Ramos v. San Diego County Superior Court

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JORDAN RAMOS,
Booking #6977025,
Plaintiff,
vs.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY SUPERIOR
COURT,
Defendant.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-01701-JES-LR
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION
FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND § 1915A(b)
[ECF No. 5]
Plaintiff Jordan Ramos, currently detained at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department’s (“LASD”) Men’s Central Jail (“MCJ”), and proceeding without counsel, has
filed an amended civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, together with a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See ECF
Nos. 4, 5. In both his original and amended complaints, Plaintiff claims his constitutional
rights were violated by the San Diego County Superior Court in Criminal Case No.
SCD304625. See ECF No. 1 at 1; ECF No. 4 at 1, 5. He requests “exoneration through
dismissal or reductions to misdemeanors” and $947 million in damages. ECF No. 4 at 6.
For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP
but DISMISSES the case.
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I. 	MOTION TO PROCEED IFP
All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the
United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
$405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to
prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007). However, all
prisoners 	who 	proceed 	IFP 	must 	pay 	any 	remaining 	balance 	in 	“increments” 	or
“installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 83–84 (2016), regardless of whether their
action is ultimately dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)&(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d
844, 850 (9th Cir. 2002).
To proceed IFP, plaintiffs must establish their inability to pay by filing an affidavit
regarding their income and assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th
Cir. 2015). A prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a “certified copy of
the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v.
King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the
Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account
for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six
months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has insufficient assets. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1)&(4); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84.
Plaintiff’s LASD jail certificate shows he had average monthly deposits of $24.34
to his trust account for the 6-months preceding the filing of his case, and an available
balance of $35.40 at the time of filing. See ECF No. 5 at 3. Therefore, the Court GRANTS
1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative
fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court
Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The administrative fee does not apply to
persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.
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Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and assesses a $4.86 initial partial filing fee pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). This initial fee need be collected, however, only if sufficient funds
are available in Plaintiff’s account at the time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a
civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner
has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d
at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal
of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds
available to him when payment is ordered.”). The LASD, or any agency later having
custody, will thereafter collect the balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case and
forward payments to the Clerk of Court as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
II. 	SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) AND 1915A(b)
A. 	Standard of Review
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) and is proceeding
IFP, his complaint requires preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and
§ 1915A(b). “On review, the court shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)); see also Hebrard v. Nofziger, 90 F.4th 1000, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 2024)
(citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126‒27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). “The standard for dismissal for prisoner claims at screening is the
same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.”
Long v. Sugai, 91 F.4th 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012)); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)
(Section 1915A screening “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the contest of
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).
/ / /
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “prescribes the information a plaintiff must
provide about the merits of his claim at the outset of litigation.” Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S. __,
__ S. Ct. __, No. 24-440, 2026 WL 135974, at *4 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026). Thus, Rules 8 and
12(b)(6) together require a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Detailed
factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Dismissal “under Rule
12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable legal theory or (2) fails
to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Valame v. Trump, 157 F.4th
1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 2025) (per curiam) (citing Somers v. Apple, Inc. 729 F.3d 953, 959
(9th Cir. 2013)). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a
method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 393–94 (1989) (citation omitted). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
acting under the color of State law.” Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134,
1144 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.
2006)).
B. 	Factual Allegations
The allegations in Plaintiff’s amended complaint are jumbled and confusing, but in
both his operative and original pleadings he makes clear that he seeks both $947 million in
damages and an “exoneration through dismissal or reductions to misdemeanors” for
unspecified counts and/or a conviction entered in San Diego Superior Court Criminal Case
///
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///
No. SCD304625.2 See ECF No. 4 at 1, 6; ECF No. 1 at 1. Both pleadings also center on a
Superior Court judge’s refusal to set aside a plea deal which appears to have involved
resisting arrest charges or “felony strike” resulting from his interaction with a Wells Fargo
Bank security guard named Alex Campos.3 See ECF No. 4 at 6; ECF No. 1 at 3, 6–7.
C. 	Discussion
Plaintiff’s pleadings are subject to sua sponte dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) without leave to amend because it is clear from their face
that suit is barred by both the Eleventh Amendment and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994).
