Correctional Corp of America et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ANJAL GUATAM,
Petitioner,
v.
CORRECTIONAL CORP OF AMERICA
and OTAY MESA IMMIGRATION
COURT,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-3600-JES-DEB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF No. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Anjal Guatam’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Pursuant to the Court’s order to
show cause, Respondents filed a return to the petition. ECF No. 4. After due consideration
and for the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, proceeding pro se, is an 18-year-old citizen of Nepal who entered the
United States around January 5, 2025. ECF No. 1 at 1. Petitioner alleges that he escaped
from his country for fear of his life. Id. He alleges that Border Patrol apprehended him
while he attempted the cross the border. Id.; see ECF No. 4-1 at 5-6. On January 6, 2025,
Petitioner was determined to be inadmissible and placed into section 235 expedited
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removal proceedings. ECF No. 1-2 at 6. Petitioner is currently being detained at Otay Mesa
Detention Center (“OMDC”). ECF No. 1 at 3.
Petitioner claimed asylum, and on February 22, 2025, he received a credible fear
interview that resulted in a positive finding. See ECF No. 1-2 at 8-33. On February 25,
2025, Petitioner received a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), taking him out of expedited removal
and placing him into section 240 removal proceedings. ECF No. 1-2 at 1. The NTA stated
that his next hearing date was to take place on March 6, 2025. Id.
Petitioner claims that after being detained for almost six months, he requested a bond
hearing but it was denied. ECF No. 1 at 4. In the order from the Immigration Judge (“IJ”),
it stated that Petitioner requested a custody redetermination hearing, but that the IJ denied
it “due to lack of jurisdiction.” ECF No. 4-1 at 15-16.
In his petition, Petitioner requests that the Court order his release on bond or parole.
ECF No. 1 at 9.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in
that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
(2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview
of a district court's habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see
also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
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III. DISCUSSION
In Respondents’ return to the petition, they raise several issues: (1) this Court lacks
jurisdiction over this petition because Petitioner failed to name the warden of OMDC in
his petition; (2) Petitioner’s claim is jurisdictionally barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252;
(3) Petitioner is lawfully detained under § 1225; and (4) his detention has not become
unconstitutionally prolonged. ECF No. 4. The Court will address each of these issues in
turn.
A. Jurisdiction for Failing to Name Warden
As a threshold issue, Respondents argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the
petition because Petitioner failed to name the Warden of the institution where he is being
detained, OMDC, in his petition. ECF No. 4 at 4.
Respondents are correct that habeas petitions generally require the Petitioner to
name the person who has custody over him. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (“It shall allege the facts
concerning the applicant’s commitment or detention, the name of the person who has
custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known.”); see Doe v. Garland,
109 F. 4th 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2024) (“[C]ore habeas petitioners challenging their present
physical confinement [must] name their immediate custodian, the warden of the facility
where they are detained, as the respondent to their petition.”). As such, Respondents argue
that district courts have dismissed petitions for lack of jurisdiction when the warden of the
detention facility is not specifically named in the petition. See, e.g., Mukhamadiev v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Security, No. 25-cv-1017-DMS-MSB, 2025 WL 1208913, at *3 (S.D.
Cal. April 25, 2025).
However, some other district courts have acknowledged this technical defect, but do
not dismiss the case, particularly where a pro se litigant is involved. See Herrera-Ramirez
v. United States, No. 2:25-CV-01749-MMD-EJY, 2025 WL 3239043 (D. Nev. Nov. 19,
2025). In Herrera, the Court recognized the Ninth Circuit’s statement in Doe as cited above
and while acknowledging that the petitioner there only named the Attorney General and
the ICE field office director, the court stated:
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In this way, the Petition does not follow the requirements laid out by statute.
But notably, the Doe v. Garland petitioner was represented by multiple
attorneys and civil rights organizations. See 109 F.4th at 1189. Here,
Petitioner is unrepresented. The Court “has a duty to ensure that pro se
litigants do not lose their right to a hearing on the merits of their claim due to
ignorance of technical procedural requirements.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at *2. Thus, the court there retained jurisdiction and addressed the case on the merits.
See also Singh v. Field Off. Dir., San Francisco Field Off., United States Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, No. 24-CV-03472-RMI, 2024 WL 4454824, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2024)
(petitioner filed wrong district and without naming warden but court transferred to the
correct district instead of dismissing the case “which would only delay this matter and
unduly burden Petitioner”).
Thus, in light of Petitioner’s pro se status and the liberty interests at issue, the Court
follows suit and will address the petition on the merits rather than dismiss the petition.
B. Jurisdiction and Section 1252
The arguments with regards to jurisdiction being barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 are
identical to those recently addressed by the undersigned in Martinez Lopez v. Noem et al.,
No: 25-cv-2717-JES-AHG, 2025 WL 3030457, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). The
Court adopts it reasoning as to these issues and incorporates it by reference. See also
Beltran et al. v. Noem et al., No. 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837, at *3-4 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (holding same).
