The Estate of Abdul Kamara et al v. County of San Diego et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
THE ESTATE OF ABDUL KAMARA,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-cv-0226-AJB-VET
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS
(Doc. No. 22)
Defendants County of San Diego (the “County”), Christopher Aberle, Alejandro
Aguilera, Carlos Heard, Derrick Jones, Travis Kaapke, and Tyler Phillips (“Individual
Defendants”) (collectively, the “County Defendants”) move to partially dismiss Plaintiffs’
First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. (Doc. No. 22.) The County Defendants also move to dismiss DOES 21–50. (Id.)
Plaintiffs oppose the Motion. (Doc. No. 25.) The County Defendants filed a reply in
support of the Motion. (Doc. No. 26.) Based on the reasoning below, the Court DENIES
the Motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On January 30, 2025, Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit against Defendants for various
civil 	rights 	violations 	in 	connection 	with 	the 	death 	of 	Decedent 	Abdul 	Kamara
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(“Decedent”). (See Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) on April 29, 2025. (Doc. No. 3.)
Plaintiffs allege the following facts in the FAC, which the Court accepts as true for
purposes of the subject Motion. See, e.g., Schueneman v. Arena Pharms., Inc., 840 F.3d
698, 704 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
accepts the allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff). On March 2, 2024, at approximately 9:18 p.m., Carlsbad
paramedics responded to a call from a concerned individual regarding a medical emergency
at a Carl’s Jr. restaurant. (Doc. No. 3 ¶ 38.) Paramedics found Decedent wandering in the
parking lot of a nearby Jack in the Box. (Id.) When paramedics arrived, Decedent stated he
had been “playing a game with his friends tonight” and expressed paranoia about lights
and movement. (Id.) Paramedics noted that Decedent was “slightly tachycardic and
hypertensive with a heart rate of 112 and a blood pressure reading of 181/116.” (Id.)
Decedent requested to go to the hospital for evaluation. (Id.) Paramedics transported
Decedent to the emergency department at Scripps Memorial Hospital in Encinitas
(“Scripps Encinitas”). (Id.)
Decedent arrived at Scripps Encinitas shortly after 10:00 p.m. (Id. ¶ 39.) A nurse
wrote that, according to paramedics, Decedent “believed the lights being shined into his
eyes and the pulse oximeter were ‘lasers trying to give him a heart attack.’” (Id.) The
emergency room doctor noted Decedent’s “affect was blunt, his speech was tangential, and
his thought content was paranoid and delusional.” (Id.) The doctor noted Decedent was
cooperative and that he did not express homicidal or suicidal ideation. (Id.) The doctor
wrote that Decedent had an “incoherent and non-linear thought process,” and the doctor
intended to “initiate [a] broad workup to include [a] CT scan of [Decedent’s] head to
evaluate for any organic cause of his presentation.” (Id.)
While medical personnel were getting ready to draw blood for lab work, Decedent
ran out of the emergency department without a shirt or shoes. (Id. ¶ 40.) At 10:56 p.m., the
hospital called 911 and requested police assistance. (Id. ¶ 41.) The hospital staff member
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who called 911 informed dispatch that Decedent was at the hospital for “mental help” and
that he was paranoid, “incompetent,” and “unable to care for himself.” (Id.)
Sheriff’s deputies, Defendants Aguilera and Phillips, responded to the 911 call. (Id.
¶ 42.) At approximately 11:13 p.m., Defendants Aguilera and Phillips spoke to a nurse and
the emergency room physician at Scripps Memorial. (Id.) The doctor indicated that
Decedent could not care for his own safety, and Defendants Aguilera and Phillips were
instructed to locate and return Decedent to the hospital for a medical hold. (Id.)
At 11:45 p.m., the Sheriff’s Department received a 911 call from a gas station
employee. (Id. ¶ 43.) The caller reported that a man (Decedent) was “crawling around the
parking lot without a shirt and only wearing hospital socks.” (Id.) The caller noted that
Decedent had a hospital wristband on his arm. (Id.) A deputy arrived at the gas station and
found Decedent lying on his stomach with his hands behind his back.1 (Id. ¶ 44.) Decedent
was “having involuntary muscle spasms and making comments about being tased even
though no one was near him.” (Id.) According to the deputy, Decedent was cooperative
and compliant. (Id.)
