Berry et al v. Petri et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SEAN M. BERRY and PATRICIA
BERRY,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ZACHARY PETRI, et. al,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-02367-BAS-DEB
ORDER SCREENING PLAINTIFFS’
AMENDED COMPLAINT,
DISMISSING CLAIMS IN PART
PER 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2), AND
DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO
SERVE AMENDED COMPLAINT
(ECF No. 7)
Plaintiffs Sean M. Berry and Patricia Berry (“Plaintiffs”) are proceeding pro se—
without an attorney. Plaintiffs filed a complaint on September 8, 2025, against Defendants
Zachary Petri, Angel Manzano, and Chula Vista Police Department. 	(ECF No. 1.)
Plaintiffs seek to relief for the impoundment of their motor home by the Chula Vista Police
Department and its officers. 	(Id.) 	Plaintiffs have also filed a motion seeking leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)—without prepaying court fees or costs. (ECF No. 4.)
The Court has previously granted Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed IFP, and dismissed
Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice. (ECF No. 5.)
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On February 11, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against Defendants
Chula Vista Police Department (“Chula Vista Police Department”) and Zachary Petri
(“Petri”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (ECF No. 7.)
For the following reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’
claims in their amended complaint against the Chula Vista Police Department for all causes
of action and Petri for Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment cause of action for state a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). (ECF No. 7.) However, the Court permits Plaintiffs’
amended complaint against Petri for Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment cause of action to
proceed. 	(Id.) 	Further, in accordance with the directions further specified in the
conclusion of this Order, the Court further DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to issue
summons to Petri and to prepare an “IFP Package” and ORDERS the U.S. Marshal
(“USMS”) to serve Petri.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or portion thereof, a complaint filed by
any person proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to a
mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the court to the extent it is “frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or ... seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief[.]” 	Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1141 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 	Proceedings in Forma Pauperis, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing a complaint filed pursuant to the IFP
provisions of § 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the
complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(c)(3). 	Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a
district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); see
also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting the “the language
of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).
Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
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to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
II. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs assert 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 claims against Defendants for violating
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights when impounding
Plaintiffs’ motor home. (ECF No. 7.)
A. 	Chula Vista Police Department
The Ninth Circuit has held that police and sheriff departments in California can be
subject to liability under § 1983 when acting for a county or city. 	Streit v. County of Los
Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 565 (9th Cir. 2001) (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department);
see also Shaw v. Cal. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 604–05 (9th
Cir.1986) (San Jose Police Department). 	Under § 1983, municipal entities (such as the
Chula Vista Police Department) can only be held liable when a custom or policy gives rise
to a constitutional deprivation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S.
658, 690 (1978). For example, a municipality must have “actual or constructive notice that
a particular omission in [its] training program causes [municipal] employees to violate
citizens' constitutional rights.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011).
Here, though Plaintiffs allege the Chula Vista Police Department “maintained
customs or policies that allowed or encouraged the unlawful seizure or property,” Plaintiffs
do not point to any specific Chula Vista Police Department policy or custom. 	See e.g.,
Brewster v. Beck, 859 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 2017)(a police department could be sued
for its written policy to impound vehicles for thirty days without securing a warrant);
Johnson v. Bradshaw, 772 F. Supp. 501, 506 (D. Nev. 1991), aff'd, 5 F.3d 537 (9th Cir.
1993) (a police department could be sued for its policy of failing to notify owners before
selling their impounded cars at an action). Nor have Plaintiffs pointed to a specific training
program of the Chula Vista Police Department that improperly instructs its police officers
on lawful procedures for impounding vehicles. Connick, 563 U.S. at 61.
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Because Plaintiffs did not correct this specific deficiency previously identified by
the Court (ECF No. 5 at 4:6–5:7), it is appropriate for the Court to DISMISS Plaintiffs’
claims against the Chula Vista Police Department WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 	See Tollette v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, No. CV 13-04272 DDP
FFMX, 2014 WL 1516544, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2014).
B. 	Zachary Petri
Though Plaintiffs do not specify in their amended complaint whether they seek to
sue Petri in his official or personal capacity, they state that Defendants (including Petri)
“act[ed] under the color of law” when impounding Plaintiffs’ motor home “without lawful
authority.” (ECF No. 7 at 2.)
Plaintiffs can sue state officials (such as police officers) in their personal capacities
for damages when that official acts “under the color of state law” to “cause[] the
deprivation of a federal right.” See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25–27 (1991). Given the
“color of law” language in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint (ECF No. 7 at 2), the Court
assumes Plaintiffs aim to sue Petri in his personal capacity.1
To succeed on Plaintiffs’ claims against Petri in his personal capacity, they need to
specify how Petri participated in the violation of Plaintiffs’ rights. See e.g., Jeffrey-Steven
of the House of Jarrett v. Hawai'i, No. CV 24-00040 LEK-KJM, 2025 WL 2083202, at *2
(D. Haw. July 23, 2025) (“[I]f Plaintiff is suing them in their individual capacities, he must
state how each of them personally participated in the alleged violation of Plaintiff's
rights.”). In addition, for each alleged constitutional violation, Plaintiffs need to allege two
elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was
violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color
of law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
1 “An official capacity suit against a municipal officer is equivalent to a suit against the entity.”
Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff Dep't, 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008).
So, to the extent Plaintiffs aim to sue Petri in his official capacity, Plaintiffs’ claims would be barred by
municipal immunity. Id.
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Since the Court has dismissed Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims
against the Chula Vista Police Department, the Court evaluates Plaintiffs’ claims against
Petri below.
1. 	Fourth Amendment
The impoundment of a motor home “is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.” 	Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable interferences in property interests
regardless of whether there is an invasion of privacy”).
