Dunsmore v. State of California et al

3:20-cv-00406Casd30 déc. 2025

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DARRYL DUNSMORE, ANDREE
ANDRADE, ERNEST
ARCHULETA, JAMES CLARK,
ANTHONY EDWARDS, LISA
LANDERS, REANNA LEVY, JOSUE
LOPEZ, CHRISTOPHER NELSON,
CHRISTOPHER NORWOOD, JESSE
OLIVARES, GUSTAVO SEPULVEDA,
MICHAEL TAYLOR, and LAURA
ZOERNER, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT, COUNTY OF SAN
DIEGO, SAN DIEGO COUNTY
PROBATION DEPARTMENT, and
DOES 1 to 20, inclusive,
Defendants.
Case No.: 20-cv-00406-AJB-DDL
ORDER:
(1) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
(2) DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ EX
PARTE MOTION TO FILE A
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION
(3) DENYING AS MOOT
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SEAL
(Doc. Nos. 979, 1007, 1008)
Five years after initiating this action, and after the Court denied Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment finding significant questions of fact on all the claims presented,
Plaintiffs now seek a preliminary injunction (the “Motion”). (Doc. No. 979.) Under Federal
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Rule of Civil Procedure 65, Plaintiffs seek a court order preliminarily enjoining Defendants
from housing people with serious mental illness (“SMI”)1 in Administration Separation
(“Ad-Sep”) units but for limited exigent circumstances. (Doc. No. 979-1 at 8.)
Plaintiffs contend that such an order is warranted under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. (Id. at 8.) Defendants opposed the Motion (Doc.
No. 998), and Plaintiffs replied (Doc. No. 992). For the reasons set forth below, the Court
DENIES the Motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The facts of this case have been recited in previous orders. (See Doc. No. 219.) The
Court briefly recounts the facts pertinent to the instant Motion. Plaintiffs are current or
former inmates of San Diego County Jail facilities (the “Jail”), operated by Defendants San
Diego County Sheriff’s Department and the County of San Diego. Plaintiffs bring this
action on behalf of “themselves and the approximately 4,000 incarcerated people who are
similarly situated on any given day” to “remedy the dangerous, discriminatory, and
unconstitutional conditions in the Jail.” (Doc. No. 231 ¶ 4.) Specifically, Plaintiffs contend
Defendants’ policies and practices contribute to the high death rates in the Jail, which “has
for years exceeded the rates nationally and in other large California jails, [and] it reached
chilling heights in 2021 when 18 people died, amounting to a death rate of 458 incarcerated
people per 100,000.” (Id. ¶ 1.)
1 For purposes of this Motion, the Court accepts the American Psychiatric Association’s definition of SMI
as follows: “Serious mental illness is a mental, behavioral or emotional disorder (excluding developmental
and substance use disorders) resulting in serious functional impairment, which substantially interferes
with or limits one or more major life Activities. Examples of serious mental illness include major
depressive disorder, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.” See What is Mental Illness?, AM. P SYCH. ASS ’N,
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/what-is-mental-illness (July 2025) [https://perma.cc/PA5E-
MU2T]. SMI is not a diagnosis but rather a subset of mental illness generally. Serious mental illness is
a broader term than severe mental illness and is usually defined by impairment rather than by
specific illnesses. See What is SMI?, TREATMENT ADVOC . C TR ., https://www.tac.org/what-is-smi/
[https://perma.cc/3AFF-U4UP].
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Relevant to the instant Motion, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have a policy and
practice of regularly placing pre-trial and convicted individuals with SMI in Ad-Sep cells.
(Doc. No. 979-1 at 25.) Plaintiffs allege that this policy exposes those individuals to a
substantial risk of serious harm. (Id. at 25.) According to Plaintiffs, since 2021, at least
seven people with mental illness have died in the Jail’s Ad-Sep units, by suicide or by not
receiving adequate care. (Id. at 8.)
Plaintiffs purport to bring this Motion in response to two recent deaths that occurred
in the Jail. According to Plaintiffs, both individuals had SMI and passed away while in
Ad-Sep units. (Id. at 28–29.) On July 13, 2025, Corey Dean, a man with SMI, died in a
Vista Detention Facility Ad-Sep unit. (Id. at 28.) On July 28, 2025, 82-year-old Karim
Talib, also a person with SMI, died in a Central Jail Ad-Sep unit. (Id. at 29.) Although there
in nothing in the record establishing a connection between the deaths of these men and
their placement in Ad-Sep, Plaintiffs suggest that their placement in Ad-Sep, while
presenting with SMI, is the likely cause of death. (Id. at 28–29.) Generally, Plaintiffs allege
that 	“individuals 	experience 	psychiatric deterioration 	in 	Ad-Sep” 	and 	“many 	have
witnessed others in Ad-Sep decompensate.” (Id. at 27, 28.) Thus, Plaintiffs urge the court
to enjoin the use of Ad-Sep for incarcerated persons who present with an SMI but for
limited exigent circumstances and not to exceed 72 hours. (Id. at 31.)
A. 	Plaintiffs’ Expert Dr. Pablo Stewart
In support of their Motion, Plaintiffs rely heavily on the Declaration and Expert
Reports of Dr. Pablo Stewart. (See Doc. No. 979-6.) Dr. Stewart is a board-certified
Psychiatrist and Clinical Professor at the University of Hawaii, John A. Burns School of
Medicine. (Doc. No. 979-6 ¶ 1.) Dr. Stewart claims to have more than thirty-five years of
experience in correctional mental health care, including serving as the court’s expert in
class action cases challenging the provision of mental health care to incarcerated people.
