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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JOHNATHAN F.,1
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration,2
Defendant.
Case No.: 24cv1774-WQH (MSB)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR
ORDER AFFIRMING THE
COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
[ECF NO. 15]
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable William Q.
Hayes, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Civil Local Rule
72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. On
October 4, 2024, Plaintiff Jonathan Fay (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a decision by the
1 Under Civil Local Rule 7.1(e)(6)(b), “[o]pinions by the Court in [Social Security cases under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g)] will refer to any non-government parties by using only their first name and last initial.”
2 In May 2025, Frank Bisignano was sworn in as Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
See https://www.ssa.gov/agency/commissioner.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2025). Accordingly, Frank
Bisignano is substituted as the defendant in this lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) (“An action does not
abate when a public officer who is a party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to
hold office while the action is pending. The officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a
party.”).
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Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s application for
supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at
1.)
Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s request to vacate the Commissioner’s
decision and remand the case for further administrative proceedings. (See ECF No. 15
(“Mot.”) at 15.) The Court has carefully reviewed the Complaint [ECF No. 1], the
Administrative Record (“AR”) [ECF No. 11], Plaintiff’s Motion [ECF No. 15], the
Commissioner’s Opposition (“Opp’n”) [ECF No. 18], and Plaintiff’s Reply (“Reply”) [ECF
No. 19]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that judgment be
entered AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s decision consistent with this Report and
Recommendation.
I. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security
income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning on January
1, 2010. (See AR 17.) On May 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning
on January 1, 2010. (See id.) The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s applications initially
on March 20, 2023 [see AR 188–92], and again upon reconsideration on May 25, 2023
[see AR 195–99]. Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on June 2, 2023. (See AR
201–02.) Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Erin Justice held a hearing on November 28,
2023. (See AR 34–39.) Plaintiff appeared at the hearing with a non-attorney
representative, and the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (See
id.) As detailed in the ALJ’s decision dated January 4, 2024 [AR 17–27], the ALJ found
that Plaintiff has not been disabled under the Social Security Act at any time from the
alleged onset date through the date of the ALJ’s decision. (AR 27.)
Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision on January 5, 2024. (AR 4.) The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on August 13, 2024, rendering the
ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (See AR 1–6; see also 42 U.S.C. §
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405(h).) Plaintiff filed the instant civil action on October 4, 2024, seeking judicial review
of the Commissioner’s decision. (See generally Compl.)
II. 	SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS
In rendering her decision, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation
process set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) and 416.920(a)(4). (See AR 18–19.) At
step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since January 1, 2010, the alleged onset date.” (AR 19.)
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments that
significantly limit his ability to perform basic work activities: degenerative disc disease,
status post cervical fusion, post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety. (AR 20.) The ALJ
also found that Plaintiff has nonsevere impairments of low vision and acid reflux but
found “no evidence that these conditions significantly [limit] [Plaintiff]’s ability to
perform basic work activities.” (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or a
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the
impairments identified in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (Id.) Specifically,
the ALJ considered listing 1.15 (disorders of the skeletal spine resulting in compromise
of a nerve root(s)) and listing 1.16 (lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in compromise of the
cauda equina) and concluded that the requirements for listing 1.15 and listing 1.16 are
not met. (Id.) The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s mental impairments, individually and
together, and concluded that the requirements for listing 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-
compulsive disorders) and listing 12.15 (trauma- and stressor-related disorders) are not
met. (AR 20–21.)
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
[P]erform light work as defined in [20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)]
except [Plaintiff] can lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently. [Plaintiff] can stand and/or walk for a total of about six hours and sit
for about six hours in an eight-hour workday. [Plaintiff] can never climb ladders,
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ropes, and scaffolds. [Plaintiff] can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. [Plaintiff]
can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. [Plaintiff] can
understand, remember, and perform simple work. [Plaintiff] can tolerate
occasional changes in the workplace.
(AR 22.)
Further, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to produce his alleged symptoms. (AR 23.) However, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence[,] and
limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the . . . other
evidence in the record.” (Id.) The ALJ stated that “[g]reater residual functional capacity
limitations are not supported by the evidence that [Plaintiff] has been observed to have
a lack of physical or mental limitations throughout the record including [] evidence of a
normal gait, full ranges of motion, and a lack of observed social anxiety.” (AR 25.)
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ concluded that light work is appropriate, emphasizing
that this assessment “is supported by the overall medical evidence of record.” (AR 26.)