Defendants Aguilera and Phillips arrived at the gas station at 11:55 p.m. (Id. ¶ 45.)
Upon arriving at the gas station, Defendants Aguilera and Phillips determined that
Decedent was the same individual from Scripps Encinitas. (Id.) Defendant Phillips
handcuffed Decedent without issue and walked Decedent to the patrol car. (Id. ¶ 46.) At
midnight, Defendants Aguilera and Phillips informed police dispatch that they were taking
Decedent back to Scripps Encinitas. (Id.) At 12:22 a.m., Defendants Aguilera and Phillips
changed course and told police dispatch that they would be transporting Decedent to the
Vista Detention Facility and not to Scripps Encinitas. (Id. ¶ 48.)
Upon arriving at the Vista Detention Facility, Defendants Aguilera and Phillips
exited the patrol car and Decedent began exhibiting bizarre behavior. (Id. ¶ 49.) Decedent
1 It is unclear from the FAC which deputy first arrived on the scene. (See Doc. No. 3 ¶¶ 44–45.)
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appeared paranoid and agitated and began bouncing around in the back seat of the patrol
car. (Id.) Decedent hit his head on the patrol car’s plexiglass divider causing Decedent to
cut his head. (Id.) Eventually, Decedent calmed down and Defendant Aguilera moved
Decedent from the patrol car to a bench. (Id. ¶ 50.) Defendant Aguilera walked away to
speak with detention facility deputies while Defendant Phillips waited at the bench with
Decedent. (Id.)
At approximately 12:49 a.m., Decedent began to stand up from the bench. (Id. ¶ 51.)
However, Decedent soon ended up on the ground—either by falling or by being taken to
the ground by Defendant Phillips. (Id.) At this point, Defendants Deputy Sheriff Kaapke,
Deputy Sheriff Jones, and California Highway Patrol Officer Liekkio approached the
scene. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 21, 51.) Defendants Kaapke, Jones, Liekkio, Aguilera, and Phillips laid
on top of Decedent, restraining his arms, legs, and neck, and placed a WRAP restraining
device around Decedent.2 (Id. ¶ 51.) While Defendants were restraining Decedent, he hit
his head on the ground. (Id.) Defendants completed placing the WRAP device on Decedent
at around 12:56 a.m., at which point he was placed face down in a prone position. (Id.
¶¶ 51, 52.) Once Decedent was restrained, Defendants called paramedics, who arrived at
approximately 1:13 a.m. (Id. ¶ 53.) The FAC alleges that “Deputies who are properly
trained on the use of hobbling restraints know that restrained individuals should be placed
sitting upright or standing to facilitate breathing and monitoring.” (Id. ¶ 52.) However,
Defendants did not do this and instead left Decedent in the prone position. (Id.)
About five minutes after the paramedics arrived, while still prone and restrained by
the WRAP, Decedent stopped breathing and became unresponsive. (Id. ¶ 53.) At 1:28 a.m.,
paramedics 	documented 	that 	Decedent 	had 	no 	pulse 	and 	began 	administering
cardiopulmonary 	resuscitation (“CPR”). (Id.) Decedent was 	transported to Tri-City
Medical Center where he passed away on the morning of March 3, 2024. (Id.)
2 The FAC does not define “WRAP,” nor does it describe how the device is meant to be used.
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Based on these facts, Decedent—by and through his successor in interest, his mother
Fredrika Nabbie—asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) excessive
and unreasonable force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) deprivation of right of
association under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) municipal liability (Monell) against the
County; (5) and violation of California’s Bane Act. (Id. ¶¶ 82–127.) The FAC also alleges
survival claims for (6) battery and (7) negligence. (Id. ¶¶ 128–141.) Fredrika Nabbie brings
the eighth claim for wrongful death. (Id. ¶¶ 142–145.)
