Perez v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement(ICE)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RUBISEL AGUILAR PEREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-3522-CAB-MMP
ORDER DENYING AMENDED
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
[Doc. No. 3]
Pending before the Court is Rubisel Aguilar Perez’s Amended Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus. [Doc. No. 3 (“Amended Petition”)]. Petitioner claims that his continued
detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) violates the Immigration and
Nationality Act, procedural and substantive due process, and the Supreme Court’s decision
in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). [Doc. No. 3 at 2.] Respondents filed a return
to the Petition. [Doc. No. 6.] Petitioner did not file a traverse. The Court finds Petitioner’s
motion suitable for determination on the papers. 	See CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the following
reasons, the Amended Petition is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen and national of Cuba who arrived in the United States on June
19, 2021. [Doc. No. 3 at 2; Doc. No. 6 at 2.] Shortly after arrival, he was referred for a
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credible fear interview, and an asylum officer made a negative credible fear finding. [Doc.
No. 6 at 2.] Petitioner was released by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on
July 22, 2021. [Id.] On May 10, 2022, an immigration judge affirmed the negative credible
fear finding and ordered Petitioner’s removal. [Id.]
On October 3, 2025, ICE arrested and detained Petitioner to execute his removal
order. [Id.] On November 19, 2025, Cuba refused to accept Petitioner’s repatriation. [Id.]
ICE then twice tried to remove Petitioner to Mexico; Petitioner refused both times. [Id.]
According to Respondents, “ICE-ERO is actively working to identify a third country to
which Petitioner may be removed and provide Petitioner with at least 24 hours’ notice prior
to removal.” [Id.]
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality
of that custody, and [] the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). 	Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a
district court has the authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that he is in illegal custody.
See Martinez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2740-BJCBJW, 2025 WL 3171738, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
Nov. 13, 2025).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Respondents argue that Petitioner’s wife, Ms. Torres Sanchez, lacks standing to
bring the Amended Petition as “next friend.” [Doc. No. 6 at 2–3.] Under 28 U.S.C. § 2242,
a habeas petition “shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it
is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.” The Ninth Circuit has used the concept of
next-friend standing to evaluate the propriety of a habeas petition filed by someone acting
on behalf of a habeas petitioner under § 2242. See Coal. of Clergy, Laws., & Professors v.
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Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2002). “In order to establish next-friend standing, the
putative next friend must show: (1) that the petitioner is unable to litigate his own cause
due to mental incapacity, lack of access to court, or other similar disability; and (2) the next
friend has some significant relationship with, and is truly dedicated to the best interests of,
the petitioner.” Massie ex rel. Kroll v. Woodford, 244 F.3d 1192, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, Ms. Torres Sanchez is Petitioner’s wife, satisfying the second prong of the
next-friend inquiry. 	The more difficult question is whether the Amended Petition
demonstrates Petitioner’s inability to litigate his own case. The Amended Petition states
that Petitioner is currently detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center (OMDC) and “is
unable to physically file or submit documents to the Court.” [Doc. No. 3 at 1.] The Court
is familiar with the difficulties inherent in pro se proceedings involving detained
individuals. 	However, this judicial district has received numerous pro se filings from
OMDC detainees over the past six months. 	Without specific allegations regarding
Petitioner’s individual inability to file, the Court finds that the first prong of the next-friend
inquiry is not met.
Additionally, “[w]hile a non-attorney may appear pro se on his own behalf, ‘[h]e has
no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.’” Johns v. Cnty. of San Diego,
114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818
F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987)).
Ordinarily “[a] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to
amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured
by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted). 	Here, however, the Court finds amendment would be futile because—
even assuming the petition could be amended to allow Ms. Torres Sanchez to proceed in
the role of next friend—Petitioner has been detained for approximately four months, two
months 	shorter 	than 	Zadvydas’ 	six-month 	presumptively 	reasonable 	period 	of
detention. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701; see also Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr.
& Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave to amend
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when amendment would be futile.”). Given this, amendment of the pending habeas petition
would be futile.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Amended Petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
If Petitioner remains in detention after Zadvydas’ six month presumptively reasonable
window has passed, Petitioner may file a new petition. The Clerk of the Court shall close
the case.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 12, 2026
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