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have the residual functional
capacity to perform the requirements of his past relevant work because Plaintiff “has no
past relevant work.” (Id.)
Finally, the ALJ proceeded to step five of the sequential evaluation process. Here,
the ALJ found that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that [Plaintiff] can perform.” (Id.) The ALJ relied upon the vocational expert’s
testimony that a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and residual
functional capacity could perform the requirements of representative occupations such
as “[c]ashier II,” “[f]ast food worker[],” and “[p]roduction assembler.” (AR 27.) Thus,
the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security
Act from January 1, 2010, through January 4, 2024, and denied Plaintiff’s applications
for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. (See id.)
/ /
/ /
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III. 	DISPUTED ISSUES
Plaintiff raises two issues as the bases for vacating the Commissioner’s decision
and remanding the case for further administrative proceedings. Those issues are
(1) whether the ALJ conducted a proper supportability and consistency analysis of the
opinion of Lane B. Andelin, Psy.D., and (2) whether the ALJ’s RFC determination is
erroneous due to the ALJ’s reliance on her own lay medical opinion. (See Mot. at 7, 11.)
IV. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows unsuccessful claimants to seek
judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope
of judicial review is limited, and the denial of benefits will only be disturbed if it is not
supported by substantial evidence in the record or is based upon legal error. Luther v.
Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). The United States
Supreme Court interprets “substantial evidence” to mean “more than a mere scintilla,”
but only “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 97 (2019) (quoting Consol.
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The Ninth Circuit further explains that
substantial evidence is “less than a preponderance.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648,
654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 846 F.2d 573,
576 (9th Cir. 1988)).
When the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the
ALJ’s decision must be upheld. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir.
2008) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). While “the ALJ is
responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and []
resolving ambiguities[,]” those findings “must be supported by specific, cogent reasons.”
Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
Even if the reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
conclusions, the court must set aside the ALJ’s decision if the ALJ failed to apply the
proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and reaching his or her decision. See
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Batson v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). The
reviewing court may enter “a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing” the
Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). However, the reviewing court “may not
reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is harmless.” Rounds v. Comm’r of
the Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Molina v. Astrue, 674
F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012)). The reviewing court may also remand the case to the
Social Security Administration for further administrative proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
V. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Whether the ALJ Conducted a Proper Supportability and Consistency
Analysis Regarding the Opinion of Lane B. Andelin, Psy.D.
1. 	Summary of the parties’ arguments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the opinion of Lane B.
Andelin, Psy.D. (“Dr. Andelin”), who examined Plaintiff on March 30, 2016. (See Mot. at
7.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ’s failure to conduct a proper
supportability and consistency analysis” of Dr. Andelin’s opinion constitutes harmful
legal error which requires remand. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s decision is
erroneous because she “completely ignores the support provided within Dr. Andelin’s
own examination” and “fail[s] to point to any specific evidence that is inconsistent with
Dr. Andelin’s opinion.” (Id. at 10.) Further, Plaintiff contends that Dr. Andelin’s opinion
is critical to the ALJ’s RFC determination and “contains objective evidence that can assist
an adjudicator in[] a determination of Plaintiff’s work-related mental limitations.” (Id.)
To summarize, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Andelin’s opinion was “less
persuasive,” claiming that “the ALJ did not provide a proper supportability and
consistency analysis of this opinion.” (Id.)
In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly articulated how she
considered the supportability and consistency factors when assessing Dr. Andelin’s
opinion. (Opp’n at 5.) The Commissioner contends that the ALJ considered the mild and
moderate limitations identified by Dr. Andelin when making her RFC determination,
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and—although the ALJ did not consider the marked limitation identified by Dr.
Andelin—the ALJ provided a valid rationale for not doing so. (Id. at 3–4.) According to
the Commissioner, the ALJ acknowledged the supportability factor by noting that Dr.
Andelin’s opinion relies on Plaintiff’s subjective allegations, rather than objective
medical evidence. (Id. at 4.) The ALJ acknowledged the consistency factor by noting
that Dr. Andelin’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s marked limitation in complex decision-
making was inconsistent with the overall record. (Id.) To summarize, the Commissioner
states that the ALJ “adopted the mild and moderate limitations Dr. Andelin assessed,
but reasonably rejected the [marked] limitation while explaining why portions of the
opinion were not welcome, supported, or consistent with the record.” (Id. at 2.)