The County Defendants move to dismiss the fourth claim for Monell liability arguing
Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to state a claim under either a policy, ratification, or
failure to train theory. (Doc. No. 22-1 at 11.3) The County Defendants seek dismissal of
the fifth claim under the Bane Act arguing the FAC lacks any facts to establish the
necessary “specific intent” of the County Defendants to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. (Id. at 16.) Finally, the County Defendants contend the allegations against Does
21–50 should be dismissed because Plaintiffs do not allege specific facts showing how
each particular Doe Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ rights. (Id.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6)
requires the Court to dismiss claims that fail to establish a cognizable legal theory or do
not allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Under Rule
8(a)(2) a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
3 Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF system page number at the top of each page rather than the
page numbers at the bottom of each filing.
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“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to
dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content,
must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint does not need detailed
factual allegations, but it must provide allegations that raise a right to relief above the
speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While the plausibility standard is not a
probability test, it does require more than a mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully.
Id. at 556. “When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court must accept all
material allegations in the complaint as true, and construe them in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party.” Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946,
956 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
III. 	JUDICIAL NOTICE AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
As a preliminary matter, the County Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice
of the Computer Aided Dispatch Log Dated March 2, 2024 (the “CAD Log”). (Doc. No.
22-2.) County Defendants contend the CAD Log “is subject to judicial notice because it
is quoted in paragraph 41 of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and is therefore
incorporated by reference.” (Doc. No. 22-2 at 2.) Plaintiffs oppose the request. (Doc. No.
25 at 29.)
Judicial notice and incorporation by reference are separate and distinct. See Khoja
v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that judicial
notice and incorporation by reference both “permit district courts to consider materials
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outside a complaint, but each does so for different reasons and in different ways”); see also
United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Judicial notice under Federal
Rule of Evidence 201(b) allows a court to “judicially notice a fact that is not subject to
reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial
jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Courts may take judicial notice at
any stage of a proceeding. Fed. R. Evid. 201(d). However, judicial notice is uncommon
during the pleading phase, as “district courts may not consider material outside the
pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint” under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Khoja, 899 F.3d at 998 (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d
668, 288 (9th Cir. 2001)). Considering information outside the pleading typically converts
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment, but judicial notice can serve as an exception. Id. at 998; Ritchie, 342
F.3d at 908.
Incorporation by reference, on the other hand, is a “judicially created doctrine that
treats certain documents as though they are part of the complaint itself.” Khoja, 899 F.3d
at 1002. This doctrine allows the court to incorporate documents and other instruments into
a complaint “if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms the
basis of the plaintiff’s claim.” Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. Merely mentioning a document
does not constitute extensive reference. Id. at 908–09. Incorporation by reference does not
convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. Id.
The CAD Log is not subject to judicial notice or incorporation by reference. The
Court may not take judicial notice of the CAD Log because it cannot be “accurately and
readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See
Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). And the single mention of the CAD Log in the FAC (see Doc. No. 3
¶ 41) is far from meeting the standard for incorporation by reference. See Ritchie, 342 F.3d
at 908–09. Thus, the County Defendants’ request for judicial notice is DENIED and the
Court finds the CAD Log has not been incorporated by reference.
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IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Monell Claim
The County moves to dismiss the fourth cause of action contending the FAC fails to
state facts sufficient to support a Monell claim. (Doc. No. 22-1.) The County argues that
“the language of the Complaint makes it difficult to decipher exactly what theories
Plaintiffs are attempting to proceed on.” (Doc. No. 22-1 at 11.) The County further argues
that even if one could decipher Plaintiffs’ theories of liability, the “allegations fall below
the threshold standards of Monell liability.” (Doc. No. 22-1 at 11.) The Court disagrees.
As the County recognizes, “Plaintiff[s] allege that part of the custom and practice is
arresting individuals in need of urgent medical intervention and booking such arrestees into
jail rather than first sending them to a hospital for medical treatment and stabilization.”