(Doc. No. 979-6 ¶ 1.) For this matter, Dr. Stewart was asked to provide his opinion
regarding Defendants’ policies and practices as they relate to the mental health care of
incarcerated people in the Jail. (Doc. No. 979-6 ¶ 2.) To do so, Dr. Stewart inspected three
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of San Diego’s jail facilities in February 2024: San Diego Central Jail, George Bailey
Detention Facility, and Las Colinas Detention and Reentry Facility. (Doc. No. 979-6 ¶ 2.)
Dr. Steward did not visit the Vista Detention Facility. (Id.) During the inspections, Dr.
Stewart spoke to individuals with SMI in the Ad-Sep units at the three facilities. (Id.) Based
on the declarations he reviewed, Dr. Stewart claims that the Ad-Sep units at the Vista
Detention Facility appear to follow a similar practice to the other three jails he visited.
(Doc. No. 979-6 ¶ 2.)
Dr. Stewart states that he is “deeply troubled by [Defendants’] widespread and
extreme use of solitary confinement-type housing for incarcerated persons with serious
mental illness.” (Doc. No. 979-6 ¶ 7.) Dr. Stewart claims the conditions in Ad-Sep are
“extraordinarily restrictive, harsh, and damaging to a person’s mental health—particularly
for someone with preexisting, serious mental illness.” (Doc. 979-6 ¶ 7.) Dr. Stewart states
that “San Diego’s Administrative Separation units constitute some of the harshest, most
restrictive forms of solitary confinement I have ever witnessed in a jail system.” (Id. ¶ 8.)
Based on his inspection of the “jail system’s solitary confinement-type units, [his]
interactions with incarcerated persons with serious mental illness in those units, and [his]
review of records, declarations, and documents,” Dr. Stewart asserts that the “Jail’s system
of Administrative Separation has caused, and currently is causing, serious and unjustified
harm on a broad scale, up to and including death.” (Id.)
By policy, incarcerated people in San Diego County Jail, including in the Ad-Sep
units, are afforded 10 hours of out-of-cell time distributed over a period of seven days.
(Id. ¶ 10.) However, Dr. Stewarts states that he understands that, in practice, people in Ad-
Sep are often not permitted to leave their cells for over 23 hours per day and sometimes
even 24 hours per day. (Id.) Often, they are let out after daylight hours, including in the
middle of night, such that they are unable to contact outside individuals by phone. (Id.)
Dr. Stewart’s 	declaration 	states 	that 	due 	to 	mental 	health 	decompensation, 	many
incarcerated people in Ad-Sep live in cells filled with urine, feces, and food waste. (Id.
¶ 16.) Further compounding the harsh conditions in those units, Dr. Stewart alleges that
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Defendants fail to provide mental health treatment or support that is “urgently and clearly
necessary to meet the needs of the incarcerated population with mental illness.” (Id. ¶ 18.)
Dr. Stewart asserts that incarcerated people in the Jail Ad-Sep units are deprived of mental
stimulation or any means of distracting themselves and passing the time, and that
Defendants fail to provide structured out-of-cell programming, such as group therapy, to
individuals in Ad-Sep. (Id. ¶ 12.) Dr. Stewart also claims that individuals in Ad-Sep are
denied in-cell stimulation such as books, workbooks, radios, or tablets. (Id. ¶ 12.)
According to Dr. Stewart, in some of the Jail Ad-Sep units, incarcerated people spend their
brief out of cell time alone in a caged area in the dayroom. (Id. ¶ 12.)
B. 	Declarations of Incarcerated Person’s
Plaintiffs also submit fourteen declarations of currently incarcerated persons that
claim to suffer from one or more mental illness and have spent time in Ad-Sep. (See Doc.
Nos. 979-8–979-20.) None of the named Plaintiffs submitted a declaration in support of
the Motion. (See id.) The declarations speak of having limited out-of-cell time, limited
access to telephones or showers, and limited use of the dayroom. (See, e.g., Doc. Nos.
979-8 ¶¶ 3–4; 979-9 ¶ 6; 979-10 ¶ 3–4.) The declarants state that the long hours of isolation,
and the frequent inability to communicate with others, has a negative effect on their mental
health. (See, e.g., 979-10 ¶ 7; 979-11 ¶ 9.)
C. 	Defendants’ Expert Dr. Joseph Penn
Defendants’ expert, Dr. Joseph Penn, paints quite a different picture of the Ad-Sep
units at the Jail. (See Doc. No. 988-7.) He asserts that he “did not identify any widespread
or extreme use of restrictive housing in any of the San Diego County Jail facilities.” (Id.
¶ 61.)
Dr. Penn is a “triple residency and fellowship-trained and triple board-certified
Psychiatrist and a Clinical Professor at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB)
School of Medicine, Galveston, Texas.” (Id. ¶ 1.) Dr. Penn claims to “have extensive
background, clinical practice and ‘real world’ clinical and administrative oversight and
responsibilities in the provision of psychiatric and mental health services and care in state
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prisons, state jails, county jails, and other short- and long-term detention settings.” (Id.) Dr.
Penn states that he has “more than 30 years of direct clinical and administrative experience
and full-time employment working as a correctional psychiatrist and overseeing the
provision and delivery of correctional mental health care in different settings.” (Id.)
