Phillips v. Healthcare Resources Medical Associates, Inc. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
KATHERINE PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff,
v.
HEALTHCARE RESOURCES
MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 24-CV-2071 JLS (DEB)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF’S
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
(ECF No. 32)
Presently before the Court is Defendants Healthcare Resources Medical Associates,
Inc.’s, Spectrum Healthcare Resources, Inc.’s, Rachael Hearn Grove’s, and Crystal Curry’s
(collectively, “Defendants”) Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint (“Mot.,” ECF No. 32). Also before the Court is Plaintiff Katherine Phillips’s
Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 35), and Defendants’ Reply to Opposition to
Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“Reply,” ECF No.
36). 	After reviewing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC,” ECF No. 27), the
Parties’ arguments, and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN
PART Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 32).
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was employed by Defendants for approximately one year as a chiropractor.
SAC ¶¶ 10(a)–(b). Plaintiff alleges that she suffered discrimination based on a disability
and was wrongfully terminated from her employment because of her disability. 	Id. at 6.
Plaintiff’s allegations surround two purported disabilities: (1) “pain and discomfort” in her
wrists, arms, shoulders, and neck due to a “lack of proper chiropractic equipment” and a
small workspace which “forced her to modify the way she typically adjusted her patients,”
id. ¶¶ 11(a)–12(a), and (2) “migraine headaches” with “photophobia and phonophobia
during her migraines, caused by the loud music and discomforting lights used throughout
the facility,” id. ¶ 16(a). Plaintiff repeatedly complained about these conditions, requested
accommodations, which were denied, attended many meetings with management, and was
eventually terminated. See generally id.
Plaintiff brings ten causes of action: (1) discrimination in violation of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), (2) hostile work environment harassment, (3)
retaliation, (4) failure to accommodate disability, (5) failure to engage in the interactive
process, (6) failing to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, harassment, and
retaliation, (7) violation of Labor Code § 1102.5 (whistleblower retaliation), (8) violation
of Labor Code § 232.5 (retaliation for reporting working conditions), (9) wrongful
termination, and (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). 	See generally
SAC. Defendants bring the present motion arguing that Plaintiff has failed to allege what
medical condition constitutes the disability at issue—thus requiring dismissal of her First,
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth causes of action. 	See generally Mot. Defendants
also argue that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege IIED—thus requiring dismissal of the
Tenth cause of action.
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LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the
defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To
survive a 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	A claim is
facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. That is not to say that the claim
must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of
a plausible entitlement to relief. 	Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 	Though this
plausibility standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[]
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 	Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	In other words, a complaint will not suffice “if it tenders
‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” 	Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 	Put differently, “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Review under Rule 12(b)(6) requires a context-specific analysis involving the
Court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In performing
that analysis, “a district court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint, and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” 	Wi-LAN Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1020 (S.D. Cal. 2019). 	“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 679 (second alternation in original). 	If a complaint does not survive Rule 12(b)(6), a
court grants leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contention “consistent
with the challenged pleading could . . . possibly cure the deficiency.” 	Schreiber Distrib.
Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Disability Under FEHA
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff “fails to plead with specificity the disability she
suffered from” and that any alleged disability fails to “constitute[] a disability under . . .
FEHA.” Mot. at 17.
“To establish disability discrimination under FEHA, Plaintiff must assert sufficient
facts to state a plausible claim that [she] ‘(1) suffered from a disability, or was regarded as
suffering from a disability, (2) could perform the essential duties of the job with or without
reasonable accommodations, and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action
because of the disability or perceived disability.’” Padro v. Ferring Pharms., Inc., No. 25-
CV-369-SSS-SPX, 2025 WL 4058222, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (quoting Wills v.
Superior Ct., 195 Cal. App. 4th 143, 159–60 (2011)). A “physical disability” under FEHA
“includes, but is not limited to, . . . any physiological disease, disorder [or] condition” that
affects a major body system and “[l]imits a major life activity” by “mak[ing] the
achievement of the major life activity difficult.” Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12926(m)(1)(A)–(B).