2. 	Applicable law
The residual functional capacity assessment is first used during step four of the
sequential evaluation process to determine whether the claimant can perform past
relevant work. Laborin v. Berryhill, 867 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017). If the claimant
cannot perform past relevant work, the residual functional capacity assessment is used
again during step five—along with the claimant’s age, education, and work experience—
to determine whether the claimant “can make an adjustment to other work.” Id.
(quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v)). The ALJ is responsible for
assessing the claimant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c),
416.946(c). If there are conflicting opinions as to the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, the ALJ may choose which opinions to credit and which to reject. However, to
reject a treating or an examining physician’s opinion, the ALJ must provide “clear and
convincing reasons,” if the opinion is uncontradicted by other evidence, or
“specific and legitimate reasons,” if the opinion is contradicted by other evidence.
Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted).
For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, the ALJ does “not defer or give any
specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s).” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ must evaluate the persuasiveness
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of medical opinions using the following factors: (1) supportability, (2) consistency, (3)
the relationship between the source and the claimant, (4) the source’s specialization,
and (5) other factors such as the source’s knowledge of other evidence and whether
there was subsequently submitted evidence. Id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5), 416.920c(c)(1)–
(5). “‘The most important factors’ that the agency considers when evaluating the
persuasiveness of medical opinions are ‘supportability’ and ‘consistency.’” Woods, 32
F.4th at 791 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a)). “Supportability”
measures the extent to which objective medical evidence and supporting explanations
reinforce a medical finding. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1).
“Consistency” measures the extent to which a medical opinion is consistent with
evidence from other medical sources and non-medical sources in the record. Id. §§
404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). Critically, “an ALJ’s decision, including the decision to
discredit any medical opinion, must simply be supported by substantial evidence.”
Woods, 32 F.4th at 787.
3. 	Dr. Andelin’s opinion
Per the state agency’s request, Dr. Andelin performed a psychological
examination of Plaintiff on March 30, 2016. (See AR 480.) As detailed in Dr. Andelin’s
report [AR 479–89], Dr. Andelin opined that Plaintiff’s impairments “interfere with his
ability [for] reality-testing, comprehension, understanding of required instructions,
consistency with learning and training, emotional regulation, motivation, and energy.”
(AR 486.) Dr. Andelin further opined that Plaintiff has mild limitations in interacting
appropriately with the public, supervisors, and co-workers; moderate limitations in
understanding and remembering complex instructions, carrying out complex
instructions, and responding appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a
routine work setting; and a marked limitation in the ability to make judgments on
complex work-related decisions. (AR 486–87.)
/ /
/ /
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4. 	Analysis
The ALJ found Dr. Andelin’s opinion “less persuasive.” (AR 25.) The ALJ reasoned
that “the overall record demonstrates that [Plaintiff] has no more than mild or
moderate limitation[s],” thereby rejecting Dr. Andelin’s opinion that Plaintiff has any
marked limitations. (AR 25, 486.) Now, this Court must assess whether the ALJ
appropriately considered the supportability and consistency factors when evaluating Dr.
Andelin’s opinion and, if not, whether the ALJ’s RFC determination reasonably
accounted for the limitations identified by Dr. Andelin. The RFC determination must be
consistent with the relevant assessed limitations but need not be identical to them. See
Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1223 (9th Cir. 2010).
a. 	Supportability
Addressing the supportability factor, the ALJ notes that Dr. Andelin “supported his
opinion . . . with [Plaintiff]’s alleged subjective symptoms,” for example, Plaintiff’s
allegation that he suffers from social anxiety and an inability to interact with others. (AR
25.) The ALJ’s decision implies that an ALJ may reject the opinion of a consultative
examiner if the opinion is based on the claimant’s self-reported symptoms. In the Ninth
Circuit, this is generally true. See, e.g., Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1162 (9th Cir.
2014) (“If a treating provider’s opinions are based ‘to a large extent’ on [a claimant]’s
self-reports and not on clinical evidence, and the ALJ finds the [claimant] not credible,
the ALJ may [reject] the treating provider’s opinion.”) (quoting Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at
1041). In the context of psychological examinations, however, the Ninth Circuit has
carved out an important exception. Recognizing that psychological examinations
inherently rely on a combination of self-reports and clinical observations, the Ninth
Circuit has held that “the rule allowing an ALJ to reject opinions based on self-reports
does not apply in the same manner to opinions regarding mental illness.” Buck v.
Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, psychological examinations may be
supported even when they depend on subjective reporting, as this is intrinsic to the
nature of psychiatry.