In 2024, Dr. Penn toured and met with custody and health care staff at all of San
Diego’s jail facilities. (Id. ¶ 8.) Dr. Penn asserts that “[u]nlike plaintiffs’ mental health
expert Dr. Pablo Stewart, I also toured and met with custody and health care staff at the
Vista Detention Facility.” (Id.) However, during his tours, Dr. Penn was not permitted to
speak with any incarcerated individuals regardless of the individual’s mental disorders, or
lack thereof, “because their attorneys objected to it.” (Id.) Dr. Penn states that he “reviewed
numerous documents regarding the provision of psychiatric and mental health care and
other medical and nursing care in the San Diego jails, including [San Diego Sheriff’s
Office] policies and procedures.” (Id.)
According to Dr. Penn, “[w]hen the implementation of administrative separation is
required due to a variety of custody driven safety issues, there are ample qualified mental
health, nursing, and medical staff and clinical interventions to mitigate any potential risk
from housing an incarcerated jail inmate in administrative separation.” (Id. ¶ 61.) “[T]here
are currently ongoing efforts to ensure the prompt and timely identification of individuals
with mental disorders and those with serious mental illness, and to ensure access to care,
continuity of care, and the provision of timely mental health and psychosocial treatment
interventions and to further reduce this population.” (Id.) Dr. Penn claims he is “impressed
with the measures being taken by the San Diego County Jail to shift their jail populations
in order to create more space in the Outpatient Step Down Program (OPSD), to permit
more persons with serious mental illness who would otherwise be housed in Administrative
Separation for behavioral reasons to obtain more treatment and out of cell time.” (Id. ¶ 62.)
Based his tours of Ad-Sep units at the Jail, his interviews of custody and health care staff,
and direct observation of the Jail’s treatment team meetings and interactions with
incarcerated individuals across a variety of housing settings, Dr. Penn claims that none of
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the Ad-Sep units demonstrated conditions that were “extraordinarily restrictive, harsh, and
damaging to a person’s mental health.” (Doc. No. 988-7 ¶ 27.)
In summary, it is Dr. Penn’s opinion that the Jail “currently employs policies,
procedures, 	and 	has 	medical 	and 	mental 	health 	staff 	to 	identify 	individuals 	who
demonstrate medical or mental health deterioration.” (Id. ¶ 56.) “Any decisions regarding
the placement and housing and duration in administrative separation is a decision made by
custody staff with expertise in the identification and management of incarcerated persons
who present with serious assault and safety risks, pose imminent risks to institutional and
staff safety.” (Id.) Dr. Penn notes that there is a careful balancing of the facility’s custody
needs, the needs of the individual incarcerated person and others, and the safety of both
custody and health-care staff. (Id.)
Finally, Dr. Penn challenges Dr. Stewart’s qualifications to provide an expert
opinion. (See Doc. No. 988-7 ¶¶ 12–62.) Dr. Penn states that “[i]t is my opinion that [Dr.
Stewart] is not qualified to render the opinions in his report, and that his opinions are devoid
of any sound methodology.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Although Dr. Stewart lists employment as an
“attending psychiatrist, John A. Burns School of Medicine” and that his “current duties
include supervising psychiatric residents in their provision of acute and chronic care to the
mentally ill population housed at the Oahu Community Correctional Center,” Dr. Penn
challenges the “frequency, hours, and amount of direct patient care, clinical services per
week or month, and the actual clinical contact that Dr. Stewart has with jail inmates versus
faculty supervision of psychiatry trainees.” (Id. ¶ 13.) According to Dr. Penn, it “remains
unclear if Dr. Stewart provides direct on-site in person evaluation and treatment to inmates
at the Oahu Community Correctional Center, if he routinely evaluates, diagnoses, and treats
incarcerated 	individuals, 	orders 	psychotropic 	medications, 	conducts 	suicide 	risk
evaluations, places individuals on and/or removes them from suicide watches, performs
direct clinical—or provides any clinical—administrative oversight of inmates housed in
restrictive housing settings.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Or alternatively, if Dr. Stewart “serves only as a
faculty 	supervisor, 	providing 	medication 	management 	recommendations 	and 	clinic
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supervision to psychiatry residents who are working at the center, seeing inmate patients,
and then verbally presenting and discussing certain cases with Dr. Stewart.” (Id. ¶ 14.)
Moreover, Dr. Penn challenges whether Dr. Stewart has ever been directly responsible,
within a clinical or administrative capacity, for the provision of “correctional psychiatry”
of any county jail, ICE detention facility, state, or federal prison system, or for any state or
federal prisoners. (Id. ¶ 15.)
D. 	Declaration of Sergeant Shannon Huard
Defendants submit the declaration of Sergeant Shannon Huard, which leads the
Court to question the veracity of the incarcerated persons’ declarations. (See Doc. No. 988-
12.) Sergeant Huard’s declaration is illustrative of some of the violent behaviors that led to
the incarcerated individuals’ placement in Ad-Sep. (See Doc. No. 988-12 at 2 (“On May
11, 2024, Sterling was involved in an unprovoked assault on another incarcerated person;
he stood over the 73-year-old victim and repeatedly struck him in the head and face,
causing serious bodily injur[y] that required emergency treatment.”), id. at 3 (Serrano’s
arrest involved battery on a peace officer with injury, so he was placed in Administrative
Separation based on his propensity for violence and assaultive behavior. Serrano has
multiple prior offenses involving violence and threats.”).
