Anthony v. Sanchez et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MARIAN ANTHONY,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANCISCO SANCHEZ, in his
Individual and Official Capacity as
Hearing Officer, Superior Court of
California; EMILY BRAY, in her
individual capacity,
Defendants.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-1548-CAB-AHG
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING MOTIONS TO
DISMISS [Doc. Nos. 14, 17];
(2) DENYING VARIOUS MOTIONS
[Doc. Nos. 20, 21, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 39]
On June 17, 2025, Plaintiff Marian Anthony filed a complaint against Defendants
Franciso Sanchez and Emily Bray, alleging Section 1983 and civil RICO conspiracy
claims. [Doc. No. 1.] The Court dismissed with leave to amend. [Doc. No. 5.] On July
9, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. [Doc. No. 7 (“FAC”).] Defendants Sanchez
and Bray filed separate motions to dismiss. [Doc. Nos. 14, 17.] Plaintiff has since filed
eight motions, including motions for preliminary injunction, to amend, to strike, and to
sanction. 	[Doc. Nos. 20, 21, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, 39.] 	For the reasons below, the Court
GRANTS the motions to dismiss and DENIES Plaintiff’s various motions.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
This action stems from a child custody proceeding in state court. Defendant Sanchez
is a Judge of the Superior Court of California, who Plaintiff alleges is supporting fraud by
Corina Galvez. [Doc. No. 17-1 at 7; FAC ¶ 6.] It appears Galvez is Plaintiff’s ex-wife or
partner. 	[Id. at ¶ 9.] 	Defendant Sanchez allegedly suppressed police misconduct,
threatened Plaintiff, and engaged in ex parte communication. [Id. at ¶ 10.] Defendant Bray
is an attorney representing Galvez in the state proceedings. [Id. at ¶ 7.] Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant Bray filed a false affidavit. [Id. at ¶ 11.]
Plaintiff brings (1) a Section 1983 claim alleging that Defendants violated due
process, the Seventh Amendment, and Plaintiff’s “parental rights”; (2) RICO conspiracy
claims for mail fraud, false affidavit, and suppression; and (3) a claim for fraud upon the
court. 	[Id. at 4–5.] 	He seeks an injunction staying state proceedings, a declaratory
judgment voiding state orders, and damages. 	[Id. at 6.] 	Defendants argue that the
complaint is entirely conclusory, fails to remedy the defects found in the initial complaint,
and should be dismissed for failure to state a claim and/or lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) permits a party to move to dismiss based on the court's lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. The federal court is one of limited jurisdiction. See Gould
v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 790 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). 	The party asserting
jurisdiction, here Plaintiff, has the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter
jurisdiction. 	Ass’n. of Am. Med. Colls. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 778–79 (9th Cir.
2000). As such, the court cannot reach the merits of any dispute until it confirms its own
subject matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 95
(1998). 	A defense of lack of “subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s
power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S.
625, 630 (2002).
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss based on a “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The Court evaluates whether a complaint
states a recognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),
which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” 	Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it [does]
demand[] . . . more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 	Id. 	(quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible
when the collective facts pleaded “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. There must be “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 	Id. 	Facts “merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. 	Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). 	The Court need not accept as true “legal conclusions” contained in the
complaint, id., or other “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of
fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 	Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998
(9th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts as true all allegations in the complaint and construes
the allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here Plaintiff. 	See
Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). 	Moreover, as Plaintiff proceeds
pro se, the Court construes his complaint liberally. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342
(9th Cir. 2010).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Motions to Dismiss
Plaintiff alleges various issues with how Defendant Sanchez conducted a hearing on
June 4, 2025, including suppressing evidence, ex parte communications, and “dismiss[ing]
diversity issues[.]” 	[FAC at 3–4.] 	He also opposes Defendant Sanchez’s denial of
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Plaintiff’s request for a stay in the state proceedings. [Id. at 4.] Defendant Sanchez argues
that he has absolute judicial immunity, and that Plaintiff’s claims against him are barred,
inter alia, by Rooker-Feldman and the Anti-Injunction Act. The Court agrees.