(Doc. No. 22-1 at 11 (citing Doc. No. 3 ¶ 114)). And “Plaintiffs also claim that the Sheriff’s
Office did not train deputies to try to minimize the amount of weight applied to someone’s
chest or back while in a prone position or the physiology of a struggle.” (Id. (citing Doc.
No. 3 ¶¶ 66, 67)). It is unpersuasive for the County to contend that the FAC is so
unintelligible that Plaintiffs’ theories of liability cannot be discerned, while simultaneously
devoting substantial portions of the Motion to addressing those very theories. Accordingly,
the Court turns to whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged Monell liability for a
constitutional injury resulting from a policy, custom, practice, or a failure to train.
In the motion to dismiss context, the Ninth Circuit has made clear claims of Monell
liability must comply with the basic principles set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. AE v. Cnty.
of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012); see, e.g., Alter v. Cnty. of San Diego, 635 F.
Supp. 3d 1048, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 2022). First, a complaint “may not simply recite the
elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to
give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE, 666 F.3d
at 637. Second, “the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an
entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected
to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Id.
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1. 	Policy, Custom, or Practice
Cities, counties and other local government entities are subject to claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658. While
municipalities, their agencies, and their supervisory personnel cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, they can, however, be
held liable for deprivations of constitutional rights resulting from their formal policies or
customs. Id. at 691–93. Liability only attaches where the municipality itself causes the
constitutional violation through “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether
made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy.” Id. at 694.
To prevail, a plaintiff must allege “(1) [the plaintiff] had a constitutional right of
which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounts to
deliberate indifference to his constitutional right; and (4) ‘the policy is the moving force
behind the constitutional violation.’” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 973 (9th Cir.
2021) (citing Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011)). As to a
municipality’s policy, a “plaintiff must allege either that (1) a particular municipal action
itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so; or (2) the municipality, through
inaction, failed to implement adequate policies or procedures to safeguard its community
members’ federally protected rights.” Hyun Ju Park v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 952
F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Absent
a formal governmental policy, [a plaintiff] must show a ‘longstanding practice or custom
which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’”
Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d
1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992)). “The custom must be so ‘persistent and widespread’ that it
constitutes a ‘permanent and well settled city policy.’” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at
691).
Plaintiffs must allege the County acted with deliberate indifference which is “a
stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a [municipality] disregarded a known or
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obvious consequence of [its] action.” Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997) (“Claims not involving an allegation that the municipal
action itself violated federal law, or directed or authorized the deprivation of federal rights,
present much more difficult problems of proof.”) (citations omitted); see also Hyun Ju
Park, 952 F.3d at 1141 (“When, as here, a plaintiff pursues liability based on a failure to
act, she must allege that the municipality exhibited deliberate indifference to the violation
of her federally protected rights.”) (citing Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1143
(9th Cir. 2012)).
A plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge
if he or she alleges the municipality has engaged in a pattern of prior, similar violations
of federally protected rights of which it had actual or constructive notice. See Connick
v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“A pattern of similar constitutional violations
by untrained 	employees 	is 	‘ordinarily 	necessary’ 	to 	demonstrate 	deliberate
indifference . . . .”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing
dismissal where plaintiff “specifically allege[s] numerous incidents” of prior, similar
incidents of excessive force and the defendant was provided notice of all these incidents);
Bagos v. Vallejo, No. 2:20-cv-00185-KJM-AC, 2020 WL 6043949, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct.
13, 2020) (“[p]rior incidents involving lawsuits alone, even those which do not result in a
finding or admission of wrongdoing, can be sufficient for Monell liability purposes in the
face of a motion to dismiss.”); Villa v. Cnty. of San Diego, Case No.: 20-cv-537-CAB-
NLS, 2020 WL 5535384, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2020) (denying motion to dismiss
Monell claim of policy and custom and failure to train claim as the plaintiff referenced
federal investigations, citizen complaints, and lawsuits against the County that include
similar allegations of misconduct).
Here, the FAC provides factual support that frames the existence of a specific custom
or practice that was the moving force behind Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. The FAC alleges
the Sheriff’s Department has a longstanding custom of arresting and booking intoxicated
or mentally ill individuals rather than diverting them to hospitals for medical care. (Doc.