E. 	Declaration of Commander Jesse Johns
Defendants also submit the Declaration of Jesse Johns, Commander of the Detention
Services Bureau of the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department in support of their
opposition to the Motion. (See Doc. No 988-5.) Prior to his role as Commander, Johns was
the Captain of the San Diego Central Jail, where he oversaw sworn operations for
eighteen years. (Id. ¶ 1.) According to Commander Johns, regular wellness checks as a
multi-disciplinary team are conducted at all Jail facilities. (Id. ¶ 6.) The wellness checks
include nursing, mental health, reentry services, and custody staff. (Id.) The goal is to
observe the patient in their environment to assess the condition of the environment, offer
medical and mental health resources, and plan services for reintegration back into the
community. (Id.) Commander Johns asserts that these rounds are done as a supplementary
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program to increase the number of interactions clinicians and nurses have with incarcerated
persons in order to proactively address any issues. (Id.)
Commander Johns provides that during wellness checks, safety checks, or any
rounds in the housing units, including Ad-Sep, if a deputy, Sergeant, or other sworn staff
observes an incarcerated person who appears disheveled or un-showered, interventions are
made to offer mental health services, provide hygienic opportunities, and clean the housing
space. (Id. ¶ 7.) Commander Johns qualifies this by stating that incarcerated persons cannot
be forced to practice cleanliness, but it is regularly encouraged, and the lack of cleanliness
can potentially indicate a mental health concern. (Id.) Commander Johns provides that if
sworn staff sees an incarcerated person in any unit, including Ad-Sep, who has evident
feces in their cell and/or flooding of their cell with water, it is protocol to remove the
incarcerated person to another location temporarily (such as a shower) while the cell is
cleaned and a change of bedding and clothing is provided before rehousing him/her. (Id.
¶ 8.)
Commander Johns’ declaration states that the Jails have regular daily cleaning
rounds in all the housing units. (Id. ¶ 9.) If security permits, incarcerated persons occupying
the housing unit are offered cleaning supplies to clean their housing area. (Id.) If security
concerns exist, incarcerated workers are used to clean the housing areas. (Id.) In units
where incarcerated persons are served meals in their cells, such as Ad-Sep, custody staff
go by each cell after the mealtimes to collect trash. (Id.)
According to Commander Johns, Defendants “have revised many of the Detention
Services Bureau and Medical Services Division policies (including those applicable to
medical and mental health) to meet NCCHC 2025 Jail standards, and [ ] are actively
working toward accreditation.” (Id. ¶ 10.) And Defendants currently “meet California Code
of Regulations, Title 15 (corrections) and Title 24 (building code) provisions that apply to
County Jails for adult offenders, including the hourly requirements for Administrative
Separation out of cell time.” (Id.) Commander Johns states that Defendants are “in the
midst of dramatically increasing the amount of beds in Out-Patient Step-Down (OPSD)
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units in order to move the Incarcerated Persons with serious mental illness who are eligible
to be housed in OPSD to those units.” (Id. ¶12.) This will provide additional therapy and
programming to an acute population that was not previously eligible for OPSD. (Id.) The
expansion of OPSD beds to incorporate Ad-Sep incarcerated people will begin on
November 14, 2025. (Id.)
Commander Johns provides that one challenge in housing is that incarcerated
persons in Ad-Sep are deemed “protective custody” for different reasons, such as
high-notoriety crimes, those with sex offenses involving minors, those who have testified
against co-defendants, or gang drop-outs. (Id. ¶ 13.) Some incarcerated persons in Ad-Sep
for disciplinary reasons—such as assaulting staff or others—may be difficult to safely
program with others. (Id. ¶ 14.) Thus, some of these incarcerated persons who are in danger
and/or pose a danger to others may have to be single-celled and attend the dayroom or the
yard on their own. (Id.)
Finally, Commander Johns states that in all Ad-Sep units, there are books available
to incarcerated persons in the dayroom. (Id. ¶ 19.) Books are exchanged on a monthly basis
or by request to counseling staff. (Id.) The units also have a large television in the dayroom
which can be seen from many cells. (Id.) Board games are also provided via the inmate
welfare fund and placed inside the dayroom. (Id.) Tablets have already been purchased by
San Diego Sheriff’s Office for all incarcerated persons, and WiFi is installed in the Jails
for this purpose. (Id. ¶ 20.) Additional infrastructure items need to be completed before full
distribution of the tablets. (Id.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs the issuance of preliminary injunctive
relief. Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction must show that: (1) they are likely to
succeed on the merits, (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor, and (4) an injunction is in
the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The
moving party bears the burden of meeting all prongs of the Winter test. See DISH Network
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Corp. v. FCC, 653 F.3d 771, 776 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the Ninth Circuit has applied
a “sliding scale” approach where “a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker
showing of another.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131–35 (9th
Cir. 2011).
The Ninth Circuit recognizes an alternative “serious questions” test. Under this
approach, a court may issue a preliminary injunction where there are “serious questions
going to the merits and a balance of hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff . . . so
long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the
injunction is in the public interest.” Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012)
(internation quotes omitted); All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131 (this test has often
been referred to as the “serious questions” test). However, the Ninth Circuit has rejected
using this approach when the plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation. Baird v. Bonta, 81
F.4th 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Because of how a finding that a plaintiff is likely to
succeed on the merits of a constitutional claim impacts the other Winter factors, a district
court necessarily abuses its discretion when it skips analyzing the likelihood of success
factor in a case involving such a claim.”)
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as a right.”
Winter, 555 U.S. at 24; All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1131. The burden to achieve
injunctive relief is particularly high when a party seeks a mandatory injunction. See Garcia
v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). Mandatory injunctions go beyond an
injunction preventing a party from acting, and thus beyond mere maintenance of the status
quo. See id. Mandatory injunctions require a party to act. Id. District courts must deny
requests for mandatory injunctions unless the law and facts clearly favor a moving party.