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Here, the only reason proffered by the ALJ for her conclusion that Dr. Andelin’s
opinion is not supported is that Dr. Andelin relied upon “[Plaintiff]’s alleged subjective
symptoms.” (See AR 25.) As discussed above, Dr. Andelin was permitted to do so.
Because the ALJ failed to offer any further discussion of supportability [Reply at 2], the
ALJ did not satisfy the “supportability” requirement of the relevant analysis. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(1), 416.920c(b)(1).
b. 	Consistency
Plaintiff further alleges that the ALJ did not satisfy the “consistency” requirement
of the relevant analysis. See id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). Plaintiff emphasizes
that Dr. Andelin’s opinion is “the only mental opinion” of record. (Mot. at 10, 11, 13.)
However, the fact the record contains only one mental opinion does not force the
conclusion that Dr. Andelin’s opinion was consistent. See Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th
732, 741 (9th Cir. 2023) (affirming the ALJ’s decision to discount a consultative
examiner’s opinion of the claimant’s limitations due to inconsistencies with the medical
record and the consultative examiner’s own unremarkable examinations). When
addressing the consistency factor, an ALJ is permitted to consider a mental opinion
alongside “other medical sources and non-medical sources in the record.” See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). Any internal inconsistency within Dr. Andelin’s
opinion, by itself, could be a legitimate reason to find the opinion less persuasive.
However, the ALJ did not explicitly discuss any internal inconsistencies within Dr.
Andelin’s opinion. “A reviewing court may not make independent findings based on the
evidence before ALJ to conclude that the ALJ’s error was harmless.” Brown-Hunter v.
Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). Rather, the reviewing court is “constrained to
review the reasons the ALJ asserts.” Id. (quoting Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874
(9th Cir. 2003)). Ultimately, the ALJ found Dr. Andelin’s opinion “less persuasive”
because it was inconsistent with the overall record regarding Plaintiff’s mental status, as
determined by other medical and non-medical sources in the record. (See AR 25.)
/ /
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The ALJ concluded that Dr. Andelin’s opinion was inconsistent with other medical
and nonmedical sources in the record. (See id.) In support of her finding, the ALJ
provided examples of Plaintiff interacting freely and without social anxiety on numerous
occasions, as observed by various medical and nonmedical sources. (See AR 24–26.)
The ALJ notes that Latifa A. Fakoya, D.O. (“Dr. Fakoya”) examined Plaintiff less than
three weeks after Dr. Andelin and found that Plaintiff “displayed no anxiety signs” and
instead was “pleasant, cooperative, and appeared in no acute distress.” (See AR 495;
see also AR 23.) Additionally, the ALJ cites to the Cooperative Disability Investigations
Unit’s finding several months later that Plaintiff “showed no social anxiety with regards
to meeting with law enforcement officers[,] . . . communicated adequately, and
demonstrated that he could track, understand, and remember simple instructions and
conversations.” (See AR 508; see also AR 21.) The ALJ also found inconsistencies within
Marie Pittman, P.A.,’s multiple evaluations of Plaintiff in 2016, during which Plaintiff was
documented as having good judgment, normal mood, alertness, and proper orientation
as to time, place, and person. (See AR 517–32; see also AR 21, 24.) Each of these
sources is inconsistent with Dr. Andelin’s opinion. Thus, Plaintiff is incorrect that “the
ALJ fails to point to any specific evidence that was inconsistent with Dr. Andelin’s
opinion.” (Reply at 4.) The ALJ thoroughly evaluated Dr. Andelin’s opinion and provided
ample support for her determination that his opinion was “less persuasive” in
comparison with the overall record. Therefore, the ALJ satisfied the “consistency”
requirement of the relevant analysis. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
Although the ALJ erred during her supportability analysis, her consistency analysis
was sound. Under such circumstances, reversal of the ALJ’s decision is not automatically
required. An ALJ’s decision will only be reversed if the error is not harmless. Smith v.
Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021). Although the supportability and
consistency factors are the most important considerations when evaluating the
persuasiveness of medical opinions, even if the ALJ errs in evaluating one of these
factors, the error may be deemed harmless if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
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decision. See generally id. Here, the ALJ’s error in her supportability analysis does not
warrant reversal, because the error is not significant enough to cast doubt on the ALJ’s
disability determination. See Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020) (“We may
affirm the ALJ’s decision even if the ALJ made an error, so long as the error was
harmless, meaning it was ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability
determination.’”) (quoting Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038). Despite finding Dr. Andelin’s
opinion to be “less persuasive” [AR 25], the ALJ nevertheless accounted for the mild and
moderate limitations identified by Dr. Andelin in her RFC determination but rejected the
marked limitation because it was inconsistent with the overall record. Thus, as
discussed below, the ALJ’s error was harmless.
c. 	The RFC determination
First, Dr. Andelin opined that Plaintiff has mild limitations in interacting
appropriately with the public, supervisors, and co-workers. (AR 487.) The ALJ agreed
with Dr. Andelin that Plaintiff has a mild limitation “[i]n interacting with others.” (AR
21.) The ALJ’s RFC determination sufficiently addressed Dr. Andelin’s opinion regarding
Plaintiff’s mild limitations by limiting Plaintiff to unskilled work, including occupations
with little human interaction such as production assembler. (See AR 27.) Unskilled jobs
require only limited interaction with people. Seth D. v. Kijakazi, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
223941, at *51 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2023); SSR 85-15 1985 WL 56857 (Jan. 1, 1985) (stating
that unskilled jobs “ordinarily involve dealing primarily with objects, rather than with
data or people”).
Next, Dr. Andelin opined that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in understanding
and remembering complex instructions, carrying out complex instructions, and
responding appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work
setting. (AR 486–87.) Again, the ALJ agreed with Dr. Andelin that Plaintiff has a
moderate limitation “[i]n understanding, remembering, or applying information,” as
well as a moderate limitation in “adapting or managing oneself.” (AR 21–22.) The ALJ’s
RFC determination adequately accounted for Dr. Andelin’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s
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moderate limitations by limiting Plaintiff to work where only “occasional changes in the
workplace” occur. (AR 22.)
Finally, Dr. Andelin opined that Plaintiff has a marked limitation in making
judgments on complex work-related decisions. (AR 21.) The ALJ disagreed with Dr.
Andelin. Relying on the overall record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has no more
than mild or moderate limitation[s].” (AR 25.) Notwithstanding her rejection of Dr.
Andelin’s opinion, the ALJ appropriately incorporated Dr. Andelin’s concerns regarding
Plaintiff’s limitations in making complex decisions by limiting Plaintiff only to jobs that
require him to “understand, remember, and perform simple work,” as opposed to
complex work. (AR 22.) Therefore, the ALJ’s RFC determination reasonably accounted
for the mild, moderate, and marked limitations identified by Dr. Andelin.
5. 	Conclusion
The ALJ reasonably considered Dr. Andelin’s opinion and identified aspects that
were contradictory to the overall record. The ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s limitations
and her RFC determination are sound. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the
ALJ’s findings regarding Dr. Andelin’s opinion be affirmed.
B. 	Whether the ALJ’s RFC Determination Is Erroneous Due to the ALJ’s
Reliance on Her Own Lay Medical Opinion
1. 	Summary of the parties’ arguments
Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial
evidence because the ALJ crafted the mental portion of the RFC out of thin air and did
not account for Plaintiff’s limitations in concentration, persistence, pace, or social
interactions.” (Mot. at 11–12.) Plaintiff reiterates that the ALJ “reject[ed] the mental
opinions of record” and “crafted an RFC based on her own interpretation of the
evidence.” (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff contends that “the clearest picture of Plaintiff’s mental
limitations was outlined by Dr. Andelin” but claims that the ALJ substituted “her own lay
medical opinion.” (Id. at 14.) According to Plaintiff, Dr. Andelin’s determinations
regarding Plaintiff’s mild, moderate, and marked limitations, as well as Plaintiff’s self-
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reported symptoms, were not properly considered by the ALJ in her RFC determination.
(Id.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ relied on testimony from a vocational expert
who “was not given a hypothetical question which incorporated all of Plaintiff’s mental
limitations.” (Id. at 15.)
In response, the Commissioner argues that there is no authority which requires an
ALJ to rely on a medical opinion when making an RFC determination. (Opp’n at 7.) In
any event, the Commissioner argues that “the ALJ agreed with and accommodated the
mild and moderate limitations Dr. Andelin assessed, and she reasonably rejected the
marked limitation he found.” (Id.) The Commissioner explains that “the ALJ restricted
Plaintiff to occasional changes in the workplace” to account for “Dr. Andelin’s finding
that Plaintiff was moderately limited in responding appropriately to usual work
situations and to changes in a routine work setting.” (Id. at 8.) The Commissioner
further explains that the ALJ agreed with Dr. Andelin’s finding that Plaintiff has only a
mild limitation in social interaction and therefore “declined to include a restriction
regarding social interactions in the RFC.” (Id.) The Commissioner notes that, in support
of this finding, the ALJ cites multiple other examinations of Plaintiff in which Plaintiff
was observed as having a normal mood and displaying no signs of anxiety. (Id.) Next,
regarding Plaintiff’s ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace, the Commissioner
argues that “[b]y restricting Plaintiff to simple, unskilled work, the ALJ accommodated
mild limitations in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace.” (Id.) Finally, the
Commissioner argues that “Plaintiff is repeating his previous claims that the ALJ erred in
evaluating Dr. Andelin’s opinion and in formulating the RFC” by arguing against the
validity and completeness of the hypothetical provided to the vocational expert. (Id. at
10.)
