Welch Molina v. U.S. Border Patrol

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Desiree Crystal WELCH MOLINA,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. BORDER PATROL,
Defendant.
Case No.: 25-cv-1948-AGS-JLB
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
(ECF 3) AND DISMISSING
COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO
AMEND
Plaintiff Desiree Welch Molina, proceeding without an attorney, is suing defendant
U.S. Border Patrol to seek deletion of records resulting from a 2013 drug-related detention.
She also requests to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, without paying the court’s filing
fees. As explained below, her IFP application is granted. But her complaint does not
survive mandatory screening, so it will be dismissed with leave to amend.
DISCUSSION
A. 	IFP Application
Parties instituting civil actions in United States district courts must pay $405 in filing
fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc.
Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023). But plaintiffs granted the right to proceed IFP need
not pay those fees. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).
Welch Molina’s application states that she recently became unemployed and is
“pending to receive unemployment benefits.” (ECF 3, at 7.) She currently only has ten
dollars in her checking account, no other assets, and estimates her monthly expenses at
“$2,875.” (Id. at 4, 7.) Paying the filing fee would result in an undue hardship on plaintiff,
and as “a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP,” the motion is granted.
See Blount v. Saul, No. 21-CV-0679-BLM, 2021 WL 1561453, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21,
2021).
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B. 	Screening and Dismissal
The IFP statute “not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma
pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir.
2000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6)
require a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Welch Molina claims that in 2013, she was “stopped by U.S. Border Patrol while
returning from Yuma, Arizona.” (ECF 1, at 2.) After a drug-sniffing dog alerted, “agents
searched [her] vehicle and located a small amount of marijuana along with paraphernalia.”
(Id.) As a result, she was “briefly questioned” and her “fingerprints were taken” before
being released. (Id.) “No charges, citations, or convictions resulted from this incident.”
(Id.)
“Since that time,” Welch Molina asserts she has “remained sober, law-abiding, and
ha[s] had no further legal issues.” (Id. at 3.) So, she requests the Court “seal and remove
from public access all records related to” her brief 2013 detention. (Id.)
But Welch Molina does not point to any authority for this Court to order U.S. Border
Patrol to expunge her records. “Although ‘expungement’ may mean different things in
different states, in general when a defendant moves to expunge records, she asks that the
court destroy or seal the records of the fact . . . .” United States v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790,
792 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit has “recognized two sources of authority by which
courts may expunge records of criminal conviction: statutes and our inherent authority.”
Id. Welch Molina does not identify any such statute, and the Court’s own research has not
provided any. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Privacy Act permitting a person to challenge
agency records and sue after exhaustion of administrative remedies); but see 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(j)(2)(A) (exempting from Privacy Act challenges “reports identifiable to an
individual compiled at any stage of the process of enforcement of the criminal laws”); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) (permitting the expungement of records under the “Controlled
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Substances Act” only if “the person was less than twenty-one years old at the time of the
offense”). Welch Molina claims to be 40 years old now, which means in 2013 she was in
her late twenties and ineligible for youth-based expungement. (See ECF 3, at 7.)
The Court also has “inherent authority to expunge criminal records” but only “in
appropriate and extraordinary cases.” Crowell, 374 F.3d at 793. That authority is very
limited. Critically, “district courts do not have the power to expunge a record of a valid
arrest” “solely for equitable concerns.” Id. Instead, “a district court’s ancillary jurisdiction
is limited to expunging the record of an unlawful arrest or conviction, or to correcting a
clerical error.” Id. (emphasis added); accord Fazaga v. FBI, 965 F.3d 1015, 1055 (9th Cir.
2020), rev’d on other grounds by 595 U.S. 344 (2022) (“In short, expungement relief is
available under the Constitution to remedy . . . alleged constitutional violations.”). Welch
Molina claims that the officers found a controlled substance in her car and briefly detained
her to question her about it. Nothing in her complaint suggests those records were created
in support of unlawful or unconstitutional action. As laudable as Welch Molina’s actions
since 2013 have reportedly been, as it stands, she has not stated a claim for relief that this
Court may grant.
The Court will, however, give Welch Molina an opportunity to amend her complaint
to address these deficiencies. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015)
(holding that a “district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend
unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
amendment” (cleaned up)).
CONCLUSION
Thus, the Court orders as follows:
1. 	Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED, and the filing
fee is waived.
2. 	Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff is granted
leave to amend.
3. 	By March 2, 2026, plaintiff must file any amended complaint. The amended
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complaint must be complete by itself without reference to any previous version of the
pleading; defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the amended complaint
will be considered waived. If plaintiff fails to timely amend, the Court will enter a final
order dismissing this civil action.
Dated: February 2, 2026
___________________________
Andrew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
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