Accordingly, for such seizure to be unconstitutional, Plaintiffs must prove that such
impoundment is unreasonable. 	Id. at 862 (“The Fourth Amendment protects against
unreasonable interferences in property interests”). 	In evaluating the reasonableness of a
motor home impoundment, a court will “balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental
interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)
A government’s legitimate reasons for impounding a vehicle include removing any
illegally parked vehicles or preventing those without valid driver’s licenses from operating
a vehicle in contravention of state or local law. Smith v. Hoberg, No. 18-CV-06279-JST,
2019 WL 13248005, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2019) (citing Miranda, 429 F.3d at 865).
The prolonged impoundment of a plaintiff’s motor home (e.g., impoundment lasting 30
days or longer, despite plaintiff’s attempts to recover their vehicle) has been commonly
held to weigh in favor of plaintiff’s allegations for Fourth Amendment violations. See e.g.,
Sandoval v. Cnty. of Sonoma, No. 11-CV-05817-TEH, 2015 WL 4148261, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
July 9, 2015), aff'd, 912 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he thirty-day impoundment of
Mateos–Sandoval's vehicle was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment.”);
Brewster, 859 F.3d at 1197 (“The 30-day impound of Brewster's vehicle constituted a
seizure that required compliance with the Fourth Amendment.”).
Here, Plaintiffs allege Petri, acting under the color of law, impounded their motor
home “without lawful authority” (ECF No. 5 at 2). See Smith, 2019 WL 13248005, at *2.
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Moreover, given that Plaintiffs are continuing to prosecute the current case to recover their
vehicle well-past 30 days and have represented that they otherwise sought the return of
their vehicle (ECF No. 7 at 3), the motor home impoundment is prolonged. See Sandoval,
2015 WL 4148261, at *1; see also Brewster, 859 F.3d at 1197. 	Thus, the Court finds
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a Fourth Amendment violation against Petri in his
personal capacity and allows this claim to proceed.
2. 	Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that the State shall not “deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of the law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 	U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 	A lack of
notice or a hearing prior to motor home impoundment is not grounds for finding a
Fourteenth Amendment violation. 	Rogers v. City of San Diego, No. 18CV2746-WQH-
MDD, 2019 WL 142174, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2019) (citing Scofield v. City of
Hillsborough, 862 F.2d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Procedural due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require a hearing be given to the owner before a vehicle
is towed.”).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Petri deprived Plaintiffs of a post-seizure hearing in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment while acting under the color of law. (ECF Nos. 1,
7.) 	However, it is well established that “California provides adequate post-deprivation
opportunities for redress” including pursuant to the California Government Tort Claims
Act, Cal. Gov't. Code § 810 et. seq. 	Salvatto v. Cnty. of Solano, No. CIV S04-0163
WBSGGH, 2007 WL 926788, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2007) (referencing Rutledge v.
Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981)). 	Plaintiffs have neither
alleged the steps they took to pursue a post-deprivation hearing, nor how Petri prevented
Plaintiffs from accessing a post-deprivation hearing. Further, Plaintiffs do not allege that
Petri’s conduct manifested “deliberate indifference” to Plaintiffs’ interest in “personal
security”. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587–88 (9 th Cir. 1989). For example, unlike
Wood, 879 F.2d at 587–88, where plaintiff was left alone at night in a high-crime area,
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Plaintiffs in this case: (1) had their vehicle impounded at 8:00am in the morning; (2)
remained together, and (3) did not claim to feel unsafe or be in an unsafe area after their
vehicle was impounded. (See ECF No. 7 at 2.)
Because the Court previously informed Plaintiffs of how to correct their pleading
deficiencies in their Fourteenth Amendment claims and they did not do so (ECF No. 5 at
7:11–8:4), it is appropriate for the Court to DISMISS Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment
claim against Petri WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Tollette,
2014 WL 1516544, at *4.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’
claims in their amended complaint against the Chula Vista Police Department for all causes
of action, and Petri for Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment cause of action for state a claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 	(See ECF No. 7.) 	However, the Court permits
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint against Petri for Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment cause of
action to proceed. (Id.)
More specifically, the Court:
1. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to terminate the Chula Vista Police Department
as a party to this matter based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against it,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 	In addition, the Clerk will provide
Plaintiffs with certified copies of this Order, their First Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 7), a copy of the order granting IFP (ECF No. 5), and the summons so
that they may 	serve Petri. Upon 	receipt 	of 	this 	“IFP 	Package,” 	Plaintiffs
are directed to complete the Form 285s as completely and accurately as possible,
include 	an 	address 	where 	service 	upon Petri is 	to 	be 	made, see S.D.
Cal. CivLR 4.1(c), and return them to the United States Marshal according to the
instructions provided by the Clerk in the letter accompanying his IFP Package.
2. ORDERS the USMS to serve a copy of the First Amended Complaint (ECF No.
7), a copy of the order granting IFP (ECF No. 5), and summons upon Petri as
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directed by Plaintiff on the U.S. Marshal Form 285 and to promptly file proof of
that service, or proof of any attempt at service, with the Clerk of Court. See S.D.
Cal. CivLR 5.2. All 	costs 	of 	service 	will 	be 	advanced 	by 	the 	United
States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).
3. ORDERS Petri, once served, to reply to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 7) within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). 	See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (“The Court may
require any defendant to reply to a complaint brought under this section if it finds
that the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits.”).
4. ORDERS Plaintiffs to serve upon Petri or, if appearance has been entered by
counsel, upon Petri’s counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other document
submitted for consideration of the Court. 	Plaintiffs must also include with the
original filing with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the manner in which
a true and correct copy of the filing was also served on Petri, or counsel for Petri,
and the date of such service. Any paper received by the Court that has not been
filed with the Clerk or that fails to include a Certificate of Service may be
disregarded.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 10, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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