2. 	Applicable law
RFC, or residual functional capacity, is a claimant’s ability to do work-related
activities on a sustained basis (i.e., eight hours a day, five days per week). Titles II & XVI:
Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-
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8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). Thus, a claimant’s RFC represents the
maximum amount of work a claimant can perform, despite his or her limitations, based
on all relevant evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1).
In making an RFC determination, the ALJ must consider all the claimant’s medically
determinable impairments, including those that are non-severe. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2); see also Buck, 869 F.3d at 1049 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting
SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *5). “The RFC therefore should be exactly the same
regardless of whether certain impairments are considered ‘severe’ or not.” Buck, 869
F.3d at 1049.
Although the RFC determination draws from medical sources for support, the RFC
is ultimately “a legal decision that is expressly reserved to the Commissioner.” Vaughn
v. Berryhill, 242 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1008 (E.D. Cal. 2017). Thus, the ALJ bears the primary
responsibility for determining a claimant’s RFC based on all relevant evidence. See id.
Although the ALJ must develop the record to ensure that it contains sufficient evidence
to assess residual functional capacity, the burden of persuasion to prove disability
remains on the claimant. See Brown v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983).
The ALJ has a duty to develop the record fully and fairly and to assure that the
claimant’s interests are considered. Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 768 F.3d 925, 930
(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003)) (citation
omitted). However, “[the] ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is triggered only
when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper
evaluation of the evidence.” Agatucci v. Berryhill, 721 F. App’x 614, 617 (9th Cir. 2017)
(quoting McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)). The claimant is generally
“responsible for providing the evidence” used to make the residual functional capacity
determination. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). “Although the burden of
proof lies with the claimant at step four, the ALJ still has a duty to make the requisite
factual findings to support [the ALJ’s] conclusion.” Ocegueda v. Colvin, 630 F. App’x 676,
677 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). To reiterate, “[w]here evidence is susceptible to
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more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”
Burch, 400 F.3d at 679.
In the Ninth Circuit, when the claimant suffers from non-exertional impairments,
such as psychiatric impairments, the ALJ is required to use a vocational expert at step
five to establish whether the claimant is disabled. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,
1102 (9th Cir. 1999). The hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert “must set
out all the limitations and restrictions of the particular claimant . . . .” Embrey v. Bowen,
849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988). “Substantial evidence does not support a finding of
disability where the [vocational expert]’s testimony either is contradictory or responds
to an inaccurate hypothetical.” Hamilton v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 464 F. App’x
681, 682 (9th Cir. 2012).
3. 	Analysis
a. 	The RFC determination
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s limitations are not
supported by substantial evidence due to the ALJ’s alleged disregard of Dr. Andelin’s
opinion, and thus, the RFC determination was “crafted out of thin air.” (Mot. at 11.) On
the contrary, the ALJ reviewed and cited numerous records documenting Plaintiff’s
physical and mental health dating back to 2011. (See AR 21–22.) The ALJ considered
Plaintiff’s own hearing testimony, prior administrative medical findings, and all available
state agency reports when making her RFC determination. (See AR 17–27.) The ALJ
evaluated Plaintiff’s alleged physical pain (e.g., shoulder, cervical spine, lumbar spine),
as well as Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairments (e.g., “impaired memory, problems
with concentration, fatigue, impulsive actions, impaired sleep, racing thoughts, rapid
speech, panic attacks, social anxiety, nightmares, flashbacks, hypervigilance, and
heightened startle reflex”). (AR 23–24.) The ALJ reviewed and considered various
professionals’ evaluations of Plaintiff, including law enforcement investigators, doctors,
nurses, physician assistants, and therapists to determine how Plaintiff’s alleged mental
health impairments impacted Plaintiff’s RFC. (See AR 22–26.)