Id. The Court will not grant such requests in doubtful cases. Id. Because an injunction is
an exercise of a court’s equitable authority, it should be invoked “only after taking into
account all of the circumstances that bear on the need for prospective relief.” Salazar v.
Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010).
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Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2) (“PRLA”), courts
in “any civil action with respect to prison conditions” may enter preliminary injunctive
relief only if it is “narrowly drawn, extend[s] no further than necessary to correct the harm
the court finds requires preliminary relief, and [is] the least intrusive means necessary to
correct that harm.” Congress enacted the PLRA to “revive the hands-off doctrine” and
restore “judicial quiescence derived from federalism and separation of powers concerns”
to remove the judiciary from prison management. Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987,
996–97 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the PRLA requires courts to “give substantial weight
to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused
by the preliminary relief . . . .” Id. at 998 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Evidentiary Objections
Both parties filed a voluminous set of declarations and exhibits in support of their
positions. In response to Plaintiffs’ evidence, Defendants filed 35 pages of evidentiary
objections. (Doc. No. 988-1.) Plaintiffs address Defendants’ evidentiary objections in their
reply brief. (See Doc. No. 992 at 9.)
As a threshold matter, the Court’s Civil Case Procedures provide that “[o]bjections
relating to the motion should be set forth in the parties’ opposition or reply. Separate
statements of objections will NOT be allowed. The inclusion of objections does not
expand the page limits set.” J. Battaglia Civ. Case Proc. § III.A (emphasis in original). The
Civil Local Rules provide that “[b]riefs or memoranda in support of or in opposition to all
motions noticed for the same motion day must not exceed a total of twenty-five (25) pages
in length, per party, for all such motions without leave of the judge who will hear the
Motion.” CivLR 7.1.h. Defendants’ objections were filed as a separate statement and far
exceed the requisite 25-page brief limit. Defendants did not seek leave of Court to file
excess pages. The Court finds it disheartening that, five years into this litigation,
Defendants have filed a brief that does not comply with the Court’s Rules or the Local
Rules.
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Moreover, “the Federal Rules of Evidence do not strictly apply to preliminary
injunction proceedings.” Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 966
(C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Republic of the Philippines v.
Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (holding that it was within the
district court’s discretion to accept hearsay evidence for purpose of a preliminary
injunction motion); Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984)
(holding that district courts “may give even inadmissible evidence some weight” when
deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction). For example, a district court may
“consider hearsay in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction.” Johnson v.
Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). However, “‘[w]hile
district courts may consider inadmissible evidence in the context of a preliminary
injunction, this does not mean that evidentiary issues have no relevance to [a preliminary
injunction] 	proceeding. 	Such 	issues, 	however, 	properly 	go 	to 	weight 	rather 	than
admissibility.’” Disney Enters., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 966 (quoting Am. Hotel & Lodging
Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2015)).
Accordingly, based on Defendants’ failure to comply with the rules, and the more
lenient standard in considering evidence on a motion for preliminary injunction, the Court
overrules Defendants’ evidentiary objections. Notwithstanding this ruling, where evidence
bearing on the resolution of the instant motion lacks, or is of limited evidentiary value, the
Court will so note.
B. 	Standing
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not have standing to
pursue the requested preliminary injunction. (See Doc. No. 988 at 11.) Defendants claim
Plaintiffs lack standing because they do not provide evidence that any class representative
suffers from a serious mental illness or has suffered harm from being housed in Ad-Sep
because of that serious mental illness. (Id.) Defendants contend that without such evidence,
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they have individual standing to seek the requested
equitable remedy. (Id.)
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Plaintiffs counter that Defendants already made this standing argument in their
motion to dismiss, and the Court already concluded that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged
standing. (Doc. No. 992 at 6.)
“In order to assert claims on behalf of a class, a named plaintiff must have personally
sustained or be in immediate danger of sustaining ‘some direct injury as a result of the
challenged statute or official conduct.’” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 860 (9th Cir.
2001) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)). Unless the named plaintiffs
are themselves entitled to seek injunctive relief, they may not represent a class seeking that
relief. Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999). Under Ninth
Circuit precedent, “system-wide injunctive relief is not available based on alleged injuries
to unnamed members of a proposed class.” Id. And “any injury unnamed members of [a]
proposed class may have suffered is simply irrelevant to the question whether the named
plaintiffs are entitled to the injunctive relief they seek.” Id. Moreover, where “a plaintiff
seeks prospective injunctive relief, he must demonstrate ‘that he is realistically threatened
by a repetition of the violation.’” Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 860 (quoting City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983)).
It is true that the Court found Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their Constitutional
claims. Quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993), the Court stated, “it would
be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening
condition in their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them.” (Doc. No.
287 at 5.) The Court found that “Plaintiffs’ TAC ‘contains detailed factual allegations
concerning the existence of uniform, statewide policies and practices’ in the Jail which
‘expose all incarcerated people to a substantial risk of harm,’ as well as ‘allegations that
demonstrate the kinds of serious harm to which members of the proposed class are exposed
by [those] policies and practices.’” (Id. at 6.)
