Matteo v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation et al

1
3:25-cv-03532-RBM-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CAROLYN GRACE MATTEO,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION, Amtrak; and
WILLIAM HERRMANN, Executive Vice
President & Chief Legal Officer Amtrak,
Defendants.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-03532-RBM-MSB
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
IFP MOTION
[Doc. 2]
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Carolyn Grace Matteo’s (“Plaintiff”) Application
to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, or request to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”). (Doc. 2.) Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
On December 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”) and Amtrak Chief Legal Officer William
Herrmann (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1 [“Compl.”].) At all times relevant to the
allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff was an individual with a disability—she had a
fractured ankle—as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id. ¶ 6.) On
1 This section summarizes the allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint, not conclusions
of law or fact by the Court.
Case 3:25-cv-03532-RBM-MSB Document 5 Filed 10/13/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 5

2
3:25-cv-03532-RBM-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
August 23, 2025, Plaintiff boarded an Amtrak train in Philadelphia heading to New
Orleans. (Id. ¶ 7.) Upon boarding, she “disclosed her disability and requested reasonable
accommodation for leg elevation,” but the conductor denied her request and threatened to
remove her from the train. 	(Id. ¶¶ 8–9.) 	The conductor also “filed a false Passenger
Incident Report [ ] claiming Plaintiff was ‘removed or prevented from boarding’” for
improper conduct. (Id. ¶ 10.) Amtrak “erased Plaintiff’s [Amtrak] app travel history and
upcoming trips” shortly after this train ride. (Id. ¶ 12.) Over the next several months, it
appears that Plaintiff had a series of negative experiences related to her attempts to file
complaints with the Amtrak regional office and request records through the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”). (See id. ¶¶ 11–21, 26–37.) These experiences culminated in
the instant lawsuit, where Plaintiff brings the following causes of action: (1) ADA
retaliation; (2) fraud / falsification of records; (3) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (4) evidence tampering under 44 U.S.C. § 3106; and (5) violations of FOIA. (Id.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	IFP Motion
The IFP Motion presents two issues. 	First, the Court must determine whether an
applicant properly shows an inability to pay the $4052 civil filing fee required by this Court.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(a). To that end, an applicant must provide the Court with
a signed affidavit “that includes a statement of all assets[,] which shows [an] inability to
pay initial fees or give security.” 	S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2(a). 	Second, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
requires the Court to evaluate whether an applicant’s complaint sufficiently states a claim
upon which relief may be granted. 	See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.
2000), overruled on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014)
2 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants typically must pay an additional
administrative fee of $55. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); United States Courts, District Court
Miscellaneous 	Fee 	Schedule 	§ 	14 	(effective 	Dec. 	1, 	2023),
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/district-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule.
Case 3:25-cv-03532-RBM-MSB Document 5 Filed 10/13/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 5

3
3:25-cv-03532-RBM-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP]
complaint that fails to state a claim.”). The Court addresses each issue in turn.
An applicant need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP, but she must
adequately prove her indigence. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331,
339–40 (1948). An adequate affidavit should “allege[] that the affiant cannot pay the court
costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234
(9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339); see also United States v. McQuade, 647
F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) (supporting facts should be stated “with some particularity,
definiteness and certainty”) (citation omitted). 	No exact formula is “set forth by statute,
regulation, or case law to determine when someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.”
Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235; see also Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858
(9th Cir. 1991) (requiring that district courts evaluate indigency based upon available facts
and by exercise of their “sound discretion”), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993).
Here, Plaintiff attests that she receives $910 per month and lists as her only assets
an old car and a checking account with a negative balance. (Doc. 2 at 1–3.) She attests
further that her monthly expenses are $1,475. (Id. at 4–5.) Exercising its sound discretion,
see Cal. Men’s Colony, 939 F.2d at 858, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff cannot pay
the filing fee and “still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234 (citation
omitted).
1. 	Screening Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
Every complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is subject
to mandatory screening by the Court under § 1915(e)(2)(B). 	Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127.
Under this provision, the Court must dismiss complaints that are (1) frivolous or malicious,
(2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (3) seek monetary relief from
defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Here, there
is no indication that Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous or malicious, or that she seeks monetary
relief from immune defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Therefore, the Court turns
to (a) whether Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted and (b) whether
Case 3:25-cv-03532-RBM-MSB Document 5 Filed 10/13/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 5

4
3:25-cv-03532-RBM-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff has adequately alleged subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
a) 	Failure to State a Claim
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). 	Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). The Court must liberally
construe pro se pleadings and afford pro se plaintiffs “the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified).
Here, Plaintiff asserts federal law causes of action under the ADA, the Federal
Records Act of 1950, and FOIA, as well as state law causes of action for fraud and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that she was an
individual with a disability whose request for reasonable accommodations was denied, and
that Defendants improperly withheld responses to which she was entitled under FOIA. (Id.
¶¶ 6–21, 26–37.) Accepting these allegations as true, see Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112, and
mindful of its mandate to liberally construe pro se pleadings, see Hebbe, 627 F.3d at 342,
the Court finds the Complaint sufficient for § 1915(e)(2)(B) screening purposes. The Court
notes, however, that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of,
and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion3 that [Defendants] may
choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
3 The Court’s sua sponte screening is also not a substitute for any motion to compel
arbitration that Defendants may seek to bring. See Chan v. Panera, LLC, Case No. 2:23-
cv-04194-JLS-AJR, 2024 WL 4328827, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2024) (“[A] motion to
compel arbitration may be filed instead of a responsive pleading under Rule 12(b).”)
(citations omitted); see also Compl. ¶¶ 41–46 (Plaintiff arguing that Amtrak’s arbitration
clause is unenforceable).
Case 3:25-cv-03532-RBM-MSB Document 5 Filed 10/13/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 5

5
3:25-cv-03532-RBM-MSB
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
b) 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Plaintiff alleges that the Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
(Compl. ¶¶ 1–2.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff because the ADA and FOIA claims arise
under the laws of the United States, and the state law claims appear to be so related to these
claims as to form part of the same case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Doc. 2) is GRANTED.
The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s
Complaint and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshals Form 285 for each
Defendant. 	In addition, the Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to provide Plaintiff with
certified copies of this Order and the Complaint so that she can serve Defendants.
Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff is INSTRUCTED to complete the
Form USM-285s as completely and accurately as possible, including an address where
each Defendant may be served, and return them to the U.S. Marshal according to the
instructions provided with the IFP Package. 	The United States Marshals Service is then
ORDERED to serve copies of the Complaint and summons upon the named Defendants
as directed by Plaintiff on the Form 285s. 	The United States will advance all costs of
service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).
Defendants, once served, are ORDERED to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint within
the time period specified in the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(a). 	Plaintiff need take no additional action in this case until after she has served all
Defendants named in the Complaint and they have had an opportunity to respond.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: October 13, 2026
________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:25-cv-03532-RBM-MSB Document 5 Filed 10/13/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 5