San Diego University for Integrative Studies v. Westerlund et al

3:24-cv-01701Casd22 janv. 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN DIEGO UNIVERSITY FOR
INTEGRATIVE STUDIES,
Plaintiff,
v.
KATHERINE WESTERLUND, in her
official capacity as Chief, School
Certification Unit, Student and Exchange
Visitor Program, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 24-cv-01701-AGS-KSC
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO COMPEL THE FULL
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
DKT. NO. 66
Presently before the Court is plaintiff’s Motion to Compel the Full Administrative
Record (“Motion”). Doc. No. 66. Defendants oppose the Motion. Dkt. No. 78. As set forth
below, plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff San Diego University for Integrative Studies is a postsecondary educational
institution whose student population is comprised primarily of international students. Dkt.
No. 1 at 6. Defendants are Katherine Westerlund, in their official capacity as the Chief,
School Certification Unit, Student and Exchange Visitor Program (“SEVP”), Todd Lyons,
in their official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
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(“ICE”)1, and Kristi Noem, in their official capacity as Secretary of United States
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)2. Id. “[SEVP] is a part of the National Security
Investigations Division and acts as a bridge for government organizations that have an
interest in information on nonimmigrants whose primary reason for coming to the United
States is to be students.” Id. at 7. SEVP manages schools, nonimmigrant students in the F
and M visa classifications, and their dependents on behalf of DHS. Id. The Department of
State (“DoS”) manages Exchange Visitor Programs, nonimmigrant exchange visitors in the
J visa classification, and their dependents. Id. Both SEVP and DoS use the Student and
Exchange Visitor Information System (“SEVIS”) to track and monitor schools; exchange
visitor programs; and F, M and J nonimmigrants while they visit the United States and
participate in the U.S. education system. Id.
On January 2, 2024, after administrative review, defendants withdrew plaintiff’s
SEVIS certification because plaintiff “failed to timely report the physical relocation of its
main instructional site” and “failed to report its loss of the state licensing necessary to
qualify graduates of degree programs.” Dkt. No. 1-4 at 6-13.
On September 23, 2024, plaintiff filed this case seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and requesting the Court compel
defendants to:
(1) to reverse their final decision that [plaintiff’s] change of mailing address
to another address on the same campus constituted a change of school
location, and
(2) to reverse their decision to punish [plaintiff] for not advising it soon
enough of an unsettled, discrete state licensing issue which was settled in
[plaintiff’s] favor.
1 Todd Lyons became Acting Director of ICE on March 9, 2025, and, therefore, is
automatically substituted as the defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
2 Kristi Noem became Secretary of DHS on January 25, 2024, and, therefore, is
automatically substituted as the defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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Dkt. No. 1 at 2, 17; Dkt. No. 1-4. On December 12, 2024, the Hon. Andrew G. Schopler
granted in part plaintiff’s preliminary injunction motion, enjoining defendants from
revoking, reducing, or changing plaintiff’s SEVP certification or SEVIS access while this
case is pending. Dkt. No. 29.
On September 26, 2025, defendants filed the Administrative Record (“AR”), which
includes certification by SEVP Section Chief Panayiota who attests “the documents and
materials listed in the attached [AR] Index consist of the administrative record constituting
all documents and materials considered by ICE in its decision to withdraw [plaintiff’s]
certification to enroll foreign students.” Dkt. No. 60. Plaintiff then filed the pending
Motion, contending “defendants did not lodge the complete [AR]” and requesting the Court
“compel the full [AR] and . . . the deposition of defendant Westerlund.” Dkt. No. 66 at 9,
12.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The APA directs the Court to “review the whole record or those parts of it cited by
a party.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West). The “whole record” is “the full administrative record
that was before the Secretary at the time he made his decision.” Citizens to Pres. Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), abrogated on
other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977).
This includes “all documents and materials directly or indirectly considered by agency
decision-makers and includes evidence contrary to the agency’s position.” Thompson v.
U.S. Dep't of Lab., 885 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation modified).
Generally 	reviewing 	courts 	are 	limited 	to 	considering 	only 	materials 	in 	the
administrative record. Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443,
1450 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S. Ct. 1241, 36 L. Ed.
2d 106 (1973) (“[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record
already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”).
However, a party may seek to add extra-record documents, i.e., supplement, an incomplete
administrative record or a complete one. See e.g. Alegre v. United States, No. 16-CV-2442-
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AJB-KSC, 2021 WL 4934982, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2021) (discussing motion to
complete record and motion to supplement record.)