In Parsons v. Ryan, the Ninth Circuit held that a claim based on “policies and
practices of statewide and systemic application[, which] expose all inmates . . . to a
substantial risk of serious harm . . . is firmly established in our constitutional law.” 754
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F.3d at 676. In Brown v. Plata, the Supreme Court distinguished the kind of systemic,
future-oriented Eighth Amendment claim from claims in which a past instance of
mistreatment is alleged to have violated the Constitution:
Because plaintiffs do not base their case on deficiencies in care provided on
any one occasion, this Court has no occasion to consider whether these
instances of delay—or any other particular deficiency in medical care
complained of by the plaintiffs—would violate the Constitution under Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–105 (1976), if considered in isolation. Plaintiffs
rely on systemwide deficiencies in the provision of medical and mental health
care that, taken as a whole, subject sick and mentally ill prisoners in California
to “substantial risk of serious harm” and cause the delivery of care in the
prisons to fall below the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society.
Brown, 563 U.S. 493, 505 n. 3 (2011) (citation omitted).
Here, the specific relief sought in this preliminary injunction does not affect “all
incarcerated 	people.” 	Plaintiffs 	submitted 	fourteen 	declarations 	from 	incarcerated
individuals in support of their Motion. (Doc. Nos. 979-8–979-21.) These declarations
include individuals who are “members of the Dunsmore class,” who suffer from various
mental illnesses, and have spent significant time in Ad-Sep. (See id.) However, none of the
named Plaintiffs submitted a declaration in support of the Motion. Plaintiffs do not submit
any evidence to show that any of the named Plaintiffs have personally sustained an injury
by suffering from an SMI and being placed in Ad-Sep.
Because the Court finds, for the reasons discussed below, that the Motion fails under
the 	Winter 	factors, the Court declines to address Defendants’ standing argument.2
2 The Court held a hearing on the Motion on November 20, 2025. (See Doc. No. 997.) After the hearing,
Plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion to submit a supplemental declaration responding to the Court’s
questions regarding standing. (Doc. No. 1007.) Defendants opposed the ex parte motion. (Doc. No. 1011.)
As it relates to this Motion, the Court specifically stated that sur-replies will not be accepted. (Doc. No.
981.) Moreover, Plaintiffs’ supplemental declaration is not needed for the analysis of this Motion;
accordingly, Plaintiffs’ ex parte motion is DENIED. (Doc. No. 1007.) Plaintiffs’ corresponding motion
to seal is DENIED AS MOOT. (Doc. No. 1008.) The documents lodged at Document Number 1009 are
STRICKEN from the record.
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However, Defendants’ standing argument does raise the question of whether the named
Plaintiffs are suitable representatives for the mental health class. The Court intends to
address potential decertification of the mental health class by way of a separate order to
show cause.
C. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Defendants contend Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). (Doc. No. 998 at 13.) The PLRA states that
“[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are
available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The Court previously rejected this argument finding that “[w]hen prison officials
improperly fail to process a prisoner’s grievance, the prisoner is deemed to have exhausted
available administrative remedies.” (Doc. No. 203 at 8–9.) Defendants do not provide a
new argument nor cite to any evidence or caselaw to establish why the Court should now
reach a different conclusion. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have exhausted
their administrative remedies.
F. 	Mootness
Next, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is moot
because of the changes that Defendants have already made, changes that are in process,
and changes already planned with defined timelines for implementation. (Doc. No. 988 at
12.) Defendants contend that the ongoing changes to the mental health system—including
additional OPSD housing, treatment, and programming—are substantial. (Id.)
Defendants list eleven reasons why they contend the request for preliminary
injunction is moot: (1) Defendants have been working on increasing sworn staff in order
to increase the ability to remove incarcerated persons from their cells for confidential
mental health evaluations, and Defendants have also been working on identifying
additional spaces available for confidential mental health sessions (Doc. No. 988 at 12);
(2) multi-disciplinary wellness checks are being done weekly and include nursing, mental
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health, reentry services and custody staff (id. at 13); (3) Defendants have revised many of
the Detention Services Bureau and Medical Services Division policies (including those
applicable to medical and mental health) to meet NCCHC 2025 Jail standards and are
actively working toward accreditation (id.); (4) Defendants are in the midst of dramatically
increasing the amount of beds in OPSD units in order to move the incarcerated persons
with SMI who are eligible to be housed in OPSD to those units (id.); (5) staffing for mental
health has been increased (id. at 15); (6) a County Registered Nurse does an initial receiving
screening for medical and mental health issues including suicide risk assessment (id. at
16); (7) after the initial screening during and booking, the incarcerated person is taken to
see either a Nurse Practitioner or a Doctor from Correctional Health Partners, who
performs a full 14-day medical screening during intake (id. at 16–17); (8) Mental Health
staff performs weekly rounds in Administrative Separation (id. at 17); (9) Mental Health
staff have been actively collaborating with custody staff to create more rooms/locations to
use for confidential mental health sessions as well as to increase available custody staff to
escort incarcerated persons to such sessions and to provide supervision from outside the
room (id.); (10) there is programming and clinical therapy provided in OPSD (id. at 18.);
and (11) Defendants are working on identifying patients who have been placed in Ad-Sep
based on behavioral symptomology for reassessment by the jail population management
unit as to their classification status, which potentially could result in incarcerated persons
being removed from Ad-Sep (id. at 18).
Plaintiffs counter that Defendants’ “plan lacks critical components including formal
policies, training plans, divisions of responsibility, treatment planning, out-of-cell time,
and oversight.” (Doc. No. 992 at 5.)
“[T]he standard for determining whether a case has been mooted by the defendant’s
voluntary conduct is stringent: A case might become moot if subsequent events make it
absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to
recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170
(2000). Defendants have not met this burden. Although Defendants outline several
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measures they are taking to address the allegedly wrongful conduct, Defendants have not
made “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be
expected to recur.” See id. Accordingly, the Court finds that the request for injunctive relief
is not moot.