Accordingly, the Court finds that the jurisdiction stripping provisions of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 do not strip it of jurisdiction to hear Petitioner’s claims.
C. Detention Under § 1225 and Length of Detention
Respondents argue that Petitioner is mandatorily detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b) because he was detained at the border as an “applicant for admission” and he has
never been granted any form of parole. ECF No. 4 at 6-7. Further, Respondents argue that
Petitioner’s detention has not become constitutionally prolonged. Id. at 7-11.
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The Court agrees that Petitioner was detained at the border and has not been granted
any form of parole, so Respondents have the authority to detain him under § 1225(b).
However, the Court disagrees that no due process violation can arise, as Respondents
claim. ECF No. 4 at 7-9. Respondents essentially argue that § 1225(b) provides no
limitation on the length of detention and that the statute provides all the due process that
the petitioner is owed. Id. This position has been called into question by the Ninth Circuit:
We have grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged
detention without any process is constitutional or that those who founded our
democracy precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary deprivation
of liberty would have thought so. Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of
our American government. “[L]iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial
or without trial is the carefully limited exception.” United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). Civil detention violates due process outside of
“certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances.” Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256-57 (9th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original). Indeed,
numerous district courts have found that prolonged mandatory detention at some point will
raise due process considerations. See Maksin v. Warden, Golden State Annex, No. 1:25-
CV-00955-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2879328, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025) (“Several courts
including the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit, as well as numerous district courts, have
found that unreasonably long detention periods may violate the due process clause.”
(collecting cases)); Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-
CV-00098-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (“[E]ssentially all
district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention
pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the
right to due process.”) (internal citation omitted); Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768,
772 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the majority of courts across the country in
concluding that an unreasonably prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an
individualized bond hearing violates due process.”). Further, even Respondents recognize
in their return that district courts within this Circuit have found a potential due process
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violation to arise when the detention has become too prolonged. See id. at 9-11 (citing
Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) and analyzing factors).
“Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court have provided guidance regarding
the point at which an immigration detainee’s prolonged mandatory detention becomes
unconstitutional.” Amado v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 25CV2687-LL(DDL), 2025
WL 3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). Thus, district courts within this Circuit have
employed similar but slightly varying tests. In the Lopez case cited by Respondents, the
court employed a test with three factors to decide when mandatory detention under
§ 1226(c) becomes unconstitutionally prolonged: “the total length of detention to date, the
duration of future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the
petitioner and the government.” 631 F. Supp. 3d at 879. In Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F.
Supp. 3d 1099, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2019), the district court considered the following six
factors in the § 1225(b) context: “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely
duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal
proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the
government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order
of removal.” Other courts have simply applied the generalized Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), procedural due process test. See Henriquez v. Garland, No. 22-cv-869-
EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2022).
The Court finds it most appropriate to apply the Banda test to Petitioner’s detention
here under § 1226(b), as other courts within this district have done in the past.1 See, e.g.,
Amado, 2025 WL 3079052, at *5 (applying 6-factor Banda test to mandatory detention
under § 1226(b)); Kadir v. LaRose, 25CV1045-LL-MMP, 2025 WL 2932654 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 15, 2025) (same); Gao v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2084-RSH-SBC, 2025 WL 2770633, at
1 Even though the Court does not employ the Lopez test as Respondents cite, the Court notes that the Lopez
factors are a subset of the Banda factors. Based on a discussion of the Banda factors below, the Court
would reach the same conclusion even if it were to consider solely the Lopez factors because it finds the
first two Lopez factors to weigh in favor of Petitioner and the last factor to be neutral.
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*4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025); Sadeqi v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2587-RSH-BJW, 2025 WL
3154520, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025).
The first Banda factor, the length of detention, is “the most important factor.” Banda,
385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. Petitioner has been detained since January 5, 2025, so his
detention is at the one-year mark. While this factor itself is not dispositive, the length now
is within the range such that this factor should weigh in favor of Petitioner. Amado, 2025
WL 3079052, at *5 (“Courts have found detention over seven months without a bond
hearing weighs toward a finding that it is unreasonable” (citing cases) and finding detention
of thirteen months to weigh in favor of the petitioner); Sadeqi, 2025 WL 3154520, at *3
(though “almost 12 months” detention was not dispositive, finding it to weigh in favor of
petitioner); Gao, 2025 WL 2770633, at *5 (“The Court finds that Petitioner’s detention for
over 10 months without a bond hearing, in the context of the specific circumstances
described above, has become unreasonable and violates due process.”); Tonoyan v.
Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00815-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013684, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 28,
2025) (“Petitioner has been detained approximately 11 months. This period . . . qualifies
as prolonged.”); Gonzalez v. Bonnar, No. 18-cv-05321-JSC, 2019 WL 330906, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 25, 2019) (“In general, ‘[a]s detention continues past a year, courts become
extremely wary of permitting continued custody absent a bond hearing.’”) (citation
omitted). In even the Lopez case cited by Respondents, that court found a detention of
“approximately one year” to weigh in favor of the petitioner and recognizing that “[d]istrict
courts have found shorter lengths of detention . . . without a bond hearing to be
unreasonable.” Thus, this first and most important factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.
The second Banda factor is the likely duration of future detention, and considers
“anticipated duration of all removal proceedings—including administrative and judicial
appeals.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119. Here, Respondents claim that Petitioner has an
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upcoming hearing on March 3, 2026.2 The records indicate that after Petitioner was put in
section 240 removal proceedings, he had an initial hearing on March 6, 2025, and there is
no information regarding what kind of hearing this March 2026 hearing will be, particularly
whether it will even result in a final decision in his removal proceedings. Even if it were,
however, a removal order may not become final until after the appeals Petitioner could file,
to both the Board of Immigration Appeals and Ninth Circuit. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108 (2020) (“The usual removal process involves an
evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge, and at that hearing an alien may attempt
to show that he or she should not be removed. . . . If that claim is rejected and the alien is
ordered removed, the alien can appeal the removal order to the Board of Immigration
Appeals and, if that appeal is unsuccessful, the alien is generally entitled to review in a
federal court of appeals.”). These appeals can take a long time. See Banda, 385 F. Supp.
3d at 1119 (finding appeal of removal order with the BIA and review in the Ninth Circuit
may take up to two years or longer). In Banda, the petitioner had a final removal order
from an IJ and had just filed an appeal to the BIA, and the court still found that this factor
favored the petitioner. Here, Petitioner’s removal is not even yet final, so the Court finds
even more reason to find that this factor falls in his favor.
The third Banda factor is regarding the conditions of detention. “The more that the
conditions under which the noncitizen is being held resemble penal confinement, the
stronger his argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119
(citation omitted). Courts have recognized that the conditions at OMDC are
“indistinguishable from penal confinement.” See Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 773; Amado,
2025 WL 3079052, at *6. Further, Petitioner is only 18 years old, does not have any
criminal history, and in his petition, alleges that it has been very difficult for him to be
2 The Court notes that the origin of this date is unclear because Respondents do not submit any official
documentation stating that Petitioner has an immigration court hearing on this date. Respondents instead
cite to Petitioner’s letter the Court included in his original Petition (see ECF No. 4 at 11 citing to ECF No.
1 at 1), but this letter from Petitioner only states that “my individual is on the 03/03/2026.”
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away from his family and he has trouble eating and sleeping. ECF No. 1 at 1. The Court
finds that this factor also weighs in favor of Petitioner.
The fourth and fifth Banda factors look to the nature and extent of any delays in the
removal proceedings caused the petitioner and then the government respectively. Banda,
385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119-1120. There is no indication in any of the filings before the Court
that either Petitioner or Respondents caused any delays in the proceedings. Thus, the Court
finds that both of these factors are neutral.
The sixth Banda factor looks to the likelihood that the removal proceedings will
result in a final order of removal. Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120 (“In other words, the
Court considers whether the noncitizen has asserted any defenses to removal.”). Here,
Petitioner has in his favor a positive credible fear determination, but there is no other
information provided to the Court regarding how an IJ would eventually rule on his
removal proceeding. Thus, the Court finds this factor mostly neutral, weighing at most only
slightly in favor of Petitioner.
In summary, at least three of the six factors weigh in favor Petitioner, with the other
factors being neutral. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s nearly year-long
detention under § 1225(b) has become unreasonable and due process requires the
Government to provide him with an individualized bond hearing at this time.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas
corpus, and ORDERS as follows:
(1) The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with an
individualized bond determination hearing within ten days of this Order. At
the hearing, the government bears the burden of establishing by clear and
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convincing evidence that Petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight
risk if released.3
(2) Respondents are ORDERED to File a Notice of Compliance within five days
of providing Petitioner with the bond hearing, including apprising the Court
of the results of the hearing.
The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 5, 2026
3 As courts have recognized, due process violations on this ground entitles Petitioner to a “a prompt and
individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents must justify her continued detention by a showing of
clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if
released.” Sadeqi, 2025 WL 3154520, at *4 (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011)
and Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785-86 (9th Cir. 2024)); see also Kadir, 2025 WL 2932654, at *6
(ordering similar relief, including specifying proper standards to be applied at bond hearing); Idiev v.
Warden of the Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-CV-01030-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3089349, at
*6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2025) (ordering bond hearing where “the government must justify Petitioner’s
continued confinement under § 1225(b) by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or
a danger to the community”).
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