Major life activities are “broadly construed” and include “physical, mental, and social
activities and working.” Cabrales v. Aerotek, Inc., No. EDCV 17-1531 JGB (KKx), 2019
WL 12374001, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2019) (quoting § 12926(m)(1)(B)(iii)). California
regulations note that “[m]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, sleeping, . . .
standing, sitting, . . . lifting, . . . bending, . . . concentrating, thinking, . . . interacting with
others, and working.” 	Cal. Code Regs. § 11065(l)(1). 	“Under FEHA, not every illness
qualifies as a disability.” 	Cabrales, 2019 WL 12374001, at *13 (citing Avila v. Cont’l
Airlines, Inc., 165 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1249 (2008)). “And simply having pain alone does
not constitute a disability.” Id. (citing Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc., 163 Cal App. 4th 327, 348
(2008)). 	“However, short term conditions that do limit a major life activity qualify for
protection.” Id. (citing Diaz v. Fed. Express Corp., 373 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1051–53 (C.D.
Cal. 2005)).
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In the Order dismissing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“Order,” ECF No. 21),
Judge Anello1 found that Plaintiff failed “to adequately explain what ‘physical limitations’
she suffer[ed] from, or that [those] limitations amount[ed] to a disability as defined by
FEHA.” Order at 2. Judge Anello reasoned that the headaches, migraines, and frequent
urination “as pleaded, were caused by loud music or fumigation of the facility,” and while
it is possible that temporary conditions are actionable, Plaintiff failed to plausibly plead
that these “actually limited a major life activity or negatively impacted her ability to work.”
Id. (citing Diaz, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1051–53). 	Regarding Plaintiff’s pain in her wrists,
arms, shoulders, and neck, Judge Anello found that Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that
these “interfered with her ability to perform her job.” 	Id. (citing Leatherbury v. C & H
Sugar Co., Inc., 911 F. Supp. 2d 872, 880 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Although pain can be a
disability under FEHA it must actually limit the employee’s ability to work.”)). The Court
now finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that her migraines and pain in her wrists,
arms, shoulders, and neck interfered with her ability to perform her job.
Regarding Plaintiff’s allegations concerning headaches and migraines, the Court
agrees with Defendants that ordinary headaches are not actionable under FEHA. 	See
Cabrales, 2019 WL 12374001, at *12 (“California regulations expressly exclude non-
migraine headaches.”) (citing Cal. Code Regs. § 11065(d)(9)(B)). 	Thus, Defendants’
Motion is GRANTED regarding any allegations concerning non-migraine headaches.
However, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that she suffered from migraines and that these
migraines “actually limited a major life activity or negatively impacted her ability to
work.”2 See Order at 2.
1 This matter was reassigned to Judge Sammartino on December 10, 2025. ECF No. 43.
2 Defendants rely on Ellis v. City of Reedley, No. CV F 05-1474 AWI SMS, 2007 WL 1098571, at *11
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2007) for the proposition that “infrequent migraine headaches” cannot constitute a
disability under FEHA. 	This case is distinguishable because in Ellis the plaintiff merely alleged one
instance of a migraine leading to his termination and a general “susceptibility to migraine headaches.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff alleges migraine issues over the course of several months and that she received a doctor’s
note stating she has migraines. SAC ¶ 16(a).
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Plaintiff alleges that, beginning on or around July 15, 2022, Plaintiff was suffering
from migraines and was “unable to concentrate, miss[ed] important patient details during
patient sessions, and [was unable] to devote herself to patient care.” SAC ¶ 15(c). On or
around July 16, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a note from her healthcare provider “outlining
that 	[Plaintiff] was diagnosed with 	migraine headaches, and has photophobia and
phonophobia during her migraines, caused by the loud music and discomforting lights used
throughout the facility.” 	Id. ¶ 16(a). As a result of these migraines, Plaintiff alleges that
she “found it harder to concentrate on patient treatment, [felt] drawn away from her
patients, and purposefully created small breaks during patients’ treatment sessions to regain
her well-being and composure.” 	Id. ¶ 17(a). 	Plaintiff repeatedly alleges throughout her
SAC that these migraines impacted her ability to concentrate, provide patient care, and
sleep at night. 	See id. ¶¶ 15(d), 17(b)–(c), 18(a), 19(b), 20(b), 22(b), 27(a), 28(a). 	The
Court finds these allegations sufficient to allege a negative interference with her work. See
Cabrales, 2019 WL 12374001, at *14 (denying summary judgment for employer on a
FEHA discrimination claim where plaintiff alleged that her migraines “made it difficult for
her to concentrate, think, and interact with others” because “[c]oncentrating, thinking, and
interacting with others are each considered major life activities,” and the plaintiff did not
“need to be totally unable to work or engage in other major life activities for her alleged
migraines to limit major life activities”) (citing Cal. Code Regs. § 11065(l)(1)).