G. 	The Winter Factors
To obtain a preliminary injunction the plaintiff “must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in
the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The first Winter factor, likelihood of success,
is a “threshold inquiry” and “the most important factor” in the analysis. Env’t Prot. Info.
Ctr. v. Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2020). This is especially true where, as here, a
plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction based on an alleged constitutional violation. Baird
v. Bonta, 81 F.4th at 1042 (.
“[A]n Eighth Amendment claim is made out if prisoners with serious mental
illnesses face a substantial risk of serious harm” from a correctional policy or practice, “and
this [risk] is met with deliberate indifference to their condition.” Disability Rts. Mont., Inc.
v. Batista, 930 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2019). Such claims are inherently fact-specific.
Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 794 (9th Cir. 2019); see Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648
F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Deliberate-indifference cases are by their nature highly
fact-specific . . . .”); see also Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 394 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Each
step of this [deliberate indifference] inquiry is fact-intensive.”) (quoting Hartsfield v.
Colburn, 491 F.3d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 2007)).
Where a plaintiff alleges systemwide deficiencies—policies or practices that expose
all inmates to a substantial risk of serious harm—courts apply a two-pronged inquiry.
Disability Rts. Montana, Inc. v. Batista, 930 F.3d 1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019). The objective
prong requires a showing that the prison conditions pose “a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). The subjective prong
requires that the plaintiff show that a prison official was deliberately indifferent by being
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“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn of that substantial risk of serious
harm exists,” and actually drawing that inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Toguchi v.
Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (“To establish an Eighth Amendment
violation, a prisoner ‘must satisfy both the objective and subjective components of a two-
part test.’”) If the circumstances suggest that the prison officials were exposed to
information about the risk, and therefore must have known of the risk, that evidence could
be sufficient to allow a trier of fact to find actual knowledge. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
However, “prison officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or
safety may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the
harm ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844. Deliberate indifference requires a “state of
mind more blameworthy than negligence,” akin to criminal recklessness. Id. at 835, 839–
40.
Both Plaintiffs and Defendants focus their analysis on the subjective, deliberate
indifference prong, and so does the Court. “Demonstrating deliberate indifference requires
a substantial showing.” Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 16 F.4th 613, 618 (9th
Cir. 2021). Plaintiffs fail to make that showing here.
Since this lawsuit was initiated five years ago, Defendants have undertaken
significant efforts to address the needs of incarcerated individuals with mental illness.
Defendants are working on increasing sworn staff to increase the ability to remove
incarcerated persons from their cells for confidential mental health evaluations and to
identify additional spaces for such evaluations. (Doc. No. 988 at 12.) Defendants have
instituted multi-disciplinary wellness checks, increased mental health staff, and revised
numerous Detention Services Bureau and Medical Services Division policies to align with
NCCHC 2025 Jail standards, while actively pursuing accreditation. (Id. at 13, 15.)
Incarcerated persons receive an initial screening for medical and mental health issues
including suicide risk assessment. (Id. at 16.) After the initial screening, the incarcerated
person is taken to see either a Nurse Practitioner or a Doctor from Correctional Health
Partners, who performs a full 14-day medical screening during intake. (Id. at 16–17.)
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Defendants are also reassessing individuals placed in administrative separation based on
behavioral symptomology to determine whether reclassification, including removal from
Ad-Sep, is appropriate. (Id. at 18.)
Although it could be argued that Defendants should be making greater changes, or
that the changes should be implemented more quickly, the record reflects ongoing, concrete
efforts to address mental health risks. Based on the efforts that Defendants have made,
Plaintiffs cannot show that Defendants have acted with deliberate indifference.
This conclusion is reinforced by the deference courts owe to prison administrators.
The Supreme Court has recognized that “maintaining institutional security and preserving
internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of
the retained constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees.” Bell
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546–48 (1979). “[C]entral to all other corrections goals is the
institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.”
Id. (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974). In Bell, the Supreme Court stated
the following:
Prison officials must be free to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of
inmates and corrections personnel and to prevent escape or unauthorized
entry. Accordingly, we have held that even when an institutional restriction
infringes a specific constitutional guarantee, such as the First Amendment, the
practice must be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison
administration, safeguarding institutional security. Finally, as the Court of
Appeals correctly acknowledged, the problems that arise in the day-to-day
operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison
administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security. 	Such 	considerations 	are 	peculiarly 	within 	the 	province 	and
professional 	expertise 	of 	corrections 	officials, 	and, 	in 	the 	absence 	of
substantial 	evidence 	in 	the 	record 	to 	indicate 	that 	the 	officials 	have
exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily
defer to their expert judgment in such matters.”
Bell, 441 U.S. at 546–48 (1979) (citations omitted).
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Plaintiffs rely on several cases where courts restricted the use of segregated housing
for inmates with mental illness, including Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267 (N.D.
Cal. 1995); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1320–21 (E.D. Cal. 1995); Jensen v.
Shinn, 609 F. Supp. 3d 789, 903, 913 (D. Ariz. 2022), amended, 2022 WL 2910835 (D.
Ariz. July 18, 2022); and Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1247 (M.D. Ala. 2017).
Those cases are distinguishable.
In Madrid, the district court found an Eight Amendment violation when the mental
health care was “grossly inadequate,” “manifestly deficient,” failing even the “most
minimal standards for adequate psychiatric care.” Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1214. Here, by
contrast, Defendants provide evidence that they have revised many of their policies
(including those applicable to medical and mental health) to meet NCCHC 2025 Jail
standards. Because Defendants’ policies meet industry standards, the Court finds that the
conditions at the Jail likely cannot be classified as “grossly inadequate” or “manifestly
deficient.”