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No. 3 ¶¶ 55, 62). The FAC goes on to allege that the San Diego County Sheriff’s
Department has a custom and practice of arresting individuals in need of urgent medical
intervention and booking such arrestees into jail rather than first sending them to a hospital
for medical clearance. (Id. ¶ 62.) Plaintiffs contend that deputies frequently arrest and jail
individuals exhibiting medical distress for being “under the influence.” (Id.) And Plaintiffs
allege the County was aware of the recurring pattern of preventable deaths caused by
failures to obtain emergency medical care. (Id.) As to deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs
allege that between 2009 and 2020, Defendants have engaged in a pattern of prior similar
violations—indeed, Plaintiffs describe the deaths of twenty individuals that passed away
from intoxication or untreated medical crises while in police custody. (Id. ¶ 62(a)–(t).)
According to the FAC, these deaths occurred because deputies refused to obtain emergency
hospitalization and instead criminalized medical crises. (Id. ¶ 63.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege
that County officials failed to take corrective action despite being on notice of the
constitutional violations. (Id. ¶ 64.)
In its reply, the County argues it can’t be liable for depriving arrestees suspected of
intoxication or mental illness of urgently needed medical care because, in this case,
Defendants eventually called the paramedics. (Doc. No. 26 at 2–3.) The County contends
the custom of depriving arrestees of medical care cannot be the moving force behind the
alleged constitutional violation in this case because the FAC indicates Defendants obtained
medical care for the decedent. (Id. at 3.) This argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs do not
allege Defendants never provide arrestees and detainees medical care. Rather, the
allegation is that Defendants have a policy and practice of arresting and jailing individuals
in need of medical attention instead of addressing their medical needs first. (See Doc. No.
3 ¶ 62.) Accordingly, the mere fact that Defendants eventually summoned medical
assistance does not negate Plaintiffs’ allegation that the County’s policy of delaying
necessary care in favor of arrest was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional
violations.
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Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the FAC’s
allegations support the finding that Defendants engaged in a practice of arresting
individuals rather than providing them with necessary medical care—and this practice was
widespread, persistent, and known to policymakers. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show the County has a custom or practice of
arresting individuals in need of urgent medical intervention and booking such arrestees into
jail rather than sending them to a hospital for medical treatment and stabilization, the
County was on notice of this custom, and the custom was the moving force behind
Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.
2. 	Failure to train
The FAC also includes a Monell claim based on a failure to train theory. The County
Defendants argue this theory is also not viable. (Doc. No. 22-1 at 11.) Plaintiffs claim that
the Sheriff’s Office did not train deputies to try to minimize the amount of weight applied
to someone’s chest or back while in a prone position or the physiology of a struggle. (Doc.
No. 3 ¶¶ 66, 67, 116, 117.) Plaintiffs also allege the Sheriff’s Department was aware its
deputies were killing individuals by using excessive and unreasonable restraint methods.
(Id. ¶68.)
“[A]s to a municipality, ‘the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for
§ 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the
rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.’” Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,
758 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989)). This means Plaintiffs “‘must demonstrate a conscious or deliberate choice on the
part of a municipality in order to prevail on a failure to train claim.’” Id. (quoting Price v.
Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 973 (9th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate
indifference requires proof that the municipal entity “disregarded a known or obvious
consequence” that a particular omission in its training program would cause city employees
to violate citizens’ constitutional rights. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 410. “Thus, when [the
municipal entity is] on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their
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training program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city
may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose[s] to retain that
program.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 407).
In the failure to train context, additional instances of misconduct are usually required to
show deliberate indifference, however, a narrow range of possibilities exist where the need
for training is so “obvious” as to be satisfied by a single incident. Connick, 563 U.S. at 64.
“To allege a failure to train, a plaintiff must include sufficient facts to support a
reasonable inference (1) of a constitutional violation; (2) of a municipal training policy that
amounts to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the constitutional
injury would not have resulted if the municipality properly trained their employees.”
Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing
Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007)).