Similarly, regarding her allegations surrounding pain in her wrists, arms, shoulders,
and neck, Plaintiff now sufficiently alleges that her pain actually limited her ability to work.
See Sanchez v. Walmart Inc., No. 23-2352-DMG (SHKx), 2025 WL 3050066, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. July 30, 2025) (“Courts have generally held that pain ‘must actually limit the
employee’s ability to work’ in order to qualify as a disability under FEHA.” (quoting
Leatherbury, 911 F. Supp. 2d at 880)). Plaintiff alleges that the pain prevented her “from
providing proper spinal manipulations and adjustments to her patients,” which at one point
became so “excruciating” that she “was approved to go home early for the day” because
“it was becoming increasingly evident that [Plaintiff] could not perform her job duties.”
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SAC ¶¶ 11(a), 23(b). Plaintiff alleges that she was forced to “continuously modif[y] the
way she adjusted her patients” and her patients “visibly saw her pain and discomfort”
resulting in patient complaints “that they were not being adjusted properly.” 	Id. ¶ 24(a).
Due to these complaints, Plaintiff alleges that she “purposefully created informal breaks
during treatment sessions to regain her well-being and composure, in hopes she could
provide proper treatment, as she used to.” Id. ¶ 24(b).
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff also pleads that, until her wrongful termination,
Plaintiff “worked diligently in her position and performed her job duties in an exemplary
matter.” Id. ¶ 10(a). At the pleading stage, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s other allegations
are sufficient to allege that her pain limited her ability to perform her job. 	See Achal v.
Gate Gourmet, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 781, 798 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (finding pleading sufficient
where plaintiff alleged that his injury caused “lifting and bending restrictions that impaired
his ability to work”); cf. Smith v. Constellation Brands, Inc., No. C 16-04101 WHA, 2017
WL 264064, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2017) (finding allegations of pain insufficient where
plaintiff claimed head and neck mobility issues but did not explain how the condition made
her unable to complete her job); Phomthevy v. Winco Holdings, Inc., No. 19-CV-41-KJM-
CKD, 2020 WL 6044040, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2020) (finding allegations of pain
insufficient as mere recitations of the elements where plaintiff only listed difficulties
“sleeping, getting out of bed, walking, sitting, lifting, bending[,] and moving” but did not
explain how these limited plaintiff’s work activities); Goode v. Maximus Human Servs.,
Inc., No. SACV 16-1254-JVS (DFMx), 2016 WL 11811972, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2016)
(finding no disability where plaintiff “did not allege any specific limitations on her ability
to work”). 	Therefore, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s allegations
concerning migraines and pain in her wrists, arms, shoulders, and neck.
Further, regarding any allegations concerning “excessive urination,” the Court
concludes that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the “excessive urination” caused
by the fumigation is a disability under FEHA because she did not demonstrate how it
impacted a major life activity. 	See Jaco v. Winco Holdings, Inc., No. 18-CV-301-DAD-
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EPG, 2019 WL 1438069, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2019) (granting a motion to dismiss as
to allegations concerning an urgent need to urinate because the plaintiff did not allege how
frequently she suffered from this need, how severe the condition was, the duration of the
condition, any long term impact, or how it impacted a major life activity). 	Therefore,
Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED regarding Plaintiff’s allegations about excessive
urination. See SAC ¶ 20(b).
In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning migraines and pain in her wrists, arms,
shoulders, and neck sufficiently allege a disability under FEHA for purposes of her First,
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth causes of action.
II. 	Harassment Claim
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead her Second cause of
action for harassment. 	Mot. at 24. 	Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations all
constitute “personnel management actions” that were not done for the secondary purpose
of “communicating a hostile message,” and therefore, cannot constitute harassment under
FEHA. Id. at 24–25 (first citing Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 646–47 (1998); then citing
Wexler v. Jensen Pharms., Inc., No. CV 15-3518-AB (AJWx), 2015 WL 6159101, at *5
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2015)). 	Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations supporting her
harassment claim are: “write ups, written counseling, and warnings (SAC ¶¶ 14, 18, 19,
26, 27, 35, 36); scheduling decisions (id. ¶ 18); accommodation decisions (id. ¶¶ 15, 17,
22, 23, 30); equipment decisions (id. ¶ 24); removal from position or suspension decisions
(id. ¶¶ 38, 43); and replacement of position (id. ¶¶ 40, 42).” 	Mot. at 25. 	Defendants
conclude that these are “quintessential personnel actions.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that the alleged harassment incidents include: “(1) issuing [Plaintiff]
questionable warnings (SAC ¶¶ 14, 19, 26, 36, 28); (2) declining to address her complaints
because Defendant[s] did not want to provide her requested accommodations ([id.] ¶ 17);
and (3) terminat[ing] her employment ([id.] ¶¶ 38, 40, 42, 43).” Opp’n at 20–21. Plaintiff
does 	not 	address 	Defendants’ 	argument 	that 	these 	decisions 	constitute 	“personnel
management actions.” See Opp’n.