In Coleman, the district court found the segregated housing policies unconstitutional
where “mentally ill inmates are placed in administrative segregation . . . without any
evaluation of their mental status, . . . and . . . are denied access to necessary mental health
care.” Coleman, 912 F. Supp. 3d at 1320–21. That is not the case here. At best, the evidence
is conflicting. Although Plaintiffs allege that incarcerated persons with SMI are not
provided adequate mental health care, Defendants counter and assert that individuals at the
Jails are frequently evaluated and have regular access to mental health care. And while
Plaintiffs may contend that the mental health care at the Jail is inadequate, they do not
allege that anyone has been placed in Ad-Sep without any evaluation of their mental status,
as was the case in Coleman.
Finally, Jensen and Braggs involved findings of deliberate indifference only after
full bench trials, where courts heard testimony, evaluated competing experts, and made
credibility determinations. 	Jensen, 609 F. Supp. 3d at 841 (“The parties presented
competing experts on the issue of mental health care. Again, Plaintiffs’ expert was far more
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credible.”); Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1190 (“Furthermore, the court heard testimony from
multiple prisoners, both named plaintiffs and class members, who clearly exhibited serious
mental-health needs.”). This case has a very different procedural posture. Here, the Court
has not heard testimony or assessed credibility, and the written record is disputed. Thus,
the determinations made in those cases cannot be made here.
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs have not carried their burden in showing
deliberate indifference or a likelihood of success on the merits of their Eighth Amendment
claim. Because Plaintiffs fail to satisfy this threshold requirement, the Court need not
address the remaining Winter factors. Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec
v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 944 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting DISH Network, 653 F.3d at 776); see
also Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740.
H. 	Scope of the Proposed Injunction
In addition to Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief failing under the Winter factors,
it is also not sufficiently narrow as required by the PLRA. “Preliminary injunctive relief
must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court
finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that
harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). As the Ninth Circuit has previously observed, the PLRA
places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to
inmates, and “operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of federal courts
and to protect the bargaining power of prison administrators—no longer may courts grant
or approve relief that binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional
minimum.” Gilmore, 220 F.3d at 998–99 (9th Cir. 2000). A district court may not
“‘enmesh[] [itself] in the minutiae of prison operations,’ beyond what is necessary to
vindicate plaintiffs’ federal rights.” Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1071
(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 at 362 (1996).
Plaintiffs’ proposed injunction does not comply with the PLRA’s requirements. (See
Doc. No. 979-2 at Ex. A.) Plaintiffs seek a court order requiring Defendants to “develop a
plan” “within 45 days.” (Id.) That plan includes revising the County Jail policies,
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procedures, practices, and training to ensure that no incarcerated person with serious
mental illness be placed into Ad-Sep unless for exigent circumstances, but then only up to
seventy-two hours, and only if those circumstances are documented and reviewed, and
during which time mental and medical care is provided, and the alternatives reviewed in
order to provide a clinically therapeutic alternative. Id. The proposed injunction also seeks
to require any person in Ad-Sep who is physically or mentally deteriorating or has “any
other signs or reports of symptoms of failing health,” to be moved out of Ad-Sep
immediately and to receive “clinically indicated care commensurate with the needs of the
incarcerated person or to a hospital in the community.”
As Defendants point out, Plaintiffs’ proposed injunction does not define “failing
health” or “deterioration.” (See 988 at 24.) Does it mean failing physical health or mental
health? (Id.) It is unclear what would constitute “failing” or “deterioration.” Moreover,
Plaintiffs do not provide a basis for limiting the amount to time in Ad-Sep to seventy-two
hours. There is no evidence in the record establishing that these specific requirements
“correspond to the constitutional floor.” 	Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703 (7th Cir. 2022)
(“[T]he PLRA demands that injunctive relief ‘extend no further’ than necessary to remedy
the constitutional violation.”) Plaintiffs’ proposed injunction is sweeping and would extend
well beyond affecting those incarcerated individuals with SMI. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
Motion does not satisfy the PLRA’s narrow-tailoring requirement.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Death is undoubtedly tragic, but it can occur even under the best of circumstances.
To warrant legal redress, however, the law requires adherence to governing legal standards
and sufficient proof. Here, the proof falls short. The evidence is disputed—some of it
arguably inadmissible—and its credibility cannot be meaningfully assessed on the written
record alone. The material facts remain unsettled. Plaintiff has not established a causal link
between the recent deaths (or any prior deaths) and Defendants’ alleged policy or practice
failures. Instead, Plaintiffs assume that deaths occurred because of deficient policies,
including the use of Ad-Sep, and that individuals in Ad-Sep necessarily decompensate due
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to inadequate clinical care. This is a significant overstatement unsupported by competent
medical evidence.
Plaintiffs ask the Court to accept their evidence while disregarding Defendants’ and
to resolve all evidentiary objections in their favor. The Court cannot do so on this record.
The evidence is conflicting, and numerous issues—including witness credibility—are
plainly 	triable. 	Absent 	trial 	or 	settlement, 	these 	questions 	cannot 	be 	resolved.
Cross-examination—long recognized as the crucible through which testimony is tested—
is essential to assessing credibility and determining the reliability of disputed evidence.
Only a trier of fact, after the adversarial process has run its course, can make those
determinations. Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 30, 2025
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