Ahsan v. Office of Assigned Counsel et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MAHMOOD AHSAN,
Booking No. 24733372,
Plaintiff,
vs.
OFFICE OF ASSIGNED COUNSEL, et al,
Defendants.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-1315-RBM-MSB
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
[Doc. 2]; AND
(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR
FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM
PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) AND
1915A(b) [Doc. 1]
Plaintiff Mahmood Ahsan (“Plaintiff”), while detained at the San Diego Central Jail
(“SDCJ”) and proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(“Complaint”) (Doc. 1), along with a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP
Motion”) (Doc. 2). 	Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his due process rights by
interfering with his legal mail, denying his “legitimate legal requests,” and subjecting him
to “inhumane” living conditions. 	(Doc. 1 at 2‒4.) 	For the reasons discussed below, the
Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Motion and DISMISSES his Complaint without prejudice.
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I. 	IFP MOTION
All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the
United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
$405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A party may initiate a civil action without prepaying the
required filing fee if the Court grants leave to proceed IFP based on indigency. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007).
To proceed IFP, plaintiffs must establish their inability to pay by filing an affidavit
regarding their income and assets. 	See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th
Cir. 2015). 	Prisoners must also submit a “certified copy of the [prisoner’s] trust fund
account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately
preceding the filing of the complaint.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). 	From the certified trust
account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of: (a) the average monthly
deposits in the account for the past six months; or (b) the average monthly balance in the
account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1) & (4). 	Prisoners who proceed IFP must repay the entire fee in
installments regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. 	See § 1915(b)(2);
Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016).
In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff provided a copy of his SDCJ trust account
activity. (Doc. 2.) During the six months prior to filing suit, Plaintiff had a total of $946.27
deposited to his account, but only $0.24 remained in his account at the time of filing. (See
id. at 4.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Motion. However, because the
initial partial filing fee assessed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) would exceed
Plaintiff’s available funds, the Court will collect no initial payment and instead DIRECTS
1 	Civil litigants must pay an administrative fee of $55 in addition to the $350 filing fee.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee
Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply
to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.
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the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, and any correctional agency later having
custody, to garnish the full $350 filing fee owed in this case from Plaintiff’s trust account
pursuant to the installment payment provisions set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). 	See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from
bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that
the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [an] initial partial filing fee.”);
Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)
acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on
“failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”).
The Court therefore ORDERS the SDCJ, or any agency later having custody, to collect
the full balance of the $350 filing fee owed in this case and forward payments to the Clerk
of Court as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
II. 	SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(B)
A. 	Legal Standards
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), the Court must screen a
prisoner’s IFP complaint and sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson,
621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). “The standard for determining whether Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.”
Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Rules”) 8(a) and 12(b)(6) together require that a complaint “contain sufficient factual
matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). While detailed factual allegations are
not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a claim. 	Id. 	The “mere possibility of
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misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short
of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “both (1) deprivation
of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” 	Tsao v. Desert
Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff’s Complaint contains two sorts of claims seemingly against two separate
groups of Defendants. First, Plaintiff claims his “due process” rights were violated by the
Office of Assigned Counsel (“OAC”), its Director F. Michael Garcia, Jackie Braden, a
“legal support supervisor” at OAC, and William G. Trainor, an OAC “staff attorney.”
(Doc. 1 at 1‒3.) 	Specifically, Plaintiff claims the OAC “reads legal documents without
permission,” “possibly tampers with legal mail,” and has “denie[d] [him] legitimate
ancillary services without grounds or justification.” (Id. at 3.) Second, Plaintiff claims the
County of San Diego, San Diego County Sheriff Kelly Martinez, and unnamed members
of Sheriff’s Department “staff” “act[] unprofessionally,” are “negligent,” and engage in
unspecified acts of “misconduct,” verbal abuse, and unreasonable force. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff
contends he has been “den[ied] meals due to mismanagement,” and has been exposed to
unsanitary conditions. (Id.) 2
2 	Plaintiff also alleges the “San Diego Central Court” “hinders due process” and is
“possibly corrupt,” but does not name the Superior Court as Defendant. (See Doc. 1 at 5.)