1. 	Eleventh Amendment Immunity
First, to the extent Plaintiff’s § 1983 suit seeks monetary damages and names only
the San Diego County Superior Court as a Defendant, it must be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2). See Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162,
1167–69, (9th Cir. 2016) (noting § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) “mandates early review” and requires
dismissal if it is clear from the face of the complaint that the governmental defendants are
2 The Court acknowledges that “[n]ormally, an amended complaint supersedes the original
complaint,” Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Comms., Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 456 n.4 (2009), but
in this case finds it necessary to consult both Plaintiff’s pleadings in order to better
understand and liberally construe his claims. See Harris v. Muhammad, __F.4th __, No.
24-3307, 2026 WL 292420, at *4 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2026) (“The Supreme Court has
instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading[s]’ of pro se
litigants.”) (quoting Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation
omitted)).
3 The Court notes Plaintiff’s amended complaint also appears to challenge the dismissal of
another § 1983 civil rights suit he filed against Alex Campos in Ramos v. Campos, S.D.
Cal. Case No. 3:25-cv-01700-JO-BLM. See ECF No. 4 at 1. That case was dismissed sua
sponte for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because
Campos, a private security guard, is not a state actor subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See id., ECF No. 12.
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immune).
“In our constitutional scheme, a federal court generally may not hear a suit brought by any
person against a nonconsenting State.” Allen v. Cooper, 589 U.S. 248, 254 (2020). This
prohibition applies when either the “state or the ‘arm of a state’ is a defendant.” Munoz v.
Superior Ct. of Los Angeles County, 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted);
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (holding that “‘arms of the
State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are not liable under § 1983). “The State of
California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims
brought under § 1983 in federal court,” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025–26
(9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted), and the Supreme Court has held that Ҥ 1983 was not
intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. (citing Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n.17 (1985)). Thus, “[b]ecause the Superior Court is an arm of
the state—and no exception applies to the rule prohibiting suits against the state—it has
Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Munoz, 91 F.4th at 980; see also Simmons v. Sacramento
County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff cannot state a claim
against the Sacramento County Superior Court (or its employees), because such suits are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
2. 	Heck’s “Favorable Termination” Requirement
Second, Plaintiff seeks to challenge the constitutional validity of his criminal
conviction in SCD304625 based on claims that it was obtained by way of a “faulty plea
deal” achieved through coercion and duress by way of § 1983, but does not also show that
conviction has already been invalidated. See ECF No. 1 at 1; ECF No. 4 at 6. Thus, even if
he named a proper Defendant, a Heck bar is “obvious from the face of his complaint,” and
his suit also requires sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). See Hebrard, 90 F.4th at 1007 (citing Washington
v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that a
court may properly dismiss a Heck-barred claim [for failing to state a claim “if there exists
an ‘obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.’”)).
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///
The Heck-bar, or “required favorable termination rule, is a rule of preclusion named
after Heck v. Humphrey—the Supreme Court case that outlined the doctrine.” Hebrard, 90
F.4th at 1007. In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be
dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence
has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the
plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any
outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be
allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.
512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis in original).
In short, “Heck’s ‘favorable termination’ rule is based on the ‘hoary principle that
civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding
criminal judgments.’” King v. R. Villegas, 156 F.4th 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 & n.5). Thus, if a prisoner seeks relief in federal court based on
claims that fall “within the core of habeas corpus,” Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 160
(2022) (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 79 (2005)), and a grant of relief would
“necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” a habeas corpus petition,
and not a civil rights suit, serves as the “exclusive remedy.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 487–89 (1973) (“[A] state prisoner challenging his underlying conviction and
sentence on federal constitutional grounds in a federal court is limited to habeas corpus.”);
accord McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 118 n.6 (2019) (noting “Congress has
determined that a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 action, is the appropriate
remedy for state prisoners attacking the . . . fact or length of their confinement”); Nettles v.
Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“The Court has long held that habeas
is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that fall within the core of
habeas, and such claims may not be brought in a § 1983 action.”) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff seeks damages and to set aside an allegedly unlawful sentence he
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claims was the product of a “faulty” guilty plea. See ECF No. 1 at 1. Heck’s prohibition
applies to convictions resulting from a guilty plea. Martell v. Cole, 115 F.4th 1233, 1236
(9th Cir. 2024); see also Duarte v. City of Stockton, 60 F.4th 566, 571 (9th Cir. 2023)
(noting that “Heck speaks of challenges that would impugn ‘a conviction or sentence[.]’”)
(quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87 (emphasis added)). Because Plaintiff contends he
pleaded guilty to offenses in SCD304625 only due to coercion, “persuasive duress,” and a
“conspiracy” between the San Diego Superior Court and his former appointed counsel, see
ECF No. 1 at 1–2, and as a result is currently serving a term of custody in violation of the
First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments, see
ECF No. 4 at 5, his suit necessarily attacks both the constitutional validity and length of
his confinement, and may not proceed pursuant to § 1983 unless he also shows his
conviction and/or sentence has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; see
also Boyle v. Nelson, No. 6:24-CV-01946-AA, 2025 WL 295142, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 24,
2025) (dismissing § 1983 suit sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) as Heck-
barred where plaintiff alleged “the District Attorney, counsel for Deschutes County, and
Detective Hudson engaged in a conspiracy to coerce the plaintiff into entering [an] Alford
plea.”).
He has not. Instead, Plaintiff refers only to an unsuccessful request he made to the
Superior Court to re-open his case and retract his plea, and admits he “has 14 months left
out of [a] two-year term.” See ECF No. 1 at 6. Nowhere in either of his pleadings does
Plaintiff contend his conviction in SCD304625 has been invalidated in his favor. A plaintiff
must first prove that his conviction or sentence has been favorably terminated—only then
may he bring suit for damages. See Roberts v. City of Fairbanks, 947 F.3d 1191, 1196–98
(9th Cir. 2020); Nettles, 830 F.3d at 928. “Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who
has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause of action under § 1983[.]”
Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489);
see also Pattillo v. Lombardo, No. 2:17-CV-01849-JAD-VCF, 2017 WL 3622778, at *4
(D. Nev. Aug. 23, 2017) (“When a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his
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custody, raises a constitutional challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release (such
as ineffective assistance of counsel), or seeks damages for purported deficiencies in his
state court criminal case, which effected a conviction or lengthier sentence, his sole federal
remedy is the writ of habeas corpus.”).
3. 	Dismissal & Leave to Amend
Therefore, because the Court finds Plaintiff both fails to state a claim upon which
§ 1983 relief may be granted, and seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is
immune, it DISMISSES his case sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and
§ 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27; Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121; Chavez, 817 F.3d
at 1167. As Plaintiff cannot fix both these pleading deficiencies, the Court DENIES leave
to amend as amendment would be futile. See Beets v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d
1038, 1041–42 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the filing of an amended complaint is futile if
claims are barred by Heck), disapproved of on other grounds by Lemos v. County of
Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002 (9th Cir. 2022); Bell v. Allison, No. 20-16880, 2022 WL 4077119,
at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 6, 2022) (affirming dismissal of Heck-barred claims without leave to
amend because “amendment would be futile”); Gallagher v. Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll.
of the L., No. 01-cv-01277-PJH, 2001 WL 1006809, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2001) (“The
dismissal is without leave to amend because an amendment would be futile in view of the
court’s finding that the defendants enjoy sovereign immunity.” (citations omitted)).
III. 	CONCLUSION
Good cause appearing, the Court:
(1) 	GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
(ECF No. 5).
(2) 	DIRECTS the Facility Commander at the LASD’s MCJ, or their designee, to
collect from Plaintiff’s trust account the $4.86 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are
available at the time this Order is executed, and forward whatever balance remains of the
full $350 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the
preceding month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account
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exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2);
(3) 	DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order by U.S. Mail
on Watch Commander, MEN'S CENTRAL JAIL (MCJ), 441 Bauchet Street, Los Angeles,
90012.
(4) 	DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte and in its entirety for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii)
and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2) without leave to amend.
(5) 	CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
(6) 	DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment and close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 27, 2026
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