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After the ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s mental health records, she assessed his mental
health functioning in four broad areas known as the “paragraph B” criteria. (See AR 20–
22.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has mild limitations in “interacting with others”
and “concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace.” (AR 21.) The ALJ also determined
that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in “understanding, remembering, or applying
information” and in “adapting or managing oneself.” (AR 21–22.) However, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff’s “mental impairments do not cause at least two ‘marked’
limitations or one ‘extreme’ limitation,” and thus, “the ‘paragraph B’ criteria are not
satisfied.” (AR 22.) The ALJ’s RFC determination accounted for the aforementioned
mild and moderate limitations by restricting Plaintiff to jobs that require understanding
and memory of “simple work” and workplaces in which only “occasional changes” occur.
(Id.) The ALJ had no duty to develop the record further because the evidence
unambiguously supports the RFC determination. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453,
460 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the ALJ had no duty to develop the record because the
record was “neither ambiguous nor inadequate”).
Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Andelin’s opinion is the “only mental opinion of
record,” and thus, the ALJ’s lack of consideration of this opinion renders her RFC
determination invalid lacks merit. (See Mot. at 11.) Plaintiff correctly points out that
the ALJ found the state agency psychological consultants’ opinion to be “not persuasive”
because “they declined to provide an opinion on [Plaintiff’s] [residual] functional
capacity.” (See AR 25.) Whether or not Dr. Andelin’s opinion was the only remaining
mental opinion of record is immaterial because an ALJ is not required to adopt a medical
opinion, even if it is the only mental opinion of record. Instead, the ALJ has discretion to
evaluate the persuasiveness of medical opinions based on factors such as supportability
and consistency. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). The applicable regulations
emphasize that the ALJ must articulate how the ALJ considered these factors when
determining the persuasiveness of a medical opinion, but they do not mandate the
adoption of any specific opinion, even if it is uncontradicted. In any event, Dr. Andelin’s
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opinion is contradicted. Multiple evaluations by medical and nonmedical sources
contradict Dr. Andelin’s findings, in whole or in part, particularly those regarding
Plaintiff’s social anxiety and capacity to remember and understand instructions. The ALJ
cites evaluations conducted by Dr. Fakoya, state agency medical consultants, and state
agency psychological consultants as evidence to support her RFC determination. (See
AR 25.)
Plaintiff further argues that “the RFC reflects an individual who is unimpaired
regarding social interaction or concentration, persistence, and pace.” (Mot. at 14.)
However, the ALJ explicitly acknowledges that, “[w]ith regard to concentrating,
persisting, or maintaining pace, [Plaintiff] has a mild limitation.” (AR 21.) Regarding
Plaintiff’s alleged impairments of “impaired memory, problems with concentration,
fatigue, impulsive actions, impaired sleep, racing thoughts, rapid speech, panic attacks,
social anxiety, nightmares, flashbacks, hypervigilance, and heightened startle reflex,”
the ALJ cites other psychological and physical evaluations of Plaintiff, particularly those
immediately following Dr. Andelin’s evaluation in 2016, as support for her RFC
determination. (AR 24.) The ALJ further explains how she weighed Dr. Andelin’s opinion
regarding Plaintiff’s social anxiety against the other medical opinions in the overall
record that describe Plaintiff as “communicat[ing] adequately” and “hav[ing] no signs of
social anxiety” to support her RFC determination. (Id.) The ALJ cites various
descriptions of Plaintiff’s lack of social anxiety and ability to “be active, oriented, and
alert, to have good insight and judgment, normal mood, normal affect, and normal
recent and remote memory” as evidence that Dr. Andelin’s opinion is less persuasive,
and Plaintiff’s limitations are no more than mild. (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ appropriately
determined Plaintiff’s RFC by thoroughly considering all relevant evidence.
b. 	The vocational expert’s hypothetical
Finally, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ relied on vocational expert testimony
proffered during the hearing to make a determination that Plaintiff is not disabled.”
(Mot. at 15.) According to Plaintiff, “the vocational expert was not given a hypothetical
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question which incorporated all of Plaintiff’s mental limitations,” and because “neither
the hypothetical nor the answer properly set forth all of Plaintiff’s impairments, the
vocational expert’s testimony cannot constitute substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s findings.” (Id.) During the hearing, the ALJ asked the vocational expert, Daniel
Best, to consider the following:
[P]lease assume an individual of [Plaintiff]’s age, education, and past work, who
can occasionally lift 20 pounds; frequently lift 10 pounds; can stand/walk for a
total of about 6 hours, and sit for about 6 hours in an 8-hour day; can never climb
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps and stairs; occasionally
balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; can understand, remember, and
perform simple work; and can tolerate occasional changes in the workplace.