Here, the FAC alleges the Sheriff’s Department did not train deputies to minimize
the amount of weight applied to someone’s chest or back while in a prone position; instead,
it trained them that they may have to apply additional body weight. (Doc. No. 3 ¶ 66). The
Department failed to train on the “physiology of a struggle” or risks of positional asphyxia
(Id. ¶ 67). The FAC alleges numerous prior deaths which involved prone restraint
and/or the use of hobbling restraints, WRAP devices, spit socks, and carotid holds (Id.
¶ 68(a)–(i)). Plaintiffs allege the Sheriff’s Department refused to correct known training
and policy deficiencies despite jury verdicts and public findings. (Id. ¶ 69.) The FAC
alleges these prior incidents placed the Sheriff’s Department on notice of unconstitutional
training related to restraint practices, yet no remedial action was taken. (Id. ¶¶ 69–70.)
These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for failure-to-train.
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged Monell liability
against the County for a constitutional injury resulting from a custom, practice, policy, or
a failure to train. The Motion to Dismiss the Monell claim against the County is DENIED.
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B. 	Bane Act
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim arguing “the FAC lacks any
facts to establish the necessary ‘specific intent’ of the County Defendants to violate
Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” (Doc. No. 22-1 at 16.) Plaintiffs counter that the FAC
plausibly alleges that County Defendants acted with “reckless disregard.” (Doc. No. 25 at
22.) According to Plaintiffs, “the deputies’ deadly, compressive force and restraint of
[Decedent] was sufficiently coercive and egregious that ‘specific intent’ is not required.”
(Doc. No. 25 at 23.) Plaintiffs go on to argue that even if “specific intent” was required,
the FAC plausibly 	supports 	such 	a 	finding. 	The 	Court 	finds 	Plaintiffs 	arguments
meritorious.
The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1987 to address hate crimes. Reese
v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018); see Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1.
The Bane Act “protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights that are
secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out ‘by threats,
intimidation or coercion.’” Reese, 888 F.3d at 1040 (quoting Venegas v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1230, 1239 (2007)). Violations of federal and California
constitutional and statutory rights are all cognizable under the Bane Act. See Cal. Civ. Code
§ 52.1(b) (a violation occurs when a defendant “interfere[s] . . . with the exercise or
enjoyment . . . of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state”). Claims under the Bane Act may
be brought against public officials who are alleged to interfere with protected rights, and
qualified immunity is not available for those claims. See Venegas, 153 Cal. App. 4th
at 1246.
The Ninth Circuit has held “the Bane Act does not require the ‘threat, intimidation[,]
or coercion’ element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the constitutional
violation alleged” so long as the claimant shows the defendant had a “specific intent” to
commit the constitutional violation. Reeseo, 888 F.3d at 1043 (9th Cir. 2018). The specific
intent requirement “is satisfied where the defendant allegedly acted with ‘[r]eckless
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disregard of the right at issue.’” Estate of Serna v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 20-cv-2096-
LAB, 2022 WL 827123, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2022) (quoting Cornell v. City & Cnty.
of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 804) (alteration in original); see, e.g., M.H. v. Cnty.
of Alameda, 90 F. Supp. 3d 889, 898 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (treating deliberate indifference as
intentional conduct); see also Scalia v. Cnty. of Kern, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1084 (treating
deliberate indifference as a coercive act).
Here, the FAC sufficiently alleges a Bane Act claim against the County Defendants.