Even if he had, “[Section] 1983 actions do not lie against a State.” Arizonans for Off. Eng.
v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997) (citation omitted). 	Superior courts in California are
entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as arms or agencies of the
state. Munoz v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2024). “Read
together, §§ 1915A(a) and (b) allow a court to dismiss sua sponte a prisoner complaint that
‘seeks redress from [a government entity or officer or] employee of a governmental entity’
on the grounds of immunity.” 	Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)), as amended on reh’g (Apr. 15, 2016)).
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Plaintiff seeks more than $10 million in general and punitive damages as well as
injunctive relief in the form of preventing Defendants from “hurting people by using
corrupt procedures.” (Id. at 7.)
C. 	Conditions of Confinement
“[L]iability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the
defendant.” 	Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 	Accordingly,
“[l]iability . . . arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant” in
the deprivation alleged. 	Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Fayle
v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979)); see King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 568 (9th
Cir. 1987) (noting that “state officials are not subject to suit under § 1983 unless they play
an affirmative part in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights”). “A plaintiff must
allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show an individual was personally involved in
the deprivation of his civil rights.” 	Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194. A person deprives another
“of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,
participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally
required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff] complains].” Johnson v.
Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Alternatively, liability also may be imposed under § 1983 if the defendant sets into
“motion a series of acts by others which the [defendant] knows or reasonably should know
would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” 	Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police
Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1371
(9th Cir. 1987)). 	Section 1983, however, does not impose liability upon state or local
officials for the acts of their subordinates under a respondent superior theory of liability.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or
her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). 	Rather, a
“supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor
participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to prevent
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them.” 	Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. Similarly, “a municipality cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134,
1153 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
With respect to Plaintiff’s challenge to “inhumane living conditions” at the SDCJ
(see Doc 1 at 4), he fails to allege any of the individual Defendant’s personal involvement.
See Conley v. Nielsen, 706 Fed. App’x 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming sua sponte
dismissal of claims raised against “all medical staff” at the county jail because the plaintiff
failed to identify any of the individuals involved and the “specific conduct attributable to
them.”). 	Rather, Plaintiff simply lists these parties as Defendants in the caption of the
Complaint and attributes the general “mismanagement” and unsanitary conditions of the
SDCJ and the “unprofessional[ism]” and “incompeten[ce]” of the Sheriff’s “staff” as a
group. (See Doc. 1 at 4.) Critically, Plaintiff fails to point to any discrete or identifiable
act of misconduct on any specific occasion involving any individual Defendant. 	See
Williams v. Cnty. of Los Angeles Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., Case No. CV 14-7625 JVS
(JC), 2016 WL 8730914, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2016), report and recommendation
adopted, No. CV 14-7625 JVS (JC), 2016 WL 8737230 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2016)
(“Conclusory allegations that an indistinguishable group of defendants essentially engaged
in identical misconduct . . . are insufficient to show that plaintiff is entitled to relief from
any individual defendant.”). 	Nor does Plaintiff allege facts sufficient to plausibly show
how Defendants’ alleged misconduct caused him constitutional injury or actual harm. See
Estate of Brooks ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999)
(“Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.”).
“[U]nadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation[s],” 	like 	those
alleged in support of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement claims, without more, are
insufficient to provide Defendants with adequate notice of the claims against them and
must be dismissed. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting a pleading that simply “offers labels
and conclusions . . . will not do.”). 	Thus, insofar as Plaintiff alleges broadly that he has
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been subject to “inhumane living conditions” (see Doc. 1 at 4) but does not identify the
individuals responsible or claim any actual harm as a result, he fails to state any plausible
claims for relief under § 1983. 	See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1179‒80 (9th Cir.
1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint which failed to “say which wrongs were
committed by which defendants”).
Plaintiff also fails to allege municipal liability against the County of San Diego and
the Sheriff’s Department, as well as individual liability against Sheriff Kelly Martinez.
Supervisory officials, like Sheriff Kelly Martinez, may only be held liable under § 1983 if
Plaintiff alleges their “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or . . . a
sufficient 	causal 	connection 	between 	the 	supervisor’s 	wrongful 	conduct 	and 	the
constitutional violation.” 	Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1242‒43 (9th Cir. 2018); see
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against such
municipal and supervisory Defendants must also be dismissed.