A. Completeness of the AR
Defendants’ certification of the AR creates a “presumption of regularity.” Pinnacle
Armor, Inc. v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1232 (E.D. Cal. 2013); see also Bar
MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739–40 (10th Cir. 1993) (while the agency “may
not unilaterally determine what constitutes the administrative record” the courts “assume[]
the agency properly designated the administrative record absent clear evidence to the
contrary”)
To rebut the presumption, a plaintiff “must put forth concrete evidence to show that
the record is incomplete.” Alegre, 2021 WL 4934982, at *4 (citation modified). Plaintiff
must (1) “identify reasonable, non-speculative grounds for the belief that the documents
were considered by the agency and not included in the record” and (2) “identify the
materials allegedly omitted from the record with sufficient specificity, as opposed to
merely proffering broad categories of documents and data that are ‘likely’ to exist as a
result of other documents that are included in the administrative record.” 	Id. It is
insufficient for a plaintiff to “simply ... assert [ ] that the documents are relevant, were
before ... [the agency] at the time it made its decision, and were inadequately considered.”
Pac. Shores Subdivision, California Water Dist. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 448 F. Supp.
2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2006)
B. Supplementation of Incomplete Record
“The administrative record prepared by the agency may be supplemented by extra-
record materials in an APA case under four narrow exceptions: (1) when it needs to
determine whether the agency has considered all relevant factors and has explained its
decision; (2) when the agency has relied upon documents or materials not included in the
record; (3) when it is necessary to explain technical terms or complex matters; and (4)
when a plaintiff makes a showing of agency bad faith.” Pinnacle Armor, Inc., 923 F. Supp.
2d at 1231; Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 100 F.3d at 1450.
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff claims defendants relied on information they did not include in the AR,
which can be a basis for the Court to include extra-record documents in the AR under either
standard. Dkt. No. 66. Plaintiff argues “defendants did not lodge the complete [AR]” and
should have included:
A. Documents which show (1) what triggered defendants to notice that
[plaintiff] had changed locations, and (2) what deliberations and actions
defendants took after they noticed the change on or about June 17, 2021,
and before January 27, 2022, when [plaintiff] gave defendants formal
notice that it had changed its main address to its former satellite location.
. . . ;
B. 	Help Desk tickets from calls SDUIS made to the SEVP Response Center.
. . . ; [and]
C. Emails regarding [plaintiff].
Id. at 6, 9. Plaintiff contends because “defendants terminated [plaintiff]’s access to SEVIS
in part based upon the alleged failure to inform SEVP of the change of address, the
communications that [plaintiff] had with SEVP, including the calls to the help line that
would be noted in help desk tickets, are extremely relevant to whether that decision was
arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 11.
Plaintiff also claims these “obvious omissions” indicate defendants acted in bad faith
and justify the deposition of defendant Westerlund.3 Id. at 6, 12.
A. Documents re: Notice of Address Change & Defendants’ Response
Plaintiff claims these “missing documents would show (1) what triggered defendants
to notice that [plaintiff] had changed locations, and (2) what deliberations and actions
defendants took after they noticed the change on or about June 17, 2021, and before January
3 Plaintiff does not argue the “relevant factors” exception applies, or that additional
information or documents are necessary to explain technical terms or complex matters, so
the Court does not address these exceptions.
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27, 2022, when [plaintiff] gave defendants formal notice that it had changed its main
address to its former satellite location.” Id. at 10.
Plaintiff claims a “screenshot not in the record of the website for USA Language
Center, a different entity” which was informally produced by defendants’ counsel and
apparently4 shows USA Language Center’s address “raises the serious question of whether
defendant Westerlund’s decision to terminate [plaintiff]’s access to SEVIS was based upon
records contained in USA Language Center’s file” and is “clear evidence that defendants
directly, or at a minimum indirectly, considered documents outside the [AR].” Id. at 7; Id.
at 14-15. Defendants do not dispute they had this information but deny they considered it
in connection with plaintiff’s certification. See Dkt. No. 78-1 at 4 (Sgardelis’s second
declaration, averring “SEVP did not rely on the document or its contents when deciding to
withdraw [plaintiff]’s certification.”).
Plaintiff’s analysis is speculative and does not provide concrete evidence defendants
directly or indirectly considered USA Language Center’s website when they withdrew
plaintiff’s SEVIS certification. See Sara Lee Corp. v. Am. Bakers Ass'n, 252 F.R.D. 31, 34
(D.D.C. 2008) (“plaintiff must do more than imply that the documents at issue were in the
[government agency’s] possession. . . . Rather, plaintiff must prove that the documents
were before the actual decisionmakers involved in the determination.”); see also Dunn v.