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“To establish a claim for harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she is a
member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected to harassment because she belonged
to this group; and (3) the alleged harassment was so severe that it created a hostile work
environment.” 	Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1244 (9th Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted). “Unlike discrimination claims, harassment ‘consists of actions outside
the scope of job duties which are not of a type necessary to business and personnel
management.’” 	Id. (first citing Reno, 18 Cal. 4th at 646–47; then citing Janken v. GM
Hughes Elecs., 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 64 (1996)). 	For example, “commonly necessary
personnel management actions such as hiring and firing, job or project assignments, office
or work station assignments, promotion or demotion, performance evaluations, the
provision of support, the assignment or nonassignment of supervisory functions, . . .
deciding who will be laid off, and the like, do not come within the meaning of harassment.”
Reno, 18 Cal. 4th at 646–47. 	“[H]arassment consists of conduct outside the scope of
necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification,
because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.” Id. at 645–46. Personnel
management actions can be actionable if the decision has “a secondary effect of
communicating a hostile message” and where the “actions establish a widespread pattern
of bias.” 	Wexler, 2015 WL 6159101, at *6 (citing Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th
686, 709 (2009)).
Judge Anello previously concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations were not actionable
because they fell “within the scope of routine management activities,” were only
“occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial,” were not “severe enough to create a work
environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive,” and were not severe enough to “interfere
with the reasonable employee’s work performance and seriously affect the psychological
well-being of a reasonable employee.” Order at 3. The Court comes to the same conclusion
concerning Plaintiff’s SAC.
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As Plaintiff summarized in her Opposition, Plaintiff’s allegations of harassment
include the issuance of “questionable warnings,” “declining to address her complaints”
surrounding accommodations, and terminating her employment. 	Opp’n at 20–21. 	The
Court concludes that these are routine management activities, and Plaintiff has failed to
allege that these were done with the “secondary effect of communicating a hostile
message” or part of a “widespread pattern of bias.” See Wexler, 2015 WL 6159101, at *6.
Nor has Plaintiff alleged that she “was subject to harassment that was so objectively severe
or pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work
environment.” Gunderson v. Potter Handy, LLP, No. 25-CV-634-VC, 2025 WL 2945696,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025). Further, any conclusory allegations by Plaintiff that these
personnel management decisions were “intended to harass and single-out” Plaintiff are
insufficient to allege harassment. 	SAC ¶ 14(c); see Ventura v. IQVIA, Inc., No. 25-CV-
9163-RS, 2026 WL 84530, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2026) (“[T]he court is not bound to
accept, without more, Plaintiff’s legally conclusive allegations that this conduct was
‘harassing’ and in furtherance of ‘pervasive harassment.’”). 	Therefore, Defendants’
Motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s harassment claim. Plaintiff cannot rely on alleged
harassment for her remaining causes of action, e.g., cause of action Six, for failure to take
all reasonable steps to prevent harassment.
III. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s IIED claim (cause of action Ten) fails to state
a claim because none of the conduct alleged is so “outrageous or extreme it exceeds all
bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” 	Mot. at 29–30 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). 	Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to
allege severe emotional distress and that the IIED claim is preempted by the California
Workers’ Compensation Act. Id. at 31–33. Judge Anello previously dismissed Plaintiff’s
IIED claim—finding that Plaintiff failed “to allege that the conduct at issue was extreme
or outrageous or that she in fact suffered serious or severe emotional distress.” Order at 4.
The Court likewise concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient.
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Under California law, to state a claim for IIED, Plaintiff must allege:
(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the
intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of
causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or
extreme 	emotional 	distress; 	and 	(3) 	actual 	and 	proximate
causation 	of 	the 	emotional 	distress 	by 	[the] 	defendant's
outrageous conduct.
Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445, 1454 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Christensen v. Superior
Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991)). 	“Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to
exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” 	Miller v. Fortune
Com. Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 133, 143 (Ct. App. 2017). There is no bright line rule for
when conduct qualifies as outrageous, and it is typically a question of fact for the jury. So
v. Shin, 212 Cal. App. 4th 652, 671 (2013). “A court may dismiss such claims as a matter
of law if the conduct alleged is insufficiently outrageous, particularly where the conduct
alleged amounts to ‘mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or
other trivialities.’” 	Morse v. Cnty. of Merced, No. 16-cv-142-DAD-SKO, 2016 WL
3254034, at *13 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) (quoting Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1051
(2009)).
In the context of FEHA, “[a] plaintiff may pursue a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress in the employment context where the conduct at issue violates FEHA
and also satisfies the elements of the claim.” Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club, 18 Cal. App.
5th 908, 945–46 (2017) (citation omitted). “A simple pleading of personnel management
activity is insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even
if improper motivation is alleged.” Janken, 46 Cal. App. 4th at 80 (dismissing IIED claim
where allegations only involved criticism of work performance and management of
personnel).
The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to plead extreme or
outrageous conduct or severe emotional distress. 	As discussed above, many if not all of
the allegations making up Plaintiff’s harassment claim, and her IIED claim, can be
considered personnel management activity. Further, none of the conduct alleged can “be
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characterized as exceeding all bounds of that tolerated in a civilized community.” Lawler,
704 F.3d at 1245 (“While [the manager] may have inconsiderately and insensitively
communicated his dissatisfaction of [plaintiff’s] managerial performance, this is not
conduct from which California tort law protects employees.”); see also Schneider v. TRW,
Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming summary judgment dismissal of IIED
claim where allegations included a supervisor screaming and yelling “in the process of
criticizing 	[plaintiff’s] 	performance,” 	threatening 	“to 	throw 	[plaintiff] 	out 	of 	the
department,” and making gestures plaintiff interpreted as threatening); Padro, 2025 WL
4058222, at *6–7 (dismissing IIED claim where the underlying allegation was firing based
on disability discrimination); Filipek v. Byram Healthcare Ctrs., Inc., No. SACV 22-254-
CJC(ADSx), 2022 WL 20401327, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2022) (“Both state and federal
courts have held that ‘[t]erminating an employee for improper or discriminatory reasons,
like many other adverse personnel management decisions, is insufficiently extreme or
outrageous to give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.’”) (quoting
Walker v. Boeing Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1190 (C.D. Cal. 2002)); Kasperzyk v.
Shelter Sec. Servs., Inc., No. C-13-3358 EMC/TEH, 2015 WL 1348503, at *12 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 25, 2015) (“At least in the absence of some extraordinary circumstances, a claim of
employment discrimination does not, in itself, give rise to an IIED claim.”).
Further, Plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress—feeling “shocked, confused, and
dejected because she was suddenly terminated,” SAC ¶ 43(b)—are insufficient to
constitute “emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no
reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” Hughes, 46 Cal.
4th at 1051; see also Lawler, 704 F.3d at 1246 (affirming summary judgment dismissing
IIED claim where plaintiff’s allegations of severe emotional distress included “[a]nxiety,
sleeplessness, upset stomach, [and] sometimes muscle twitches”). 	There is no evidence
that Plaintiff “suffered from anything other than typical psychological effects following
termination.” 	Desoto v. DOT Foods, Inc., No. 24-CV-1140-WBS-CSK, 2025 WL
3761815, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2025).
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Therefore, Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s IIED claim (cause of action Ten) is
GRANTED.
IV. 	Leave to Amend
The final consideration is whether Plaintiff should again be granted leave to amend.
Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
But 	while 	the 	rule 	should 	be 	interpreted 	liberally, 	leave 	should 	not 	be 	granted
automatically. 	Jackson v. Bank of Haw., 902 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir. 1990). 	In
determining whether to grant leave to amend, trial courts should consider various factors,
including bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility of amendment,
and whether the party has previously amended. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Applying the Foman factors here, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to
amend. The Court finds that “it is clear that granting leave to amend would [be] futile.”
Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004).
Thus, Plaintiff’s causes of action Two (harassment) and Ten (IIED) are dismissed without
leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
(“Mot.,” ECF No. 32). Defendants SHALL file an answer within thirty (30) days of the
electronic docketing of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 23, 2026
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