“Judges . . . are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their
official capacities.” 	Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). 	“This
absolute immunity insulates judges from charges of erroneous acts or irregular action, even
when it is alleged that such action was driven by malicious or corrupt motives, or when the
exercise of judicial authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” In
re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted). 	Despite suing Defendant Sanchez in his individual capacity, Plaintiff seeks
damages for actions Defendant Sanchez took in his official capacity as a judge. [FAC at
4–5.] Plaintiff states that “Sanchez’s non-judicial acts . . . negate immunity[,]” but he does
not allege any non-judicial acts. 	[Id. at 5.] 	Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant
Sanchez is immune to any damages liability.
Plaintiff also seeks an injunction staying the state court proceedings and declaratory
judgment “voiding state orders.” [Id. at 6.] “[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars direct
federal district court appellate review of state court judicial proceedings.” 	S. California
Edison Co. v. Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 804 (9th Cir. 2002). 	“If claims raised in the federal
court action are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s decisions such that the
adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling . . . then the federal
complaint must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” 	Bianchi v.
Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). 	Additionally, the Anti-Injunction Act
prohibits 	this 	Court 	from 	enjoining 	ongoing 	state 	court 	proceedings 	with 	limited
exceptions, none of which apply here. See Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 295 (1970). As Plaintiff seeks to void state court decisions and stay
state court proceedings, the Court dismisses his claims against Defendant Sanchez for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and denies Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.
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Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Bray are also dismissed for failure to state a
claim. 	Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant Bray filed a false and inaccurate affidavit
with no further explanation. [FAC at 4.] His claims are entirely conclusory. See Daniels-
Hall, 629 F.3d at 998. Moreover, Defendant Bray, as a lawyer in private practice, does not
act under the color of state law when representing a party in court proceedings. 	See
Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Superior Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). A Section
1983 claim against her, therefore, is not possible. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the
motions to dismiss, [Doc. Nos. 14, 17], and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction. 	[Doc. No. 34.] 	The Court notes that Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary
injunction was previously denied without leave to amend. [Doc. No. 5 at 2.] Plaintiff may
be subject to sanctions if he continues to file frivolous motions.
B. 	Motions to Strike
Plaintiff filed two motions to strike portions of Defendant Sanchez’s motion to
dismiss. [Doc. Nos. 20, 29.] Plaintiff takes issue with Defendant Sanchez noting that he
had trouble understanding Plaintiff’s complaint, and his argument that Plaintiff’s claims
are defective. 	A court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). None of
Defendant Sanchez’s submissions qualify as such. The motions to strike are DENIED.
C. 	Motions for Leave to Amend Complaint and File Sur-reply
Plaintiff seeks to file a second amended complaint and sur-reply. [Doc. Nos. 21, 27,
28.] 	“A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is
absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.”
Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). 	Plaintiff
was already given an opportunity to file an amended complaint, and he cured none of the
deficiencies in his initial complaint. 	It is clear to the Court that another opportunity to
amend is futile; Plaintiff improperly seeks to contravene settled law to void and enjoin state
court judgments and proceedings in a federal district court. 	The Court DENIES the
motions for leave to file a second amended complaint and for an extension of time to file
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that complaint. [Doc. Nos. 27, 28.] The Court DENIES AS MOOT the motion for leave
to file a sur-reply. [Doc. Nos. 21, 27.]
D. 	Motion for Sanctions
Plaintiff seeks to sanction Defendant Sanchez for “frivolous Objection to Judicial
Notice, misapplying law and attaching incomplete minutes. Seeking Safe harbor. Seek fees,
strike Objection.” 	[Doc. No. 35 at 3.] 	Plaintiff’s motion is frivolous and immaterial.
Defendant Sanchez has not engaged in any bad faith or improper conduct. 	See B.K.B. v.
Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that sanctions are
available under the court’s inherent authority “if the court specifically finds bad faith or
conduct tantamount to bad faith”). The Court DENIES the motion to sanction.
E. 	Motion for Hearing
Plaintiff seeks to have a hearing on all pending motions in this case. [Doc. No. 39.]
The Court has discretion to decide a motion without oral argument. 	See CivLR 7.1(d).
With all other motions in the case decided, the Court DENIES AS MOOT the motion for
a hearing.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS WITH PREJUDICE the motions to dismiss [Doc. Nos. 14, 17];
(2) DENIES the motions to strike, to file an amended complaint, for an extension
to file an amended complaint, to file a sur-reply, to sanction, for preliminary
injunction, and for a hearing [Doc. Nos. 20, 21, 27, 28, 29, 34, 35, and 39.]
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 17, 2025
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