First, the right at issue, “the right to be free from deliberate indifference to one’s serious
medical needs, is ‘clearly delineated and plainly applicable’ to the circumstances.” Scalia,
308 F. Supp. 3d at 1084 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 803). As is
the right to be free from the use of excessive force. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989); Brown, 520 U.S. at 414. Second, the FAC alleges that Defendants Aguilera and
Phillips acted with reckless disregard for Decedent’s rights and safety because they knew
he required medical attention, did not pose a risk or threat to the officers or the public, and
ultimately decided to take Decedent to Vista Detention Facility rather than returning him
to the hospital. (Doc. No. 3 ¶ 86.) Then, the Individual Defendants restrained Decedent on
the ground using bodyweight compression, downward pressure, and a WRAP device,
restricting his ability to breathe for approximately seven minutes and constituting deadly
force. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 51, 100.) Doe 1, the WRAP safety officer, “did nothing in response to
[Decedent’s] complaints of injury and pain.” (Id. ¶ 87.) After the WRAP was applied,
Individual Defendants left Decedent unmonitored in a dangerous prone position that
restricted his breathing for 20 minutes, contrary to proper training to use a position such as
sitting upright that does not restrict breathing and monitoring, and to closely monitor him
for signs of distress. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3, 52, 100.) Then, once paramedics arrived, they failed to
remove the restraints or properly position Decedent until after he was not breathing,
unresponsive, and pulseless. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 53, 88.) The FAC alleges that all Defendants’
conduct was in deliberate or reckless disregard of constitutional rights, and with specific
intent and purpose to violate those rights. (Id. ¶¶ 92, 103, 125.) Taken together, these
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allegations 	plausibly 	establish 	that 	Defendants 	interfered 	with 	Decedent’s 	clearly
established rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion, thereby sufficiently stating a
claim under the Bane Act.
Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs here have failed
adequately to allege a violation of the Bane Act. The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim.
C. 	DOE DEFENDANTS 21-50
Finally, the County Defendants move to dismiss Doe Defendants 21–50. (Doc. No.
22-1 at 16–17.) The FAC identifies Doe Defendants 21 to 40 as “individuals, corporations,
or other entities in the County of San Diego who had contact with [Decedent] on March 2,
2024, or March 3, 2024, and whose actions, or inactions, violated [Decedent’s] state and
federally protected rights and whose conduct caused decedent injury or harm.” (Doc. No. 3
¶ 33.) Doe Defendants 41 to 50 are identified as “supervisors, captains, commanders, and
other high-ranking officials at the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, California
Highway Patrol, or Vista Fire Department, who were responsible for supervising,
disciplining, and training subordinate individual defendants in this case and who were
responsible for promulgating and approving all policies and practices in this case.” (Id.
¶ 34.)
“As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.”
Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). However, “where the identity of
alleged defendants will not be known prior to the filing of a complaint . . . [a] plaintiff
should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants,
unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint
would be dismissed on other grounds.” Id. Plaintiff must nevertheless still “allege specific
facts showing how each particular doe defendant violated his rights.” Keavney v. Cnty. of
San Diego, No. 3:19-cv-01947-AJB-BGS, 2020 WL 4192286, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 20,
2020).
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Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against the Doe Defendants is premature at this point.
The Court declines to dismiss the claims against the Doe Defendants simply because
Plaintiffs were not aware of their identities at the time they filed the Complaint. See
Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163. Indeed, dismissal would only be warranted
if (1) discovery would not uncover their identities or (2) dismissal is warranted on other
grounds. See id. (quoting Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642); see also Palacios v. Cnty. of San
Diego, No. 20-cv-450-MMA (DEB), 2020 WL 4201686, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2020).
Here, Plaintiffs allege the County withheld information in response to public records
requests, including all audio and video of the incident. (Doc. No. 3 ¶¶ 27–28.) As a result,
Plaintiffs allege they “are genuinely ignorant of the identities of all people whose conduct
may have violated [Decedent’s] rights and caused his death.” (Id. ¶¶ 29, 35.) The Court
finds that discovery could uncover the Doe Defendants’ identities. Assuming the truth of
Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations and construing them in their favor, Chubb Custom, 710
F.3d at 956, the Court finds that is plausible that the Doe Defendants are: (1) individuals,
corporations, or other entities in the County of San Diego who had contact with Decedent
(Does 21–40); and (2) supervisors, captains, commanders, and other high-ranking officials
at the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, California Highway Patrol, or Vista Fire
Department, who were responsible for supervising, disciplining, and training subordinate
individual defendants in this case (Does 41–50). Accordingly, the County Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Doe Defendants 21–50 is DENIED.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the County Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss. The County Defendants must answer the FAC on or before April 1, 2026.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 17, 2026
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