(AR 46.)
The ALJ then asked the vocational expert whether jobs exist in the national economy for
an individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC. (Id.; AR 26–27.)
The hypothetical question posed by the ALJ incorporates Plaintiff’s limitations, as
supported by the overall record, and takes care “[t]o determine the extent to which
these limitations erode the unskilled light occupational base.” (AR 26.) First, the
hypothetical question posed by the ALJ incorporates Plaintiff’s mild limitations in
interacting with others and in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace by asking
the vocational expert to consider an individual who “performs simple work and can
tolerate occasional changes in the workplace.” (See AR 46.) Second, the hypothetical
question posed by the ALJ incorporates Plaintiff’s moderate limitations in
understanding, remembering, and carrying out complex instructions as well as
responding appropriately to usual work situations and to changes in a routine work
setting by asking the vocational expert to consider an individual who “can understand,
remember, and perform simple work and can tolerate occasional changes in the
workplace.” (Id.) The Ninth Circuit has held that an ALJ does not err by failing to
“explicitly include Plaintiff’s moderate limitations verbatim” so long as the RFC properly
incorporated the limitations and was supported by substantial evidence. Robbins v. Soc.
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Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006); McIntosh v. Colvin, No. 16cv963-JAH-
BGS, 2018 WL 1101102, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018).
After considering this hypothetical, the vocational expert identified three jobs
requiring a “light exertional level” that Plaintiff could perform in the national economy:
(1) cashier II, (2) fast food worker, and (3) production assembler. (AR 27.) The ALJ
determined that the vocational expert’s testimony was “consistent with the information
contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles” and “[a] finding of ‘not disabled’ is
therefore appropriate.” (Id.) The ALJ met her burden at step five by finding that an
individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform the aforementioned jobs, each with a range
of 50,000 to 1,900,000 jobs available in the national economy. (See AR 27; see also 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).) Further, the ALJ reasonably relied on the
vocational expert’s testimony in reaching this conclusion. See Ford, 950 F.3d at 1160
(holding that a qualified vocational expert’s testimony regarding the number of jobs
available in the national economy that a claimant can perform is sufficient to support an
ALJ’s step-five finding). There is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding
because she relied on Plaintiff’s own description of his limitations, the vocational
expert’s testimony, and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). See Zavalin v.
Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 845–46 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that the DOT is the Agency’s
“primary source of reliable job information”).
Plaintiff is responsible for “provid[ing] the evidence to be used in making the
[RFC] finding.” See Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir.2006) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(c),
404.1545(a)(3). Here, the ALJ reviewed the record in its entirety and supported her RFC
determination by citing the unambiguous opinions of multiple medical and nonmedical
sources. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the evidence before the ALJ was
insufficient to determine disability. Thus, the ALJ did not have a duty to develop the
record further. See Mayes, 276 F.3d at 460. The Court finds the ALJ’s interpretation of
the evidence is rational. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1038.
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4. 	Conclusion
The ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by substantial evidence, as exemplified
by her thorough consideration of the overall record, including the testimony of the
vocational expert. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the ALJ’s findings regarding
her RFC determination be affirmed.
VI. 	CONCLUSION
A reviewing court may enter a “judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing” the
Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court may also remand the
case to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id. The reviewing
court has discretion in determining whether to remand for further proceedings or award
benefits. See Salvador v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d 13, 15 (9th Cir. 1990); McAllister v. Sullivan,
888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Remand for further proceedings is warranted where
additional administrative proceedings could remedy defects in the decision. See Kail v.
Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1497 (9th Cir. 1984). Remand for the award of benefits is
appropriate where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative
proceedings, where the record has been fully developed, or where remand would
unnecessarily delay the receipt of benefits to which the claimant is entitled. See
Hoffman v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1986); Bilby v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d
716, 719 (9th Cir. 1985); Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1980).
Here, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence, and thus, this matter should “be remanded to the Commissioner for further
administrative proceedings including a de novo hearing and new decision.” (Mot. at 15.)
The Commissioner asks the Court to affirm the Commissioner’s decision. (Opp’n at 2.)
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Judgment be entered
AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner.
IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 20, 2026, any party to this action may
file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document
should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the
Court and served on all parties no later than January 27, 2026. The parties are advised
that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those
objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th
Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 6, 2026
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