F.D.I.C., 2012 WL 1986042, *5 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2012) (“[T]he crux of the analysis is
whether the documents or materials ... were actually considered, directly or indirectly, by
the agency decision makers.”). Moreover, plaintiff offers no evidence to support its claim
defendants withheld documents reflecting deliberations or actions taken after they noticed
plaintiff’s address change.
/ /
4 Plaintiff did not file a copy of the screenshot, so the Court relies on the parties’
uncontested description of the document.
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B. Help Desk Tickets
Plaintiff posits “Help Desk tickets from calls [plaintiff] made to the SEVP Response
Center” should have been included in the AR and “[t]he fact that they are logged is proof
that the(re) are records.” Dkt. No. 66 at 10. Plaintiff’s assertion, however, is speculative
and lacks concrete evidence that defendants directly or indirectly considered Help Desk
tickets in making its decision. Sara Lee Corp., 252 F.R.D. at 34; Dunn, 2012 WL 1986042,
*5.
C. Emails Regarding Plaintiff
Plaintiff next contends defendants wrongfully withheld emails regarding plaintiff
from the AR, as evidenced by five emails. Dkt. No. 66 at 10, 17-29.
Two emails were sent by ICE to plaintiff in March 2020 and discuss COVID-19
related updates and resources generally. Id. at 17-22. Plaintiff does not explain why these
emails should be included in the AR, nor is it apparent to the Court why they would be, as
they do not discuss plaintiffs SEVS certification or the reasons defendants decided to
withdraw it. Sara Lee Corp., 252 F.R.D. at 34; Dunn, 2012 WL 1986042, *5.
The third email was sent by one of defendants’ field representatives on March 25,
2022. Dkt. No. 66 at 23-24. She requests a date and time to conduct a site visit and provides
general information about the procedure for a site visit. Id. at 23-24. It is not clear how this
scheduling email would have directly or indirectly been considered by defendants in
reaching their decision because it was sent two months after “January 27, 2022, when
[plaintiff] gave defendants formal notice that it had changed its main address.” Id. at 10.
Plaintiff, therefore, has not shown concrete evidence this email was considered by
defendants. Sara Lee Corp., 252 F.R.D. at 34; Dunn, 2012 WL 1986042, *5.
The fourth document is a two sentence email sent by an ICE field representative on
June 1, 2022. See Dkt. No. 66 at 26-27, (“I have just returned from extended leave and
working through emails. Was your question(s) answered?”). Plaintiff does not explain how
this email would have had any bearing on defendants’ decision and, thus, does not meet its
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burden with respect to this document. Sara Lee Corp., 252 F.R.D. at 34; Dunn, 2012 WL
1986042, *5.
The fifth email was sent on February 3, 2025, so it clearly should not be included in
the AR because it wasn’t considered in relation to defendants’ decision, which was made
the year prior. Dkt. No. 66 at 28-29. An administrative record need not include documents
that became available after the agency made its decision (“post-decisional” documents).
See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
555, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) (judicial review is “limited . . . by the time at
which the decision was made.”)
D. Bad Faith
Plaintiff 	argues 	defendants’ 	“deliberate” 	withholding 	of 	the 	aforementioned
documents is bad faith and the Court, therefore, should compel defendants to produce “the
full administrative record.” Dkt. No. 66 at 12. As discussed above, plaintiff has not shown
that defendants should have included any of these documents in the AR. By extension, they
also have not shown defendants acted in bad faith by not including them. See Pinnacle
Armor, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1243. (“For the bad faith exception to apply, normally there
must be a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior before the court may inquire
into the thought processes of administrative decision makers.”) (citation modified).
E. Westerlund Deposition
Plaintiff also argues “obvious omissions” in the record justify a deposition of
defendant Westerlund because as “the author of the decision . . . [she] is in the best position
to know what she had access to, the agency’s intention behind its ‘investigation’ of
[plaintiff], whether the agency had less than pure motives in doing so, and what she
considered when making that decision.” Dkt. No. 66 at 6. Plaintiff’s allegation of “obvious
omissions” is speculative and does not support taking defendant Westerlund’s deposition.
See Pinnacle Armor, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1242 (allowing “plaintiff to file a very narrow
motion for discovery” to determine whether governmental agency considered data not
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included in the administrative record only after finding “non-speculative grounds” to
believe the agency did so.).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
In 	sum, 	plaintiff 	has 	not 	rebutted 	the presumption 	of 	regularity 	created 	by
defendants’ certification of the AR. Plaintiff’s Motion is, therefore, DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED
Dated: January 22, 2026
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