The Court therefore finds Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the County of San
Diego, the Sheriff’s Department, or Sheriff Kelly Martinez. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
conditions of confinement claims are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A(b). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633–34 (9th Cir.
1988) (stating the focus for § 1983 claims must be on the “individual defendant,” and his
or her individual “duties [and] discretion”).
D. 	Legal Support Claims
Plaintiff alleges the OAC, its Director, an OAC legal support supervisor, and an
OAC staff attorney violated his right to “due process” by “acting like a judge,” “possibly
tamper[ing] with legal mail,” and/or failing to provide him with unspecified legal support
services while housed in the SDCJ. (Doc. 1 at 2‒3.) While he does not identify the nature
of the criminal proceedings he presumedly had pending at the time, Plaintiff attaches
exhibits referring to San Diego Superior Court Case No. SCD304569 (see Doc. 1-2, Ex.
A; Doc. 1-5, Ex. B) and admits the OAC “was appointed as [his] legal runner.” (Doc. 1 at
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3.) However, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to plausible suggest that any individual with the
OAC acted on behalf of the state to deprive him of his constitutional rights.
“When attorneys act in the role of advocate, they do not act under color of state law
for purposes of § 1983.” 	Rodriguez v. Gore, Case No.: 3:15-cv-02248-GPC-WVG, 2015
WL 9413136, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (citations omitted); see Szijarto v. Legeman,
466 F.2d 864, 864 (9th Cir. 1972) (“[A]n attorney, whether retained or appointed, does not
act ‘under color of’ state law.”); see also Miranda v. Clark Cnty., 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding a public defender was not a state actor under § 1983 because
a traditional role of an attorney for a client, no matter how ineffective, is “to represent h[er]
client, not the interests of the state or county.”). Indeed, a court-appointed official’s role
in representing a client “is essentially a private function . . . for which state office and
authority are not needed.” 	Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992) (“[A] public defender is not amenable to
administrative direction in the same sense as other employees of the State” and the State
has a “constitutional obligation [to] respect the professional independence of the public
defenders whom it engages.”). 	Even if the OAC is assisting Plaintiff in an “ancillary”
capacity, Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a reasonable inference that their actions were
taken under the color of state law. See Dodson, 454 U.S. at 317–18 (“[A] person acts under
color of state law only when exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”) (quoting
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see, e.g., Rodriguez, 2015 WL
9413136, at *4 (finding prisoner’s § 1983 claims against OAC subject to sua sponte
dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A because OAC attorneys
appointed to assist during criminal proceedings in an “ancillary” capacity were not alleged
to have acted “under color of state law.”).
Thus, to the extent Defendants OAC, F. Michael Garcia, Jackie Braden, or William
G. Trainor are alleged to have been “appointed … by the local courts” to either represent
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Plaintiff or to provide ancillary legal support services for him during ongoing state criminal
proceedings, Plaintiff’s claims against such Defendants are DISMISSED pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) for failing to state a viable § 1983 claim for relief.
E. 	Leave to Amend
Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court GRANTS him leave to amend his
Complaint, as detailed below. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015)
(“A district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the
complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202,
1212 (9th Cir. 2012)).
III. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. 2) is GRANTED.
2. 	The Court ORDERS the Facility Commander of the San Diego Central Jail,
his designee, and any correctional or detention agency later having custody, to garnish from
Plaintiff’s trust account the full $350 filing fee owed for this case, and to forward monthly
payments to the Clerk of the Court in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the
preceding month’s income each time the amount in Plaintiff’s account exceeds $10
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
3. 	The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Order on the
Facility Commander, San Diego Central Jail, 1173 Front Street, San Diego, California
92101.
4. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety without prejudice for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b).
5. 	The Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint on or
before March 9, 2026 which cures the deficiencies of pleading identified in this Order.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his original
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Complaint. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co.,
Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the
original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims
dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be
“considered waived if not repled.”).
If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint on or before March 9, 2026, the
Court will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on his failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(b), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring
amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does
not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the
dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: February 19, 2026
_____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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